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Oxford Law Citator
Contents
Expand All
Collapse All
Preliminary Material
Foreword
Preface
Contents
Table of Cases
Table of Legislation
Statutes
UK Statutory Instruments
Other National Legislation
Australia
Canada
European Directives
France
Germany
New Zealand
Singapore
United States
International Legislation
Conventions
Miscellaneous Instruments
Main Text
Part I The General Part
1 Principles and Policies
Preliminary Material
Introduction
1.01
1.02
Sources of disputes about contractual construction
1.03
1.04
1.05
1.06
Meaning and effect
1.07
Commercial consequences
1.08
1.09
Question of law or question of fact?
Written contracts
1.10
1.11
1.12
1.13
Oral contracts
1.14
Integrated contract or partly in writing, partly oral?
1.15
1.16
1.17
1.18
Integration and ‘entire agreement’ clauses
1.19
Interpretation, Implication, and Rectification
Construction and interpretation
1.20
Interpretation and implication
1.21
Terms implied in law and terms implied in fact
1.22
Terms implied in law or ‘general default rules’
1.23
Terms implied in fact or ‘ad hoc gap-fillers’
1.24
1.25
1.26
1.27
Implied terms and contractual discretion
1.28
Interpretation and rectification
1.29
Interpretation and characterization or categorization
1.30
1.31
1.32
The Evolution of the Principles of Construction
1.33
Statutory construction: a comparison
1.34
1.35
1.36
The ‘literalist’ school and the ‘purposive’ school
1.37
1.38
The traditional approach to construction
1.39
1.40
The traditional approach encapsulated
1.41
The traditional approach: what is the purpose of construction?
1.42
The traditional approach: what is the approach of the court to language?
1.43
The traditional approach: what materials or evidence will the court consider?
1.44
The shift to the modern approach to construction
1.45
1.46
1.47
The Investors Compensation Scheme restatement
1.48
The modern approach to construction encapsulated
1.49
The modern approach: what is the purpose of construction?
1.50
The modern approach: what is the approach of the court to language?
1.51
The modern approach: what materials or evidence will the court consider?
1.52
Principles and Policies
Canons of construction
1.53
Common law and equity
1.54
1.55
Principles of construction, not rules
1.56
1.57
Standard form contracts
1.58
1.59
Standard forms versus bespoke alterations
1.60
The principles of construction are universal
1.61
1.62
1.63
The role of reasonableness (or unreasonableness)
1.64
1.65
1.66
The role of good faith and fair dealing
1.67
The intentions of the parties and the objective approach
1.68
1.69
1.70
1.71
‘Natural and ordinary meaning’
1.72
1.73
1.74
1.75
1.76
The importance of business common sense
1.77
1.78
1.79
The relevance of the contract as a whole
1.80
1.81
The primacy of the contractual language or loyalty to the text
1.82
The role of the legal, regulatory, and factual matrix
1.83
1.84
1.85
1.86
1.87
Balancing the principles
1.88
Prior negotiations and subsequent conduct
1.89
1.90
1.91
1.92
Purposive construction
1.93
1.94
1.95
Public policy and strict construction
1.96
1.97
The need for certainty
1.98
1.99
1.100
1.101
Lawful effect
1.102
Apparent incompleteness
1.103
1.104
Badly drafted contracts
1.105
1.106
1.107
Vagueness and ambiguity
Distinguishing vagueness and ambiguity
1.108
Vagueness and the ‘penumbra’ of words and concepts
1.109
Farnsworth’s analysis: ambiguities of term and syntax
1.110
‘Latent’ ambiguity and ‘patent’ ambiguity
1.111
Abandonment of the patent and latent ambiguity distinction
1.112
Difficulty of construction not equated to ambiguity
1.113
Ambiguity no longer a precondition to the contextual approach
1.114
1.115
Reaction to the Investors Compensation Scheme restatement
1.116
1.117
1.118
1.119
1.120
1.121
1.122
Reaffirmation and entrenchment
1.123
Discarding intellectual baggage?
1.124
1.125
The role of construction in the wake of discharge for breach or termination
1.126
1.127
1.128
1.129
1.130
The position of third parties and transferees
1.131
1.132
Precedential force and the citation of authorities
1.133
1.134
Twelve Leading Decisions of the House of Lords and the Supreme Court
1.135
1.136
Prenn v Simmonds
1.137
1.138
1.139
Schuler v Wickman Machine Tool Sales
1.140
1.141
1.142
Reardon Smith v Hansen-Tangen (The Diana Prosperity)
1.143
1.144
The Antaios
1.145
1.146
Charter Reinsurance v Fagan
1.147
Charter Reinsurance v Fagan: Staughton LJ’s dissent
1.148
Charter Reinsurance v Fagan: the judgments in the House of Lords
1.149
1.150
1.151
1.152
Mannai Investments v Eagle Star Assurance
1.153
1.154
Investors Compensation Scheme v West Bromwich Building Society
1.155
1.156
1.157
Bank of Credit and Commerce International v Ali
1.158
1.159
1.160
1.161
The Starsin
1.162
Lord Bingham’s four canons of construction
1.163
The missing words in the Himalaya clause
1.164
Chartbrook v Persimmon Homes
1.165
1.166
1.167
1.168
1.169
1.170
Rainy Sky v Kookmin Bank
1.171
1.172
1.173
Arnold v Britton
1.174
1.175
1.176
1.177
1.178
1.179
1.180
1.181
Concluding Observations
Where are we now?
1.182
The Lloyds Bank Bonds case
1.183
1.184
1.185
The Globe Motors summary: changes of emphasis
1.186
Wood v Capita : the Supreme Court stresses continuity
1.187
1.188
1.189
Summary of leading principles and policies
The aim of construction
1.190
The objective principle
1.191
The holistic or ‘whole contract’ approach
1.192
The contextual dimension
1.193
Business purpose
1.194
Lawful effect
1.195
Contra proferentem
1.196
Avoiding unreasonable results
1.197
Specially negotiated terms
1.198
General provisions versus precise provisions
1.199
2 Comparative and Theoretical Perspectives
Preliminary Material
Comparative Perspectives
Civil law jurisdictions and international instruments
2.01
Restatements of contract law
2.02
2.03
2.04
2.05
Objective and subjective
2.06
2.07
2.08
Restatements of contract law
2.09
2.10
2.11
Article 4.1
Intention of the Parties
Article 4.2
Interpretation of Statements and Other Conduct
2.12
Context, prior negotiations, and subsequent conduct
2.13
Vienna Convention on the International Sale of Goods 1980 (‘CISG’)
2.14
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts 2004 (‘PICL’)
2.15
Article 4.3
Relevant Circumstances
Principles of European Contract Law (‘PECL’)
2.16
Article 5
102: Relevant Circumstances
Draft Common Frame of Reference (‘DCFR’)
2.17
Relevant Matters
A domestic perspective
2.18
Theoretical Perspectives
Language and law
2.19
2.20
Wider developments in language studies
2.21
The later Wittgenstein
2.22
Donald Davidson and Mrs Malaprop
2.23
Chomsky and modern linguistics
2.24
The limits of interdisciplinary insights
2.25
2.26
2.27
Objective and subjective
2.28
2.29
2.30
Extra-judicial theory
2.31
2.32
2.33
2.34
2.35
Context, purpose, and pragmatics
2.36
Deprecating ‘detailed semantic and syntactical analysis’
2.37
2.38
Syntax, semantics, and pragmatics
2.39
2.40
Modern linguistic theory
2.41
2.42
2.43
2.44
2.45
2.46
3 The Objective Principle of Construction
Preliminary Material
Overview
3.01
Formation and construction
3.02
‘Promisee objectivity’ and ‘detached objectivity’
3.03
3.04
3.05
Lord Denning and ‘fly-on-the-wall objectivity’
3.06
Objectivity and the construction of contracts
3.07
Objective test of formation is an amalgam of objective and subjective
3.08
Does the objective test of construction have a subjective element?
3.09
3.10
The role of the ‘intentions of the parties’
3.11
The Objective Principle in Contract Formation
3.12
3.13
3.14
3.15
Two nineteenth-century perspectives
Raffles v Wichelhaus
3.16
3.17
Smith v Hughes
3.18
3.19
3.20
3.21
Twentieth-century case law: qualified objectivity
The Hannah Blumenthal
3.22
3.23
3.24
3.25
3.26
3.27
The Leonidas D
3.28
3.29
3.30
3.31
Centrovincial Estates v Merchant Investors Assurance
3.32
3.33
3.34
Hartog v Collin & Shields
3.35
3.36
OT Africa Lines v Vickers
3.37
Conclusion
3.38
The Objective Principle in Interpretation
3.39
Victorian origins of the objective principle
3.40
3.41
3.42
3.43
3.44
3.45
3.46
Twentieth-century statements of principle
3.47
3.48
3.49
3.50
3.51
3.52
3.53
3.54
The interplay of the objective principle and the available background
3.55
Personification of the objective principle: the ‘reasonable person’
3.56
Rational choice theory
3.57
The objective principle and standard form contracts
3.58
Contract binding on its true construction even if parties were not in agreement
3.59
3.60
Objectivity and ‘presumed common intention’
3.61
3.62
A different approach in New Zealand: Professor McLauchlan, Thomas J, and ‘common actual intention’
3.63
3.64
3.65
3.66
3.67
Objectivity and contracts partly oral or partly by conduct
3.68
A subjective coda?
3.69
3.70
The law of agency
3.71
The Objective Principle in Implication
3.72
3.73
The Objective Principle in Rectification
3.74
4 Internal Context: The Whole Contract Approach
Preliminary Material
4.01
4.02
4.03
The Whole Contract or Holistic Approach
Every word counts
4.04
4.05
Oliver Wendell Holmes and internal context
4.06
The limits of the whole contract approach
4.07
4.08
4.09
Arguments from redundancy and the presumption against surplusage
4.10
4.11
Inconsistency
4.12
4.13
4.14
The patchwork quilt of the standard form
4.15
Reading two clauses together
4.16
Same phrase; different meaning
4.17
4.18
Ignoring or deleting an inconsistent clause
4.19
The traditional rule restated?
4.20
4.21
The modern approach
4.22
4.23
Bills of Exchange Act: words and figures
4.24
The Constituent Parts of a Contract
4.25
Recitals
4.26
4.27
4.28
4.29
Section 58 of the Law of Property Act 1925
4.30
Recital as estoppel
4.31
Definitions
4.32
4.33
4.34
Deleted words
4.35
5 External Context: Surrounding Circumstances, ‘Matrix’, and ‘Background’
Preliminary Material
Overview
5.01
5.02
5.03
5.04
5.05
5.06
Key Points
5.07
5.08
5.09
5.10
5.11
The irrelevance of the ‘parol evidence rule’ to construction
5.12
The different strands of the ‘parol evidence rule’
5.13
5.14
5.15
5.16
5.17
The Traditional Approach: The Surrounding Circumstances
What were the ‘surrounding circumstances’ in the nineteenth century?
5.18
Shore v Wilson
5.19
5.20
5.21
5.22
Lord Wensleydale on ‘surrounding circumstances’
5.23
Lord Blackburn’s statement of principle
5.24
5.25
Lewis v Great Western Railway Company
5.26
5.27
5.28
5.29
5.30
Macdonald v Longbottom
5.31
Bank of New Zealand v Simpson
5.32
Bank of Australasia v Palmer
5.33
Charrington v Wooder
5.34
5.35
5.36
5.37
5.38
5.39
The Modern Approach: ‘Matrix’ to ‘Background’
Lord Wilberforce’s contribution: ‘matrix’
5.40
Prenn v Simmonds
5.41
5.42
The Diana Prosperity
5.43
The modern restatement: ‘background’
5.44
Glossing the restatement
5.45
5.46
The impact of the restatement
5.47
5.48
Pleading and procedural controls
5.49
Jettisoning the ‘ambiguity’ threshold
5.50
Reasonably available to both parties
5.51
The legal context
5.52
5.53
5.54
5.55
5.56
Legal or commercial draftsperson?
5.57
5.58
Relevance of prior case law?
5.59
Cultural traditions
5.60
The Exclusionary Rules
The restriction on prior negotiations and declarations of subjective intent
5.61
5.62
The classical statement of the ‘prior negotiations’ rule
5.63
5.64
Prenn v Simmonds
5.65
5.66
5.67
5.68
Modern case law on prior negotiations
5.69
Investors Compensation Scheme v West Bromwich
5.70
Bank of Scotland v Dunedin
5.71
5.72
5.73
5.74
BCCI v Ali
5.75
5.76
Proforce Recruit v The Rugby Group
5.77
5.78
5.79
Chartbrook Ltd v Persimmon Homes Ltd
5.80
5.81
5.82
5.83
5.84
5.85
5.86
5.87
The rise and fall of The Karen Oltmann
5.88
5.89
5.90
5.91
5.92
5.93
5.94
No direct evidence of the parties’ intentions
5.95
5.96
5.97
5.98
Prior negotiations admissible
5.99
Exception (1): contracts partly oral
5.100
Exception (2): objective facts reasonably known to both parties
5.101
5.102
Exception (3): genesis and object
5.103
5.104
5.105
Exception (4): rectification of documents
5.106
Exception (5): the private dictionary
5.107
Speculation about negotiations?
5.108
5.109
Particular examples of pre-contractual evidence
5.110
Earlier drafts of the contract
5.111
Deletions from earlier drafts
5.112
5.113
Deletions or alterations to a standard form
5.114
5.115
5.116
Memorandum of negotiations
5.117
Related contracts
5.118
Previous contracts
5.119
5.120
Side-letters and accompanying letters
5.121
‘Without prejudice’ communications
5.122
Explanatory notes
5.123
Use of dictionaries
5.124
5.125
Recent scepticism about dictionaries
5.126
5.127
5.128
Context-driven and policy-based restrictions on admissible background
5.129
Contracts which are transferable, likely to be assigned, or otherwise relied upon by third parties
5.130
5.131
5.132
Standard form contracts
5.133
5.134
Contracts which are required to be in writing or evidenced in writing
5.135
Public documents
5.136
The restriction on subsequent statements and conduct
5.137
5.138
5.139
James Miller v Whitworth Street Estates
5.140
5.141
Schuler v Wickman Machine Tool Sales
5.142
5.143
The status of Watcham
5.144
Exceptions to the exclusionary rule
5.145
Exception (1): characterization or categorization
5.146
5.147
5.148
5.149
5.150
5.151
5.152
5.153
Exception (2): oral contracts
5.154
5.155
5.156
5.157
5.158
5.159
Exception (3): variation by conduct
5.160
Exception (4): estoppel by convention
5.161
The Future
5.162
5.163
Reform of the exclusionary rules
5.164
5.165
5.166
Reform of the exclusionary rules in other common law jurisdictions
5.167
Prior negotiations
Yoshimoto in the Court of Appeal of New Zealand
5.168
5.169
5.170
Yoshimoto in the Privy Council
5.171
5.172
5.173
Vector Gas Ltd v Bay of Plenty Energy
5.174
5.175
5.176
5.177
5.178
5.179
5.180
5.181
5.182
5.183
5.184
5.185
5.186
5.187
5.188
Zurich Insurance (Singapore) v B-Gold
5.189
5.190
5.191
5.192
5.193
Subsequent conduct
5.194
5.195
5.196
5.197
Gibbons Holdings v Wholesale Distributors
5.198
5.199
5.200
5.201
5.202
5.203
5.204
5.205
5.206
5.207
5.208
5.209
5.210
5.211
5.212
5.213
5.214
Zurich Insurance (Singapore) v B-Gold
5.215
Franklins v Metcash
5.216
Comparison: Draft Common Frame of Reference (‘DCFR’)
5.217
5.218
6 Standard Form Contracts, Public Policy, and the Realms of Strict Construction and Strict Compliance
Preliminary Material
6.01
6.02
6.03
6.04
Key Points
6.05
Standard Form Contracts
6.06
Two species of standard form contracts
6.07
6.08
6.09
The story of unfair exemption clauses
6.10
6.11
6.12
6.13
6.14
6.15
Modern approaches to construction of exemption clauses and indemnity clauses
6.16
6.17
Photo Productions v Securicor
6.18
6.19
Ailsa Craig v Malvern Fishing
6.20
6.21
The ‘three degrees’ of strict construction
6.22
6.23
6.24
6.25
6.26
Other Examples of Strict Construction
Contracts of insurance
6.27
Contracts of guarantee and ‘letters of comfort’
Contracts of guarantee
6.28
6.29
6.30
‘Letters of comfort’
6.31
Estate agents’ commission cases
6.32
Verification clauses in banking contracts
6.33
6.34
6.35
6.36
6.37
Other ‘draconian’ clauses
6.38
6.39
Strict Compliance and Contractual Machinery
Strict construction and strict compliance
6.40
6.41
Contractual machinery
6.42
Obligatory or optional machinery
6.43
Sudbrook Trading Estate v Eggleton
6.44
6.45
Gillatt v Sky Television
6.46
6.47
6.48
6.49
Infiniteland v Artisan Contracting
6.50
6.51
6.52
6.53
6.54
7 Presumptions
Preliminary Material
Statutory Presumptions
Law of Property Act 1925
7.01
Persons to include legal persons
7.02
7.03
Singular and plural
7.04
Masculine and feminine
7.05
Month means a calendar month
7.06
Interpretation Act 1978
7.07
Time of day
7.08
Changes in legislation
7.09
7.10
Common Law Presumptions
The presumption that a contracting party cannot take advantage of its own wrong
7.11
7.12
7.13
7.14
The leading statement of principle
7.15
The leading case
7.16
7.17
7.18
7.19
7.20
Analysis
7.21
7.22
The presumption that clear words are required to exclude or modify remedies that arise by operation of law
The leading statement of principle
7.23
7.24
7.25
7.26
7.27
7.28
7.29
Beaufort Developments v Gilbert-Ash
7.30
Presumption of legality
7.31
Presumption against impossibility
7.32
Presumption of technical legal usage in document drafted by lawyers
7.33
Presumption in favour of one-stop dispute resolution
7.34
7.35
7.36
7.37
7.38
8 Maxims
Preliminary Material
Introduction
8.01
8.02
8.03
Contra proferentem
8.04
8.05
8.06
Who is a proferens ?
8.07
8.08
8.09
8.10
8.11
8.12
8.13
8.14
8.15
8.16
8.17
Ut res magis valeat quam pereat
8.18
8.19
8.20
8.21
8.22
8.23
Expressio unius
8.24
8.25
8.26
8.27
Eiusdem generis
8.28
8.29
8.30
Identifying a genus
8.31
8.32
8.33
8.34
8.35
Noscitur a sociis
8.36
Reddendo singula singulis
8.37
8.38
8.39
Part II Related Doctrines
9 Implication of Terms: General Principles and Implied Terms at Law
Preliminary Material
General Principles of Implication of Terms
9.01
Incompleteness and lack of contractual specification
9.02
Terminology: construction, interpretation, and implication
9.03
Interpretation and implication
9.04
The seminal distinction between the two sub-categories of implied terms
9.05
Terms implied in law and terms implied in fact
9.06
Necessity and reasonableness
9.07
Terms implied in law
9.08
Terms implied in fact
9.09
9.10
9.11
Implied terms and contractual discretion
9.12
Question of law
9.13
The doctrine of precedent
9.14
Implication of Terms at Law
Introduction
9.15
Supply of goods and services
9.16
9.17
9.18
9.19
9.20
9.21
9.22
9.23
9.24
9.25
9.26
9.27
9.28
9.29
Carriage of goods
9.30
Banker and customer
9.31
9.32
9.33
9.34
Principles for Developing New Implied Terms at Law
Public policy
9.35
9.36
Implied terms in law in commercial contracts
9.37
9.38
Characterization
9.39
The leading case: Liverpool City Council v Irwin
The factual matrix
9.40
The implied terms
9.41
Lord Wilberforce’s spectrum
9.42
9.43
The test applied
9.44
The material available
9.45
Implied Terms and the Employment Relationship
9.46
The seminal case: Scally
9.47
9.48
9.49
Employees and references
9.50
Employment: the implied duty of trust and confidence
9.51
University of Nottingham v Eyett: a duty to provide advice?
9.52
9.53
9.54
Crossley v Faithful & Gould Holdings
9.55
Implied Terms as to Cooperation
Duties to cooperate
9.56
Implied term not to interfere in necessary pre-existing state of affairs
9.57
Implied Terms and Contractual Discretions
9.58
9.59
9.60
The Equitable Life case
The factual matrix
9.61
9.62
The problems posed by ‘guaranteed annuity rates’
9.63
9.64
The decision of the Court of Appeal
9.65
9.66
The decision of the House of Lords
9.67
9.68
9.69
9.70
Analysis
9.71
9.72
9.73
9.74
9.75
9.76
9.77
Public law analogies?
9.78
The mortgage cases
9.79
9.80
9.81
Socimer International Bank v Standard Chartered Bank
9.82
9.83
10 Implied Terms in Fact
Preliminary Material
Introduction
10.01
10.02
10.03
10.04
The Relationship between Implication and Interpretation
10.05
10.06
10.07
10.08
10.09
The Relationship between Implication and Rectification
10.10
10.11
10.12
10.13
10.14
The Traditional Tests for the Implication of Terms in Fact
10.15
(1) ‘Cela va sans dire’
10.16
(2) The ‘business efficacy’ test
10.17
10.18
10.19
10.20
(3) The ‘officious bystander’ test
10.21
10.22
10.23
Criticisms of the test
10.24
10.25
10.26
(4) A multi-pronged formulation: BP Refinery (Westernport) v Hastings Shire Council
10.27
(5) The test of Bingham LJ in Phillips Electronique v British Sky Broadcasting
10.28
Implication in Fact as Part of the Process of Construction: Attorney-General for Belize v Belize Telecom Ltd
10.29
Special characteristics of articles of association
10.30
10.31
10.32
10.33
10.34
The articles in Belize Telecom
10.35
10.36
The facts giving rise to the dispute
10.37
The holding
10.38
10.39
General approach to implication
10.40
The Belize Telecom test
10.41
10.42
10.43
‘Do nothing’
10.44
‘Do something’
10.45
Objective principle
10.46
Holistic principle
10.47
Context and background facts
10.48
10.49
Purpose
10.50
Insisting on the Necessity Threshold: Marks and Spencer v BNP Paribas Securities
10.51
10.52
10.53
What is the test?
10.54
10.55
10.56
10.57
10.58
Summary of developments
10.59
Applying the Technique of Implication in Fact
Reasonableness necessary but not sufficient
10.60
Lord Denning’s rival test of reasonableness
10.61
Limited scope for implication where contract is detailed
10.62
10.63
Difficulty of framing the implied term with certainty
10.64
10.65
Inconsistency with the express terms
10.66
Evidence that the parties rejected a particular draft provision
10.67
10.68
The materials available
10.69
10.70
10.71
Some Particular Types of Implied Terms
Implied obligations to bring about a particular result
10.72
Planning permission
10.73
10.74
10.75
Export licences
10.76
Implied terms as to duration
10.77
10.78
Statements of principle
10.79
10.80
The leading case
10.81
10.82
10.83
10.84
Entire Agreement Clauses and Implied Terms
Exxonmobil v Texaco
10.85
10.86
11 New Horizons: Good Faith, Contractual Discretions, and Human Rights
Preliminary Material
The Role of Good Faith
Orthodoxy revisited
11.01
11.02
11.03
Walford v Miles
11.04
11.05
Yam Seng
11.06
Responses to Yam Seng
11.07
11.08
Statutory examples
11.09
11.10
Common law principles
Interpretation and unreasonable results
11.11
Incorporation and notice
11.12
Unreasonable termination clauses
11.13
11.14
11.15
11.16
11.17
Contractual Discretion and Analogies with Public Law
11.18
The Equitable Life case
11.19
11.20
Human Rights
11.21
11.22
11.23
Article 6 (fair trial) and the substantive content of private law
11.24
11.25
Article 1 of Protocol 1 (property and possessions)
11.26
11.27
11.28
11.29
11.30
Human Rights, Cultural Traditions, and Context
11.31
11.32
12 Custom and Usage
Preliminary Material
Custom, Practice, and Usage
12.01
Construction and implication
12.02
A modern view
12.03
12.04
12.05
12.06
Supplementing or Contradicting the Written Contract
12.07
12.08
12.09
12.10
Certain, Notorious, Reasonable
12.11
The burden of proof
12.12
Law or fact
12.13
The leading case
12.14
Certainty
12.15
Notoriety
The evidence required
12.16
Participants in the trade?
12.17
Reasonable?
12.18
The Lloyd’s brokers cases
12.19
12.20
The binding effect
The role of knowledge
12.21
12.22
Contractual exclusion
Exxonmobil v Texaco
12.23
13 Technical and Legal Language
Preliminary Material
Introduction
13.01
13.02
Legal Language
13.03
Sydall v Castings
13.04
13.05
13.06
The lawyer at the elbow
13.07
13.08
Drafting and legal terminology
13.09
13.10
13.11
Scientific, Technical, and Specialist Language
13.12
13.13
13.14
Foreign Language
13.15
Foreign legal terms
13.16
14 Formation and Certainty
Preliminary Material
14.01
14.02
14.03
Construction Techniques in Formation and the Interface with Certainty
14.04
Pagnan v Feed Products
Introduction
14.05
The facts and the holding
14.06
14.07
Bingham J’s guidance at first instance
14.08
Lloyd LJ’s six principles in the Court of Appeal
14.09
Conclusions
14.10
14.11
14.12
14.13
Particular Topics Relating to Contractual Certainty
‘Subject to contract’
14.14
‘Subject to details’
14.15
‘Heads of agreement’
14.16
‘Letters of comfort’
14.17
14.18
‘Letters of intent’
14.19
14.20
Agreements to agree
14.21
14.22
14.23
Summary of principle
Mamidoil and certainty
14.24
Implied Contracts and Contracts by Conduct
14.25
The Aramis
14.26
Bingham LJ’s statement of principle
14.27
14.28
Percy Trentham v Archital Luxfer
14.29
Steyn LJ’s statement of principle
14.30
14.31
RTS Flexible Systems v Müller
14.32
14.33
14.34
15 Proof of Terms and Incorporation of Terms
Preliminary Material
15.01
Key Points
15.02
Proof of Terms
Reduction to writing
15.03
15.04
15.05
15.06
The impact of ‘entire agreement’ clauses
15.07
The past: the ‘Parol Evidence Rule’, its exceptions, and its demise
15.08
15.09
Attempts to resuscitate the parol evidence rule
15.10
15.11
15.12
15.13
‘Somewhat old-fashioned’?
15.14
What was the parol evidence rule?
15.15
15.16
15.17
15.18
15.19
15.20
What were the exceptions to the parol evidence rule?
15.21
Exception (1): document not intended to be whole contract
15.22
15.23
15.24
15.25
Exception (2): collateral contracts and warranties
15.26
15.27
15.28
15.29
15.30
15.31
15.32
Exception (3): surrounding circumstances
15.33
Exception (4): subject matter or identity
15.34
15.35
15.36
15.37
Exception (5): technical or scientific language
15.38
Exception (6): trade usages or terms
15.39
Exception (7): ancient documents
15.40
Exception (8): foreign language
15.41
Exception (9): non est factum and vitiating factors
15.42
Exception (10): characterization or sham
15.43
Lord Wedderburn’s critique
15.44
15.45
The Law Commission report
15.46
15.47
The approach of the leading texts
15.48
The authorities
15.49
The demise of the ‘best evidence’ rule
15.50
Incorporation of Terms
The basis of incorporation
The construction approach versus the estoppel rationale
15.51
15.52
Modes of incorporation
15.53
15.54
15.55
A contractual document
15.56
15.57
15.58
15.59
15.60
15.61
Incorporation by Signature
15.62
L’Estrange v Graucob
15.63
15.64
15.65
15.66
Incorporation by Notice
15.67
15.68
Time
15.69
15.70
15.71
Incorporation by a Course of Dealing
15.72
15.73
Commercial course of dealing
15.74
15.75
Non-commercial course of dealing?
15.76
15.77
15.78
15.79
Incorporation of trade association terms
15.80
15.81
The British Crane Hire case
15.82
15.83
Incorporation by Reference
15.84
Standard industry terms
15.85
Contractor’s standard terms
15.86
15.87
The Effect of Misrepresentation
15.88
15.89
Limitations on Incorporation: The Effect of the Interfoto Principle on ‘Onerous and Unusual’ Terms
15.90
The Interfoto case
15.91
15.92
15.93
15.94
15.95
15.96
‘Onerous’ and/or ‘unusual’
15.97
Evidence
15.98
Subsequent cases on the Interfoto principle
15.99
15.100
15.101
15.102
15.103
Does the Interfoto approach apply to signed contracts?
15.104
15.105
15.106
The English authority
15.107
15.108
15.109
15.110
15.111
16 Parties, Third Party Effects, and Clauses Precluding Assignment
Preliminary Material
16.01
Identifying the Parties to the Contract
The importance of identity
16.02
Evidence
16.03
Inconsistency as to identity of parties
16.04
The Starsin
16.05
16.06
16.07
Misnomer
16.08
Impersonation
16.09
Cundy v Lindsay
16.10
King’s Norton Metal v Edridge Merrett
16.11
Shogun Finance Ltd v Hudson
The problem
16.12
The majority: Lord Hobhouse
16.13
16.14
16.15
The majority: Lord Walker
16.16
16.17
The majority: Lord Phillips
16.18
16.19
16.20
16.21
16.22
Overall
16.23
The minority: Lord Nicholls
16.24
The minority: Lord Millett
16.25
16.26
16.27
The Third Party Effects of Contracts
16.28
Three exercises in construction
16.29
Two relevant intentions
16.30
Express provision
Express conferral of a right of action
16.31
Explicit denial of a right of action
16.32
No rights of action save those explicitly conferred
16.33
Implicit provision
16.34
Stage one: conferral of benefit
16.35
Stage two: rebutting the presumption
16.36
16.37
16.38
Evidence to rebut the presumption
16.39
16.40
16.41
Causes of action and defences
16.42
Himalaya clauses
16.43
16.44
Anti-assignment Clauses
Contractual prohibition of assignment
16.45
16.46
The seminal authority
Helstan Securities v Hertfordshire County Council
16.47
Professor Goode’s critique
16.48
16.49
The leading case: Linden Gardens Trust
16.50
16.51
16.52
16.53
16.54
16.55
16.56
16.57
16.58
Subsequent case law
16.59
Flood v Shand Construction
16.60
16.61
16.62
16.63
Ex p Floods of Queensferry Ltd
16.64
Hendry v Chartsearch
16.65
Bawejem v MC Fabrications
16.66
The problem cases
Don King v Frank Warren
16.67
16.68
16.69
16.70
Return to In re Turcan
16.71
16.72
Don King and In re Turcan
16.73
16.74
Critique of Don King
16.75
16.76
16.77
16.78
Barbados Trust v Bank of Zambia
16.79
Foamcrete
16.80
16.81
16.82
Construction of insurance covenants and notices of assignment
16.83
16.84
16.85
16.86
17 Rectification and Correcting Mistakes through Construction
Preliminary Material
17.01
17.02
Construction as a Technique for Correcting Mistakes in Expression
17.03
17.04
17.05
No jurisdiction to claim rectification
17.06
Misdescription
17.07
Supplying words
17.08
Disregarding clauses or words
17.09
Transposing words
17.10
The leading nineteenth-century authority
17.11
The East v Pantiles Plant Hire test
17.12
The principles for correcting mistakes by construction
17.13
17.14
Modern examples of ‘correcting mistakes by construction’
17.15
17.16
17.17
17.18
17.19
17.20
17.21
17.22
17.23
17.24
Penal provisions
17.25
17.26
17.27
Rectification of Documents in Equity
17.28
Differences between construction and rectification
17.29
17.30
17.31
17.32
17.33
17.34
17.35
Recent developments in rectification
17.36
17.37
The two categories
Lord Mustill’s summary of principle in The Olympic Pride
17.38
17.39
Common mistake rectification introduced
17.40
Unilateral mistake rectification introduced
17.41
17.42
Common Mistake
17.43
Prior agreement or continuing common intention
17.44
17.45
17.46
17.47
The test for establishing intention
17.48
17.49
(1) Subjective and objective
17.50
17.51
17.52
17.53
17.54
17.55
17.56
(2) Growing complexity: Daventry
17.57
17.58
17.59
17.60
17.61
17.62
17.63
17.64
17.65
17.66
17.67
17.68
(3) Conclusions on Daventry
17.69
(4) Outward expression of accord
17.70
(5) Continuing intention
17.71
(6) Disparity between agreement or consensus and document
17.72
17.73
17.74
17.75
17.76
17.77
(7) Mistake
17.78
17.79
The redundancy of ‘common mistake’ rectification?
17.80
Unilateral Mistake
17.81
The standard of knowledge in unilateral mistake
17.82
17.83
17.84
17.85
17.86
17.87
17.88
17.89
17.90
17.91
17.92
17.93
17.94
17.95
Subjective and objective
17.96
General Matters
Certainty of intention
17.97
Standard of proof
General principles concerning the civil standard of proof
17.98
17.99
17.100
The traditional standard of proof in rectification cases
17.101
17.102
17.103
17.104
The modern standard of proof in rectification cases
17.105
Available materials
17.106
17.107
Entire agreement clauses and rectification
17.108
Practice
17.109
Effect of relief
17.110
18 Common Assumptions, Estoppel by Convention, and Estoppel by Deed
Preliminary Material
Estoppel by Convention
18.01
18.02
Relationship with Other Species of Estoppel
18.03
18.04
18.05
18.06
Two Leading Cases
AIP v Texas Bank
18.07
18.08
18.09
18.10
The Vistafjord
18.11
18.12
The Ingredients of Estoppel by Convention
18.13
18.14
Common assumption
18.15
Facts or law?
18.16
No requirement for clear and unequivocal representation
18.17
Objective manifestation or communication
18.18
Reliance
18.19
Unjust or unconscionable to depart from assumed state of affairs
18.20
A cause of action?
18.21
18.22
18.23
18.24
18.25
Estoppel and Pre-contractual Statements
18.26
Estoppel by Deed
18.27
18.28
18.29
18.30
18.31
18.32
19 Construction and Mistake as a Vitiating Factor
Preliminary Material
19.01
19.02
19.03
The Intricate Relationship between Mistake and Interpretation
19.04
19.05
19.06
19.07
Common Mistake
Common law mistake
19.08
Equitable Mistake
19.09
Associated Japanese Bank v Credit du Nord
19.10
William Sindall v Cambridgeshire County Council
19.11
The Great Peace
19.12
19.13
The facts and the holding
19.14
The new test for common mistake
19.15
Part III Particular Contractual Provisions
20 Conditions, Warranties, and Indemnities
Preliminary Material
Conditions
The varieties of conditions
20.01
First sense: condition equates to term
20.02
Second sense: condition as fundamental term
20.03
20.04
20.05
Third sense: conditions precedent and subsequent
20.06
Promissory and contingent conditions
20.07
Conditions and elective discharge or termination
20.08
The nature of discharge for breach
Prospectivity
20.09
Damages post-discharge
20.10
20.11
Characterizing conditions, warranties, and intermediate terms
20.12
20.13
Characterization of terms
20.14
Statutory classification
20.15
Precedent: judicial classification
20.16
Precedent: time stipulations in commercial contracts
20.17
Juristic classification
20.18
Construction: explicit classification
20.19
Schuler v Wickman
20.20
20.21
20.22
20.23
Construction: implicit classification
20.24
20.25
Warranties
The varieties of warranties
20.26
20.27
20.28
20.29
Representation or warranty?
20.30
When is a representation a term of the contract?
20.31
The factors in determining the existence of a collateral warranty: the Inntrepreneur summary
20.32
Warranties in Business Acquisition Contracts
The Eurocopy case
20.33
20.34
20.35
20.36
20.37
20.38
20.39
20.40
The Infiniteland case
20.41
20.42
20.43
20.44
20.45
20.46
20.47
20.48
20.49
Indemnities
Indemnity clauses and indemnities by operation of law
20.50
20.51
Contracts of indemnity insurance
20.52
Indemnities and guarantees
20.53
Non-insurance indemnity clauses
20.54
Common law and equity
20.55
Nature of an indemnity
20.56
Jervis v Harris
20.57
20.58
20.59
20.60
20.61
The Fanti and the Padre Island
20.62
20.63
Construction of Indemnity Clauses
20.64
The Canada Steamship guidelines
20.65
The Canada Steamship case
20.66
20.67
20.68
A gloss on the Canada Steamship guidelines
20.69
The Piper Alpha case: construction of mutual indemnity clauses
20.70
20.71
20.72
20.73
20.74
20.75
Illegality, public policy, and indemnity clauses
20.76
Indemnity clauses and limitation
20.77
21 Exemption Clauses and Unfair Contract Terms
Preliminary Material
Introduction
21.01
What is an exemption clause?
21.02
21.03
The varieties of exemption clauses
21.04
Construe the contract whilst disregarding the exemption
21.05
The rival Coote thesis
21.06
Statutory definition of exemption clauses
21.07
Exemption clauses and other standard provisions
21.08
Construction of Exemption Clauses
21.09
Previous examples of strict or strained construction
21.10
The demise of the doctrine of fundamental breach
21.11
Fundamental breach as a rule of construction
21.12
21.13
21.14
21.15
Deliberate breach
21.16
The Securicor cases: distinguishing exclusion clauses and limitation clauses
21.17
21.18
21.19
21.20
21.21
21.22
21.23
21.24
21.25
Time limitation clauses
21.26
Excluding Liability for Negligence
21.27
21.28
The Canada Steamship guidelines
21.29
Case law prior to the Canada Steamship case
21.30
21.31
21.32
21.33
21.34
The Canada Steamship case
21.35
21.36
21.37
21.38
Status of the Canada Steamship guidelines
21.39
21.40
21.41
21.42
21.43
21.44
Particular phrases
21.45
‘At sole risk’
21.46
‘Liability at common law’
21.47
‘However caused’ and ‘whatsoever’
21.48
21.49
21.50
21.51
‘Wilful neglect or default’
21.52
21.53
Carving out Fraud
21.54
21.55
21.56
‘Direct’, ‘Indirect’, and ‘Consequential’ Losses
Direct and indirect losses at common law?
21.57
21.58
The approach of the English courts
21.59
21.60
Summary of the approach
21.61
The leading case
21.62
21.63
21.64
21.65
21.66
21.67
21.68
Doubts cast upon Watford Electronics
21.69
21.70
Statutory Control: The Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977
21.71
The principal provisions
21.72
21.73
21.74
21.75
21.76
21.77
21.78
21.79
21.80
21.81
21.82
General Approach to the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977
21.83
21.84
21.85
Cases on the reasonableness test
The Overseas Medical case: Potter LJ’s guide to the reasonableness test
21.86
21.87
21.88
R & B Customs Brokers v United Dominions Trust
21.89
21.90
21.91
Purnell Secretarial Services v Lease Management Services
21.92
AEG (UK) Ltd v Logic Resource Ltd
21.93
SAM Business Systems Ltd v Hedley & Co
21.94
21.95
21.96
21.97
Granville Oil and Chemicals v Davies Turner
21.98
Grounds for appeal
21.99
Pleading and practice under the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977
21.100
21.101
21.102
21.103
The Consumer Rights Act 2015
21.104
Scope
21.105
21.106
The requirement of transparency
21.107
The requirement of fairness
21.108
Consequence of unfairness
21.109
Practice
21.110
Public law enforcement
21.111
21.112
The bank charges litigation
21.113
21.114
21.115
22 Change of Circumstances and ‘ Force Majeure ’ Clauses
Preliminary Material
22.01
22.02
22.03
22.04
22.05
Key Points
22.06
The Common Law Doctrine of Frustration
22.07
22.08
Juridical basis of frustration
22.09
22.10
22.11
The doctrine in outline
22.12
The effects of the doctrine
22.13
Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943
22.14
Contracting out of the Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943
22.15
22.16
No common law power of suspension
22.17
Incorporating Express Terms to Deal with Changes of Circumstances
Express clauses to deal with change of circumstances
22.18
‘Subject to force majeure conditions’
22.19
Four questions
22.20
General words or laundry list
22.21
22.22
Excuse or suspension
22.23
Notice provisions
22.24
22.25
22.26
Financial adjustment
22.27
Force majeure ’
22.28
22.29
22.30
22.31
22.32
22.33
22.34
Construction of the Operation and Effect of Force Majeure Clauses
Are force majeure clauses exemption clauses?
22.35
22.36
The leading case
22.37
22.38
Fairclough Dodd v J H Vantol
22.39
22.40
22.41
The Angelia
22.42
The Super Servant Two
22.43
Summary
22.44
Does contra proferentem apply?
22.45
Do the Canada Steamship guidelines apply?
22.46
22.47
22.48
Does ejusdem generis apply to general words or ‘sweeping words’?
22.49
Ambatielos v Anton Jurgens
22.50
The majority
22.51
Lord Sumner’s dissent
22.52
22.53
Sweeping words
22.54
22.55
Taking reasonable steps to avoid the event
22.56
Beyond control
22.57
‘Every effort will be made to carry out this contract …’
22.58
Knowledge of circumstances at the time of the contract
22.59
Burden of proof
22.60
22.61
Public regulation
22.62
23 Modification of Remedies: Express Termination, Retention of Title, and No Set-Off Clauses
Preliminary Material
23.01
Express Termination Clauses
Key points
23.02
Relationship with discharge for breach
23.03
23.04
Mistaken invocation of express termination provisions
23.05
The approach to construction
23.06
23.07
23.08
23.09
Meaning of ‘breach’
The Antaios
23.10
Rice v Great Yarmouth
23.11
23.12
23.13
23.14
23.15
23.16
Dominion v Debenhams
23.17
Compliance with procedure
23.18
23.19
23.20
23.21
23.22
23.23
23.24
Meaning of ‘material breach’ and ‘substantial breach’
23.25
Meaning of ‘terminated’
23.26
Relationship between express provisions and the common law regime
23.27
23.28
Schuler v Wickman
23.29
Statutory control
23.30
The measure of damages following the exercise of an express termination right
23.31
Financings v Baldock
23.32
23.33
Lombard North Central v Butterworth
23.34
23.35
23.36
Critique
23.37
23.38
Relief against forfeiture
23.39
Retention of Title
23.40
Policy issues
23.41
23.42
Incorporation
23.43
Construction and characterization
23.44
Categories of clause
23.45
23.46
23.47
23.48
Sales of goods legislation
23.49
23.50
The companies legislation
23.51
Claiming the goods
23.52
Proceeds and products
23.53
Fiduciary relationship?
23.54
23.55
Following clauses: sub-buyers
23.56
Restriction of Set-off
The principal species of set-off
23.57
23.58
23.59
23.60
Stewart Gill v Horatio Myer
Statutory regulation
23.61
Reasonableness
23.62
23.63
Application to commercial and financial transactions
23.64
24 Payment, Agreed Damages, and Acceleration Clauses
Preliminary Material
Payment Clauses
24.01
Agreed Damages Clauses
The traditional law on penalties
24.02
24.03
24.04
24.05
The retreat from Dunlop
24.06
The modern restatement of the penalty rule
24.07
24.08
24.09
24.10
24.11
24.12
24.13
24.14
24.15
24.16
24.17
24.18
24.19
24.20
24.21
24.22
24.23
Minimum Payment Clauses
24.24
Accelerated Payment Clauses
24.25
24.26
24.27
25 Time Stipulations
Preliminary Material
25.01
Construction of Time Stipulations
25.02
25.03
Time of the Essence: the General Rule
25.04
Statutory provision: Law of Property Act 1925
25.05
25.06
25.07
25.08
25.09
Statutory provision: Sale of Goods Act 1979
25.10
Stipulations as to time in commercial and mercantile contracts
25.11
25.12
Commercial leases: United Scientific Holdings v Burnley Borough Council
25.13
25.14
Making Time of the Essence
25.15
25.16
Time of the essence and equitable relief
25.17
25.18
Calculating Time
A question of construction
25.19
Inclusive construction: ‘beginning with’
25.20
Exclusive construction: ‘after’ and ‘from’
25.21
25.22
‘Within’
25.23
25.24
‘On the expiry of’
25.25
26 The Integrity of the Instrument: ‘Entire Agreement’ and ‘Non-Reliance’ Clauses
Preliminary Material
Introduction
26.01
Restriction of Variation and Waiver Clauses
26.02
‘Entire Agreement’ and ‘Non-reliance’ Clauses
Key points
26.03
26.04
What does an ‘entire agreement’ clause look like?
26.05
26.06
26.07
26.08
26.09
Carving out ‘fraud’
26.10
The issues
26.11
26.12
26.13
Construction of Entire Agreement Clauses
26.14
26.15
Entire Agreement Clauses and Collateral Warranties
Alman v Associated Newspapers: origin of ‘non-reliance’ clauses
26.16
26.17
26.18
Trident Turboprop v First Flight Couriers: ‘no representations’ clause
26.19
Thomas Witter v TBP Industries
26.20
26.21
26.22
26.23
26.24
EA Grimstead & Son Ltd v McGarrigan
26.25
26.26
Deepak v ICI
26.27
26.28
26.29
Government of Zanzibar v British Aerospace
26.30
The Inntrepreneur Pub cases
26.31
26.32
26.33
26.34
26.35
26.36
26.37
Watford Electronics Ltd v Sanderson CFL Ltd
26.38
26.39
26.40
Infiniteland Ltd v Artisan Contracting Ltd
26.41
Non-reliance Clauses and Excluding Liability for Misrepresentation
26.42
Evidential estoppel
26.43
Lowe v Lombank
26.44
26.45
26.46
Subsequent consideration of Lowe v Lombank
26.47
26.48
Chadwick LJ’s analysis of ‘non-reliance’ clauses
26.49
26.50
26.51
Estoppel by contract
Peekay: factual matrix and inducement
26.52
26.53
26.54
26.55
Peekay: estoppel by contract
26.56
26.57
26.58
26.59
Springwell Navigation v J P Morgan Chase
26.60
26.61
26.62
Springwell: the attack on Peekay at first instance
26.63
Springwell: the attack on Peekay in the Court of Appeal
26.64
26.65
26.66
26.67
Exceptions to the estoppel by contract principle
26.68
26.69
26.70
26.71
Quest-4-Finance v Maxfield
26.72
Conclusions on Peekay and Springwell
26.73
26.74
26.75
26.76
Statutory Regulation
The Misrepresentation Act 1967
26.77
The requirement of reasonableness
26.78
McGrath v Shah
26.79
26.80
Thomas Witter Ltd v TBP Industries Ltd
26.81
26.82
26.83
Government of Zanzibar v British Aerospace
26.84
Inntrepreneur Pub Co v East Crown Ltd
26.85
Watford Electronics Ltd v Sanderson CFL Ltd
26.86
SAM Business Systems Ltd v Hedley
26.87
26.88
IFE Fund v Goldman Sachs
26.89
26.90
Trident Turboprop (Dublin) v First Flight Couriers
26.91
Springwell Navigation v J P Morgan Chase
26.92
26.93
26.94
The Law Commission on ‘merger clauses’
26.95
26.96
26.97
26.98
Entire agreement clauses and consumer contracts
26.99
Entire Agreement Clauses and Implied Terms
Exxonmobil v Texaco
26.100
26.101
Impact of Entire Agreement Clause on Extrinsic Evidence
Proforce v Rugby Group
26.102
26.103
Waiver and subsequent agreement or variation
26.104
SAM Business Systems Ltd v Hedley & Co
26.105
Entire agreement clauses, rectification, and estoppel
26.106
Practical matters
26.107
26.108
26.109
Final Comparative Reflection
26.110
Part IV Rules Relating to Written Contracts
27 The Status of Instruments: Forgeries, Deliberate Alteration, Non Est Factum , and Shams
Preliminary Material
27.01
Forgery
27.02
Initial forgery
Ruben v Great Fingall
27.03
27.04
27.05
Effect on co-signatories
27.06
Forgery: subsequent alteration
Kwei Tek Chao v British Traders
27.07
27.08
27.09
27.10
Critique of Kwei Tek Chao
27.11
27.12
27.13
Deliberate Alteration of Instruments
The original formulation of the rule in Pigot’s Case
27.14
27.15
Materiality of alteration irrelevant
27.16
27.17
Alteration by a stranger
27.18
The modern scope of the rule
Applies to all instruments
27.19
Deliberate
27.20
What is material?
27.21
Immaterial matters
27.22
27.23
Effect of alteration
27.24
Non Est Factum
Introduction
Origins
27.25
Why is non est factum pleaded?
27.26
Applicable to all contracts
27.27
The leading case: Gallie v Lee
27.28
Facts and holding
27.29
Ingredients of non est factum
27.30
27.31
Lack of negligence
27.32
27.33
27.34
Effect of non est factum
27.35
Sham
Characterization
27.36
27.37
What is a sham?
27.38
The requirement of common intention
27.39
The modern statement of principle
27.40
What evidence is available?
27.41
27.42
The effect of a sham
Proper characterization
27.43
Impact on the parties and third parties
27.44
27.45
Summary
27.46
27.47
27.48
Part V Construction and Practice
28 Evidence and Practice
Preliminary Material
The Modern Law of Civil Evidence
28.01
28.02
28.03
Document, originals, and copies
What does ‘in writing’ mean?
28.04
What is a document?
28.05
What is an original?
28.06
What is a copy?
28.07
Proof of information in documents
28.08
What is a signature?
Function of signature
28.09
28.10
What counts as a signature? Traditional cases
28.11
Electronic Communications Act 2000
28.12
Law Commission advice on electronic commerce
28.13
28.14
E-mails and guarantees
28.15
The impact of electronic commerce
28.16
28.17
The Best Evidence Rule
The rise and fall of the best evidence rule
28.18
The origins
28.19
28.20
28.21
Osman: demise of the best evidence rule
28.22
28.23
Springsteen: death of the best evidence rule
28.24
The Court of Appeal’s three categories of cases
28.25
The facts and the first instance decision
28.26
The decision of the Court of Appeal
28.27
28.28
Lost or destroyed documents: the modern general rule
28.29
Lost or destroyed documents: forgeries and other allegations of impropriety
28.30
The requirement to produce original documents at trial
28.31
28.32
28.33
Practice: Procedures for Determining Issues of Construction
28.34
28.35
28.36
28.37
28.38
28.39
28.40
28.41
28.42
Further Material
Bibliography
Index
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Table of Legislation
From:
McMeel on The Construction of Contracts (3rd Edition)
Gerard McMeel
Content type:
Book content
Product:
International Commercial Law [ICML]
Published in print:
12 October 2017
ISBN:
9780198755166
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