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This chapter begins by considering the especially severe information-asymmetry problem that plagues primary offerings of truly new securities. It then examines market-based solutions for these problems, the shortcomings of exclusive reliance on such solutions, and the rationale for having a government-designed affirmative-disclosure regime, whereby an issuer making an offering is required to answer certain questions. It also addresses the question of whether this regime should be imposed on all issuers making such offerings or only those that volunteer to be subjected to it. The remainder of the chapter considers the rationale for mandating the imposition of liability on issuers, issuer directors and officers, underwriters, dealers, and experts such as accountants or rating agencies when there have been material misstatements or material omissions of what was required to be disclosed. The final section briefly applies the preceding discussion to the efforts, as part of the Capital Markets Union, to increase the opportunities for European SMEs raise funds through public offerings.

This chapter provides a U.S. perspective on the MiFID II equity trading regulation. The author concludes that a comparison of the EU and U.S. market structure rules, and the concerns that generated them, suggests four three key differences. Relative to the United States, the EU shows (i) more concern with having an effective price formation process, (ii) more concern with the possibility that HFTs contribute to price instability and engage in market abuse, (iii) less concern with promoting competition among trading venues. These differences have characterized the MiFID I era and are reflected in MiFID II as well, although MiFID II does evince somewhat greater concern about competition among trading venues than was true before.