1 See A Rigo Sureda, ‘Introduction to Investor-State Arbitration. A Case Study: Wena Hotels Limited (Wena) v Arab Republic of Egypt’ in C Jimenez Piernas (ed), The Legal Practice in International Law and European Community Law: A Spanish Perspective (The Hague: Brill Academic Publishers, 2006), 233.
2 MINE para 5.08 (emphasis added).
3 See for example LCIA Rules, Art 26(1); UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, Art 34(3). See Art 79 of the Hague Convention of 1907 and Art 56(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.
4 See Memorandum on Arbitral Procedure, prepared by the Secretariat, Doc A/CN.4/35, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1950, Vol II, 176.
5 ICSID Arbitration Rule 47(1)(i) echoes these requirements and provides that the award must state ‘the decision of the Tribunal on every question submitted to it, together with the reasons upon which the decision is based’.
6 See G Aguilar Alvarez and W M Reisman, ‘How Well Are Investment Awards Reasoned?’ in G Aguilar Alvarez and W M Reisman (eds), The Reasons Requirement in International Investment Arbitration: Critical Case Studies (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 3.
7 See L Goldschmidt, ‘Projet de règlement pour tribunaux arbitraux internationaux’ (1874) 6 Revue de Droit International et de Législation Comparée 421, 447 (‘La sentence arbitrale duement prononcée peut être attaquée et mise à néant…Si, le compromis prescrivant l’exposé des motifs, la sentence a été rendue sans motifs’); and P Fiore, Le Droit International Codifié (Paris: Pedone, 1911), 619–20 (‘La sentence arbitrale sera réputée nulle …Si [la décision] manque totalement de motifs aussi bien en fait qu’en droit’).
8 Fiore, Le Droit International Codifié, 619–20.
9 See Arbitral Procedure—Comments by Governments on Draft on Arbitral Procedure, Doc A/CN.4/68, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1953, Vol II, 233.
10 See Summary Records of the Fifth Session, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1953, Vol 1, 44–5.
11 See Summary Records of the Fifth Session, 45.
12 See Summary Records of the Fifth Session, 45.
13 See Summary Records of the Fifth Session, 45.
14 See Summary Records of the Fifth Session, 45. The text was subsequently amended to provide ‘including failure to state the reasons for the award’ (see Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1953, Vol II, 211).
15 See Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1958, Vol II, 86.
16 See History of the ICSID Convention, Vol I, 230 (‘The validity of an award may be challenged by either party on one or more of the following grounds…that there has been a serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure, including failure to state the reasons for the award’) (emphasis added). See History of the ICSID Convention, Vol II, 269, 330, 331, 421, 515, 572, 654, 817–18.
17 See History of the ICSID Convention, Vol I, 232 (emphasis added).
18 See A Broches, ‘Observations on the Finality of ICSID Awards’ (1991) 6 ICSID Rev–FILJ 330; ICSID, ‘Background Paper on Annulment for the Administrative Council of ICSID’, Aug 10, 2012, at 47–9.
19 See Broches, ‘Observations on the Finality of ICSID Awards’, 330.
20 See M B Feldman, ‘The Annulment Proceedings and the Finality of ICSID Arbitral Awards’ (1987) 2 ICSID Rev–FILJ 85, 109 (quoting History of the ICSID Convention, Vol II, 515).
21 C Schreuer et al, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 1011.
22 G Aguilar Alvarez and W M Reisman (eds), The Reasons Requirement in International Investment Arbitration: Critical Case Studies (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 21.
24 Klöckner I para 119. The Klöckner I committee held that under Article 52(1)(e), the tribunal is not merely required to state ‘just any reasons, purely formal or apparent, but rather reasons having some substance’ (para 119). According to Andrea Bjorklund, this formulation, although questionable, does not always work against tribunals, because it might lead to a ‘reconstruction’ of the tribunal’s reasoning by the annulment committee analysing the award. See A K Bjorklund, ‘The Continuing Appeal of Annulment: Lessons from Amco Asia and CME’ in T Weiler (ed), International Investment Law and Arbitration: Leading Cases from the ICSID, NAFTA, Bilateral Treaties and Customary International Law (London: Cameron May, 2005), 503–4.
26 Klöckner I para 120. The committee also pointed out that the sufficiency should be interpreted with caution because ‘the application for annulment under Article 52 is not to serve as an appeal in disguise’ (para 118).
29 Soufraki para 131, 128.
31 Lucchetti para 98 (emphasis added).
32 Schreuer, Commentary, 1003.
33 T de Berranger, ‘L’article 52 de la Convention de Washington du 18 mars 1965 et les premiers enseignements de sa pratique’ (1988) 1 Revue de l’arbitrage 93, 110).
34 Feldman, ‘The Annulment Proceedings’, 109. See B Pirrwitz, ‘Annulment of Arbitral Awards Under Article 52 of the Washington Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States’ (1988) 23 Texas International Law Journal 73, 110. Contra P Rambaud, ‘L’Annulation des Sentences Klöckner et Amco’ (1986) 32 Anuaire Français de Droit International 259, 266 and F Lattanzi, ‘Convenzione di Washington Sulle Controversie Relative ad Investimenti e Invalidità delle Sentenze Arbitrali’ (1987) 70 Rivista di Diritto Internazionale 535–6.
35 MINE paras 5.08–5.09. See Amco I para 23; Vivendi I para 63; Azurix paras 53, 137; Enron paras 74, 220; Duke para 162; and D D Caron, ‘Reputation and Reality in the ICSID Annulment Process: Understanding the Distinction Between Annulment and Appeal’ (1992) 7 ICSID Rev–FILJ 21, 43–4.
39 See Vivendi I para 64; CMS para 55 (quoting MINE para 5.08); MTD para 78; Togo Electricité para 62.
40 C Schreuer, ‘ICSID Annulment Revisited’ (2003)(30)(2) Legal Issues of Economic Integration, 112.
43 See MINE para 5.09; Mitchell para 21; Soufraki para 126; Lucchetti para 127; CMS para 55; Enron para 74; Sempra para 167; Continental Casualty para 100; Vieira para 357; Fraport para 249.
44 See Caron, ‘Reputation and Reality’, 44. See Feldman, ‘The Annulment Proceedings’, 105; W L Craig, ‘Uses and Abuses from Awards’ (1988) 4(3) Arbitration International 174, 210–1; and Pirrwitz, ‘Annulment of Arbitral Awards Under Article 52’, 110.
45 See Broches, ‘Observations on the Finality of ICSID Awards’, 366.
48 MINE para 5.09. See Mitchell para 21; Soufraki para 126; Lucchetti para 127; CMS para 5; Enron para 74; Sempra para 167; Continental Casualty para 100; Vieira para 357; Fraport para 249.
49 See Broches, ‘Observations on the Finality of ICSID Awards’, 366.
50 See Mitchell para 21. See MTD para 78.
51 Rumeli para 82. See Togo Electricité para 63.
55 W M Reisman, ‘The Breakdown of the Control Mechanism in ICSID Arbitration’ (1989) 4 Duke Law Journal 739, 764–65.
56 Reisman, ‘Breakdown of the Control Mechanism’, 764–65.
57 See Caron, ‘Reputation and Reality’, 44; Feldman, ‘The Annulment Proceedings’, 109; Craig, ‘Uses and Abuses from Awards’, 210; and Pirrwitz, ‘Annulment of Arbitral Awards Under Article 52’, 110.
58 See M Sturzenegger, ‘ICSID Arbitration and Annulment for Failure to State Reasons: The Decision of the Ad Hoc Committee in Maritime International Nominees Establishment v The Republic of Guinea’ (1992) 9(4) Journal of International Arbitration 192–3. See G Alvarez-Avila, ‘ICSID Annulment Procedure: A Balancing Exercise Between Correctness and Finality’ in A J van den Berg (ed), Arbitration Advocacy in Changing Times, ICCA Congress Series, 2010 Rio Volume 15 (Kluwer Law International, 2011), 300.
60 Vivendi I para 64, cited in MTD para 50; CMS para 54; Azurix para 55; and Enron para 76. See Rumeli para 104 and Duke paras 236–51.
63 Klöckner I paras 143–51. See Fraport para 258.
64 Wena para 81. See CMS paras 97, 127; Azurix paras 54–6; Enron para 75; Vieira para 355; Togo Electricité paras 57, 61, 233; Continental Casualty para 131.
65 Wena paras 81, 83. See Soufraki para 24; CMS para 127; Azurix paras 54–6; Enron para 75; Rumeli para 138; and Continental Casualty para 101. The Rumeli committee held: ‘The Committee is not limited in its review of the Award under Article 52(1)(e) of the ICSID Convention to the text of the Award alone, but rather should seek to understand the motivation of the Award in the light of the record before the Tribunal’ (Rumeli para 179).
66 Reisman, ‘Breakdown of the Control Mechanism’, 764–5. Similarly, Schreuer opined that committees are prepared to take a proactive role to explain apparent defects in awards regarding alleged failures to state reasons, because they should not annul awards ‘for trivial cause’, as annulment is an extraordinary remedy for situations that are grossly illegitimate (Schreuer, Commentary, 914, 1003).
67 Schreuer, Commentary, 914, 1003. Schreuer also pointed out: ‘If the decision appears incorrect or inexplicable, the ad hoc committee will be more inclined to view the absence of reasons as a ground for annulment’. We understand that an analysis of the decision’s correctness by an annulment committee is improper, at any stage.
68 Klöckner v Republic of Cameroon (ICSID Case No ARB/81/2), Award, 1983, p 186.
71 Klöckner I para 126 (emphasis in the original).
80 Klöckner I paras 145–6.
82 Klöckner I para 149 (emphasis in the original). See para 150.
83 Klöckner I paras 143–51.
85 Klöckner I paras 156–7.
88 Aguilar Alvarez and Reisman, The Reasons Requirement, 10.
89 See Caron, ‘Reputation and Reality’, 44; Feldman, ‘The Annulment Proceedings’, 109; Craig, ‘Uses and Abuses from Awards’, 210; and Pirrwitz, ‘Annulment of Arbitral Awards Under Article 52’, 110.
90 J Paulsson, ‘ICSID’s Achievements and Prospects’ (1991) 6 ICSID Rev–FILJ 380, 392.
91 Paulsson, ‘ICSID’s Achievements and Prospects’, 392.
93 See Amco I paras 58–60.
94 See Amco I paras 61–2.
97 See Amco I paras 90–8. Indonesia also alleged that the tribunal failed to state reasons when considering that a shortfall in Amco’s investment of one-sixth of the required level of investment was not material. The committee rejected Indonesia’s contention and held that the notion of ‘materiality’ was not alien to Indonesian administrative law, and therefore, the committee did not fail to state reasons (paras 99–102).
98 Reisman, ‘Breakdown of the Control Mechanism’, 780.
104 T Cheng and R Trisotto, ‘Reasons and Reasoning in Investment Treaty Arbitration’ (2008–9) 32 Suffolk Transnational Law Review 409, 420.
105 Cheng and Trisotto, ‘Reasons and Reasoning’, 420.
107 MINE para 5.08–5.09 (emphasis added).
109 MINE paras 6.111–6.112.
110 Klöckner II para 7.03.
111 Klöckner II paras 7.13–7.14.
112 Klöckner II para 7.14.
113 Klöckner II para 7.14. See paras 7.68–7.71.
114 Klöckner II paras 7.22–7.45.
115 Klöckner II para 7.49.
119 Amco II paras 9.11–9.13. The committee, however, stated that the second tribunal did not exceed its power to rectify a clerical error and that its duty to state reasons in that context was confined to ‘making plausible the assertion that the error was inadvertent’ (Amco II, para 9.11).
122 C Schreuer, ‘Three Generations of ICSID Annulment Proceedings’ in E Gaillard and Y Banifatemi (eds), Annulment of ICSID Awards (New York: Juris Publishing, 2004), 39 (citing Klöckner and MINE).
131 S A Alexandrov, ‘The Vivendi Annulment Decision and the Lessons for Future ICSID Arbitrations—The Applicants’ Perspective’ in E Gaillard and Y Banifatemi (eds), Annulment of ICSID Awards (New York: Juris Publishing, 2004), 117.
141 See Mitchell para 23.
142 The Salini test identifies four elements as indicative of the existence of an ‘investment’ for purposes of the ICSID Convention: (i) a contribution; (ii) a certain duration over which the project is implemented; (iii) a sharing of operational risks; and (iv) a contribution to the host State’s development. See Salini Costruttori SpA and Italstrade SpA v Kingdom of Morocco (ICSID Case No ARB/00/4), Decision on Jurisdiction, Jul 23, 2001, para 30.
143 See Mitchell para 27.
144 See Mitchell para 27.
145 See Mitchell paras 37–8.
146 See Mitchell para 39.
147 See Mitchell para 40. The committee added: ‘Such inadequacy of reasons is deemed to be particularly grave, as it seriously affects the coherence of the reasoning and, moreover, it opens the door to a risk of genuine abuses, to the extent that it boils down to granting the qualification as investor to any legal counseling firm or law firm established in a foreign country, thereby enabling it to take advantage of the special arbitration system of ICSID’ (Mitchell para 40).
148 See Mitchell para 41.
149 Schreuer, Commentary, 915.
150 See W Hamida, ‘Two Nebulous ICSID Features: The Notion of Investment and the Scope of Annulment Control’ (2007) 24(3) Journal of International Arbitration 287, 303.
151 See I Marboe, ‘ICSID Annulment Decisions: Three Generations’ in Essays in Honour of Christoph Schreuer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 207–9.
152 See the awards and annulment decisions in Malaysian Historical Salvors and Mitchell.
154 See Mitchell para 50.
155 See Mitchell para 59.
156 See Mitchell para 62.
157 See Mitchell para 65.
158 See Mitchell para 62.
159 See Mitchell para 65.
173 Lucchetti, Sir Franklin Berman Dissenting Opinion para 4.
174 Lucchetti, Sir Franklin Berman Dissenting Opinion para 4.
175 See F Berman, ‘Review of the Arbitral Tribunal’s Jurisdiction in ICSID Arbitration’ in E Gaillard (ed), The Review of International Arbitral Awards (New York: Juris Publishing, 2010), 260.
178 Treaty Between the United States of America and the Argentine Republic Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, signed Nov 14, 1991, entered into force Oct 20, 1994, Art II(2)(c).
181 Aguilar Alvarez and Reisman, The Reasons Requirement, 23.
182 Aguilar Alvarez and Reisman, The Reasons Requirement, 23.
183 Aguilar Alvarez and Reisman, The Reasons Requirement, 25.
184 Cheng and Trisotto, ‘Reasons and Reasoning’, 422–3.
185 Wena para 83. It held: ‘If the award does not meet the minimal requirement as to the reasons given by the Tribunal, it does not necessarily need to be resubmitted to a new Tribunal. If the ad hoc Committee so concludes, on the basis of the knowledge it has received upon the dispute, the reasons supporting the Tribunal’s conclusions can be explained by the ad hoc Committee itself’. See MINE paras 6.48–6.56. For an opposite view, see E Schwartz, ‘Finality at What Cost? The Decision of the Ad Hoc Committee in Wena Hotels v Egypt’ in E Gaillard and Y Banifatemi (eds), Annulment of ICSID Awards (New York: Juris Publishing, 2004), 43.
186 CMS Award para 303; CMS para 93.
187 CMS paras 95–6. The ‘major difficulties’ were that: (a) that it seemed clear that Art II(2)(c) is concerned with consensual obligations arising independently of the BIT itself (ie under the law of the host State or possibly under international law); (b) consensual obligations are not entered into erga omnes but with regard to particular persons; (c) the effect of the umbrella clause is not to transform the obligation which is relied on into something else; (d) a shareholder, though apparently entitled to enforce the company’s rights in its own interest, will not be bound by the company’s obligations, eg as to dispute settlement; (e) if the tribunal’s implicit interpretation is right, then the mechanism in Art 25(2)(b) of the ICSID Convention is unnecessary wherever there is an umbrella clause; (f) there is no discussion in the award of the travaux of the BIT on this point, or of the prior understandings of the proponents of the umbrella clause as to its function (CMS para 95).
188 See S Marchili, ‘ICSID Annulment: A Saga of Virtue and Vice’ in I A Laird and T J Weiler (eds), Investment Treaty Arbitration and International Law—Vol 5 (New York: Juris Publishing, 2012).
192 W M Reisman, ‘Reflections on the Control Mechanism of the ICSID System’ in E Gaillard (ed), The Review of International Arbitral Awards (New York: JurisNet, 2010), 245. Verhoosel, on the other hand, pointed out that while the committee ‘was evidently eager to lay out its own views on the proper construction of the umbrella clause, the partial annulment arguably remained within the boundaries of the standard set for itself by the committee’ (G Verhoosel, ‘Annulment and Enforcement Review of Treaty Awards: To ICSID or Not to ICSID?’ in 50 Years of the New York Convention: 14 ICCA International Arbitration Conference 285 (Dublin: Kluwer Law International, 2009), 303); E Gaillard, ‘Chroniques des sentences arbitrales’ (2008) 175(1) Journal du Droit International 311, 362–4.
193 CMS para 113. Argentina alleged that this also amounted to a manifest excess of power.
195 CMS paras 123–4, 125, 126.
196 Aguilar Alvarez and Reisman, The Reasons Requirement, 26. See Paulsson, ‘ICSID’s Achievements and Prospects’, 392.
197 See Gaillard, ‘Chroniques des sentences arbitrales’, 364; Reisman, ‘Reflections on Control Mechanism’, 247–50; and Marboe, ‘ICSID Annulment Decisions’, 217. See Chapter 6. For an interesting discussion on obiter dicta in annulment decisions, see the discussion among several prominent experts in Annex 4, E Gaillard (ed), The Review of International Arbitral Awards (New York: JurisNet, 2010), 373–81. Gaëtan Verhoosel, on the other hand, considers that the CMS annulment decision ‘will carry no more authority than what the prestige of its members commands in the community’ and that ‘as long as it is benign and the dicta remain no more than that, it matters little for purposes of finality’ (Verhoosel, ‘Annulment and Enforcement Review of Treaty Awards’, 307).
198 H Van Houtte, ‘Article 52 of the Washington Convention—A Brief Introduction’ in E Gaillard and Y Banifatemi (eds), Annulment of ICSID Awards (New York: Juris Publishing, 2004), 14–15. Similarly, Cheng and Trisotto held that if a committee decides to apply a low standard of reasoning, that is disregarding potential errors in the law, it should be slow to express in obiter dictum its criticism of the law or facts determined by the tribunal. See Cheng and Trisotto, ‘Reasons and Reasoning’, 426.
205 MCI Power paras 77, 82.
214 Rumeli paras 144, 146.
217 Rumeli paras 174, 178.
220 Helnan para 36 (emphasis in the original).
224 Enron paras 94–5. The committee considered that the same applies with references to prior decisions in the same case: ‘Provided that the tribunal’s own reasons are sufficiently apparent, it is not necessary for a tribunal in adopting the reasoning of the earlier decision to distinguish specifically between those passages in the earlier decision that it adopts as its own reasoning, and those passages in the earlier decision that it considers inapplicable to its own decision’ (Enron para 95; see para 96).
233 Enron paras 284–7. The committee reached the same conclusion regarding another defence raised by Argentina under Argentine law (paras 288–91).
240 Vivendi II paras 255–7. See para 263.
244 Continental Casualty paras 110 et seq.
245 Continental Casualty paras 124–32.
246 Continental Casualty paras 151–75.
247 Continental Casualty paras 237 et seq.
250 Duke para 166. See paras 182, 185–9.
254 Togo Electricité paras 95, 117–18, 135, 140, 162–3.
255 Togo Electricité paras 102, 123.
256 Togo Electricité paras 191–200.
257 See History of the ICSID Convention, Vol II, 849. Indeed, the drafters of the ICSID Convention unanimously indicated that the remedy should be a supplemental review.
258 See Schreuer, Commentary, 798; Enron paras 72, 110; MCI Power paras 66–7.
259 Schreuer, Commentary, 799. Schreuer added: ‘Arguments must be decisive in the sense that their serious consideration might conceivably have affected the outcome’.
260 Klöckner I para 115. The Klöckner I committee also stated ‘Obviously, and in accordance with principles of interpretation that are recognized generally—for example Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties—Article 52 on the annulment of awards, must be interpreted in the context of the Convention and in particular of Articles 42 and 48, and vice versa. It is furthermore impossible to imagine that when they drafted Article 52, the Convention’s authors would have forgotten the existence of Articles 42 or 48(3), just as it is impossible to assume that the authors of provisions like Articles 42(1) or 48(3) would have neglected to consider the sanction for non-compliance’ (Klöckner I para 58).
262 Reisman, ‘Breakdown of the Control Mechanism’, 763.
263 Reisman, ‘Breakdown of the Control Mechanism’, 763.
264 Reisman, ‘Breakdown of the Control Mechanism’, 789.
265 Reisman, ‘Breakdown of the Control Mechanism’, 791.
266 Case Concerning the Arbitral Award made by the King of Spain 1969 ICJ 216.
267 A Broches, ‘On the Finality of Awards: A Reply to Michael Reisman’ (1993) 8 ICSID Rev–FILJ 92, 96. Further, Broches added: ‘[T]he explicit requirement to deal with such questions constitutes a fundamental procedural protection of the parties against arbitrary decisions. Failure of a tribunal to observe it is a serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure which is a ground for annulment under Article 52(1)(d). The objective of the annulment process is the protection of parties against procedural injustice. Reisman’s interpretation of Article 52 would allow a tribunal to perpetrate injustice with impunity’.
268 Broches, ‘Observations on the Finality of ICSID Awards’, 367. Reisman responded to this criticism arguing that ‘a claim for annulment on the basis of inadequacy of reasons may be based upon the narrow grounds of Article 52(1)(e) but not on the broader grounds of Article 48(3)’ (W M Reisman, ‘Repairing ICSID’s Control System: Some Comments on Aron Broches’ “Observations on the Finality of ICSID Awards”’ (1992) 7 ICSID Rev–FILJ 204).
269 See D A Redfern, ‘ICSID—Losing its Appeal?’ (1987) 3(2) Arbitration International 109–10, 111. See Feldman, ‘The Annulment Proceedings’, 105.
270 See Redfern, ‘ICSID—Losing its Appeal?’, 109–10, 111. He added: ‘Lawyers who are experienced in the practice of international commercial arbitration will know of many cases in which arguments are put forward, but are ignored or barely touched upon by the arbitral tribunal because, in the final analysis, they are not considered to have any bearing on the arbitral tribunal’s decision’.
271 G R Delaume, ‘The Finality of Arbitration Involving States: Recent Developments’ (1989) 5(1) Arbitration International 21, at 32, citing History of the ICSID Convention, Vol II at 515.
272 Delaume, ‘The Finality of Arbitration Involving States: Recent Developments’, at 32.
275 MINE paras 5.12–5.13. See Togo Electricité para 57, stating that failure to deal with every question submitted to the tribunal does not constitute a ground for annulment.
276 See MINE paras 5.12–5.13.
278 Schreuer, Commentary, 1001.
279 MINE paras 6.101. Eric Schwartz interpreted this paragraph as meaning that ‘an award should not be found to be supported by reasons if important questions have not been addressed’ (in E Schwartz, ‘Finality at What Cost?’, 81).
281 Wena para 101; CDC para 71; Lucchetti para 129; Continental Casualty para 229. The Helnan committee went a step further and held that Article 52(1)(e) of the ICSID Convention permits annulment on the ground that ‘the award has failed to state the reasons on which it is based’, which meant that ‘the object of this ground is the reasoning which leads to the Tribunal’s Award’ (Helnan para 36) (emphasis in the original). The Rumeli committee held: ‘If the arguments of the parties have been correctly summarized and all the claims have been addressed, there is no need explicitly to address each and every one of the arguments raised in support of the particular claims, and it is in the discretion of the tribunal not to do so’. The Rumeli committee also held that Art 52(1)(e) does not to require the tribunal to explain its take on each piece of evidence adduced by either party, but rather to enable the reader to see the reasons upon which the award itself is based. See Rumeli paras 81, 84, 104.
282 Repsol para 44; Togo Electricité paras 57, 63, 109.
283 The United Mexican States v Metalclad Corp, 2001 BCSC 664, para 121.
284 The United Mexican States v Metalclad Corp, 2001 BCSC 664, para 122.
286 See Redfern, ‘ICSID—Losing its Appeal?’, 108–9. Aron Broches joined Redfern in criticizing the broad concept of ‘questions’ in the annulment in Klöckner, see Broches, ‘Observations on the Finality of ICSID Awards’, 377.
287 See Klöckner I para 148.
289 See MINE paras 5.11–12, 6.99–101.
290 The United Mexican States v Metalclad Corp, 2001 BCSC 664, para 122.
291 Enron paras 72–7, 222; MCI Power paras 66–9; Continental Casualty para 99.
294 MINE paras 6.48–6.56 (emphasis added).
296 Schreuer, Commentary, 798.
297 See A Broches, ‘Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States of 1965, Explanatory Notes and Survey of its Application’ in A J van den Berg (ed), Yearbook Commercial Arbitration, Vol XVIII (1993), 627, 681.
298 See Feldman, ‘The Annulment Proceedings’, 105.
302 See Amco I paras 35–6. See MCI Power para 69.
303 See MINE paras 5.11–5.13. The committee stated: ‘The Committee has considered whether Article 49(2) constitutes the only remedy for non-compliance with the obligation to deal with every question submitted to the tribunal. It has concluded that Article 49(2) provides a satisfactory remedy for the case of a tribunal having failed to exercise its jurisdiction in full. For example, in the present case the Tribunal failed to rule on MINE’s claim to be reimbursed for the costs and expenses incurred in the United States District Court and in arbitration before the American Arbitration Association in earlier stages of its conflict with Guinea. Article 49(2) would have provided a specific remedy and, not having invoked it, MINE could not have relied on that failure for purposes of annulment’ (MINE para 5.12).
304 See Wena paras 100–1.
306 See Klöckner I paras 148–51.
307 Klöckner I paras 148–9.
308 See Klöckner I para 164.
309 See Klöckner I para 164.
310 MINE para 6.101. With respect to another claim, however, the committee found that the tribunal did not have to address specific conflicting contentions of the parties because it had addressed and resolved the principal argument on the issue (MINE para 6.51).
313 Schwartz, ‘Finality at What Cost?’, 82–3.
315 See CDC para 56: ‘The specific terminology used by the Republic in its Memorial cannot define the question the Tribunal was obliged to answer. Rather, the Tribunal was required to answer a legal question, or to put it another way, come to a conclusion about the Parties’ rights and liabilities. In this case, the legal question for the Tribunal’s determination was whether or not the Republic’s claimed defenses protected it from liability under the 1993 Guarantee. This question necessarily entailed, under English law as the Tribunal understood it, the determination, inter alia, of whether the Republic was entitled to rely on CDC’s loan decision as a representation regarding the substance of the project it financed. The Tribunal answered the question in the negative, thereby addressing the proper legal question before it’.
318 The United Mexican States v Metalclad Corp, 2001 BCSC 664, para 122.
320 See Enron paras 109–10.
321 See Enron para 222. In reaching one of the most controversial annulment decisions, the committee annulled the award under Art 52(1)(e) on the basis of an argument that the applicant did not raise in its annulment submissions (see Enron paras 373–95 and Chapter 6).
322 See A Rigo Sureda, ‘Introduction to Investor-State Arbitration’, 233.
323 MINE para 5.08 (emphasis added).