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Part I General Aspects, 5 The Disclosure Paradigm: Conventional Understandings and Modern Divergences

Henry T. C. Hu

From: Prospectus Regulation and Prospectus Liability

Edited By: Danny Busch, Guido Ferrarini, Jan Paul Franx

From: Oxford Legal Research Library (http://olrl.ouplaw.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved.date: 09 May 2021

Subject(s):
Securities — Improper disclosure

This chapter focuses on the United States' (US) disclosure paradigm. It explains that the disclosure paradigm contemplates a unique regulatory role for the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Here, the fulfilment of its core mission is essential not only to investor protection and market efficiency, but to a wide variety of transparency-dependent corporate governance mechanisms. Financial innovation is contributing to a ‘too complex to depict’ problem that brings into question the sufficiency of the core approach to information that the SEC has used since its creation. Moreover, particular financial innovations pose product-specific challenges to the fulfilment of the SEC's mission. Additionally, changing conceptions of the ends to be achieved by public disclosure, within the SEC disclosure system itself and pursuant to a new disclosure system driven by regulators with far different mindsets, raise new issues. It is now demonstrable that the new modes of information and the alternative data made possible by technological innovation can help address some of the disclosure challenges posed by financial innovation. At the same time, these new modes and alternative data introduce regulatory complexities. The chapter thus concludes that modern divergences are making life interesting for regulators, practitioners, and academics alike.

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