Jump to Content Jump to Main Navigation

You are looking at 120 of 70 results

Contributor: Ferrarini, Guido x
Clear All

Part I General Aspects, 4 A Single Listing Authority and Securities Regulator for the CMU and the Future of ESMA: Costs, Benefits, and Legal Impediments »

Emilios Avgouleas, Guido Ferrarini
From: Capital Markets Union in Europe
Edited By: Danny Busch, Emilios Avgouleas, Guido Ferrarini
This chapter proposes a system for EU centralization of scrutiny and approval of public offers of securities or of listing of companies mature enough to conduct an IPO or those that seek a listing following a secondary offer. It first discusses the European Securities and Markets Authority's unique presence in the EU regulatory edifice and the true ambit and interpretation of its powers. It then sets out the preferred architecture and ambit for a possible European Listing Authority and Capital Markets Union–Securities and Exchange Commission (CMU–SEC), and the advantages their establishment could bring to the CMU project. Next, it discusses the legality of a possible CMU–SEC and brings the different strands of the present analysis into a comprehensive solution.

Author Biographies »

Edited By: Danny Busch, Guido Ferrarini
From: European Banking Union (2nd Edition)
Edited By: Danny Busch, Guido Ferrarini

Author Biographies »

Edited By: Danny Busch, Guido Ferrarini
From: Regulation of the EU Financial Markets: MiFID II and MiFIR
Edited By: Danny Busch, Guido Ferrarini

Part III Single Resolution and the BRRD, 12 Bank Resolution in Practice: Analysis of Early European Cases »

Guido Ferrarini, Alberto Musso Piantelli
From: European Banking Union (2nd Edition)
Edited By: Danny Busch, Guido Ferrarini
This chapter explains that resolution lies at the heart of both the Bank Resolution and Recovery Directive and the Single Resolution Mechanism Regulation and that the preservation of taxpayers’ money through bail-in is one of its main political and ideological objectives. However, there are shortcomings in bail-in mainly due to small savers’ involvement and contagion effects. Moreover, the new regime does not cover ‘normal’ insolvency proceedings that remain regulated under national law, raising the issue of the relationship between EU resolution and national insolvency proceedings. The chapter deals with the cases of the Venetian Banks in Italy and Banco Popular in Spain. It concludes that, notwithstanding prompt regulatory responses to the 2008 crisis, the road to effective and credible bank resolution is slow and bumpy. The EU resolution framework is at risk of being displaced by path-dependent national rules, while the bail-in doctrine has met with opposition in practice, remaining de facto largely unapplied in major crisis episodes. Clearly, politicians and the public in general are still unprepared for a radical change in approach to crisis management.

Part I General Aspects, 1 Capital Markets Union after Brexit »

Danny Busch, Emilios Avgouleas, Guido Ferrarini
From: Capital Markets Union in Europe
Edited By: Danny Busch, Emilios Avgouleas, Guido Ferrarini
In line with the European Commission's wish to create fully integrated European capital markets, its Capital Markets Union (CMU) Action Plan is intended to make it easier for providers and receivers of funds to come into contact with one another within Europe, especially across borders. This book discusses various aspects of CMU from a legal and/or economic perspective. The chapters are grouped in a thematic way, covering the following areas: (i) general aspects, (ii) Brexit, (iii) financing innovation, (iv) raising capital on the capital markets, (v) fostering retail and institutional investment, (vi) leveraging banking capacity to support the wider economy, and (vii) facilitating cross-border investing. This chapter outlines some general aspects of CMU that are not explicitly covered by the other chapters in this book: (1) the CMU objectives, (2) the EBU–CMU relationship, (3) regulatory burden, and (4) Better Regulation and the Call for Evidence.

Capital Markets Union in Europe »

Edited By: Danny Busch, Emilios Avgouleas, Guido Ferrarini

Part II Governance Structures and Regulation, 11 Compensation in Financial Institutions: Systemic Risk, Regulation, and Proportionality »

Guido Ferrarini
From: Governance of Financial Institutions
Edited By: Danny Busch, Guido Ferrarini, Gerard van Solinge
This chapter addresses the issue of executive and employee compensation in financial institutions. Excessive pay at financial institutions has often been indicated as one of the possible causes of the recent financial crisis, but the case for regulating compensation is rather weak, while regulation of remuneration and risk governance, and of remuneration disclosure are to some extent justified. The EU law shifted the setting of compensation from a supervisory approach to a regulatory one, adopting detailed and rigid provisions on the structure, governance, and disclosure of pay. Moreover, the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD IV) introduced an unprecedented cap to variable remuneration, which may distort incentives and produce unintended consequences on bank risk-taking. The chapter then looks at possible ways to overcome the shortcomings of EU regulation of financial institutions in the remuneration are and suggests that it should be made more flexible and proportionate within the limits allowed by the international principles.

Contents »

Edited By: Danny Busch, Guido Ferrarini
From: European Banking Union (2nd Edition)
Edited By: Danny Busch, Guido Ferrarini

Contents »

Danny Busch, Emilios Avgouleas, Guido Ferrarini
From: Capital Markets Union in Europe
Edited By: Danny Busch, Emilios Avgouleas, Guido Ferrarini

Contents »

Edited By: Danny Busch, Guido Ferrarini
From: Regulation of the EU Financial Markets: MiFID II and MiFIR
Edited By: Danny Busch, Guido Ferrarini

Part IV Conduct and Culture, 16 Corporate Culture in the Governance of Financial Institutions: An Interdisciplinary Approach »

Shanshan Zhu, Guido Ferrarini
From: Governance of Financial Institutions
Edited By: Danny Busch, Guido Ferrarini, Gerard van Solinge
This chapter looks at the role of ethics and culture in the financial services industry as determinants of either good or bad behaviour. Because banks are run by human beings, one should know first how to fix people’s behaviour if one wants to understand how to fix banks. Therefore, governance models should be rather analysed with a focus on the organizational and cultural aspects of institutions. A proactive inclusion of cultural and ethical issues in banking supervision has been accomplished by the De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB), which was in 2010 the first banking supervisor globally to treat culture and behaviour as risk factors in supervision. At EU level, the European Banking Authority (EBA) Guidelines on common procedures and methodologies for the supervisory review and evaluation process (SREP) make reference to culture and ethics in banks.

Detailed Contents »

Edited By: Eddy Wymeersch, Klaus J Hopt, Guido Ferrarini
From: Financial Regulation and Supervision: A post-crisis analysis
Edited By: Eddy Wymeersch, Klaus J Hopt, Guido Ferrarini

European Banking Union »

Edited By: Danny Busch, Guido Ferrarini

Part I Introduction, 4 Financial Market Infrastructures: The International Approach and the Current Challenges »

Paolo Saguato, Guido Ferrarini, Eric Pan
From: Financial Market Infrastructures: Law and Regulation
Edited By: Jens-Hinrich Binder, Paolo Saguato
This chapter analyses the global initiatives for coordination of financial market infrastructure (FMI) regulation that have emerged since the 1990s, reflecting on both the European and the American perspectives. It begins by looking at the different approaches that authorities can take in tackling cross-border phenomena. Finding the right balance between securing national interests and engaging in international relationships is a delicate process: in international financial regulation, authorities can claim extraterritorial application of their domestic regime to keep control of the market and minimize the opportunities of regulatory arbitrage; but they can also try to contain opportunities for regulatory arbitrage by engaging in harmonization and coordination with other countries. The chapter then discusses the dynamics of the European Union and United States relationship and the approaches embraced by the two jurisdictions in regulating and overseeing derivatives central clearinghouses (CCPs) in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. It also examines Brexit and considers the severe challenges that the decision of the United Kingdom to leave the EU will have to the markets, before offering a snapshot of the challenges that financial technology (FinTech) is posing to the existing delicate cross-border regulatory equilibrium.

Financial Regulation and Supervision: A post-crisis analysis »

Edited By: Eddy Wymeersch, Klaus J Hopt, Guido Ferrarini

Part III Financing Innovation, Start-Ups, Non-Listed Companies, and Infrastructure Projects, 10 FinTech and Alternative Finance in the CMU: The Regulation of Marketplace Investing »

Guido Ferrarini, Eugenia Macchiavello
From: Capital Markets Union in Europe
Edited By: Danny Busch, Emilios Avgouleas, Guido Ferrarini
This chapter focuses on FinTech, which offers firms and individuals new ways for accessing alternative sources of finance. It first examines the main types of alternative finance which technology has helped to develop and could further complement the traditional markets, focusing on marketplace investing and its perspectives in Europe. It then analyzes financial return crowdfunding as an application of marketplace investing; its main business models, such as investment-based and loan-based crowdfunding; and the risks and benefits deriving from them. Next, it compares the different regulatory models applicable to crowdfunding at EU and member states' levels, distinguishing between the traditional approach, which extends existing banking or financial regulation to these new sectors, and the ‘innovative’ approach contemplating ad hoc regimes for crowdfunding. The final section suggests a tailored policy approach to marketplace investing in the Capital Markets Union.

Further Material »

Edited By: Danny Busch, Guido Ferrarini
From: European Banking Union (2nd Edition)
Edited By: Danny Busch, Guido Ferrarini

Part III Trading, 11 Governance and Organization of Trading Venues: The Role of Financial Market Infrastructure Groups »

Guido Ferrarini, Paolo Saguato
From: Regulation of the EU Financial Markets: MiFID II and MiFIR
Edited By: Danny Busch, Guido Ferrarini
This chapter shows that MiFID II brings modest changes to trading venues in the EU: newly introduced Organized Trading Facilities (OTFs) will be the reference venues for a significant portion of derivatives trading; and regulated markets (RMs) and Multilateral Trading Facilities (MTFs) regimes have been aligned, with specific provisions to strengthen the governance of venues and operators. However, trading venues which have developed into Financial Markets Infrastructures (FMI) groups providing trading and post-trading services test the capacity of the current regime—and MiFID II itself—to oversee their activities and guarantee competition and stability. MiFID II does not explicitly take FMI groups into account; only three sets of rules address some of their potential risks. The authors conclude that this regulatory gap might threaten financial market stability, and regulators should consider a regulatory intervention, such as the experience of the regulatory and supervisory colleges of CCPs under EMIR and the regulatory framework of the financial conglomerates directive.

Governance of Financial Institutions »

Edited By: Danny Busch, Guido Ferrarini, Gerard van Solinge

Part I General, 1 Governing Financial Institutions: Law and Regulation, Conduct and Culture »

Danny Busch, Guido Ferrarini, Gerard van Solinge
From: Governance of Financial Institutions
Edited By: Danny Busch, Guido Ferrarini, Gerard van Solinge
This introductory chapter provides an overview of the governance of financial institutions. After the numerous bank failures resulting from the 2008 financial crisis, regulation and supervision have been enhanced both as a complement to the governance of financial institutions and as a substitute for the same in areas where governance failures appear more evident. Indeed, the financial crisis has led to a restatement of the global principles concerning the corporate governance of financial institutions in the belief that governance failures contributed to these institutions' failures in the crisis. Given that corporate governance is a complement to regulation in assuring the stability of financial institutions, an important question for policy research is to what extent and under what conditions regulation should work either as a complement or a substitute for corporate governance.