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Part I Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 3 Managing Holdouts: The Case of the 2012 Greek Exchange »

Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Christoph Trebesch, G. Mitu Gulati
From: Sovereign Debt Management
Edited By: Rosa M Lastra, Lee Buchheit
3.01 Perhaps the most discussed issue in the modern literature on sovereign debt restructurings is how to manage holdout creditors. Argentina’s long battle with holdouts provides an illustration. More than eleven years after its default in 2001, Argentina is still mired in litigation against hundreds of creditors in multiple fora. It is so fearful of creditors being able to attach its assets that it spends considerable resources every year in hiding them. For those same reasons, we suspect, it has also avoided re-entering the international bond markets. By...

Part III Complicating Factors, 18 Sovereign Contingent Liabilities »

Lee Buchheit, G. Mitu Gulati
From: Sovereign Debt Management
Edited By: Rosa M Lastra, Lee Buchheit
18.01 It is a truth universally acknowledged, that a sovereign borrower in possession of an uncomfortably large stock of debt, must be in want of camouflage. And since the commencement of the financial crisis in 2008, many sovereigns seem to have found it—in the form of contingent sovereign liabilities. 18.02 In every situation in which a sovereign lends its credit support to facilitate a borrowing by a third party, the sovereign will have had a choice. The alternative to guaranteeing the debt of the third party is for the sovereign to borrow the money in its own...