We use cookies to enhance your experience on our website. By continuing to use our website, you are agreeing to our use of cookies. You can change your cookie settings at any time.
Find out more
Jump to Content
Jump to Main Navigation
User Account
Personal Profile
See all online law products
More
About
Guided Tour
Subscriber Services
Contact Us
FAQ
Help
Search
Browse all
Area of law
Financial Law [FBL]
International Commercial Arbitration [ICMA]
Private International Law [PRIL]
International Commercial Law [ICML]
Author
My Content
(0)
Recently viewed
(0)
Save Entry
My Searches
(0)
Recently viewed
(0)
Save Search
Print
Save
Cite
Email this content
Share Link
Copy this link, or click below to email it to a friend
Email this content
or copy the link directly:
https://olrl.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law/9780198754411.001.0001/law-9780198754411-miscMatter-9
The link was not copied. Your current browser may not support copying via this button.
Link copied successfully
Copy link
Share This
Sign in
You could not be signed in, please check and try again.
Username
Please enter your Username
Password
Please enter your Password
Forgot password?
Don't have an account?
Sign in via your Institution
You could not be signed in, please check and try again.
Sign in with your library card
Please enter your library card number
View translated passages only
Oxford Law Citator
Contents
Expand All
Collapse All
Preliminary Material
Preface
Acknowledgements
Contents—Summary
Table of Cases
Court of Justice of the European Union
European Commission
Germany
United Kingdom
Table of Legislation
European Legislation
Treaties
Directives
Regulations
Other Instruments
International Instruments
Germany
New Zealand
United Kingdom
Statutes
Statutory Instruments
United States
List of Abbreviations
List of Contributors
Editors
Contributors
Main Text
1 Recovery and Resolution Planning: Reconfiguring Financial Regulation and Supervision
A Introduction
1.01
1.02
1.03
1.04
1.05
B The Competent Authority and Resolution Authority
1.06
1.07
1.08
1.09
1.10
1.11
1.12
1.13
1.14
C Recovery Planning
1.15
1.16
1.17
1.18
1.19
1.20
1.21
1.22
1.23
1.24
1.25
1.26
1.27
1.28
1.29
1.30
1.31
1.32
D Resolution Planning
1.33
1.34
1.35
1.36
1.37
1.38
1.39
1.40
E Resolvability Assessment of Institutions and Groups
1.41
1.42
1.43
F Intragroup Financial Support
1.44
1.45
1.46
1.47
G Title III: Early Intervention Planning
1.48
1.49
1.50
1.51
H Recovery and Resolution Planning: Improving Forward-looking Risk-based Supervision
1.52
1.53
1.54
2 Resolution: Concepts, Requirements, and Tools
A Introduction
2.01
2.02
2.03
2.04
B The Concept of ‘Resolution’ and General Principles
1 Requirements of an alternative insolvency regime for banks: BRRD and its background
a) The lack of international harmonization prior to the global financial crisis
2.05
2.06
2.07
b) Lessons learnt from Lehman and others: The shortcomings of traditional approaches to bank insolvency
2.08
2.09
2.10
2.11
2.12
2.13
c) Squaring the circle? The quest for alternative procedures and the emergence of the toolbox approach
2.14
2.15
2.16
2.17
2.18
2.19
2 The concept of ‘resolution’ under BRRD
2.20
2.21
2.22
2.23
2.24
2.25
C Defining the Key to the Toolbox: Objectives of and Conditions for Resolution
1 ‘Resolution objectives’
2.26
2.27
a) Ensuring continuity of ‘critical functions’
2.28
2.29
2.30
2.31
b) Avoiding significant adverse effects on financial stability
2.32
2.33
c) Protecting public funds
2.34
2.35
2.36
d) Protecting insured depositors and investors, protecting client assets
2.37
2 Conditions for resolution
a) Overview
2.38
2.39
b) Institution failing or likely to fail
2.40
2.41
2.42
c) No reasonable prospect of other successful solutions
2.43
d) Resolution necessary in the public interest
2.44
2.45
2.46
D Resolution Tools and Write Down of Capital Instruments
1 Sale of business and bridge institution
2.47
2.48
2.49
2.50
2 Asset separation tool
2.51
2.52
2.53
3 Bail-in and write down of capital instruments
2.54
2.55
2.56
2.57
2.58
2.59
2.60
2.61
E Conclusion
2.62
2.63
3 The Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive: An International Standards Perspective
A Introduction
3.01
3.02
3.03
3.04
B The IMF and the Standards
3.05
3.06
3.07
C International Standards and the European Banking Crisis
3.08
3.09
3.10
3.11
3.12
D Assessing the Observance of Financial Sector Standards in Europe
3.13
3.14
3.15
3.16
3.17
E Towards Banking Union
3.18
3.19
3.20
3.21
3.22
3.23
F The Commission Proposals to Address the Crisis: The BRRD
3.24
3.25
3.26
3.27
G Timelines
3.28
3.29
H From Bailout to Bail-in
3.30
3.31
3.32
3.33
3.34
3.35
3.36
I The Legacy
3.37
J Harmonized National Frameworks?
3.38
3.39
3.40
3.41
3.42
K Institutional Framework
3.43
3.44
3.45
3.46
L Multi-speed Europe and Beyond
3.47
3.48
3.49
3.50
M Conclusion
3.51
3.52
3.53
3.54
3.55
1 ‘Steel plating’ the system for the future
3.56
3.57
3.58
3.59
4 Derivatives and Bail-in under the EU Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive
A Introduction
4.01
4.02
4.03
B Definitions
1 Derivatives under the BRRD
4.04
4.05
4.06
2 Netting
4.07
4.08
3 Bail-in
4.09
4.10
4.11
C Valuation
4.12
4.13
4.14
4.15
4.16
4.17
4.18
D Resolution Powers
4.19
1 Suspension of contractual rights
4.20
4.21
4.22
4.23
2 Temporary suspension of termination rights
4.24
4.25
4.26
3 Suspension of payment and delivery obligations
4.27
4 Restrictions on the enforcement of security interests
4.28
5 Continuity arrangements
4.29
E Exclusions from Bail-in
4.30
1 General exclusions
4.31
2 Specific exemptions
4.32
F Conclusion
4.33
4.34
5 The Implementation of the EU Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive’s Derivative Bail-in Powers in the UK
A Introduction
5.01
5.02
B Implementation of the BRRD’s Derivative Bail-in Provisions in the UK
1 Legislative context of the Restriction Order
5.03
5.04
5.05
5.06
5.07
5.08
5.09
5.10
5.11
2 Problems of, and concerns with, implementation
5.12
5.13
5.14
5.15
a) Definitional contortions
5.16
(i) ‘Derivative’
5.17
5.18
5.19
5.20
(ii) ‘Financial contract’
5.21
5.22
(iii) ‘Eligible liabilities’
5.23
b) Excluded Liabilities I—secured liabilities
5.24
5.25
5.26
5.27
5.28
5.29
(i) Quasi-security
5.30
5.31
(ii) Liabilities that are themselves security
5.32
5.33
c) Excluded Liabilities II—Financial Collateral Directive
5.34
5.35
d) Nature of Protected Liabilities in general
5.36
5.37
5.38
(i) Definition of ‘relevant arrangements’
5.39
5.40
5.41
5.42
(ii) Definition of ‘netting arrangements’
5.43
5.44
5.45
5.46
5.47
5.48
5.49
5.50
5.51
5.52
5.53
(iii) Interim conclusion on Protected Liabilities
5.54
e) Protected Liabilities—‘Mandatory’ close-out
5.55
f) Valuation issues
5.56
5.57
5.58
g) Capital adequacy
5.59
h) NCWO and US Most Favoured Treatment
5.60
5.61
(i) Timing issues
5.62
3 Systemic consequences of derivative bail-in—UK concerns
5.63
5.64
5.65
C Conclusion
5.66
5.67
6 The Revision of the Credit Derivative Definitions in the Context of the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive
A Introduction
6.01
6.02
B Purpose and Function of Credit Derivatives
6.03
6.04
6.05
6.06
C Adjustment of the CDS Framework during the Financial Crisis
6.07
1 The ISDA framework
6.08
6.09
2 Confirmation as trade documentation
6.10
3 The 2009 Supplements
6.11
6.12
6.13
6.14
6.15
4 The CDS Matrix
6.16
D The BRRD and its Challenges for the 2003 Definitions
6.17
1 Overview of the BRRD
6.18
6.19
6.20
2 Bankruptcy and Restructuring under the 2003 Definitions
6.21
6.22
6.23
6.24
6.25
6.26
6.27
6.28
6.29
6.30
6.31
6.32
E The ISDA 2014 Credit Definitions
6.33
1 Background
6.34
6.35
6.36
2 Governmental Intervention Credit Event
6.37
a) Exploring Governmental Intervention
6.38
6.39
b) Distinction Restructuring and Bankruptcy
6.40
c) Governmental Intervention’s breadth
6.41
6.42
6.43
6.44
6.45
1 Revised Deliverable Obligation
6.46
a) Preservation of the deliverability of Obligations
6.47
6.48
6.49
6.50
6.51
6.52
6.53
6.54
b) Asset package delivery provisions
6.55
6.56
2 Discussion of the 2014 Definitions
6.57
F Conclusion
6.58
6.59
6.60
6.61
6.62
7 Third Country Relations in the Directive Establishing a Framework for the Recovery and Resolution of Credit Institutions
A Introduction
7.01
7.02
7.03
B Cross-border International Banking: From and to the EU
7.04
7.05
7.06
7.07
7.08
7.09
C Third Country Relations in the Recovery and Resolution Directive
7.10
1 Inspiring principles and exceptions
7.11
7.12
7.13
7.14
7.15
7.16
2 What bank financial structures are covered by the recovery and resolution Directive?
7.17
7.18
7.19
3 Cooperation framework with third country resolution authorities
7.20
7.21
7.22
7.23
7.24
7.25
7.26
7.27
7.28
4 An economic analysis of the single point of entry resolution strategy
7.29
7.30
7.31
7.32
D Third Party Relations with Resolution Authorities in the European Banking Union
7.33
7.34
7.35
7.36
7.37
7.38
7.39
7.40
E Final Reflections
7.41
7.42
7.43
7.44
7.45
7.46
7.47
F Annex: Principles and Tools
7.48
7.49
7.50
7.51
8 Third Country Cooperation Mechanisms within the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive: Will they be Effective?
A Introduction
8.01
8.02
8.03
8.04
8.05
8.06
8.07
B The Meaning of ‘Cooperation’ and its Difference with ‘Coordination’
8.08
8.09
8.10
8.11
8.12
8.13
8.14
8.15
8.16
8.17
C Layers of Cooperation
1 Institutional
8.18
8.19
8.20
8.21
8.22
8.23
8.24
8.25
2 Temporal and subject matter
8.26
8.27
8.28
8.29
8.30
8.31
8.32
8.33
3 A brief discussion on certain problems related to cross-border cooperation
8.34
8.35
4 Different regulatory cultures and supervisory forbearance
8.36
5 Agency conflicts among supervisors
8.37
8.38
8.39
6 Memoranda of understanding (MoU)
8.40
8.41
8.42
8.43
7 Fiscal responsibilities and burden sharing
8.44
8.45
8.46
D BRRD and Third Country Cooperation Mechanisms: A Critical Analysis
8.47
8.48
8.49
8.50
8.51
8.52
8.53
8.54
8.55
8.56
8.57
8.58
8.59
8.60
8.61
8.62
8.63
8.64
8.65
8.66
8.67
8.68
E Some Conclusive Reflections
8.69
8.70
8.71
9 Bank Resolution Financing in the Banking Union
A Introduction
9.01
9.02
9.03
9.04
9.05
B The Birth of the Banking Union: Critical Juncture and Radical Policy Turn
9.06
9.07
9.08
9.09
9.10
9.11
9.12
C The Concept Applied
9.13
9.14
1 Single Supervisory Mechanism
9.15
9.16
9.17
9.18
9.19
2 Single Resolution Mechanism
9.20
9.21
9.22
9.23
9.24
9.25
D The Need for a Common ‘Fiscal Backstop’ as Raison d’Être of the Move to a Banking Union
9.26
9.27
9.28
9.29
9.30
9.31
9.32
9.33
E The BRRD’s Burden-sharing Cascade and its Impact on Resolution Financing in the Banking Union
9.34
1 The burden-sharing cascade
9.35
9.36
2 Mandatory bail-in
9.37
9.38
9.39
3 Single Resolution Fund
9.40
9.41
9.42
9.43
9.44
4 The ESM’s direct recapitalization instrument
9.45
9.46
9.47
9.48
9.49
9.50
9.51
9.52
9.53
9.54
9.55
9.56
9.57
9.58
9.59
9.60
9.61
9.62
F Questioning the Sufficiency of the Financing Arrangements
9.63
9.64
9.65
9.66
9.67
9.68
9.69
G A Stable Compromise?
9.70
9.71
9.72
10 The Funding of Bank Resolution
A Introduction
10.01
10.02
10.03
10.04
10.05
10.06
10.07
B Minimizing the Costs of Failure Resolution
10.08
10.09
10.10
10.11
10.12
10.13
C Where do the Costs of a Bank Failure Fall?
10.14
10.15
10.16
10.17
D Open Bank Resolution in New Zealand
10.18
10.19
10.20
10.21
10.22
10.23
10.24
10.25
E The RBNZ Assessment
10.26
10.27
10.28
10.29
10.30
10.31
10.32
10.33
F Who Pays Under the BRRD?
10.34
10.35
10.36
10.37
10.38
10.39
10.40
10.41
10.42
10.43
G The Impact of the BRRD
10.44
10.45
10.46
10.47
10.48
H Bailing-in versus Bailing Out
10.49
10.50
10.51
10.52
10.53
10.54
10.55
10.56
10.57
10.58
10.59
I Concluding Remark
10.60
10.61
10.62
10.63
11 The Role of Deposit Insurance Post Implementation of the EU Recovery, Resolution, and Deposit Guarantee Directives
Preliminary Material
A Introduction
11.01
1 The financial system safety net—its components and how they are evolving
11.02
11.03
11.04
2 European deposit guarantee schemes and their ability to contribute to financial stability
11.05
11.06
3 Institutional framework of a financial system safety net
11.07
11.08
11.09
11.10
11.11
11.12
4 The BRRD: establishing the framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions
11.13
a) Appointment of a public body
11.14
11.15
11.16
11.17
11.18
11.19
11.20
b) Bail-in
11.21
11.22
11.23
11.24
c) Relationship of BRRD to IADI and FSB work
11.25
11.26
11.27
11.28
B Conclusion
11.29
11.30
11.31
12 The European Deposit Guarantee Directive: A Domestic Perspective
A Introduction
12.01
12.02
12.03
B The German Insurance Deposit Landscape as it Stands
12.04
12.05
1 The German deposit protection before Directive 94/19 EEC (DPD 1)
12.06
a) Landesbanken
12.07
12.08
b) Private banks
12.09
12.10
c) The German Deposit Protection in the Transposition of DPD 1
12.11
12.12
12.13
C Experiences Before and during the Financial Crisis
12.14
12.15
12.16
12.17
12.18
12.19
1 The Lehman case—state aid issues and the view of the Commission
12.20
12.21
12.22
12.23
2 Lessons from Icesave and the Commission’s little sister’s view
12.24
12.25
12.26
12.27
12.28
12.29
3 The compensation of the Phoenix investors—a German story before the financial crisis
12.30
12.31
D Impact of the Directive 2014/49/EU (Deposit Protection—‘DPD 3’)
12.32
12.33
1 Ex ante financing
12.34
12.35
12.36
12.37
2 Rules for allotment to the scheme and compensation procedures
a) Mandatory allotment to the DGS
12.38
3 Change in the pay-out systems
12.39
4 New powers for statutory DGS
12.40
5 Lessons which are not covered
a) Lehman
12.41
12.42
12.43
12.44
b) Icesave
12.45
12.46
12.47
c) Phoenix
12.48
6 Link to the BRRD
12.49
12.50
E Impact of the Directive 2014/59/EU (Bank Resolution and Recovery Directive)
12.51
12.52
12.53
12.54
12.55
1 How does the Bail-in Instrument work?
12.56
12.57
a) Exercise by a resolution authority
12.58
(i) The European set-up
12.59
(ii) The German Transposition : Sanierungs- und Abwicklungsgesetz (SAG)
12.60
12.61
(iii) Write down and conversion powers
12.62
(iv) The European set-up
12.63
(v) The German Transposition
12.64
(vi) Bail-in liabilities of an institution
12.65
(vii) The European set-up
12.66
(viii) The German Transposition
12.67
(ix) Subrogation of Rights
12.68
12.69
(x) Open issues/bail-in
12.70
12.71
12.72
12.73
12.74
F Summary
12.75
13 Resolution in the UK and US: Variations to the Same Goals
A Introduction
13.01
13.02
13.03
13.04
13.05
B International Responses
13.06
13.07
1 The US response
13.08
13.09
2 The UK and European response
a) The United Kingdom’s response
13.10
13.11
13.12
13.13
b) The European response
13.14
13.15
C The Role of Bail-in under the Resolution Authorities
13.16
1 Summary of the FDIC SPOE strategy
13.17
13.18
13.19
13.20
13.21
13.22
13.23
D Summary of the UK and European Union Approach to SPOE
1 The Bank of England’s approach to SPOE
13.24
13.25
13.26
13.27
13.28
13.29
13.30
13.31
13.32
13.33
E Total Loss-absorbing Capacity and Bail-in
13.34
13.35
13.36
13.37
13.38
13.39
13.40
13.41
13.42
13.43
14 The Single Point of Entry Approach to Bank Resolution
A Introduction
14.01
14.02
14.03
14.04
14.05
14.06
14.07
14.08
B The Two Main Approaches to Resolution Strategies
14.09
14.10
14.11
1 Single point of entry approach
14.12
14.13
14.14
14.15
14.16
14.17
14.18
14.19
a) Key features of a successful SPE strategy
14.20
14.21
14.22
14.23
14.24
14.25
14.26
14.27
14.28
b) Key features of a successful MPE strateg
14.29
14.30
14.31
14.32
14.33
14.34
14.35
c) Operational resolution plan
14.36
14.37
14.38
14.39
14.40
14.41
14.42
C The Approach of the FDIC and Bank of England
14.43
14.44
14.45
14.46
14.47
14.48
D US Approach to SPE Resolution Strategy
14.49
14.50
14.51
14.52
14.53
14.54
14.55
14.56
E UK Approach to SPE Resolution Strategy
14.57
14.58
14.59
14.60
14.61
14.62
14.63
14.64
14.65
14.66
14.67
14.68
14.69
14.70
14.71
F Which of the SPE or MPE Approaches is Most Suitable?
14.72
14.73
15 The Operation of the Single Resolution Mechanism in the Context of the EU State Aid Regime
A Introduction
15.01
15.02
15.03
15.04
15.05
B The Design of the European Banking Union
15.06
15.07
C The EU Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive
15.08
15.09
15.10
15.11
15.12
15.13
15.14
15.15
1 The Single Resolution Mechanism
15.16
15.17
15.18
15.19
15.20
15.21
15.22
15.23
15.24
15.25
D The Single Resolution Mechanism and State Aid
15.26
15.27
15.28
15.29
15.30
15.31
15.32
15.33
15.34
15.35
15.36
E Where (and how) to Strike the Balance
15.37
15.38
15.39
15.40
15.41
15.42
15.43
15.44
15.45
15.46
15.47
15.48
15.49
15.50
16 Financial Market Infrastructures in Stress Scenarios
A Introduction
16.01
16.02
16.03
16.04
16.05
1 Asymmetries in rules, procedures, and authorities’ motivations
16.06
16.07
16.08
16.09
16.10
2 Elements of efficient and effective recovery and resolution planning
16.11
16.12
a) Rules commensurate to the divergent risk profiles of systemically important FMIs
16.13
16.14
16.15
16.16
b) Automated versus discretionary activation
16.17
16.18
c) A European issue: Single versus multiple resolution authorities
16.19
d) Set-off, netting, collateral, and designation under the SFD
16.20
16.21
16.22
16.23
e) Extra-territorial issues
16.24
16.25
16.26
f) Potential conflicts faced by authorities
16.27
16.28
3 EU Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive and FMIs
16.29
16.30
16.31
16.32
4 Systemically important financial market utilities under the US Dodd–Frank Act
16.33
16.34
5 The way forward
16.35
16.36
16.37
B Conclusion
16.38
Further Material
Index
Sign up for alerts
List of Contributors
Edited By: Jens-Hinrich Binder, Dalvinder Singh
From:
Bank Resolution: The European Regime
Edited By: Jens-Hinrich Binder, Dalvinder Singh
Content type:
Book content
Product:
Financial Law [FBL]
Published in print:
28 July 2016
ISBN:
9780198754411
Prev
|
Next
[18.208.126.232]
18.208.126.232