Jump to Content Jump to Main Navigation

You are looking at 12 of 2 results

Contributor: Skinner, Christina x
Clear All

Part IV Conduct and Culture, 20 Conflicts of Interest: Comparing Compliance and Culture in the United States and the United Kingdom »

Geneviève Helleringer, Christina Skinner
From: Governance of Financial Institutions
Edited By: Danny Busch, Guido Ferrarini, Gerard van Solinge
This chapter focuses on conflicts of interest in the retail space. Because of the structure of incentives, conflicts of interest situations regularly arise in the context of retail investment advice. As such, conflicts of interest have been the focal point of regulators' efforts to improve conduct in the retail investment space. In the United States, both the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Department of Labor (DOL) have embarked on rulemaking projects to heighten and refine the fiduciary duties that investment advisors owe to retail clients — and, in particular, the duty of loyalty that dictates the identification and management of conflicts of interest. Similarly, as a result of the Financial Conduct Authority’s ‘Retail Distribution Review’, U.K. regulators have issued new guidance on how the investment adviser can best comply with his or her fiduciary duties.

Part III Ownership Structures, 14 State-Owned Financial Institutions »

Johannes Adolff, Katja Langenbucher, Christina Skinner
From: Governance of Financial Institutions
Edited By: Danny Busch, Guido Ferrarini, Gerard van Solinge
This chapter assesses whether State-ownership of financial institutions can further systemic stability and allocative efficiency. State-owned financial institutions are not common in most Western developed and capitalist economies. However, the United States and Germany may be seen as partial exceptions among their peer Western economies, with the United States' Government-Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs) and Germany’s State-owned banks. In the United States, the State-ownership conversation has been framed largely in terms of public utility regulation. Likewise, in Germany, where almost half of banking activities are carried out by ‘alternative banks’, there is a certain level of support for the notion that such ‘alternative’ ownership structures have their merits and that, therefore, a good mix of private and non-private ownership structures may well be the most promising approach for pursuing allocative efficiency and overall system stability.