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Part I Fundamental Principles and the Legal Framework within which the Arbitral Tribunal Operates, Ch.2 General Provisions and Place of Arbitration

David D. Caron, Lee M. Caplan, Matti Pellonpää

From: The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules: A Commentary (1st Edition)

David D. Caron, Matti Pellonpää, Lee M. Caplan

A newer edition of The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules is available. Latest edition (2 ed.)
Next Edition: 2nd Edition Latest edition (2 ed.)

From: Oxford Legal Research Library (http://olrl.ouplaw.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2023. All Rights Reserved. Subscriber: null; date: 06 June 2023

(p. 17) Chapter 2  General Provisions and Place of Arbitration

  1. Introduction 18

  2. Scope of Application–Article 1 18

    1. Text of the UNCITRAL Rule 18

    2. Commentary 19

    3. Extracts from the Practice of NAFTA Tribunals 22

    4. Extracts from the Practice of Other Tribunals 23

      1. (1)  General and Article 1(1) 23

      2. (2)  Article 1(2) 24

  3. (3)  General Provisions–Article 15 25

    1. Text of the UNCITRAL Rule 25

    2. Commentary 25

      1. (1)  Basic Principles–Article 15(1) 26

      2. (2)  Right to a Hearing–Article 15(2) 45

      3. (3)  Communication of Documents–Article 15(3) 50

    3. Extracts from the Practice of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal 51

      1. (1)  General and Tribunal Rules, Article 15(1) 51

      2. (2)  Tribunal Rules, Article 15(2) 58

    4. Extracts from the Practice of NAFTA Tribunals 64

      1. (1)  Article 15(1)–General 64

      2. (2)  Article 15(1)Amicus Submissions) 66

    5. Extracts from the Practice of Other Tribunals 74

  4. Place of Arbitration–Article 16 76

    1. Text of the UNCITRAL Rule 76

    2. Commentary 77

      1. (1)  Selection of the Place of Arbitration–Article 16(1) 77

      2. (2)  Selection of the Particular Locale, Special Meetings for Consultation and the Hearing of Witnesses 94

      3. (3)  Special Meetings for the Inspection of Goods, Other Property or Documents 96

      4. (4)  Where the Award Shall Be Made 97

    3. Extracts from the Practice of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal 98

    4. (p. 18)
    5. Extracts from the Practice of NAFTA Tribunals 99

    6. Extracts from the Practice of Other Tribunals 114

Introduction

The drafters of the UNCITRAL Rules focused Article 1(1) on the general scope of application of the Rules and Article 1(2) on their relationship to the mandatory norms of law of the place of arbitration. The focus of Article 1(2) is closely related to the principle, expressed in Article 15(1), that “the arbitral tribunal may conduct the arbitration in such manner as it considers appropriate, …” In addition, Articles 15(2) and 15(3) concern the right to a hearing and the communication of documents, respectively. The actual role in concrete arbitrations of some of the basic principles expressed in Articles 1 and 15 is largely dependent on the place of arbitration, the subject matter of Article 16.

Scope of Application–Article 1

Text of the UNCITRAL Rule1

Article 1 of the UNCITRAL Rules provides:

1.  Where the parties to a contract have agreed in writing* that disputes in relation to that contract shall be referred to arbitration under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, then such disputes shall be settled in accordance with these Rules subject to such modification as the parties may agree in writing.

(p. 19)

2.  These Rules shall govern the arbitration except that where any of these Rules is in conflict with a provision of the law applicable to the arbitration from which the parties cannot derogate, that provision shall prevail.

Note (*) to Article 1(1) contains the following Model Arbitration Clause:

Any dispute, controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this contract, or the breach, termination or invalidity thereof, shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules as at present in force.

Note–Parties may wish to consider adding:

(a)  The appointing authority shall be (name of institution or person)

(b)  The number of arbitrators shall be (one or three)

(c)  The place of arbitration shall be (town or country)

(d)  The language(s) to be used in the arbitral proceedings shall be …

Commentary

Arbitration is a form of dispute settlement based on agreement between parties who, for various reasons, may wish to avoid proceedings before the courts.2 They may select an arbitral institution, whereby the procedural rules of that institution are applied. They may, however, also wish to arrange their arbitration on an ad hoc basis outside any such institution. In doing so, they are, in principle, free to make up their own rules of procedure. As agreeing on such rules for a particular case may entail many difficulties, it is useful to have a ready–made set of procedural rules to which the parties may resort if they so agree. The UNCITRAL Rules are such a set of procedural rules.3

In accordance with a requirement common to many municipal laws,4 Article 1(1) provides that an agreement to arbitrate under the UNCITRAL Rules should be made in writing. While the desirability of this requirement was subject to some controversy during the preparatory stage, it was concluded that “[w]riting is required in order to avoid uncertainty as to whether (p. 20) the Rules have been made applicable.”5 By guaranteeing both certainty and compliance with most national laws, as well as with the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,6 the written form enhances the acceptability and enforceability of the award that may result from the proceedings.7

In conformity with the contractual nature of arbitration and the principle of party autonomy, the UNCITRAL Rules do not require that they be adopted as a “package.” The parties may modify the Rules,8 but any “modification must be in writing in order to ensure certainty as to its existence and precise ambit.”9 The Tribunal Rules of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal constitute a modified version of the UNCITRAL Rules.10 Due to the special nature of this Tribunal, the power to make such modifications has been conferred on the two Governments and the Tribunal itself, the private parties being excluded.11 In these modified UNCITRAL Rules, some of the original Articles have been left intact, while others have been rewritten, mainly to serve the specific needs arising from the institutional structure of the Tribunal. Several Rules have been supplemented by “Notes” indicating how the Tribunal intends to interpret and apply the Rule in question. In more (p. 21) typical ad hoc arbitration, modifications to the UNCITRAL Rules can be made in the arbitration agreement or in a separate agreement which can be concluded between the parties even after the commencement of the arbitral proceedings.

The UNCITRAL Rules are highly adaptable for resolution of various types of disputes. Article 1 does not limit the applicability of the Rules to “international commercial transactions” or in any similar manner.12 Although intended to be applied mainly in international commercial arbitration, there is nothing that prevents the Rules from being utilized in purely domestic arbitration. The Rules are also easily modified to cover disputes involving non–contractual issues, such as issues of tort or public international law. The Iran-US Claims Tribunal, for example, expanded the scope of Article 1 to include claims permitted within the framework of the Algiers Declarations, i.e., “debts, contracts …, expropriation or other measures affecting property rights.”13 In a recent ad hoc arbitration administered by the Permanent Court of Arbitration, the tribunal found that the parties were free to adapt the UNCITRAL Rules to apply to their dispute over the annexation of the Hawaiian Kingdom by the United States.14

While the freedom of the parties to modify the Rules and the discretion of the arbitral tribunal in their application15 is considerable, Article 1(2) contains an important limitation to be taken into account in both respects. (p. 22) According to that provision, the UNCITRAL Rules “shall govern the arbitration except that where any of these Rules is in conflict with a provision of the law applicable to the arbitration from which the parties cannot derogate, that provision shall prevail.” Article 1(2), which requires the respect of mandatory norms of the applicable procedural law, reflects the fact, touched upon in the introduction to the present Chapter, that arbitration is in many ways circumscribed by laws pertaining to it.16 The scope and meaning of the requirement, and its relation to certain other fundamental principles concerning arbitration, will be further discussed in the next Section.17

Extracts from the Practice of NAFTA Tribunals

  1. By letter of November 18, 2003, the parties advised the Tribunal that they had agreed, pursuant to Article 1(1) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, to modify Article 16(1) of those Rules to provide that, “[u]nless the parties have agreed upon the place where the arbitration is to be held, the Tribunal shall fix the place of arbitration at a city in Canada or the United States of America, having regard to the circumstances of the arbitration.”

Canfor Corporation and United States of America, Decision on the Place of Arbitration, Filing of a Statement of Defence and Bifurcation of the Proceedings (NAFTA Chapter Eleven, 23 Jan 2004), at 2, available at http://www.state.gov/s/l.

  1. As contemplated by Article 1.1 of UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, the disputing parties hereby agree to modify Article 39 of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules to provide as follows: “Compensation for the arbitration tribunal shall be at the rates specified in the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) Schedule of Fees, and administered as provided in ICSID’s Administrative and Financial Regulation 14.”

(p. 23) Glamis Gold Ltd and United States of America, Agreement on Certain Procedural Matters (NAFTA Chapter Eleven, 20 Jan 2004), available at http://www.state.gov/s/l.

Extracts from the Practice of Other Tribunals

(1)  General and Article 1(1)

  1. 10.7  … When regard is had to the non–prescriptive and non–coercive nature of the UNCITRAL Rules as a standard regime available for parties to apply to resolve disputes between them, however, there appears no reason why the UNCITRAL Rules cannot be adapted to apply to a non–contractual dispute. For example, the parties could agree that a dispute as to tort, or occupier’s or environmental liability might be determined in an arbitration applying the UNCITRAL Rules. Moreover they could so agree in relation to a dispute which had already arisen independently of any contractual relationship between them. In this manner the parties to an arbitration may specifically or by implication adopt or apply the UNCITRAL Rules to any dispute.

  2. 10.8  Further, although the UNCITRAL Rules were primarily drawn for the purposes of the arbitration of contractual disputes between parties or corporations, a State entity, or a State itself, may become a principal party to an agreement to arbitrate subject to UNCITRAL Rules. A State may agree to arbitrate under the UNCITRAL Rules before or after a dispute arises. Indeed, State parties commonly agree to apply the UNCITRAL Rules, modified as may be appropriate, to disputes that they have agreed to arbitrate with a non–state party. In the context of international arbitration this often enough occurs in disputes over procurement or “build, operate and transfer” contracts and other transactions involving a State and a non–State foreign party.

  3. 10.10  For these reasons the Tribunal approaches the issue of the applicable rules on the basis that the UNCITRAL Rules may be applied to an agreement to arbitrate a non–contractual dispute, including a dispute where one of the parties is or is said to be a State. The Tribunal finds that the parties to this arbitration effectively have agreed to apply the UNCITRAL Rules with such necessary adaptations as arise from the terms of the Arbitration Agreement and the nature of the issues referred to arbitration.

(p. 24) Lance Paul Larsen and The Hawaiian Kingdom, Award (Permanent Court of Arbitration, 5 Feb 2001), reprinted in (2001) 119 ILR 566, 585–86.

(2)  Article 1(2)

By the second sentence of paragraph 1 of its Order of March 18, 1987, the Tribunal provided that the procedure of the arbitration shall be governed by the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, as agreed by the Parties in the Agreement of October 22, 1986, subject to any mandatory provisions of the Netherlands Arbitration Law, which, in the event of conflict with any of the UNCITRAL Rules shall prevail. The Tribunal has concluded that its Partial Award on Liability, determining the substance of the claims on both jurisdiction and the merits, and proposed Final Award (See XX hereof) are consistent with the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules and in no respect in conflict with any of the mandatory provisions of the Netherlands Arbitration Law.

Wintershall AG, et al. and The Government of Qatar. Partial Award on Liability (Ad Hoc UNCITRAL Proceeding, 5 Feb 1988), at 6–7, reprinted in (1989) 28 ILM 798, 801.

  1. [44]  With respect to matters of procedure, the Arbitral Tribunal is bound to follow the agreement of the Parties, which in this case means the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules to which their contract refers. The Arbitral Tribunal is not required to apply any national rules of procedure unless a Party has shown that the application of such a rule is mandatory. This is the consequence of Art. 1(2) of the UNCITRAL Rules which provides:

    These Rules shall govern the arbitration except that where any of these Rules is in conflict with a provision of the law applicable to the arbitration from which the parties cannot derogate, the provision shall prevail.

Himpurna California Energy Ltd and PT (Persaro) Perusahaan Listruik Negara, Final Award (Ad Hoc UNCITRAL Proceeding, 4 May 1999), reprinted in (2000) XXV YCA 13, 26.

(p. 25) General Provisions– Article 15

Text of the UNCITRAL Rule18

Article 15 of the UNCITRAL Rules provides:

  1. Subject to these Rules, the arbitral tribunal may conduct the arbitration in such manner as it considers appropriate, provided that the parties are treated with equality and that at any stage of the proceedings each party is given a full opportunity of presenting his case.

  2. If either party so requests at any stage of the proceedings, the arbitral tribunal shall hold hearings for the presentation of evidence by witnesses, including expert witnesses, or for oral argument. In the absence of such a request, the arbitral tribunal shall decide whether to hold such hearings or whether the proceedings shall be conducted on the basis of documents and other materials.

  3. All documents or information supplied to the arbitral tribunal by one party shall at the same time be communicated by that party to the other party.

Commentary

Article 15 contains “General Provisions” and is one of the most important sections of the UNCITRAL Rules. It spells out certain fundamental principles which must be taken into account in the application of the more specific rules “during the arbitral proceedings”, that is, until the issuance of (p. 26) the award or other termination of the proceedings.19 Although at first reading Article 15 may not appear to provide answers to so many concrete questions, it does in fact provide the key to a variety of problems not regulated elsewhere in the Rules. Therefore, Article 15 should be carefully studied prior to commencement of the arbitral proceedings.

(1)  Basic Principles– Article 15(1)

(a)  Arbitral autonomy and its limits

Article 15(1) has rightly been referred to as the “heart” of the UNCITRAL Rules.20 By providing that “the arbitral tribunal may conduct the arbitration in such manner as it considers appropriate” the provision reflects the procedural flexibility which is generally regarded as one of the main advantages of arbitration.21 In international cases there is a special need for freedom from unfamiliar local standards and requirements.22 The desire for flexibility, however, has to be balanced against other interests, such as the need for some (p. 27) ultimate control of procedural fairness and legal certainty concerning the international acceptance of the award. Hence, the ostensibly wide discretion of the arbitrators is subject to certain limitations; some follow directly from Article 15(1), while others flow from other provisions in the Rules.

First, the freedom of the arbitral tribunal is “[s]ubject to these Rules,” i.e. limited) by the more specific provisions of the UNCITRAL Rules. Although more detailed than some other sets of international arbitration rules,23 the UNCITRAL Rules in many cases only provide a framework for the exercise of arbitral discretion. For example, Article 24(3) provides that “[a]t any time during the arbitral proceedings the arbitral tribunal may require the parties to produce documents, exhibits or other evidence within such a period of time as the tribunal shall determine.”24 In other cases, the Rules provide almost no structure at all and it is incumbent upon the arbitrators to develop the particulars in accordance with the general principle enunciated in Article 15(1). For example, the question of whether a tribunal applying the Rules has the power to accept amicus submissions from third parties arose in the Methanex and UPS cases.25 In both cases, it was found that allowing third parties to make amicus submissions fell within the tribunal’s powers over the conduct of the arbitration under Article 15(1).26 Whenever the Rules impose more definite limitations on arbitral discretion, these should be taken into account. A major departure from them could provide a ground for setting aside the award27 or endanger an award’s enforceability under the New York Convention.28

(p. 28) A second fundamental limitation on the discretionary powers granted by Article 15 is set by the principle of equality, a concept closely connected with the principle of audiatur et altera pars.29 The Preliminary Draft Set of Arbitration Rules for an Optional Use in Ad Hoc Arbitration Relating to International Trade (“Preliminary Draft”), which formed the basis for the UNCITRAL Rules, required that parties be treated “with absolute equality.”30 The abolition of the word “absolute” from the rule as finally adopted indicates that the provision aims to guarantee not so much formal equality as equality in the sense of justice and fairness.31 The arbitral tribunal may, for example, deviate from a “mechanical” application of equality as between the respective national languages of the parties (assuming both are used in arbitration), provided it does not prejudice any party’s right to present its case and receive justice on the basis of material equality.32 On the other hand, a party’s rights would unavoidably be prejudiced should its opponent be consulted ex parte by the arbitrators,33 or be “permitted to present an extensive Memorial and additional exhibits, without providing an opportunity for the other party to file a memorial in response.”34 This understanding of equality is further corroborated by the wording of Article 15(1) as finally adopted without the word “absolute.” Since that revision, the principle of equality has been closely tied with the requirement “that at any (p. 29) stage of the proceedings each party is given a full opportunity of presenting his case.”35

Denial of such an opportunity may lead to the non–enforcement of the award,36 as was the case with the Iran-US Claims Tribunal’s award in Avco, discussed below.37

Indeed, in the practice of international tribunals, the issue of equality has mainly arisen as a question concerning the right to present one’s case, most particularly in connection with orders and other decisions on written submissions.38 The delicate and difficult questions which the requirement of equality may raise are shown by dissenting opinions to some decisions filed by party–appointed arbitrators.39

A party who feels that its right to equal treatment has been violated is advised to object promptly. Failure of timely protest may not only deprive the arbitral tribunal of opportunity to reconsider the matter immediately, but also, in subsequent court proceedings, may be regarded as indirect (p. 30) proof that the requirement of fair treatment of the parties was in fact fulfilled.40

A third limitation on the discretion of the arbitrators stems from Article 1(1) according to which the UNCITRAL Rules govern arbitration “subject to such modifications as the parties may agree in writing.” Thus, the parties have freedom to modify the rules, but the modifications must be in writing.41 The proceedings before the Iran-US Claims Tribunal exemplify the application of the UNCITRAL Rules in a modified fashion. Such modifications have been created through article–by–article specifications in the “Tribunal Rules.” Furthermore, the provisions of the Algiers Accords (in so far as they relate to the Tribunal proceedings) amount to written modifications of the UNCITRAL Rules which the Tribunal must respect.42

A fourth basic limitation to be taken into account in the application of Article 15(1) follows from Article 1(2). It provides that the UNCITRAL Rules (whether intended to apply as such or in a version modified by the parties) prevail only to the extent that they are not “in conflict with a provision of the law applicable to the arbitration from which the parties cannot derogate.”43 This means, on the one hand, that the parties cannot agree to modifications which are in conflict with mandatory provisions of the law applicable to the arbitration, nor is it possible for the arbitrators to derogate from such provisions. On the other hand, the combined effect of Articles 15(1) (p. 31) and 1(2) is that “a choice of the UNCITRAL Rules is to be understood as an exclusion of all national arbitration law, except for its mandatory provisions.”44 In other words, unless the parties have agreed to abide by a given law, or the arbitral tribunal has decided, in accordance with Article 15(1), to apply procedural norms of a designated national law, the arbitrators are not obliged to follow any domestic law in solving procedural problems not covered by the UNCITRAL Rules.45 They must, however, ensure that the mandatory norms of “the law applicable to the arbitration” are not circumvented.

If no national procedural law has been specifically designated, “the law applicable to the arbitration” presumptively is the law of the place of arbitration (lex loci arbitri&9;).46 Even when another law has been chosen as the procedural law of the arbitration, any mandatory norms of the law of the place prevail by virtue of the sovereignty of the territorial state,47 or–to put it differently–“an international arbitral tribunal is only free of the constraints of local law if the local law itself allows it to be so.”48 In order to avoid confusion, and also practical difficulties, caused by applying different domestic norms, an arbitral tribunal should avoid designating a law other than the lex loci arbitri as the applicable procedural law.49

(p. 32) The normal sanction for non–observance of the mandatory norms of the local law is that the award may be set aside by the courts of the seat of arbitration. This, in turn, may prevent the award from being recognized and enforced in other countries.50 The contents of typical mandatory norms are discussed in connection with Article 16(1) below.

While, at least as a general principle, the mandatory provisions of the law of the place of arbitration must be respected, the question remains whether exceptions to this rule are ever possible. In other words, do the UNCITRAL Rules envisage the possibility of “a–national” arbitration, detached from any control exercised by the local law?51

The relevant wording allows the interpretation “that Article 1(2) only provides for national law ‘if applicable,’ and, thereby does not exclude the possibility that none is applicable.”52 Although the sovereignty aspect usually does exclude such a possibility, this is not the case where the territorial state has accepted the non–applicability of its own mandatory norms, or where it has no mandatory norms. In the latter, perhaps somewhat theoretical53 case, it is clear that Article 1(2) has no practical relevance. If, on the other hand, the territorial state does have mandatory norms from which derogations are permitted (e.g. in international arbitrations), the detachment of the proceedings from the national law is conceivable, provided the parties, in accordance with Article 1(1), or the arbitral tribunal, by virtue of Article 15(1), are in agreement. However, in the absence of a clear agreement between the parties,54 the tribunal should not detach the proceeding from national law. The very existence of Article 1(2) in the applicable procedural rules might be understood by courts to signify the parties’ intention to keep the arbitration under the control of the local law. Further, as indicated above, non–observance of the party agreement may, in turn, have harmful consequences.55

(p. 33) (b)  Confidentiality and non–disputing party participation in&192; UNCITRAL arbitration

Privacy is a long–established hallmark of international commercial arbitration. One of the main attractions to arbitration is undoubtedly the ability to resolve commercial disputes discreetly, without exposure to the public scrutiny often associated with national court proceedings.56 In most arbitration, the discretion of the parties is enough to prevent sensitive information from being disclosed to the public. However, privacy, even if deeply established in custom, does not equate to confidentiality, which implicates a legal obligation to avoid public disclosure of sensitive information. Thus, it is not imprudent to expect that international arbitration will take place in a completely closed environment in which all sensitive information and documents remain private and confidential. As explained below, the degree of disclosure may depend on other important factors, such as the existence and scope of a confidentiality agreement and/or confidentiality order, and the mandatory provisions of any governing law on confidentiality. Further, the participation of non–disputing parties in the arbitral process, namely as amicus curiae, may be determined by the public character of the arbitration.

The UNCITRAL Rules address only a handful of issues relating to the exclusivity of the arbitral process. Article 25(4) requires that the hearings “be held in camera.” Article 31(2) provides that the deliberations of the arbitral tribunal must be conducted “in private.” According to Article 32(5), the award may be published “only with consent of both parties.” However, other important issues regarding confidentiality are not addressed, such as the extent to which written submissions or supporting materials, such as witness statements, expert reports, or documentary evidence, may be made public. The arbitration rules of various arbitral institutions have addressed these issues with notably greater specificity and depth than the UNCITRAL Rules.57 The limited approach of the Rules toward confidentiality matters raises two important issues: (1) whether a general duty of confidentiality can be inferred from the existing provisions of the Rules or from the arbitral process in general; and (2) whether in the absence of such a general duty (p. 34) confidentiality can be preserved through a confidentiality agreement by the parties or a procedural order by the arbitral tribunal.

Since Articles 25(4), 31(2), and 32(5) of the Rules affirmatively address discrete aspects of the arbitral process (the hearing, the deliberations, and the award), we conclude that they alone cannot give rise to a general duty of confidentiality. Whether a duty of confidentiality can be inferred from the arbitration agreement (perhaps along with the UNCITRAL Rules as incorporated into that agreement) is a more relevant question that has divided many national courts.58 The common view in English law is that the parties’ arbitration agreement gives rise to an implied duty of confidentiality.59 In contrast, Australia, the United States, and Sweden have taken the view that a party to the arbitral proceedings is not bound by an inherent duty of confidentiality.60 For example, in Panhandle Eastern Corporation, a US district court ruled that absent express provisions on confidentiality in the arbitral rules of procedure “parties to arbitration proceedings or the independent arbitration tribunal which conducts those proceedings” are not bound to keep documents confidential.61 Some arbitral institutions have followed this approach.62

Given the divergence of national law approaches toward confidentiality, the parties to arbitration are well advised to research carefully the lex arbitri. The Model Law does not contain any provisions on confidentiality. At least one jurisdiction has adopted a modified version of the Model Law that (p. 35) includes provisions providing for significant protections against public disclosure.63 In addition to the lex arbitri, the laws on confidentiality of other relevant jurisdictions should be considered, such as the law of a jurisdiction in which the award might be enforced, since enforcing courts are likely to address claims of confidentiality in accordance with local rules on disclosure.64

The best protection against disclosure of sensitive information relating to the arbitral process is a precise and comprehensive agreement by the parties on all confidentiality matters. A confidentiality agreement may assume many forms with equal effectiveness. It may be fashioned as part of the arbitration agreement,65 as a modification of the Rules, in accordance with Article 1(1), or as a separate agreement reached by the parties during the early phase of arbitration. Regardless of the agreement’s form, the arbitral tribunal may wish to issue a procedural order, pursuant to Article 15(1), which endorses any agreed–upon terms of confidentiality or, if agreement has not been reached with respect to one or more terms, establishes such terms to the extent necessary. Once embodied in a procedural order, the terms of confidentiality are binding on the parties and enforceable by the tribunal, if necessary, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the UNCITRAL Rules.66

As to the substance of a confidentiality agreement, the UNCITRAL Notes recommend inclusion of one or more of the following matters:

(p. 36)

  1. [1]  the material or information that is to be kept confidential (e.g. pieces of evidence, written and oral arguments, the fact that the arbitration is taking place, identity of the arbitrators, content of the award); [2] measures for maintaining confidentiality of such information and hearings; [3] whether any special procedures should be employed for maintaining the confidentiality of information transmitted by electronic means (e.g. because communication equipment is shared by several users, or because electronic mail over public networks is considered not sufficiently protected against unauthorized access); [4] circumstances in which confidential information may be disclosed in part or in whole (e.g. in the context of disclosures of information in the public domain, or if required by law or a regulatory body).67

A party often will find it necessary to disclose confidential information to a third party who is involved in the arbitration, such as counsel, officials or employees of a party, experts or witnesses. Accordingly, to elaborate on matter [2] above, it is good practice to require each such individual to execute a separate confidentially agreement which establishes the terms of confidentiality and the obligation to return all original documents and copies to the relevant parties when the arbitration concludes.68

Even where the duty of confidentiality is firmly established by a confidentiality agreement, a confidentiality order, or by national law, that duty is typically not absolute. Information or materials designated as confidential in arbitration may be subject to disclosure for various reasons. For example, disputing parties may be subject to competing or superseding contractual obligations to disclose information relating to a dispute to shareholders, creditors, insurance companies or auditors. In addition, where one of the disputing parties is a sovereign nation, that party’s national laws on public access to government documents may compel disclosure of confidential information.69

(p. 37) Another issue regarding the openness of the arbitral process is the level of participation in proceedings by non–parties (other than counsel, experts, and witnesses). Non–parties have no standing to bring claims before the arbitral tribunal as intervenors if they are not contractually bound by the arbitral agreement. The participation of non–disputing parties as amicus curiae in special circumstances is another matter, however. Two NAFTA decisions, for example, have concluded that an arbitral tribunal may accept submissions by non–disputing parties as amicus curiae under its Article 15(1) authority to conduct the proceedings in the manner it deems appropriate.70 This conclusion is consistent with the practice of international tribunals, including the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, according to which outside involvement by non–disputing parties has been deemed acceptable.71

The arbitral tribunal’s authority to accept amicus submissions is circumscribed by other important provisions of the Rules. The arbitral tribunal’s procedural powers under Article 15(1) are tempered by that same provision’s requirement to treat the parties with equality. Accordingly, amicus submissions may not be used in a way which is unduly burdensome for the parties in terms of time and cost or which complicates or substantially lengthens the arbitral process. An arbitral tribunal thus may wish to place restrictions on the scope and length of any submissions made by non–disputing parties.72 Moreover, the acceptability of amicus submissions does not imply any higher level of participation by non–disputing parties. Article 25(4) expressly bars all non–parties from attending the hearings, unless the parties agree otherwise.73 Further, with respect to access to confidential information, amicus curiae would obtain no greater access to confidential materials than any other (p. 38) member of the public would in accordance with an applicable confidentiality agreement, procedural order, or national law provision.

While generally permissible under the UNCITRAL Rules, amicus submissions are unlikely to be utilized in most arbitration. Traditional resistance by the parties in a commercial arbitration to disclosing any information about their dispute to the public may likely stymie any outside participation.74 In a more public forum, such as investor–state arbitration, the presence of a sovereign party and “the important public character of the matters in issue” are clearly more conducive to the acceptance of amicus submissions.75 This is not to say, however, that non–disputing party participation could not occur in international commercial arbitration where the arbitration arises under a national statute with a public purpose or the issues bear heavily upon the public interest.

(c)  The nature of the proceedings before the Iran-US Claims Tribunal

The status of the arbitral proceedings before the Iran-US Claims Tribunal, and their relation to the local (i.e., Dutch) law, is not easily characterized. The ambiguity primarily concerns the “private” element of the Tribunal proceedings, that is, the commercial cases involving private parties on one side. As to the public international arbitration between Iran and the United States, it appears that the proceedings are governed solely by the Algiers Accords and the Tribunal Rules.76

The Tribunal’s work which resembles private arbitration is filled with ambiguity. On the one hand, factors such as the specification of The Hague as the place of arbitration, the practice according to which the Tribunal deposits its awards with the District Court of The Hague and the adoption of Article 1(2) of the UNCITRAL Rule in the Tribunal Rules, may be taken to suggest that the proceedings are subject to mandatory Dutch law.77 On the other hand, all of these factors can be explained otherwise: the specification of The Hague as the place of arbitration was made only in order to provide a (p. 39) neutral seat; the practice concerning deposit can be explained by practical considerations; and Article 1(2) of the UNCITRAL Rules in itself does not exclude the possibility of no national law being “applicable.”78

Given these circumstances, guidance should be sought from the Tribunal’s practice. The fact that the Tribunal has never referred to the mandatory norms of Dutch law is hardly alone decisive.79 It is conceivable that, when applying the UNCITRAL Rules, the Tribunal takes for granted that any mandatory requirements of the arbitration law of the Netherlands are automatically complied with. A somewhat more forceful argument supporting the “a–national” characterization of the Tribunal proceedings is found in the Chambers’ orders emphasizing that the proceedings are governed “by the Tribunal Rules and by no national procedural system,”80 or “by the Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria and by the Tribunal Rules of Procedure.”81 These statements clearly reflect an understanding that the arbitration before the Tribunal is in no way controlled by Dutch law.

Whether or not this view of the nature of the Tribunal proceedings can be taken as the Tribunal’s final word on the issue, it certainly could not overrule any contrary conclusion drawn by the territorial state, the Netherlands, or by courts in the Netherlands. Neither the Dutch courts nor the Dutch government have taken a definite stand. In 1983 the Dutch government proposed a “Bill regarding the Applicability of Dutch Law to the Awards of the Tribunal Sitting in The Hague to Hear Claims between Iran and the United States,”82 which would have declared the Tribunal’s awards rendered in cases involving private parties to be Dutch, and made it possible to challenge them before Dutch courts (though on very limited grounds only). The legislative process, however, was frozen, largely due to criticism leveled against the Bill by Iran.83 (p. 40) Iran, in turn, agreed to withdraw ten lawsuits filed in 1983 at the District Court of the Hague against the Tribunal’s awards allegedly rendered in breach of the Dutch arbitration law.84

Thus, the relationship between the Tribunal proceedings and Dutch law remains untested by the courts and authorities of the Netherlands. Opposite views have been put forward in Dutch legal writing,85 and the following passage from the preamble to the Dutch Bill discussed above also shows the ambiguity surrounding the question: “It is by no means clear that the decisions and awards of the Tribunal concerning private claims would be characterized, by Dutch courts, as arbitral decisions or awards under the relevant provisions of the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure.”86

Faced with this problem, a court of another country should take into account the possibility of the Tribunal awards being “a–national,” that is, not under the control of the procedural law of the Netherlands. It is in connection with efforts to enforce Tribunal awards outside the Netherlands that the issue may arise–indeed, has arisen. According to some experts, “the primary international Convention in the field, the New York Arbitration Convention of 1958, does not apply to awards which are not governed by a national arbitration law.”87 However, an equally eminent author has noted that “[t]his is not the black letter of the Convention–in fact, to many it is an impermissible reading.”88

(p. 41) Such differences of opinion indicate that the enforceability of “a–national” awards under the New York Convention is at least uncertain. Indeed, one of the side effects expected from the Dutch Bill discussed above was to guarantee the enforceability of the awards under the Convention.89

The question whether the awards of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal fall under the New York Convention arose in connection with the Gould case, in which the Tribunal awarded US $3.6 million to the Iranian Respondent on the basis of its counterclaim.90 It will be recalled that the payment mechanism with a special Security Account works only in favor of US claimants.91 As Gould refused to comply with its payment obligation, the Iranian party had to seek the enforcement of the award through other venues. After the Full Tribunal confirmed in Case A/21 that the United States government was not directly responsible for the implementation of the awards rendered against its nationals,92 the Iranian party commenced enforcement action in the United States. The case first came before the District Court of the Central District of California93 and then before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.94 Both courts substantially agreed on the applicability of the New York Convention.95

Thus it was held that the requirement concerning a written arbitral agreement96 had been met, despite the fact that the agreement had been (p. 42) concluded by the governments of the respective parties, and not by the parties themselves.97

Gould’s remaining objection to the jurisdiction was that the New York Convention allegedly contained “an implicit requirement that the Convention applies only to arbitral awards made in accordance with the national arbitration law of a Party State.”98 To this the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals responded as follows:

Section 203 does not contain a separate jurisdictional requirement that the award be rendered subject to a “national law.” Language pertaining to the “choice of law” issue is not mentioned, or even alluded to, in Article 1, which lays out the Convention’s scope of applicability. In addition, although it is a close question, the fairest reading of the Convention, itself appears to be that it applies to the enforcement of non–national awards.99

The Court then concluded “that an award need not be made ‘under a national law’ for a court to entertain jurisdiction over its enforcement pursuant to the Convention.”100

In 1992, the applicability of the New York Convention to Tribunal awards was confirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Avco.101 In the circumstances of that case, however, the enforcement of an award made in favor of Iran was refused on the ground that, before the Tribunal, Avco had been “unable to present [its] case” within the meaning of Article V(I)(b) of the New York Convention.102 The Court held that, while enforceable under the Convention, the Tribunal awards are also “subject to the defences to enforcement provided for in the Convention.”103 According to the Court, Avco had been denied due process before the Tribunal in such a (p. 43) way as to justify the non–enforcement of the award rendered against the company.104

The Gould and Avco cases set important precedents regarding both the scope of the New York Convention in general and the enforcement of Tribunal awards in particular. Avco, in particular, shows that the New York Convention provides the competent court with power to exercise certain ultimate control over the fairness of the Tribunal proceedings.105 However, in the absence of Dutch judicial pronouncements, the cases discussed do not definitively settle the question concerning the relationship of the Tribunal proceedings to Dutch law.106

Another remaining question is whether the Tribunal has inherent power to reopen its proceedings in exceptional circumstances.107 In one decision the Tribunal, while leaving the question open, cautiously suggested in an obiter–like manner that “it might possibly be concluded that a tribunal, like the present one, which is to adjudicate a large group of cases and for a protracted period of time would by implication, until the adjournment and (p. 44) dissolution of the tribunal, have the authority to revise decisions induced by fraud.”108

(d)  Concluding remarks

Whatever the nature of the Tribunal proceedings or Tribunal awards, a completely a–national arbitration under the UNCITRAL Rules does not seem practically possible or desirable in normal ad hoc arbitration. In such proceedings the effect of Articles 1(2) and 15(1) is to subject the arbitration to at least the mandatory procedural norms of the lex loci arbitri. Normally this is not likely to hamper the proceedings in any substantial way, as the concurrent observance of the UNCITRAL Rules guarantees that no non–derogable national norms are circumvented. On the other hand, considering the uncertainties and differing attitudes among various jurisdictions concerning the applicability of the New York Convention to “a–national” awards, this kind of connection with a national legal system is likely to facilitate the enforcement of the award in other jurisdictions. These questions are explored further when the place of arbitration is discussed under Article 16. In this connection a few final remarks on the scope of Article 15(1) are due.

Subject to the limitations discussed above, “the arbitral tribunal may conduct the arbitration in such manner as it considers appropriate.” Except for the mandatory norms of the lex loci arbitri, it does not have to follow any national rules; on the other hand, if they deem it useful, the arbitrators can choose a specific national law of procedure.109 As already noted, if they do choose a specific national law, the arbitrators should give preference to the law of the place of arbitration. General reliance on any national law, however, can be dispensed with, as the UNCITRAL Rules themselves contain a rather comprehensive procedural order.110 Any lacunae that the rules may leave can be filled by creative application of discretion, whereby procedural models may be borrowed from various legal systems. For example, without selecting any procedural system as a whole, the arbitral tribunal may follow common law or civil law principles, or a mixture of both, concerning witnesses and evidence, depending on which kind of legal system with which the parties are (p. 45) most familiar.111 They may also establish specific procedural devices, such as the possibility, provided for in note 5 to the Tribunal Rules of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal, of utilizing non–parties as a kind of amicus curiae.112 As the Rules contain no provision on power of attorney, it is (unless the mandatory provisions of the lex loci arbitri provide otherwise) up to the arbitral tribunal to decide whether this is required of counsel of the parties. By virtue of its wide discretion under Article 15(1), the tribunal is also free to use the administrative and technical services of an arbitral institution.113

(2)  Right to a hearing– Article 15(2)

Article 15(2) elaborates upon the “full opportunity” of each party to present its case. According to paragraph 2, the tribunal shall hold hearings at the request of either party “at any stage of the proceedings.” In the Preliminary Draft, this requirement was intended to apply only to hearings for the production of evidence by witnesses, whereas hearings for the presentation of oral argument were to be discretionary, unless requested by both parties.114 The New Delhi Arbitration Congress, at which the Draft was discussed, “disclosed a preponderant opinion that the presentation of oral argument was a right generally available in [municipal] legal proceedings which should also be available in arbitral proceedings at the request of either party.”115 Hence, either party has the right to have hearings not only for the presentation of witness evidence, but also for oral argument.

(p. 46) In the UNCITRAL Model Law, the scope of the hearings to be provided has been further broadened. Instead of referring to evidence by “witnesses,” Article 24(1) of the Model Law contains a provision on hearings, inter alia, “for the presentation of evidence” in general.116 This wording “was intended to ensure that the provision would not be interpreted to bar types of evidence that might be deemed in some systems not to be ‘testimony of witnesses,’ such as cross–examination or the testimony of a party.”117 While the clarification in question can be welcomed, it is submitted that in the UNCITRAL Rules, intended for world–wide use, the concept of “witness” also can and should be interpreted in a broad, non–technical sense. This has been the practice of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal where, on the one hand, a distinction has been made between witnesses in a strict sense and “party witnesses,” but where, on the other hand, both categories of witnesses have been allowed to testify at hearings.118

Nevertheless, the limitations of the right to a hearing guaranteed by Article 15(2) are not quite clear. At face value, the provision appears to include the right to request hearings not only on merits, but also on jurisdictional and other preliminary questions and even on procedural matters. On the other hand, the participants of the New Delhi Congress, when referring to a right “generally available in legal proceedings,” plainly did not contemplate a right to have a separate hearing on any kind of preliminary issue. Nor does the reference to “any stage of the proceedings,” not included in the Preliminary Draft, contradict this conclusion. The quoted phrase was added in response to the suggestion of the representative of the Soviet Union who “proposed an amendment to the effect that a party might request an oral hearing at any stage in the proceedings, not just at the beginning.”119 Thus the altered wording was not intended to have any bearing on the question of whether there is a right to a hearing on procedural and other issues, but only to clarify when a hearing can be requested.

(p. 47) Regarding the question of jurisdiction in particular, Article 21(4) provides that “[i]n general the arbitral tribunal should rule on a plea concerning its jurisdiction as a preliminary question.”120 Although this does not say anything about the hearing, the concept of “preliminary question” has sometimes been understood to refer to something that is decided prior to any hearing.121 This, however, is not the only possible interpretation of the phrase in question. Moreover, if an arbitral tribunal considers a question important enough to be treated preliminarily, should it not also merit a hearing?

The Iran-US Claims Tribunal has interpreted Article 15(2) so as to make the right to a hearing dependent on whether or not the question regards “procedural matters.”122 If it does, a hearing can be dispensed with, notwithstanding a party’s request concerning it. The right to a hearing has been considered excluded, inter alia, for requests for interim measures and preliminary jurisdictional questions.123 However, in ad hoc arbitration, an arbitral tribunal is advised not to proceed from such a general distinction between substantive and procedural questions unless authorized to do so by the parties.

In light of the unqualified wording of Article 15(2), the policy of exempting procedural or jurisdictional questions from the scope of the right to a hearing could be regarded as such a departure from the agreement of the parties as to subject the award to a challenge at the place of arbitration or non–recognition in another jurisdiction.124 In this regard, the legislative history of Article 24(1) of the Model Law is illustrative. In that context a proposal was made to limit the right to a hearing to “the substance of the dispute,” to the exclusion of procedural or jurisdictional questions. From the rejection of this proposal it has been concluded that “the party’s right to a hearing should not be considered limited to substantive issues.”125 There are no strong reasons why Article 15(2) of the UNCITRAL Rule should be construed differently.

(p. 48) As already indicated, the broad scope of Article 15(2) should not be interpreted as granting unlimited rights to have separate hearings on all kinds of procedural or preliminary questions as they may arise. It is expected that various legal systems under which the UNCITRAL Rules may be employed recognize that the arbitral tribunal must have considerable control over such matters as the number of hearing days and the hearing procedure. By virtue of this control, the tribunal normally can, for example, join jurisdictional issues to merits or decide minor procedural questions without a hearing, even if a party requests one. Whenever a decision on a preliminary question may lead to the final disposition of the rights of the parties, or to the termination of the proceedings, a hearing normally should be granted if requested by a party.

As to decisions on interim measures (those which neither affect the final disposition of the rights of the parties nor terminate the whole proceedings), the decision whether or not to grant a requested hearing should be made in light of the particular circumstances. Sometimes the urgency of the matter may not allow a hearin; in other cases, the very nature of the measure requested may require that oral argument be heard. The principle of party autonomy suggests that a hearing be granted whenever requested by both parties. Even where requested by only one of the parties, the arbitral tribunal should keep in mind that Article 15(2) spells out the principle of the right to a hearing. Should a party request a hearing abusively, that party may be forced to bear the costs resulting from an unnecessary hearing.126

The hearing can be requested at “any stage of the proceedings.” As noted above, this wording was chosen in order to make it clear that the right does not necessarily have to be exercised in the beginning of the proceedings. While this may open up the possibility for disruptive requests made on the eve of the proceedings’ termination, the overall control exercised by the arbitral tribunal should allow it to prevent the disruption of orderly proceedings.127 In this spirit the Iran-US Claims Tribunal has held that Article 15(2) “should be interpreted, in the light of the particular circumstances of each case, to mean that hearings are to be held upon reasonable (p. 49) request of a party at an appropriate stage of the proceedings.”128 In Ladjevardi, the Tribunal held a hearing upon the request of the Claimant in a case in which a hearing probably would not have been held proprio motu.129 Thus the arbitral tribunal can, whenever it intends to proceed without a hearing, inform the parties and invite them to exercise their right to request a hearing by a certain date.130

In addition to hearings for the presentation of evidence and oral argument, the arbitral tribunal may, by virtue of its power to “conduct arbitration in such manner as it considers appropriate” under Article 15(1), summon the parties for more informal meetings according to the needs of the particular arbitration. The Swedish practice in this respect has been described as follows:

The chairman summons a preliminary meeting at a place and time chosen by him. Argument may be heard on the issue of which language or languages will be used, which issue is then decided by the arbitrators. The issues to be tried are finally settled. Written evidence is to the extent possible submitted at this stage. Lists of other evidence are submitted. Production orders may be made and summonses to witnesses may be issued. If discovery is requested an additional preliminary meeting may be held.131

In the practice of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal, meetings with basically similar functions have been institutionalized in the form of “pre–hearing conferences” mentioned in note 4 to Article 15 of the Tribunal Rules.132 The arranging of such preliminary meetings is within the discretion of the arbitrators.133 In the early years of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal they were very common in more substantial cases. Generally, the pre–hearing conferences serve the purpose of clarifying and narrowing issues, especially jurisdictional questions. They provide an opportunity to examine the possibilities of a settlement and to discuss the further proceedings, as well as settle questions (p. 50) such as production of documents.134 There are differing views on the usefulness of the pre–hearing conferences, and their utility at the Tribunal would appear to depend on the particular circumstances of each case.135 In simple cases, especially where it is clear that a hearing is going to be held, they may be unnecessary. In more complex cases they may be useful both to the parties and the arbitrators, for example, to determine whether some jurisdictional or other preliminary question deserves to be treated separately.136 While a pre–hearing conference is not a hearing, in the sense of Article 15(2), such a preliminary conference may help the tribunal in deciding whether and to what extent hearings are needed.137

In the practice of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal, the number of pre–hearing conferences decreased after the first years.138 In fact no pre–hearing conferences were held in 1990–1992. In the beginning of 1993, however, a pre–hearing conference was held in a very complicated inter–state case, but none have occurred since then.139

(3)  Communication of documents– Article 15(3)

Article 15(1) requires equal treatment of the parties by the arbitral tribunal. Paragraph 3 of the same Article extends the principle of “[e]qual treatment and equal opportunity for both parties”140 to the conduct of the parties themselves by requiring them to communicate any information (p. 51) supplied to the arbitral tribunal at the same time to the other party. Such elaboration of the principle of audiatur et altera pars creates an important safeguard against unenforceability of the arbitral award on the ground that it has been based on documents not communicated to the losing party.141 Article 2 sets forth the details concerning the mode of communication of documents to the other party.142

In its overall control of the arbitral proceedings, the tribunal should see to it that the parties act in accordance with Article 15(3). Therefore, if it ascertains that certain documents, or other pieces of information supplied to it, have not been communicated to the other party, the Tribunal should, if necessary, convey the information to the other party itself.

Indeed, the parties may consider the possibility of modifying Article 15(3) so as to entrust the arbitral tribunal with the task of acting as a “clearinghouse” to which the documents and other information are first supplied, and which then transmits them to the other party.143

Extracts from the Practice of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal

(1)  General and Tribunal Rules, Article 15(1)

Upon invitation of the Tribunal in accordance with Note 5 to Article 15 of the Provisionally Adopted Tribunal Rules the Government of the United States has submitted oral and written statements with a view to assisting the Tribunal in carrying out its task.

E–Systems, Inc. and The Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. ITM 13–388–FT (4 Feb 1983) at 6, reprinted in 2 Iran-US CTR 51, 54 (1983–II).

Article 15 of the Tribunal Rules requires that the Tribunal treat the parties equally. This is a fundamental principle of justice. In the circumstances of these cases, the delicate balance of equality would be tipped if one party were to be permitted to present an extensive Memorial and (p. 52) additional exhibits, without providing an opportunity for the other party to file a memorial in response. While the filing by Claimants of their Memorial on the Merits prior to the Hearing may be an advantage to the Respondents in that it informs them in detail of Claimants’ contentions and arguments and may be of assistance to the Tribunal in analyzing the case, nevertheless it cannot be accepted without providing the Respondents an equal opportunity to make a written submission.

Foremost Tehran Inc. and The Islamic Republic of Iran, Case Nos. 37 and 231, Chamber One, Order of 15 Sep 1983, reprinted in 3 Iran-US CTR 361, 362 (1983–II).

The conduct of proceedings before this Tribunal is governed by the Tribunal Rules and by no national procedural system.

Amman & Whitney and Ministry of Housing and Urban Development (Khuzestan Department of Housing and Urban Development), Case No. 198, Chamber One, Order of 30 Jan 1984.

It is clear from the language and context of Article 15 that its operative terms apply during the arbitral proceedings themselves, prior to the issuance of an award. Its applicability terminates with the rendering of an award. This is especially apparent when Article 15 is compared with Article 29(2), …

Dames & Moore and The Islamic Republic of Iran, Decision No. DEC 36–54–3 (23 Apr 1985) at 15, reprinted in 8 Iran-US CTR 107, 115 (1985–I).

The Tribunal notes a document received by the Tribunal’s Registry on 25 April 1986, submitted by M. A. Saheb, who identifies himself as the Chairman and Managing Director of South Gulf Trading and Shipping Limited of Dubai, who is not a party in this Case.

Pursuant to note 5 to Article 15 of the Tribunal Rules and taking into consideration that the above–mentioned document may assist the Tribunal in deciding the jurisdictional issue regarding the Claimant’s ownership and control of SGTC, the Tribunal decides that such document should be filed by the Registry and served on the Parties.

George W Drucker Jr and Foreign Transaction Co., Case No. 121, Chamber Two, Order of 2 May 1986.

On 27 November 1987 the Claimants filed a request for permission to file a “Supplemental Memorial and Summary of Evidence” in response (p. 53) to “Respondents’ Brief and Evidence and Rebuttal Memorial” filed on 15 September 1987 (Doc. No. 178). The Claimants did not allege that Respondents’ Doc. no. 178 contains improper rebuttal material and identified no new material. Together with this request, the Claimants filed the “Supplemental Memorial and Summary of Evidence” that it requested be admitted.

It has been the established practice of the Tribunal to close the exchange of written pleadings after the submission of Memorials in Rebuttal. In order to secure equal treatment of the Parties and an orderly conduct of the proceedings, the Tribunal admits further written submission close to the Hearing date only in exceptional circumstances. It finds no reason to depart from this practice in the circumstances of this Case, particularly in view of the fact that the Hearing has already been postponed once to afford the Parties another round of written pleadings.

Watkins–Johnson Company and The Islamic Republic of Iran, Case No. 370, Chamber One, Order of 3 Dec 1987.

On 30 November 1987 the Claimant filed a Request for an Order authorizing the Parties in this Case to file simultaneous surrebuttals. In the Request it is stated that the Respondents’ rebuttal Memorial and Exhibits filed on 3 August 1987 contain new arguments and evidence. It is also stated that a round of surrebuttal pleadings would afford the Respondents a further opportunity to respond fully to Claimant’s evidence and arguments.

It has been the established practice of the Tribunal to close the exchange of written pleadings after the submission of Memorials in Rebuttal. In order to secure equal treatment of the Parties and an orderly conduct of the proceedings, the Tribunal admits further written submissions close to the Hearing date only in exceptional circumstances.

The Tribunal finds no reason to allow a further round of submissions in the present Case. If any of the material filed by the Respondents on 3 August 1987 is found not to fall within the definition of rebuttal evidence, it will be ruled inadmissible and disregarded. The Claimant’s request is therefore denied.

General Electric Company and The Islamic Republic of Iran, Case No. 386, Chamber One, Order of 10 Dec 1987.

On that date the Tribunal also received the documents in French language, dated 6 March, 15 April and 5 October 1987, allegedly related to the criminal proceedings at the Swiss court initiated by the (p. 54) Respondents. The above submissions were made in support of the Respondents’ request to “suspend the proceedings in this Case, pending determination of suit” in the Swiss court.

On 30 October 1987 the Claimant objected to the above request and to the submission of the above documents.

The Tribunal’s proceedings are governed by the Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria and by the Tribunal Rules of Procedure. None of these texts obliges the Tribunal to suspend the proceedings before it for the reason of an alleged initiation of the criminal proceedings in a national court by one of the Parties. Such a suspension could be only a matter of convenience.

Fedders Corporation and Loristan Refrigeration Industries, Case No. 250, Chamber Three, Order of 5 Jan 1988.

  1. 19.  As to the existence, or the exercise of any inherent power to reinstate a terminated Case, the Tribunal practice fails to provide conclusive guidance; indeed, the Tribunal has specifically reserved its position as to whether it has inherent power to revise an award under exceptional circumstances. See, e.g. World Farmers Trading Inc. and Government Trading Corporation, et al., Decision No. DEC 93–764–1, para 3 (3 Oct. 1990), reprinted in 25 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 186, 187 (1990–II); Dames & Moore and The Islamic Republic of Iran, Decision No. DEC 36–54–3, pp. 18–21 (23 Apr. 1985), reprinted in 5 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 107, 117–18 (1984–I); Mark Dallal and Islamic Republic of Iran, Decision No. DEC 30–149–1 (12 Jan. 1984), reprinted in 5 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 74, 745 (1984–I); Henry Morris and Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran et al., Decision No. DEC 26–200–1, p. 2 (16 Sept. 1983), reprinted in 3 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 364, 365 (1983–II).

  2. 20.  Of the Decisions cited above, the Decision most on point is Dames & Moore. There, the Tribunal rejected the Respondent’s request to reopen a case allegedly based on forged documents and perjured affidavits. The Tribunal concluded that even a generous reading of the Respondent’s allegations of fraud did “not raise justified concern that the processes of the Tribunal [had] been subverted.” The Tribunal thus did not need to decide whether it possessed inherent authority to reopen a case procured by fraud:

    In the absence of an express grant of authority to the Tribunal to reopen and reconsider cases in the merits after issuance of an award, the question has been posed as to whether an (p. 55) “inherent power” to do so may exist “under exceptional circumstances”, at least where an award “was based on forged documents or perjury.” [citing Henry Morris and Mark Dallal, above]. The implied or inherent power of an international claims tribunal in this area is an issue which has been subjected to learned analysis and limited judicial scrutiny, with wholly inconsistent results. […]. The instant request for reopening and reconsideration, however, falls well short of justifying any such effort to ascertain the precise balance struck between finality of Tribunal dispositions, on the one hand, and the integrity of its processes on the other.

  3. 21.  As in Dames and Moore, the Tribunal has first to examine the request to determine whether there exists a prima facie case to justify reinstatement and if such a case exists, whether the Tribunal possesses inherent power to do so under the circumstances.

  4. 24.  The evidence submitted by the Applicants falls short of establishing a prima facie case …

Gloria Jean Cherafat and The Islamic Republic of Iran, Decision No. DEC 106–277–2 (25 June 1992), reprinted in 28 Iran-US CTR 216, 221–23 (1992) (footnotes omitted).

  1. 27.  The Tribunal Rules grant considerable discretion to the Tribunal to admit or exclude written submissions. This discretion includes the power to accept unauthorized post–Hearing submissions, as derived from Article 15, paragraph 1; Article 22; Article 25, paragraph 6; and Article 29, paragraph 2 of the Tribunal Rules.

  2. 28.  Tribunal precedent is, however, strongly against the admission into evidence of unauthorized late–filed documents. The Tribunal has expressed a particular aversion to admitting documents that are submitted not only after filing deadlines, but also after the Hearing itself. The most extensive treatment of this issue is to be found in Harris International Telecommunications, Inc. and The Islamic Republic of Iran, et al., Award No. 323–409–1 (2 November 1987), reprinted in 17 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 31, 45–50.

  3. 29.  Harris emphasizes that in deciding whether to admit a late submission, it is important that the Tribunal treat the parties equally and fairly, bearing in mind that accepting late–filed documents from one party can result in prejudice to the other. A further consideration is the “orderly conduct of the proceedings.” In applying these principles to the facts of a given case, the Tribunal (p. 56) should consider the “character and contents of late–filed documents and the length and cause of the delay.” Late–filed submissions containing new facts and evidence “are the most likely to cause prejudice to the other Party and to disrupt the arbitral process if filed late.”

  4. 30.  Thus the considerations that are generally relevant when deciding whether to admit late–filed documents are the possibility of prejudice, the equality of treatment of the Parties, the disruption of the arbitral process caused by the delay and the reason for the delay.

  5. … 

  6. 59.  The Agent of Iran also cited Article 15, paragraph 1 of the Rules as authority for the Respondents’ request to reopen [the hearing]… The Agent of Iran argued that

    [t]here is no doubt that if an affidavit is accepted as evidence in a case while, on the other hand, the adverse party is not given the permission to orally and directly examine the said witness at the hearing session, the latter will be completely deprived of the “full opportunity” he is supposed to be given for presenting his Case. In other words, it is not possible to deprive a party of the right of examining a witness whose written testimony has been accepted and still claim that the latter party has been granted a “full opportunity” of presenting his case.

  7. 60.  The Tribunal need hardly point out, however, that this Tribunal (like many others) customarily accepts affidavits into evidence and takes account of those affidavits without the opposing party necessarily being given the opportunity to cross–examine the affiant. Several examples (unchallenged by either of the Parties) are to be found in these very Cases.

  8. 61.  Furthermore, the Tribunal is unpersuaded that any Party can credibly claim that it has been denied a “full opportunity of presenting [its] case” given the procedural history of these Cases. The key word is “opportunity”: the Tribunal is obliged to provide the framework within which the parties may present their cases, but is by no means obliged to acquiesce in a party’s desire for a particular sequence of proceedings or to permit repetitious proceedings.

Dadras International, et al and Islamic Republic of Iran, et al, Award No. 567–213/215–3 (7 Nov 1995), reprinted in 31 Iran-US CTR 127, 135–36, 143–44 (1995) (footnotes omitted).

(p. 57)

  1. 9.  Under the Tribunal Rules the Tribunal has the discretion to accept unauthorized late submissions from the Parties. See Article 15, paragraph 1, and Article 22 of the Tribunal Rules. However, in the interests of the orderly conduct of the proceedings and in order to maintain “equality of arms,” it has in general taken a restrictive approach to the exercise of this discretion. See, for example, Dadras International, et al. and Islamic Republic of Iran, et al., Award No. 567–213/215–3, paras27–28 (7 Nov. 1995), reprinted in 31 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 127, 135–36; Edgar Protiva, et al. and Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 566–316–2, paras30–36 (14 July 1995), reprinted in 31 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 89, 102–03 (“Protiva”); Reza Said Malek and Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 534–193–3, para 12 (11 Aug. 1992), reprinted in 28 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 246, 249–50; Harris International Telecommunications, Inc. and Islamic Republic of Iran, et al., Award No. 323–409–1 (2 Nov. 1987), reprinted in 17 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 31, 45–50. In the present Case, the Tribunal’s Order of 17 April 1996 clearly restricted the scope of the submissions to be made by both Parties. In light of these restrictions and in the absence of any other justifying circumstances, the Tribunal excludes from the record items 3, 4 and 6 of the Respondent’s submission of 27 June 1996, the Claimant’s entire submission of 22 July 1996 and the Respondent’s entire submission of 20 August 1996.

Vivian Mai Tavakoli et al and The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 580–832–3 (23 Apr 1997), reprinted in 33 Iran-US CTR 206, 211 (1997).

  1. 48.  The Tribunal notes that, according to its practice reflected in Harris International Telecommunications, Inc. and The Islamic Republic of Iran, et al., Partial Award No. 323–409–1, paras57–75 (2 Nov. 1987), reprinted in 17 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 31, 45–52, Articles 15, 22, 23, and 28 of the Tribunal Rules are the primary rules regulating the status of late–filed documents…

  2. 49.  Furthermore, on the basis of Article 15, both parties to the case have to be treated equally. This means that both parties to the case are entitled to have an equal opportunity to present written submissions and to respond to each other’s submissions. This also means that the parties must have an equal opportunity to go through the evidence and the arguments submitted by the other party, and to prepare their own position and arguments in advance of the hearing.

  3. (p. 58)
  4. 50.  Chamber One has taken a strict stance on these matters: no new evidence is permitted prior to the hearing unless the Tribunal finds that it is justified by exceptional circumstances and is filed no later than two months before the hearing in the case. Moreover, as a matter of routine in its orders scheduling a hearing the Chamber advises the parties that any party is free to make whatever arguments it wishes at the hearin; however, parties may not introduce new documents into evidence absent the Tribunal’s permission. Such permission normally is not granted except for rebuttal evidence introduced to rebut evidence produced at the hearing.

  5. 52.  Typically, the practice not to allow new evidence in the record encompasses not only the two–month period directly preceding the hearing but also the post–hearing period preceding the filing of an award. The practice of Chamber One has been strict, even though the Chamber has taken into consideration the nature of these documents, the elapsed period of time, and the reasons for the delay, when deciding on the admissibility of late–filed, unauthorized documents. Usually, the Tribunal has rejected the late–filed unauthorized documents in order to prevent any party from using “tactical” filings at the hearing or thereafter.

Vera–Jo Miller Aryeh et al and The Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 581–842/843/844–1 (22 May 1997), reprinted in 33 Iran-US CTR 272, 287–88 (1997).

(2)  Tribunal Rules, Article 15(2)

The Parties are hereby notified that a settlement or pre–hearing conference in this case will beheld on Thursday 16 December at 9.00 am at Parkweg 13, The Hague. The Parties should be prepared to discuss the matters indicated in the schedule annexed. The Parties are requested in particular to have available all necessary authorizations and approvals in the event that a settlement should result.

ANNEX

  1. (a)  Clarification of the issues presented and relief sought;

  2. (b)  identification and clarification of any issues to be considered as preliminary questions and particularly the issue of jurisdiction;

  3. (c)  status of any settlement discussions;

  4. (d)  whether any further documents or written statements, including any reply or rejoinder, are requested by the arbitrating parties or required by the arbitral tribunal;

  5. (p. 59)
  6. (e)  fixing a schedule for submission by each arbitrating party of a summary of the documents or lists of witness or other evidence it intends to present at the hearin;

  7. (f)  fixing a schedule for submission of any documents, exhibits or other evidence which the arbitral tribunal may require;

  8. (g)  desirability of appointing an expert by the arbitral tribunal and, if so, the expert’s qualifications and terms of reference; whether the arbitrating parties intend to present experts and, if so, the qualification of and the areas of expertise to be covered by any such expert;

  9. (h)  determining what documentary evidence will require translation;

  10. (i)  fixing a schedule of hearings;

  11. (j)  other appropriate matters.

The Austin Company and Machine Sazi Arak, Case No. 295, Chamber Two, Order of 30 Jul 1982.

The Tribunal intends to decide on the basis of the documents submitted (i) whether the forum selection clause in the Contract excludes jurisdiction of the Tribunal and (ii) whether the claim is a claim by a national of the United States as defined in Article VII of the Claims Settlement Declaration.

Sylvania Technical Systems, Inc. and The Islamic Republic of Iran, Case No. 64, Chamber One, Order of 10 May 1983.

The Tribunal wishes to point out that, contrary to the provisions relating to Hearings, the Tribunal Rules do not contain any provision by which the Parties are entitled to a Pre–hearing Conference when they make a request to that effect. Moreover, the practice of the Tribunal to date has been to schedule Pre–hearing Conferences only when the Tribunal deems it necessary for the proper scheduling of further proceedings. In quite a number of cases this is not necessary, such as in the present case.

Phelps Dodge Corporation and Overseas Private Investment Corporation and The Islamic Republic of Iran, Case No. 99, Chamber Two, Order of 8 May 1984.

In view of the large number of pending cases and the practical limits on the number of hearings and deliberations that can be held during each year, the Tribunal cannot afford, as a general practice, to separate certain issues for preliminary hearing and decision but must normally join such issues to the merits.

(p. 60) White Consolidated Industries Inc. and Iran Compressor Manufacturing Co., Case No. 126, Chamber Two, Order of 7 Dec 1984.

… neither the Tribunal Rules nor Tribunal practice requires that there be a Pre–Hearing Conference or that a Hearing be held on requests for interim measures or preliminary issues such as jurisdiction.

Component Builders, Inc. and The Islamic Republic of Iran, Case No. 395, Chamber Three, Order of 19 Feb 1985.

The Tribunal does not find that the reasons invoked by the Respondent in this submission constitute strong and compelling reasons. Nevertheless, it is prepared to grant a last extension for the filing of Respondent’s submission until 21 October 1986. After that date, the Tribunal will take a decision regarding its jurisdiction on the basis of the briefs and evidence before it.

Parvin Mariam Samrad and The Islamic Republic of Iran, Case No. 465, Chamber Two, Order of 28 Jul 1986.

Unless by 18 February 1987 either Party has filed a request for an oral Hearing, both the jurisdictional issues and the merits of the Case will be decided thereafter by the Tribunal on the basis of the documents submitted.

World Farmers Trading Inc. and Government Trading Corporation, Case No. 764, Chamber One, Order of 4 Aug 1986.

The Tribunal makes the following order pursuant to the pre–hearing conference held on 1 July 1986:

  1. 1.  The Tribunal does not consider it appropriate at the present stage of the proceedings to issue an interlocutory Award disposing of jurisdictional or other preliminary issues.

    It is the present intention of the Tribunal that the issues raised in paragraphs 2 and 3 above shall thereafter be decided on the basis of the documents submitted.

Tai, Inc. and The Islamic Republic of Iran, Case No. 421, Chamber One, Order of 12 Aug 1986.

  1. 1.  Considering the nature of the dispute and the amount involved in the claim in relation to the costs that will be incurred by the parties (p. 61) in the event of a hearing, the Tribunal is prepared to decide this claim on the basis of the documents submitted.

  2. 2.  The Tribunal will decide the claim without a hearing unless a request for a hearing is filed by either party not later than 22 September 1986. In the event such a request is filed, the hearing will be held on 20 October 1986 at Parkweg 13, The Hague starting at 9.30 am.

The United States of America on behalf and for the benefit of the New York Blower Company and The Islamic Republic of Iran, Case No. 10418, Chamber Two, Order of 1 Sep 1986.

  1. 21.  As noted above, … Iran withdrew its earlier request for a hearing on jurisdictional issues by its submission filed on 5 February 1992. As noted also in para 11, Siporex California requested in its submission filed on 22 June 1992 “a formal hearing and the presentation of evidence since the respondents have criticized and slandered the evidence presented on behalf of the claimant in support of its claim contending it is unreliable and fabricated.” This request for hearing must be denied. More than a year before Siporex California requested a hearing, the Tribunal had, by Order filed on 14 March 1991, informed the Parties that it “intends to take a decision regarding its jurisdiction on the basis of the evidence before it …” The Tribunal notes that the Claimant was free at that time to request a hearing, but it chose not to do so. Instead, it and the Respondents filed extensive pleadings within the framework of the Tribunal’s Order, without any mention of a request for a hearing. In the circumstances, the request for a hearing was not made at an appropriate time. Although Article 15, paragraph 2, of the Tribunal rules states that a party may request a hearing at “any stage of the proceedings”, the Tribunal has previously held that “such provision should be interpreted, in the light of the particular circumstance of each case, to mean that Hearings are to be held upon the reasonable request of a party made at an appropriate stage of the proceedings.” See World Farmers Trading Inc. and Government Trading Corporation, et al., Award No. 428–764–1 (7 July 1989), para 16, reprinted in 22 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 204, at 209 (1989–II). Further, it is clear from its request that the Claimant seeks a hearing in order to present evidence in connection with the authenticity of certain documents that Iran asserts were fabricated. However, no hearing for that purpose is needed because, for reasons stated below, … the Tribunal decides that it (p. 62) has no jurisdiction in this Case regardless of the Parties’ dispute on the authenticity of those documents.

Tchacosh Company, Inc. and The Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 540–192–1 (9 Dec 1992), reprinted in 28 Iran-US CTR 371, 379–80 (1992).

  1. 3.  The Tribunal notes that the Parties appear to disagree about the controlling precedent in these Cases, the Claimant citing Award No. 382–B 1–FT (31 Aug. 1988) and the Respondent citing Award No. 529–A15 (II:A and II:B)–FT (6 May 1992). The Tribunal also notes that the Parties appear to envisage somewhat different proceedings and filings.

  2. 4.  In these circumstances, the Tribunal believes that it would be desirable to have a Pre–Hearing Conference with the Parties prior to its decision on the further proceedings in these consolidated Cases.

  3. 5.  Accordingly, the Parties are requested to attend a Pre–Hearing Conference in these consolidated Cases to be held at Parkweg 13 on 10 February 1993, commencing at 9:30 a.m.

  4. 6.  The following matters will be considered at the Pre–Hearing Conference:

    1. (a)  identification of any issues that the Parties believe the Tribunal should consider as preliminary questions;

    2. (b)  procedures for avoiding overlap between properties at issue in these consolidated Cases and properties at issue in Case No. A15 (II:A);

    3. (c)  further proceedings in these consolidated Cases, including the schedule for further submissions by the Parties:

    4. (d)  any other procedural issues relating to these consolidated Cases that the Parties or the Tribunal may wish to raise at the Pre–Hearing Conference.

The Islamic Republic of Iran and United States of America, Case Nos. A3, A8, A9, A14 and B16, Full Tribunal, Order of 3 Dec 1992.

On March 1993, the Respondent filed “Respondent’s Rebuttal Brief on the Issue of Claimant’s Dominant and Effective Nationality”. Both Parties having now filed their rebuttals, the Tribunal takes note of the Claimant’s request for “oral argument on the issue of the dominant and effective nationality” contained in her submission, filed on 31 October 1991, and in accordance with Article 15, paragraph 2 of the Tribunal Rules, orders as follows:

(p. 63)

The Parties are requested to appear before Chamber One of the Tribunal for a Hearing, restricted to the issue of the Claimant’s dominant and effective nationality, which is scheduled to take place on 11 June 1993 at Parkweg 13, The Hague, starting at 9:30 a.m.

Ninni Ladjevardi (formerly Burgel) and The Islamic Republic of Iran, Case No. 118, Chamber One, Order of 24 Mar 1993.

  1. 56.  The Tribunal concludes that Article 15, paragraph 2 is primarily applicable to the situation where there has not yet been a hearing and one of the parties requests one. The right of the parties to request a hearing under Article 15, paragraph 2 is not, however, an absolute right. For example, in World Farmers Trading, Inc. and Government Trading Corporation, et al., Award No. 428–764–1 (7 July 1989), reprinted in 22 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 204, 209, the Tribunal held that although Article 15, paragraph 2 of the Tribunal Rules states that a party may request a hearing “at any stage of the proceedings,” “[t]his provision should be interpreted, in light of the particular circumstances of each case, to mean that Hearings are to be held upon the reasonable request of a party made at an appropriate stage of the proceedings.” This interpretation of Article 15, paragraph 2 was followed in Tchacosh Company, Inc., et al. and The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, et al., Award No. 540–192–1, para 21 (9 December 1992), reprinted in 28 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 37, 380, in which the Tribunal refused to grant the claimant’s request for a hearing, saying that the request had not been made at an “appropriate time” because it was made more than one year after the Tribunal had informed the Parties of its intention to take a decision on jurisdiction on the basis of the written evidence before it.

  2. 57.  Thus even where no hearing has been held, Article 15, paragraph 2 does not oblige the Tribunal to accede to any request by a party for a hearing. The applicable criteria in evaluating each request are whether the request is both reasonable and made at an appropriate stage of the proceedings. In a context such as the present, where a Hearing has already been held, the reasonableness of the request and the appropriateness of the timing become even more important because the disruption of the arbitral process is that much greater and because the parties have already had an extensive opportunity to present their cases.

  3. 58.  For the foregoing reasons, the Tribunal does not consider Article 15, (p. 64) paragraph 2 to be capable of justifying the reopening of the Hearing in the present situation.

Dadras International, et al. and Islamic Republic of Iran, et al., Award No. 567–213/215–3 (7 Nov 1995), reprinted in (1995) 31 Iran-US CTR 127, 143 (footnotes omitted).

Extracts from the Practice of NAFTA Tribunals

(1)  Article 15(1) –general

  1. 1.5  In the specific context of a NAFTA arbitration where the parties have agreed to operate by UNCITRAL Rules, it is an overriding principle (Article 15) that the parties be treated with equality. The other NAFTA Parties do not, so far as the Tribunal has become aware, have domestic law that would permit or requires them to withhold documents from Chapter 11 Tribunals without any justification beyond a simple certification that they are some kind of state secret. In these circumstances, Canada, if it could simply rely on s. 39 [of the Canada Evidence Act], might be in an unfairly advantaged position under Chapter 11 by comparison with the United States and Mexico.

Pope & Talbot Inc. and The Government of Canada, Decision on Privileges (NAFTA Chapter Eleven, 6 Sep 2000), at 2–3, available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/NAFTA-en.asp.

  1. 193.  As noted, during the course of discovery in this proceeding, Canada objected to producing certain items on the ground that, as Privy Council documents, their disclosure was prohibited by the Canada Evidence Act. The Tribunal rules that that Act by its terms did not apply to a Chapter 11 tribunal, and Canada did not contest that ruling. However, it nonetheless refused to produce or even identify the documents in order to permit the Tribunal to make a reasoned judgment as to their relevance and materiality. In the result, this refusal did not appear prejudicial to the Investor, and the Tribunal proceeded upon the basis of the materials actually before it. However, the Tribunal deplores the decision of Canada in this matter. As the Tribunal noted in its decision on this matter dated September 6, 2000, Canada’s position could well be a derogation from the “overriding principle” found in Article 15 of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, under which these proceedings have been conducted, that all (p. 65) Parties should be treated with equality. Moreover, Article 115 of NAFTA declares that there shall be “equal treatment among investors of the Parties.” As Canada’s refusal to disclose or identify documents in these circumstances is at variance with the practice of other NAFTA Parties, at least of the United States, that refusal could well result in a denial of equality of treatment of investors and investments of the Parties bringing claims under Chapter 11.

Pope & Talbot Inc. and The Government of Canada, Award on the Merits of Phase 2 (NAFTA Chapter Eleven, 10 Apr 2001), (No. 4, 2001) 13 WTAM 61, 153.

  1. 20.  … Methanex seeks confirmation that it is not now required to produce all evidence on which the presentation of its case on the merits will rely, thereby foreclosing the development and presentation of additional evidence at a later stage. Methanex also seeks clarification as to whether it is required to produce “essentially final reports from all its experts” within the ninety day time limit imposed by the Tribunal; and it seeks confirmation now that the Tribunal is not planning to proceed directly to a hearing on the merits.

  2. 21.  It is difficult for the Tribunal to follow Methanex’s apparent difficulties. As the Partial Award states in Paragraph 163 (page 69), Methanex must file with its fresh pleading copies of all evidential documents on which it relies. This direction is clear both as to the ambit of the evidence required (“as regards the USA’s alleged liability”; but “we exclude evidential materials relating to the alleged quantum”) and the extent (“all evidential documents”). Similarly there is no ambiguity with respect to the Tribunal’s direction on the submission of expert reports, and there is no suggestion that these should be draft reports or reports that are otherwise incomplete: see Paragraphs 163 and 165 of the Partial Award (pages 69 & 70).

  3. 22.  Nonetheless, insofar as Methanex may find insuperable difficulty in complying with the ninety day limit imposed by the Partial Award, it remains open to Methanex to seek an extension of that deadline from the Tribunal. Moreover, if for good cause shown, Methanex is unable timeously to complete its filing of all relevant evidential materials, it remains equally open to Methanex to seek dispensation from the Tribunal in regard to missing materials; e.g. an outstanding application against a third person under 18 (p. 66) U.S.C. § 1782 28 (if applicable), as raised at page 6 of Methanex’s letter.

  4. 23.  It is the Tribunal’s intention, both in the Partial Award and now, that Methanex and its legal advisers should have the best opportunity to advance Methanex’s best case. It is not the Tribunal’s intention to deprive either Disputing Party of its procedural rights under Article 15(1) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, or otherwise. However, as regards Methanex’s present exercise, given the long history of this arbitration (on which Methanex rightly comments at page 7 of its letter), that can only be a reasonable opportunity. There must therefore be a reasonable deadline. In all the circumstances, from the Tribunal’s current perspective, ninety days is a reasonable period of time. It could be extended by the Tribunal if necessary; but an extension should be sought by means of a reasoned application to the Tribunal and not by a request for interpretation of the Partial Award.

  5. 24.  There is no suggestion in the Partial Award that if, at a later stage Methanex sought to submit further relevant evidence, it would be debarred automatically from doing so–nor could there be. This would be a matter for consideration by the Tribunal in the future, if and when that issue arose and after hearing both Disputing Parties.

Methanex Corporation and United States of America, Letter from the Tribunal to the Parties (NAFTA Chapter Eleven, 25 Sep 2002), at 9–10, available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/c3439.htm.

(2)  Article 15(1) – Amicus submissions

  1. 24.  … In the Tribunal’s view, there is nothing in either the UNCITRAL Arbitration rules or Chapter 11, Section B, that either expressly confers upon the Tribunal the power to accept amicus submissions or expressly provides that the Tribunal shall have no such power.

  2. 25.  It follows that the Tribunal’s powers in this respect must be inferred, if at all, from its more general procedural powers. In the Tribunal’s view, the Petitioner’s requests must be considered against Article 15(1) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules; and it is not possible or appropriate to look elsewhere for any broader power or jurisdiction.

  3. 26.  Article 15(1) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules grants to the Tribunal a broad discretion as to the conduct of this arbitration, subject always to the requirements of procedural equality and (p. 67) fairness towards the Disputing Parties. It provides, broken down into numbered sub–paragraphs for ease of reference below, as follows:

    “[1] Subject to these Rules, [2] the arbitral tribunal may conduct the arbitration in such manner as it considers appropriate, [3] provided that the parties are treated with equality and that at any stage in the proceedings each party is given a full opportunity of presenting its case.”

    This provision constitutes one of the essential “hallmarks” of an international arbitration under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, according to the travaux préparatoires. Article 15 has also been described as the “heart” of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules; and its terms have since been adopted in Article 18 and 19(2) of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, where these provisions were considered as the procedural “Magna Carta” of international commercial arbitration. Article 15(1) is plainly a very important provision.

    [The Tribunal turned to the issue of “whether the Tribunal’s acceptance of amicus submissions falls within the general scope of the sub–paragraph numbered [2] of Article 15(1)”]

  4. 28.  In addressing this issue, there are four principal matters to be considered:

    1. (i)  whether the Tribunal’s acceptance of amicus submissions falls within the general scope of … Article 15(1);

    2. (ii)  if so, whether the acceptance of amicus submissions could affect the equal treatment of the Disputing Parties and the opportunity of each to present its case, under … Article 15(1);

    3. (iii)  whether there are any provisions in Chapter 11, Section B, of NAFTA that modify the application of Article 15(1) for present purposes;

    4. (iv)  whether other provisions of the UNCITRAL Rules likewise modify the application of Article 15(1) in regard to this particular case, given the introductory words … of Article 15(1).

It is convenient to consider each matter in turn.

(i)  The General Scope of Article 15(1) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules

  1. 29.  The Tribunal is required to decide a substantive dispute between the Claimant and the Respondent. The Tribunal has no mandate (p. 68) to decide any other substantive dispute or any dispute determining the legal rights of third persons. The legal boundaries of the arbitration are set by this essential legal fact. It is thus self–evident that if the Tribunal cannot directly, without consent, add another person as a party to this dispute or treat a third person as a party to the arbitration or NAFTA, it is equally precluded from achieving this result indirectly by exercising a power over the conduct of the arbitration. Accordingly, in the Tribunal’s view, the power under Article 15(1) must be confined to procedural matters. Treating non–parties as Disputing Parties or as NAFTA Parties cannot be matters of mere procedure; and such matters cannot fall within Article 15(1) of the UNCITRAL Rules.

  2. 30.  However, in the Tribunal’s view, its receipt of written submissions from a person other than the Disputing Parties is not equivalent to adding that person as a party to the arbitration…

  3. 31.  The Tribunal considers that allowing a third person to make an amicus submission could fall within its procedural powers over the conduct of the arbitration, within the general scope of Article 15(1) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. The wording of … Article 15(1) suffices, in the Tribunal’s view, to support its conclusion; but its approach is supported by the practice of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal and the World Trade Organisation.

[The Tribunal’s discussion of the practice of these institutions, as well as that of the International Court of Justice, has been omitted.]

(ii)  Safeguarding Equal Treatment

  1. 36.  However, at least initially, the burden in meeting the Petitioners’ written submissions would be shared by both Disputing Parties; and moreover, that burden cannot be regarded as inevitably excessive for either Disputing Party. As envisaged by the Tribunal, the Petitioners would make their submissions in writing, in a form and subject to limitations decided by the Tribunal. The Petitioners could not adduce the evidence of any factual or expert witness; and it would not therefore be necessary for either Disputing Party to cross–examine a witness proffered by the Petitioners: there could be no such witness. As to the contents of the Petitioners’ written submissions; it would always be for the Tribunal to decide what weight (if any) to attribute to those submissions. Even if any part of those submissions were arguably to constitute written (p. 69) “evidence”, the Tribunal would still retain a complete discretion under Article 25.6 of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules to determine its admissibility, relevance, materiality and weight. Of course, if either Disputing Party could not then complain at that burden: it was always required to meet its opponent’s case; and that case, however supplemented, can form no extra unfair burden or unequal treatment.

  2. 37.  It would always be the Tribunal’s task, assisted by the Disputing Parties, to adopt procedures whereby any burden in meeting written submissions from a Petitioner was mitigated or extinguished. In theory, a difficulty could remain if a point was advanced by a Petitioner to which both Disputing Parties were opposed; but in practice, that risk appears small in this arbitration. In any case, it is not a risk the size or nature of which should swallow the general principle permitting written submissions from third persons. Accordingly, whilst there is a possible risk of unfair treatment as raised by the Claimant, the Tribunal is aware of that risk and considers that it must be addressed as and when it may arise. There is no immediate risk of unfair or unequal treatment for any Disputing Party or Party.

(iii)  Relevant Provisions in Chapter 11, Section B, of NAFTA

(iv)  Other UNCITRAL Rules

  1. 40.  The Claimant’s reliance on Article 25(4) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules to the effect that hearings are to be held in camera is not relevant to the Petitioners’ request to serve written submissions to the Tribunal. In the Tribunal’s view, there are no further provisions under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules that modify the application of its general power under Article 15(1) to allow the Petitioners to make such submissions in this arbitration.

  2. 41.  However, the Claimant’s reliance on Article 25(4) is relevant to the Petitioners’ request to attend hearings and to receive copies of all submissions and materials adduced before the Tribunal. [The Tribunal declined to grant Petitioners these rights because the Parties had not consented in this regard pursuant to Article 25(4).] Article 25(4) provides that: “[Oral] Hearings shall be held in camera unless the parties agree otherwise …”. The phrase “in camera ” is clearly intended to exclude members of the public, i).e. non–party third persons such as the Petitioners. As the travaux préparatoires disclose, the UNCITRAL drafting committee deleted a different provision in an earlier draft which could have allowed (p. 70) the arbitration tribunal to admit into an oral hearing persons other than the parties. However, as discussed further below, Article 25(4) relates to the privacy of the oral hearings of the arbitration; and it does not in like terms address the confidentiality of the arbitration.

  3. 42.  As to privacy, the Respondent has accepted that, as a result of Article 25(4), hearings are to be held in camera unless both Disputing Parties consent otherwise. The Respondent has given such consent. The Claimant has given no such consent. The Tribunal must therefore apply Article 25(4); and it has no power (or inclination) to undermine the effect of its terms. It follows that the Tribunal must reject the Petitioners’ requests to attend oral hearings of the arbitration.

  4. 43.  As to confidentiality, the Tribunal notes the conflicting legal materials as to whether Article 25(4) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules imposes upon the Disputing Parties a further duty of confidentiality (beyond privacy) in regard to materials generated by parties within the arbitration…

  5. 46.  This is however a difficult area; and for the present purposes, the Tribunal does not have to decide the point. Confidentiality is determined by the agreement of the Disputing Parties as recorded in the Consent Order regarding Disclosure and Confidentiality, forming part of the Minutes of Order of the Second Procedural meeting of 7th September 2000. As amici have no rights under Chapter 11 of NAFTA to receive any materials generated within the arbitration (or indeed any rights at all), they are to be treated by the Tribunal as any other members of the public…

(v)  The Tribunal’s Conclusion

  1. 47.  Power: The Tribunal concludes that by Article 15(1) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules it has the power to accept amicus submissions (in writing) from each of the Petitioners, to be copied simultaneously to the legal representatives of the Disputing Parties, Canada and Mexico… The Tribunal also concludes that it has no power to accept the Petitioners’ requests to receive materials generated within the arbitration or to attend oral hearings of the arbitration. Such materials may however may be derived from the public domain or disclosed into the public domain within the terms of the Consent Order regarding Disclosure and Confidentiality, or otherwise lawfully; but that is a quite separate matter outwith the scope of this decision.

(p. 71)

(vi)  The Tribunal’s Order

  1. 53.  For the reasons set out above, pursuant to Article 15(1) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, the Tribunal declares that it has the power to accept amicus written submissions from the Petitioners.

Methanex Corporation and The United States of America, Decision on Petitions from Third Persons to Intervene as Amici Curiae (NAFTA Chapter Eleven, 15 Jan 2001), reprinted in (2001) 13(3) WTAM 97, 109–11, 114–15, 118–20.

[The Tribunal’s discussion of the general nature of Article 15(1) in paragraphs 37 to 39 is omitted.]

The Tribunal’s opinion and conclusion on the participation of amici curiae

  1. 59.  The submission by Mexico raises a threshold issue: does the Tribunal have any power at all to allow third parties to participate in these proceedings? The Tribunal has already ruled that they cannot participate as parties to the proceedings. But is a less, amicus curiae role, permitted?

  2. 60.  As all those making submissions agree, the answer is to be found in the powers conferred by article 15(1), read of course in its context. Those powers are limited to matters of procedure and they are constrained by other relevant rules and NAFTA provisions and by the principles of equality and fairness. They cannot be used to turn the dispute the subject of the arbitration into a different dispute, for instance by adding a new party to the arbitration. Rather, the powers are to be used to facilitate the Tribunal’s process of inquiry into, understanding of, and resolving, that very dispute which has been submitted to it in accordance with the consent of the disputing parties.

  3. 61.  Is it within the scope of article 15(1) for the Tribunal to receive submissions offered by third parties with the purpose of assisting the Tribunal in that process? The Tribunal considers that it is. It is part of its power to conduct the arbitration in such manner as it considers appropriate. As the Methanex Tribunal said, the receiving of such submissions from a third person is not equivalent to making that person a party to the arbitration. That person does not have any rights as a party or as a non–disputing Party. It is not participating to vindicate its rights. Rather, the Tribunal has exercised its power to permit that person to make the submission. It is a matter of its power rather than of third party right. The rights of the disputing Parties is not altered (although in exercise of (p. 72) their procedural rights they will have the rights to respond to any submission) and the legal nature of the arbitration remains unchanged.

  4. 63.  We consider that article 15(1) supports a power to allow submissions by amici curiae.

  5. 64.  In support of that conclusion, we call attention to the practice mentioned by the Methanex Tribunal of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal and the WTO Appellate Body which supports a power (but not a duty) to receive third party submission: Iran v. United States case A/15 Award No. 63–A/15–FT; 2 Iran-US CTR 40, 43; and Hot Rolled Lead and Carbon Steel, order of the Appellate Body of the WTO. It is true that in contentious cases in the International Court of Justice only states and in certain circumstances public international organizations may have access to the Court (the latter only to provide information relevant to cases before it.) But that limit appears to result directly from the wording of articles 34, 35 and 61–64 of the Statute of the Court which carefully regulate those matters as well as from the practice under them extending over several decades; see Shabtai Rosenne The Law and Practice of International Court, 1920–1966 (1997) chs 10 and 26.

    Relevant provisions of NAFTA and the UNCITRAL Rules

  6. 67.  The relevant provision of the UNCITRAL rules to which attention is given in the submissions is article 25(4) under which hearings are in camera unless the parties agree otherwise. They have not so agreed. The provision does not however prevent the Tribunal receiving written submissions. But it does prevent third parties or their representatives attending the hearings in the absence of both parties agreeing.

  7. 68.  Next there is the difficult question of the confidentiality of the pleadings and other documents generated in the course of the proceeding … The privacy of the hearing is perhaps to be distinguished from the confidentiality or availability of documents. Under Chapter 11 and the UNCITRAL Rules provision is made for the communication of pleadings, documents and evidence to the other disputing party, the other NAFTA Parties, the Tribunal and the Secretariat–and to no one else. The matter is also subject to any agreement between the parties or order in respect of confidentiality…

(p. 73)

The requirement of equality and of the full opportunity of parties to present their case

  1. 69.  The requirement of equality and the parties’ right to present their cases do limit the power of the Tribunal to conduct the arbitration in such manner as it considers appropriate. That power is to be used not only to protect those rights of the parties, but also to investigate and determine the matter subject to arbitration in a just, efficient and expeditious manner. The power of the Tribunal to permit amicus submissions is not to be used in a way which is unduly burdensome for the parties or which unnecessarily complicates the Tribunal process. The Tribunal envisages that it will place limits on the submissions to be made in writing in terms for instance of the length. The third parties would not have the opportunity to call witnesses (given the effect of article 25(4)) with the result that the disputing parties would not face the need to cross–examine them or call contradictory evidence. The parties would also be entitled to have the opportunity to respond to any such submissions.

    The Tribunal’s assessment

  2. 70.  The Tribunal returns to the emphasis which the petitioners, with considerable cogency, have placed on the important public character of the matters in issue in this arbitration and on their own real interests in these matters. It recalls as well the emphasis placed on the value of greater transparency for proceedings such as these. Such proceedings are not now, if they ever were, to be equated to the standard run of international commercial arbitration between private parties…

  3. 71.  The Tribunal does not consider that among the matters on which it is appropriate for the Petitioners to make submissions are questions of jurisdiction and the place of arbitration. On both, the parties are fully able to present the competing contentions and in significant degree have already done so. In any event it is for the respondent to take jurisdictional points and the parties themselves have the power to fix the place of arbitration by agreement between them. The Tribunal does not consider that any other procedural matters of which it is award should be the subject of amicus submissions.

  4. 72.  The circumstances and the detail of the making of any amicus submissions would be the subject of consultation with the parties.

(p. 74)

United Parcel Service of America Inc. and Government of Canada, Decision on Petitions for Intervention and Participation as Amici Curiae (NAFTA Chapter Eleven, 17 Oct 2001) at 24–28, reprinted in (2002) 14(1) WTAM 41, 64–68.

Extracts from the Practice of Other Tribunals

  1. 6.  The parties subsequently filed Memorials and Counter–Memorials dated respectively 22 May 2000 and 22/23 June. These were supported by a substantial number of annexes. The Tribunal has carefully considered these. However, before proceeding to the substance of the issues the parties have sought to place before it, the Tribunal wishes to raise a number of preliminary issues. In short, there are questions whether the “dispute” identified in Article 1 of the Arbitration Agreement is one which is capable of reference to arbitration under the UNCITRAL Rules, or which the Tribunal has jurisdiction to decide in accordance with international law. It does not matter that the parties have failed to raise these issues. The Tribunal has the power to do so, by virtue of Article 6 of the Agreement and Article 15(1) of the Rules. Indeed, the jurisprudence of international tribunals suggests that it has the duty to do so.

  2. 14.  In accordance with Article 15(1) of the Rules, the parties must have a full opportunity to deal with these questions before the Tribunal proceeds to consider them further, or to reach any conclusion on them. The pleadings currently before the Tribunal do not consider these questions.

  3. 15.  The Tribunal believes that the parties should have an opportunity to decide whether they wish to undertake a separate round of pleadings or should include an oral phase. If the parties do not wish to engage in a separate round of pleadings, the Tribunal is presently of the view that it should then proceed to consider these issues as preliminary issues and to make an award thereon.

  4. 16.  The Tribunal accordingly gives the parties until 7 August 2000 to present, jointly or separately, their views on the procedure that should now be followed…

Lance Paul Larsen and The Hawaiian Kingdom, Procedural Order No. 3 (Permanent Court of Arbitration, 17 Jul 2000), reprinted in (2001) 119 ILR 566, 577, 578.

(p. 75)

  1. 6.4.  Following the delivery of the Tribunal’s Procedural Order No. 3 the parties entered into Special Agreement No. 2 of 2 August 2000 and sought to raise a preliminary issue to be determined by the Tribunal in the following terms:

    Pursuant to Article 32(1) of the UNCITRAL Rules, the Parties request the Arbitral Tribunal to issue an Interlocutory Award, on the basis of the 1843 Anglo–Franco Proclamation of 28 November 1843 and the rules and principles of international law, verifying the continued existence of Hawaiian Statehood with the Hawaiian Kingdom as its government.

  2. 6.5.  The Tribunal responded to the making of Special Agreement No. 2 with its Procedural Order No. 4 of 5 September 2000, which read as follows:

  3. 3.  The Tribunal set out in its Order No. 3 the questions which, in its view, are raised before it can proceed to the merits of the dispute. The issue identified in Article 1 of Special Agreement No. 2 is not one of these. Rather it appears to be a reformulation of the first substantive issue identified as being in dispute.

  4. 4.  It is not open to the parties by way of an amendment to the Special Agreement to seek to redefine the essential issues, so as to convert them into “interim” or “interlocutory” issues. In accordance with article 32 of the UNCITRAL Rules, and with the general principles of arbitral procedure, it is for the Tribunal to determine which issues need to be dealt with and in what order. For the reasons already given, the Tribunal cannot at this stage proceed to the merits of the dispute; these merits include the question sought to be raised as a preliminary issue by Article I. If the arbitration is to proceed it is first necessary that the preliminary issues identified in its Order No. 3 should have been dealt with.

  5. 5.  If the parties are not content with the submission of the dispute to arbitration under the UNCITRAL Rules and under the auspices of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, they may no doubt, by agreement notified to the Permanent Court, terminate the arbitration. What they cannot do, in the Tribunal’s view, is by agreement to change the essential basis on which the Tribunal itself is constituted, or require the Tribunal to act other than in accordance with the applicable law.

Lance Paul Larsen and The Hawaiian Kingdom, Award (Permanent Court of Arbitration, 5 Feb. 2001), reprinted in (2001) 119 ILR 566, 579–80.

(p. 76)

  1. 43.  In accordance with Article 15.1 of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, the Tribunal decided to conduct the arbitration in the manner it considers appropriate. For this purpose, the Tribunal decided, to the extent appropriate, to apply the IBA Rules [in Taking Evidence in International Commercial Arbitration].

CME Czech Republic BV and The Czech Republic, Final Award (Ad Hoc UNCITRAL Proceeding, 14 Mar 2003), reprinted in (2003) 15(4) WTAM 83, 100.

Place of Arbitration–Article 16

The preceding discussion concerning Article 15(1) already indicated that the choice of the place of arbitration is not only a practical matter, but also may involve significant legal consequences in the form of local mandatory norms. Given that such a choice may decisively affect the enforcement of an award, the issue is much more important than might appear at first blush. Consequently, the UNCITRAL Rules in Article 16 devote relatively detailed provisions to the question concerning the place of arbitration.

Text of the UNCITRAL Rule144

Article 16 of the UNCITRAL Rule provides:

1.  Unless the parties have agreed upon the place where the arbitration is to be held, such place shall be determined by the arbitral tribunal, having regard to the circumstances of the arbitration.

2.  The arbitral tribunal may determine the locale of the arbitration within the country agreed upon by the parties. It may hear witnesses and hold meetings for consultation among its members at any place it deems appropriate, having regard to the circumstances of the arbitration.

3.  The arbitral tribunal may meet at any place it deems appropriate for the inspection of goods, other property or documents. The parties shall be given sufficient notice to enable them to be present at such inspection.

4.  The award shall be made at the place of arbitration.

(p. 77) Commentary

(1)  Selection of the place of arbitration– Article 16(1)

(a)  Considerations to be taken into account

“Unless the parties have agreed upon the place” of arbitration, “such place shall be determined by the arbitral tribunal.”145 This provision of Article 16(1) states that the parties have the right to determine the place of arbitration prior to the commencement of the proceedings, or even thereafter so long as the arbitrators have not made the determination.146 The wording of the provision appears to bar the parties from determining the place of arbitration after the tribunal’s decision on the matter.147 However, there is nothing to prevent the tribunal from revisiting its determination upon a unanimous request by the parties.148 Indeed, as the parties are the “masters” of the proceedings, that is, they can simply terminate the arbitration if their request is not complied with, the tribunal should always follow such a unanimous request.149

It is generally preferable that the parties expressly determine the place of arbitration in their arbitration clause or agreement.150 In some cases, however, (p. 78) this may not be advisable, as “the identity of the most suitable place of arbitration may depend on the nature and circumstances of the particular dispute that will be submitted to arbitration.”151 The nature of the dispute may not be foreseeable at the time the agreement is concluded. In such circumstances the parties may leave the place to be decided by the tribunal. Article 16(1) guarantees that, in the absence of a party agreement, the arbitrators shall make the choice without causing delay to the proceeding.152 Even generally this possibility may be valuable for parties who feel uncertain as to what the most appropriate place of arbitration is, and who therefore may wish to leave the question to the arbitral tribunal which is bound to decide the matter “having regard to the circumstances of the arbitration.”

The relevant circumstances can be divided into considerations of neutrality; legal considerations pertaining to the law of the country of arbitration; legal consequences flowing from the choice of the place as regards enforcement outside the last–mentioned country; and “purely practical” considerations.153 Each of these categories of relevant considerations is dealt with in the following discussion.

(b)  Neutrality

Strong psychological considerations, as well as the principle of equality of the parties, favor that the arbitration be held “in a country that is ‘neutral’, in the sense that it is not the home country of any of the parties to the dispute.”154 The neutrality aspect is particularly relevant in arbitrations involving parties from different socio–economic systems.155 Although this (p. 79) consideration has lost much of its relevance in recent years, the tribunal (and the parties, if they make the determination) is normally recommended to follow the prevailing practice156 of choosing a neutral country as the place of arbitration.157 For example, arbitration in the country of the respondent is normally not recommended to avoid giving an unfair advantage to one party with greater familiarity with the local law.158 Although choosing a neutral location may appear reasonable, there arise potential difficulties since the arbitral proceedings may differ from those conducted in the respective home countries of both parties.159 However, the increased harmonization of national arbitration laws has minimized this concern. Thus, other considerations may prevail over neutrality with the consequence that the parties and (p. 80) the arbitrators should not always be discouraged from selecting the country of one of the parties as the place of arbitration.

(c)  Nature of the local law

Where a neutral place of arbitration is chosen, as is usually recommended, the dispute’s connections to that jurisdiction may be very remote. Even so, “[i]t is generally accepted… that a state should insist upon the observance of a minimum standard of objectivity and justice in quasi–judicial proceedings held within its territory, whether they are the proceedings of a jockey club or of an arbitral tribunal.”160

In addition to its own legitimate interest in controlling the proceedings, the chosen jurisdiction may also be involved in providing the support of its courts for such purposes as gathering evidence and ordering interim measures of protection. The tribunal thus should take into account the contents and nature of the local law.

As to control over the proceedings, an arbitral tribunal’s wide discretion under the UNCITRAL Rules to conduct the arbitral proceedings in the manner it considers appropriate, save in exceptional cases, is restricted by the tribunal’s duty to respect mandatory norms of the law of the place of arbitration.161 This, of course, is also the case where the country of one of the parties has been chosen as the venue. Therefore the arbitrators, as well as the parties, should carefully examine the requirements of the law of the place or proposed place of arbitration in this respect.162 This is not always an easy task, if only for the reason that the mandatory or non–mandatory character of a particular norm may be difficult to determine even for a lawyer educated in the country in question.163

Such local expertise or at least commentaries or other literature on the arbitration law of the country in question164 should be consulted in case of doubt. Here it suffices to outline generally the impact which the mandatory norms of the lex loci arbitri, as well as the challenge and appeal possibilities provided by it, may have on the arbitration process. In addition to the actual proceedings, mandatory requirements of the local law may also impose conditions (p. 81) as to what may be arbitrated and who can arbitrate.165 In a worst case scenario, the failure to comply with such requirements may lead to the setting aside of the award. This in turn may make it impossible to have the award enforced.166

Many national laws restrict what issues are arbitrable.167 Such limitations usually concern disputes on matters with public law elements, such as employment, antitrust rules, competition law and intellectual property rights. These limitations should be taken into account when selecting the place of arbitration. Fortunately for international arbitration, the trend in various countries having such restrictions has been to adopt a more flexible attitude regarding international arbitrations.168

Thus, in international cases, “most commercial disputes are arbitrable under the laws of most countries.”169 Some caution is nevertheless needed, as indicated by cases in which a party relying on an arbitration clause has been unable to enforce it on the ground of non–arbitrability of the issue according to the law of the country in question.170

Local law also may deny to certain parties, such as state entities, the capacity to arbitrate.171 Although the principle of estoppel may be applied against an entity which, in contravention of such a prohibition,172 has consented to arbitration, the other party should be aware of any limitations of this kind. If the arbitration takes place in the home country of such an entity (instead of a neutral venue), the free consent to arbitration by the entity may not cure the legal impediment in question.

(p. 82) Mandatory norms of the locale may also exclude certain categories of persons as arbitrators.173 General exclusion of foreigners by such rules may provide enough impediment not to choose the country in question as the venue of arbitration. However, a trend towards more flexibility in international, as distinct from domestic, arbitration is discernible.174

While the choice of the place of arbitration may only exceptionally have impact on the question of substantive law governing the dispute,175 the way in which the mandatory procedural norms of the lex loci arbitri control the arbitration is one of the most important considerations to be taken into account in the selection of the place.176 The more extensively the local law imposes mandatory requirements, the greater the risk of the award being canceled or set aside by a domestic court, and the greater the likelihood that the proceedings will be hampered by judicial interference.177 The extent of the possibility of such an interference is one consideration to be taken into account in the selection of the place.178 After making the choice of location, the arbitral tribunal should see to it that those norms of the venue, the non–application of which may subject the proceedings or the award to a successful attack before a court, are followed.

In so far as non–derogable national rules are limited to such fundamental procedural principles as audiatur et altera pars, they do not present any particular problems, as strict application of the UNCITRAL Rules guarantees that universally accepted principles are observed to the extent necessary.179 (p. 83) The arbitral tribunal, however, should be aware that various domestic laws may contain mandatory norms which are less universal in character, but nevertheless may be in conflict with the UNCITRAL Rules. Such norms may relate to questions such as the acceptability of written affidavits as evidence,180 notice provisions contained in Article 2,181 dissenting opinions and the allowability of decisions ex aequo et bono.182 The power of the arbitral tribunal to decide its own jurisdiction in accordance with Article 21 is often circumscribed by the local courts’ power to determine whether the tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction.183

As to the control which the local law and local courts exercise over arbitration proceedings, the general trend is clearly towards more autonomy of international arbitration. Thus, while violation of ordre public or public policy is frequently a ground for setting aside an award, a distinction is increasingly made between domestic and international public policy in the sense that mandatory norms originally based on domestic public policy considerations are not necessarily applied to international cases.184 The consequence is that:

where an arbitration under the UNCITRAL Rules is of an international character, provisions in the Rules although in conflict with national public policy for domestic arbitration, may nevertheless be upheld, when the more restrictive standard of international public policy is applied.185

As a result, the validity and arbitrability of a contract involving international sales may be upheld, even if a similar contract involving domestic (p. 84) sales were void,186 or a procedural practice not accepted in purely domestic contexts may be tolerated in international arbitration. The trend towards more autonomy of international arbitration is evident in recent legislative changes carried out in various countries with a view to reducing court interference–and to increasing the attractiveness of the country as a venue for international commercial arbitration. Probably the most radical step was taken by Belgium, where, in cases in which none of the parties is a Belgian national or resident, the arbitration was, by law of 1985, placed totally outside the control of national judges.187 The law, however, has been changed.188 More typical is the position adopted by France and Australia. In both countries international arbitration remains under the control of courts, but the review standards are less strict than those applied in domestic cases.189

Still another approach is represented by the law of England,190 where the parties may appeal to a court on a point of law, unless they have agreed otherwise. “Exclusion agreements” are, as far as international arbitration is concerned, also possible under Swedish and Swiss law but are rare in practice.191

(p. 85) The trend towards limitations on appeals against arbitral awards–and at the same time towards harmonization of national laws–is likely to be accelerated by the adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law, under which the “grounds for challenge of an arbitral award are strictly limited”.192 The setting aside procedure regulated in Article 34 of the Model Law is the sole means for recourse to courts, and it is possible only on the following narrow grounds modeled on Article V of the New York Convention:193

  1. (a)  the party making the application furnishes proof that:

    1. (i)  a party to the arbitration agreement referred to in article 7 was under some incapacity; or the said agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law of this State; or

    2. (ii)  the party making the application was not given proper notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case; or

    3. (iii)  the award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration, provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted only that part of the award which contains decisions on matters not submitted to arbitration may be set aside; or

    4. (iv)  the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, unless such agreement was in conflict with a provision of this Law from which the parties cannot derogate, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with this Law; or

  2. (b)  the court finds that:

    1. (i)  the subject–matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law of this State; or

    2. (ii)  the award is in conflict with the public policy of this State.

Certain Canadian provinces were apparently the first jurisdictions to adopt, as a part of a comprehensive arbitration law reform of that country, legislation substantially based on the Model Law.194 Legislation influenced by (p. 86) the Model Law has been adopted in a number of countries.195 To a varying degree the UNCITRAL Model Law has affected the contents of legislative reforms carried out in other countries, such as Finland.196

As the Model Law gains international acceptance, domestic laws allowing extensive court interferences during arbitral proceedings or appeals on the merits are likely to become rare. They will not disappear, however; while the Model Law has opted in favor of only limited judicial control, at the same time it firmly allows some judicial control to be exercised by domestic courts. This is the compromise the Model Law strikes between arbitral autonomy and the need for some minimum level of official control over procedural fairness, as well as between the conflicting expectations the parties may have in this respect.197 In light of recent legislative trends, which in some countries have led to more limited judicial control than the Model Law compromise, it appears that, on a world–wide level, the Model Law approach will, more and more, represent the maximum of judicial control over arbitral proceedings.

The position adopted in the Model Law can also be understood as recognition of the fact that arbitration cannot completely cut off its ties with courts, but may need their support at various stages, such as the constitution of the tribunal and gathering of evidence.198 In the application of the UNCITRAL Rules, such support is not needed so much because the Rules themselves contain complete provisions on the appointment of arbitrators and challenges against them.199 However, in certain respects, the availability of the supportive role of domestic courts should also be taken into account as a pertinent consideration in the choice of the place of arbitration for proceedings under these rules.200

The recognition in the UNCITRAL Model Law of the connection (p. 87) between arbitral proceedings and the legal system of the place of arbitration is also important in that it increases the enforceability of the arbitral award in other jurisdictions.201 This leads to a very important criterion to be considered in the selection of the place of arbitration.

(d)  Enforceability of the award

It is rare that the losing party has assets in any neutral country which would be suitable as the place of arbitration.202 If it has, the enforcement of the award does not usually pose any particular problems but takes place in the same way as the enforcement of “purely” domestic awards.203 Normally a party to an international arbitration, however, must be prepared for the possibility of having to seek the enforcement of the award outside the place of arbitration. The selection of that place in turn influences the international enforceability of the award. This, consequently, is one factor to be taken into account in the choice of the arbitration place. This is the case notwithstanding the fact that, in an overwhelming majority of cases, an international award is complied with voluntarily.

Usually the enforcement (if any is needed) of awards rendered in international commercial arbitration takes place by virtue of international agreements, whether bilateral treaties or regional204 or general conventions. The most important general convention (and most important international agreement on the enforcement of arbitral awards in general) is the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.205

As the New York Convention provides the most effective mechanism for the enforcement of international arbitral awards, it is important to select the place of arbitration so as to guarantee that the award falls under the (p. 88) Convention. The place of arbitration is frequently determinative in this respect due to a provision according to which a state, party to the Convention, “may on the basis of reciprocity declare that it will apply the Convention to the recognition and enforcement of awards made only in the territory of another Contracting state.”206 In fact, the majority of the 137 contracting states have accepted the Convention with such a “reciprocity reservation,” and thus enforce by virtue of the Convention only awards rendered in the territory of another state party.207 Accordingly, “[c]hoosing a country that is a signatory to the New York Convention is of fundamental importance in ensuring the enforceability of an award.”208 Should this not seem practical, the existence of a bilateral treaty on the subject between the prospective place of arbitration and the likely place of enforcement should be studied.

The following list enumerates the contracting parties to the New York Convention and indicates the reservations, if any, which they have made.209

(p. 89)

Table 1:  The New York Convention–Contracting Parties

Reason for reservation

Country

Reciprocity

Commercial

Afghanistan

R

C

Albania

Algeria

R

C

Antigua and Barbuda

R

C

Argentina

R

C

Armenia

R

C

Australia

Austria

Azerbaijan

Bahrain

R

C

Bangladesh

Barbados

R

C

Belarus

Belgium

R

Belize

Benin

Bolivia

Bosnia and Herzegovina

R

C

Botswana

R

C

Brazil

Brunei Darussalam

R

Bulgaria

R

Burkina Faso

Cambodia

Cameroon

Canada

Central African Republic

R

C

Chile

China

R

C

Colombia

Costa Rica

Côte d’ Ivoire

Croatia

R

C

Cuba

R

C

Cyprus

R

C

Czech Republic

Denmark

R

C

Djibouti

Dominica

Dominican Republic

Ecuador

R

C

Egypt

El Salvador

Estonia

Finland

France

R

Georgia

Germany

R

Ghana

Greece

R

C

Guatemala

R

C

Guinea

Haiti

Holy See

R

C

Honduras

Hungary

R

C

Iceland

India

R

C

Indonesia

R

C

Iran

R

C

Ireland

R

Israel

Italy

Jamaica

R

C

Japan

R

Jordan

Kazakhstan

Kenya

R

Korea (Republic) (South)

R

C

Kuwait

R

Kyrgyzstan

Lao People’s Democratic Republic

Latvia

Lebanon

R

Lesotho

Lithuania

Luxembourg

R

Macedonia (former Yugoslav Republic of)

R

C

Madagascar

R

C

Malaysia

R

C

Mali

Malta

R

Mauritania

Mauritius

R

Mexico

Moldova (Republic of)

R

Monaco

R

C

Mongolia

R

C

Morocco

R

Mozambique

R

Nepal

R

C

Netherlands

R

New Zealand

R

Nicaragua

Niger

Nigeria

R

C

Norway

R

Oman

Pakistan

Panama

Paraguay

Peru

Philippines

R

C

Poland

R

C

Portugal

R

Qatar

Romania

R

C

Russian Federation

Saint Vincent and the Grenadines

R

C

San Marino

Saudi Arabia

R

Senegal

Serbia and Montenegro

R

C

Singapore

R

Slovakia

Slovenia

R

C

South Africa

Spain

Sri Lanka

Sweden

Switzerland

Syrian Arab Republic

Tanzania (United Republic of)

R

Thailand

Trinidad and Tobago

R

C

Tunisia

R

C

Turkey

R

C

Uganda

R

Ukraine

United Kingdom

R

United States of America

R

C

Uruguay

Uzbekistan

Venezuela

R

C

Vietnam

R

C

Zambia

Zimbabwe

(p. 90) The choice of the place of arbitration is important because enforcement may be denied on grounds related to the law of the place of arbitration. Among other reasons set out in Article V of the Convention,210 recognition and enforcement may be denied if the party against whom the award is (p. 91) invoked shows that the Convention “has not yet become binding on the parties, or has been set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of which, that award was made.”211 Although not all the grounds for enforcement under the New York Convention are judged under the standards of the law of the place of arbitration, Article V of the Convention emphasizes that, to produce an enforceable award, the arbitrators should assure that the mandatory requirements of the law of the place of arbitration are respected.212 As the UNCITRAL Model Law gains acceptance, the mandatory requirements justifying the setting aside of the award at the place of arbitration, on the one hand, and those justifying the denial of recognition and enforcement, on the other hand, are likely to be harmonized. In the Model Law both are defined in substantially similar terms, modeled on Article V of the New York Convention.213

(p. 92) (e)  Practical considerations

In addition to neutrality and other important legal considerations discussed above, there are other factors to be taken into account in the selection of the place of arbitration. The place should also be suitable from a functional point of view.214

Factors to consider include the availability of suitable hearing rooms as well as accommodation. The accommodation must be convenient and guarantee the necessary privacy for a party, its counsel and witnesses. The availability of competent interpreters, shorthand writers, and the existence of a competent local bar able to advise on the requirements of the local law are factors to be taken into account when the place of arbitration is being chosen. An experienced arbitral institution willing to offer its facilities for arbitrations under the UNCITRAL Rules normally guarantees these practical requirements. When a particular institution of that kind has been, or is going to be, designated as appointing authority by the parties, it more often than not would be natural to have the place of arbitration coincide with the seat of the institution in question.215 On the other hand, if no appointing authority has been designated, the parties and the arbitrators should be aware that the designation of the place of arbitration will likely determine the nationality of the appointing authority, if any, designated by the Secretary–General of the Permanent Court of Arbitration.216

Communications between the prospective place of arbitration and the outside world is another pertinent consideration. Any potential restrictions (including visa requirements) on the entry of the persons involved, and on the right of the parties to communicate with their home bases, should be carefully considered. In construction cases, arbitration in a country near the site may be desirable, as a visit to the site may become necessary.217 The distances between the place of arbitration and the headquarters of the parties are important but purely geographical considerations should not be overemphasized. Desirable as it is to minimize the costs and inconveniences (p. 93) caused by distances between the place of arbitration and the various participants in the arbitration process, such inconveniences can be mitigated by hearing witnesses and having other special meetings take place outside the place of arbitration.218

(f)  Concluding remarks

There are several suitable places to conduct international commercial arbitration, and the number is likely to increase as states adopt the UNCITRAL Model Law and resort to other measures to improve their attractiveness as a possible venue.219 Nevertheless, not every jurisdiction has the necessary qualifications, and so the decision should be made only after careful weighing of the various considerations involved, especially those of a legal nature. It is the legal consequences of the choice of the place of arbitration that have prompted a leading commentator to argue that such a decision, where it is made by the arbitral tribunal, should not be regarded as a procedural matter which, in the absence of a majority, could be decided by the presiding arbitrator alone.220 Although the wording does not preclude a different interpretation,221 it is advisable that an arbitral tribunal select the place of arbitration by a majority decision in accordance with Article 31(1).

The seat of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal was specified in the Claims Settlement Declaration. According to this declaration, the seat “shall be The Hague, The Netherlands, or any other place agreed by Iran and the United States.”222 The parties did not reach any such agreement, so the proceedings have taken place in The Hague.223

(p. 94) (2)  Selection of the particular locale, special meetings for consultation and the hearing of witnesses

The selection of the place of arbitration in accordance with Article 16(1) denotes the determination of the chosen jurisdictional area with all its legal and practical consequences. This may be defined by reference only to the country or other distinct jurisdiction (e.g. the State of New York or Province of British Columbia) in question; it also may be specified by naming the city and even the exact locality therein. The specification of a locale, however, does not entail specific legal consequences in addition to those flowing from the choice of the broader jurisdictional area.224 It can conveniently be left to the arbitral tribunal, even in those cases in which the parties determine the place of arbitration.225 With a view to such cases, Article 16(2) of the Rules provides that “[t]he arbitral tribunal may determine the locale of the arbitration within the country agreed upon by the parties.”226

Should the home country of one of the parties be chosen as the place of arbitration, the tribunal should avoid holding the arbitral proceedings at the office of the party227 or of a party–appointed arbitrator.228 The premises of the law firm of the chairman may be a natural locale, if available and otherwise suitable for the purpose. The premises of an arbitral institution situated within the designated jurisdictional area may also be desirable. Facilities provided by big hotels are often utilized for this purpose.

The Iran-US Claims Tribunal was initially housed in The Hague at the Peace Palace where both the International Court of Justice and the Permanent Court of Arbitration are located. Even after the Tribunal had rented its own building in The Hague, certain hearings requiring larger facilities were held at the Peace Palace.

(p. 95) Designation of the locale in essence determines where the main oral proceedings, i.e., hearing and pre–hearing conferences, if any, are held. Meetings for the purposes of hearing witness testimony and deliberations by the arbitrators (“consultation among … members”) can be arranged, according to Article 16(2), at any place the arbitral tribunal considers “appropriate, having regard to the circumstances of the arbitration.” This option may mitigate practical inconveniences caused by selecting the place of arbitration primarily on the basis of the legal consequences, and may minimize the overall costs of the arbitration. Emphasis on such circumstances is intended to reduce the temptation to choose “attractive meeting places such as the Riviera or the Bahamas which have no relationship whatsoever with the arbitration or the domicile of arbitrators.”229 In exceptional cases, circumstances may compel the arbitral tribunal to move the physical venue of the proceedings from the designated place of arbitration, such as when a party engages in inappropriate conduct at the legal seat of arbitration designed to undermine the work of the tribunal.230

It should be noted that, both in light of its wording and the travaux préparatoires, Article 16, including paragraph 3,231 provides only for “limited flexibility”232 to hold meetings outside the place and locale of the arbitration. Article 20(2) of the UNCITRAL Model Law233 deliberately increased this (p. 96) flexibility in sharp contrast to Article 16 of the UNCITRAL Rules. In the Model Law, the hearing of “experts or the parties” was added to the list of purposes for which the arbitral tribunal may meet “at any place it considers appropriate.”234 In accordance with Article 1(1) of the UNCITRAL Rules, the parties may modify Article 16 in keeping with the more liberal approach of the Model Law. When contemplating this kind of modification, however, the parties should be aware that very loose ties between the formal place of arbitration and the actual proceedings may, depending on the nature of the domestic laws involved, have negative repercussions.235

When an arbitral tribunal, with its seat in one country, visits another country for the purpose of a particular proceeding, it should respect the laws of the latter country. If, for example, the purpose of the visit is to take witness evidence, the tribunal should follow the mandatory provisions concerning the taking of such evidence in that country.236

(3)  Special meetings for the inspection of goods, other property or documents

According to Article 16(3), the arbitral tribunal may hold meetings “for the inspection of goods, other property or documents” at any place considered appropriate by that tribunal. In many cases, this provision is not only useful but essential. It may, for instance, be impossible as well as impractical to transfer items such as goods stored in a warehouse to the tribunal locale. Similarly, it may be necessary for an arbitral tribunal having its seat in a neutral country to visit the site in another country.237

Any inspection of goods, property and documents must take place in accordance with the mandatory norms of the law of the place where the goods are situated.

Article 16(3) also provides that the parties shall be given an opportunity to be present at any inspection of which they also have to be given “sufficient (p. 97) notice.” With regard to such notice, it would be wise to apply the same principles concerning notice of the hearing.238 By accepting Article 16(3) without modification, the party with control over the goods to be inspected is generally understood to waive any right to deny access to the goods.

The members of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal have not made any on–site inspections.239

(4)  Where the award shall be made

Article 16(4) provides that “[t]he award shall be made at the place of arbitration.” This provision must be read in light of the question discussed in connection with Article 16(1), concerning the enforcement of awards. The travaux préparatoires of the UNCITRAL Rules explain that

Paragraph 4 of this article is useful, since, when issues arise concerning the enforceability of arbitral awards, reference is on some occasions made to the national law of the place of arbitration and on other occasions to the national law of the “country where the award was made” (see, e.g. Article V, paragraph 2, subparagraphs (a), (d) and (e) of the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.240

Article 16(4) not only equates the place “where the award is made” with the “place of arbitration,” but also ensures that the award is made at the place of arbitration, even though the tribunal may have met elsewhere. The risk of different national laws being applied to the procedure, and the consequential complications at the stage of challenge or enforcement, is thereby reduced.241

Does Article 16(4) require that the arbitrators travel to the place of arbitration just for a signing ceremony? On the one hand, it may be most convenient to have the award circulated from one arbitrator to another for signing.242 On the other hand, the clear wording of Article 16(4) (“shall be made at the place”), especially when compared to that of Article 31(3) of the UNCITRAL Model Law, discussed below, can be construed to require the signing (p. 98) at the place of arbitration.243 The travaux préparatoires do not provide for a conclusive answer, although the preponderant view seems to have been that signing at the place is not required by the rule which later became Article 16(4).244 In view of the uncertainty, the importance “of signing the award (or at least deeming it to have been ‘made’) at the seat of arbitration” has been emphasized.245 If the law applicable to the arbitration requires the signing at the place where the award is deemed to be made,246 it is especially important that the arbitrators meet there. The award, of course, can be drafted elsewhere.

Where the applicable procedural law does not prevent the award from being signed outside the place of arbitration,247 the parties may consider modifying Article 16(4) to provide the arbitrators wider discretion. For example, the provision in question could be modeled on Article 31(3) of the UNCITRAL Model Law. According to Article 31(3), “[t]he award shall be deemed to have been made” at the place of arbitration. In any case, the award should always state that it has been made at the place of arbitration.248 In the practice of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal, awards have occasionally been signed by one or more arbitrators outside The Hague. The signatures of the arbitrators are nevertheless always preceded by the words: “Dated, The Hague” (the date).

Extracts from the Practice of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal

The seat of the Tribunal shall be the Hague, The Netherlands, or any other place agreed by Iran and the United States.

Article VI, paragraph 1 of the Claims Settlement Declaration

(p. 99) Extracts from the Practice of NAFTA Tribunals

  1. 13.  In order to provide guidelines to the Tribunal in the determination of the place of arbitration, the parties have referred to the UNCITRAL Notes on Organizing Arbitral Proceedings (hereafter “UNCITRAL Notes”) and, in particular, Paragraph 22 of the Notes which discusses various factual and legal factors…

  2. 15.  The Tribunal considers that it must determine the place of arbitration in light of any relevant circumstances in this arbitration and that the factors enumerated in the UNCITRAL Notes provide no more than non–binding guidelines, as Paragraph 2 of the Notes makes clear (“The arbitral tribunal remains free to use the Notes as it sees fit and is not required to give reasons for disregarding them”).

  3. 16.  The Tribunal will therefore examine each of the factors offered for consideration by the parties, without according particular weight to any individual circumstance over another. These factors include neutrality, which is not referred to in the UNCITRAL Notes but which constitutes one of the key features of international arbitration.

    (1)  The neutrality factor

  4. 17.  … [T]he Claimant contends that the factor of neutrality, or perceived neutrality, should direct the Tribunal to determine the place of arbitration in Canada. The Claimant argues that, unlike in those cases where Washington, D.C. was held to be the appropriate place of arbitration, in this case the Tribunal should consider Vancouver as an appropriate place of arbitration given its substantial connection to the proceedings; should Vancouver not be perceived as neutral, Toronto could in the alternative be determined as the place of arbitration where neutrality would be best ensured …

  5. 18.  … [T]he Claimant maintains that Washington, D.C., which is not only the seat of the United States Government but also the place where the disputed measures were taken, is the least neutral location for the place of arbitration …

  6. 19.  The Respondent considers, for its part, that the venues proposed by each party are equally neutral … First, relying on the Methanex v. USA case, the Respondent argues that a neutral national venue is not possible in this case … Second, the Respondent submits that neutrality is not an important factor to be taken into consideration, given that it was excluded from the UNCITRAL Notes, that Chapter Eleven limits the place of arbitration to one of the three NAFTA Parties, and the fact that the parties have agreed to (p. 100) exclude Mexico as an alternative place of arbitration. Only if the five factors set forth in the UNCITRAL Notes do not result in the determination of a place of arbitration could neutrality be considered as a tie–breaking factor. Third, the Respondent submits that neutrality could be addressed by holding the hearings in ICSID’s headquarters in Washington, D.C. In addition, the Respondent has emphasized that the softwood lumber issue is an important local issue in British Columbia and Ontario and that, should neutrality be weighed at all, it should not be considered a factor favoring a Canadian venue …

  7. 20.  The Tribunal is not convinced by the parties’ arguments.

  8. 21.  The Tribunal observes that Article 1130 of the NAFTA has limited the choice of the place of arbitration, absent an agreement between the disputing parties, to one of the three NAFTA Parties. In the present arbitration, had the disputing parties intended to ensure neutrality, they were at liberty to agree to a neutral forum outside any of the three NAFTA Parties. In the alternative, the disputing parties were at liberty to leave open the option of Mexico. Rather, the parties have chosen expressly to exclude such options and to limit the scope of the Tribunal’s choice to a venue in either Canada or the United States. As a result, because of the choice made by the negotiators of the NAFTA and because of the procedural choices made by the disputing parties in this arbitration, the Tribunal considers that, with regard to the place of arbitration, a neutral venue is not available.

  9. 22.  Further, the Tribunal is not persuaded, in the circumstances of this arbitration, by the argument of perceived neutrality. In particular, the Tribunal finds little assistance in the Respondent’s argument that any concern of neutrality in this arbitration could be addressed by holding the hearings at the ICSID facilities in Washington, D.C. First, the Respondent’s implication that the mere physical location of a building may ensure the neutrality of the place of arbitration is at odds with the distinction, on which it has laid emphasis, between the legal seat of an arbitration and the physical location of hearings… Second, the Tribunal does not find any reason in the facts of this case to give consideration to ICSID as a weighing circumstance with respect to the determination of the place of arbitration. Absent the ratification of the Washington Convention by Canada, the guarantees offered by ICSID, including the true neutrality provided by a system which is genuinely independent from any national legal order, are not available to the disputing parties in this arbitration.

  10. (p. 101)
  11. 23.  As a result, the Tribunal concludes that the neutrality factor does not favor either the United States or Canada. To the contrary, by the very choice of the disputing parties, any decision on the place of arbitration taken by the Tribunal will result in having one of the parties arbitrate in the other’s forum…

  12. (2)  The suitability of the law on arbitral procedure

  13. 24.  The Claimant and the Respondent agree on the suitability of both U.S. and Canadian arbitral laws…

  14. 25.  The Tribunal agrees with the parties that this factor weighs neutrally, and that the laws applicable in British Columbia and in Ontario as well as the Federal Arbitration Act are equally suitable, including on questions concerning the applicable standards of review for Chapter Eleven arbitral awards…

  15. (3)  The existence of a multilateral treaty on enforcement of arbitral awards

    [The Tribunal found that this factor was neutral because both the United States and Canada are parties to the New York Convention.]

  16. (4)  The convenience of the parties and the arbitrators

  17. 27.  … The Claimant argues that [this factor] weighs neutrally and does not point to any one place over another since the parties have agreed, in accordance with Article 16(2) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, that the seat of the arbitration and the place of hearings need not coincide and that hearings or meetings may take place at any appropriate place, including Washington, D.C., Vancouver or Toronto… The Respondent does not agree. It contends that holding the arbitration in Washington, D.C. would be less inconvenient than Vancouver or Toronto for the members of the Tribunal as well as for the U.S. officers from the various governmental agencies involved in this arbitration, without such venue being inconvenient for Canfor …

  18. 28.  The Tribunal agrees with the Claimant and considers that this factor, which should not be accorded a great weight in this arbitration, is neutral. The Tribunal is attentive to the Respondent’s argument regarding the convenience of Washington, D.C. The Tribunal is also mindful that, as emphasized by the Respondent, a distinction should accurately be drawn between the legal seat of an arbitration and the geographical location of hearings… However, in light of Paragraph 13 of the Terms of Agreement signed by the parties at the Hearing of October 28, 2003, the Tribunal considers that the parties’ agreement, without prejudice (p. 102) to the legal seat of the arbitration, to hold the hearings and the meetings at any appropriate place–which may include, as need be, Washington, D.C.–adequately satisfies, in the circumstances of this arbitration, the convenience factor.

  19. (5)  The availability of cost and support services

  20. 29.  … The Claimant argues that the availability and cost of support services is neutral, and that the cost of support services may become relevant at the time of the determination of the place where particular hearings will be held… The Claimant further argues that the facilities of ICSID in Washington, D.C. may be compared, in terms of costs, to equivalent facilities in either Vancouver or Toronto… The Respondent contends that this factor favors Washington, D.C. as a less costly venue. The relevant factors considered by the Respondent are travel costs for the members of the Tribunal, the parties and their attorneys, and the fact that ICSID facilities are available for use at rates that are likely more competitive than equivalent facilities in Vancouver or Toronto …

  21. 30.  The Tribunal finds that this factor does not favor any venue over the other and considers that the parties’ agreement to hold the hearings and the meetings at any appropriate place allows the Tribunal to conduct the arbitration in a cost–effective manner.

  22. (6)  The location of the subject matter in dispute and the proximity of evidence

  23. 31.  The final factor set forth in the UNCITRAL Notes, that of the location of the subject matter in dispute and the proximity of evidence, sharply divides the parties. The Claimant finds it to be neutral… In particular, the Claimant disputes the Respondent’s submission that the subject matter of the dispute is located exclusively in Washington, D.C.: according to the Claimant, the subject matter in dispute relates to decisions made by the United States in relation to the alleged conduct of Canadian softwood lumber companies operating in British Columbia …

  24. 32.  The Respondent argues to the contrary that the subject matter in dispute is located in Washington, D.C. for the following reasons: the Claimant’s allegations are based on antidumping and countervailing duty determinations which were made in Washington, D.C. by the U.S. Department of Commerce and the International Trade Commission; the significant events underlying the Claimant’s allegations took place in Washington, D.C.; and most or all of the relevant evidence is located in Washington, D.C. In (p. 103) contrast, the Respondent finds no connection between either Vancouver or Toronto and the subject matter in dispute … The Respondent further argues that the subject matter in dispute points to a U.S. venue given that the Claimant’s allegations that it has been denied national treatment or most–favored nation treatment may only be made with respect to its U.S. investments …

  25. 33.  The Tribunal finds that, as regards the proximity of evidence, it is irrelevant in this arbitration given the parties’ agreement to hold hearings and meetings at any appropriate place … As regards the subject matter in dispute, the parties have not presented the Tribunal with a uniform definition of what constitutes the “subject matter”. The Claimant refers to the determination of the location of a particular hearing and considers that [t]he ‘subject matter’ of the dispute is the treatment of a Canadian investor situate in Canada and the United States, by organs of the United States government situate in Washington, D.C.”… The Claimant further refers to the “physical subject–matter of the dispute” which it situates in British Columbia and to “legal facts” it claims have occurred in British Columbia … The Respondent, referring to the decision rendered in ADF v. United States, considers “the ‘subject–matter’ of the dispute as ‘the issue presented for consideration; the thing in which [or in respect of which] a right or duty has been asserted’ […]

  26. 35.  The Tribunal considers that the subject matter, independently from the proximity of evidence, does not, in this arbitration, relate to the Claimant’s conduct in British Columbia. It rather relates to the Respondent’s measures determining the Claimant’s softwood lumber importations into the United States as subsidized or dumped, which are alleged by the Claimant to have affected its investments in the United States and breached Chapter Eleven of the NAFTA…

  27. 36.  The Tribunal therefore finds that, with respect to the subject matter in dispute in this arbitration, substantial connections point to a venue in the United States: the United States is the territory in which the Claimant’s investments are alleged to have been made …; it is the place where the alleged measures were taken; it also happens to be the country of the defendant’s domicile in this case.

  28. (7)  The Tribunal’s decision

  29. 37.  The Tribunal has carefully balanced each of the factors discussed by the parties and has found most of these factors to weigh equally between a venue in Canada and a venue in the United States. The (p. 104) Tribunal finds however that the location of the subject matter in dispute is a factor pointing to a venue in the United States. As a result, the Tribunal considers that Washington, D.C. (United States) should be designated as the place of arbitration.

Canfor Corporation and United States of America, Decision on the Place of Arbitration, Filing of a Statement of Defence and Bifurcation of the Proceedings (NAFTA Chapter Eleven, 23 Jan 2004) (citations omitted), available) at http://www.state.gov/s/l.

Ethyl urges that the place of arbitration be New York City, whereas Canada … requests the Tribunal “to determine that the place of arbitration should be Ottawa, or alternatively, could be Toronto …”.

Our decision is governed by NAFTA Article 1130(b), which provides that absent “the disputing parties agree[ing] otherwise, a Tribunal shall hold an arbitration in the territory of a Party [to NAFTA] that is a party to the New York Convention, selected in accordance with … the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules if the arbitration is under those Rules.” All three NAFTA Parties, i.e., Canada, Mexico and the United States, are parties to the New York Convention. Therefore our selection is to be made from among sites in those three countries.

[The Tribunal notes the factual and legal factors enumerated in paragraph 22 of the UNCITRAL Notes on Organizing Arbitral Proceedings.]

… [T]he Tribunal now turns its attention to the four factors relevant under the UNCITRAL Notes, considering each of them in relation to the respective proposed places of arbitration: Ottawa (or, alternatively, Toronto) and New York City.

As to criterion (a) of the Notes–“suitability of the law on arbitral procedure”–the Tribunal concludes that all proposed fora are all equally suitable. It appears undisputed that Canada’s Commercial Arbitration Act is based on the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration and by its terms would apply to this arbitration under NAFTA Chapter 11. It appears to be equally undisputed that the relevant laws of the United States, and, to the extent relevant, the State of New York, are no less suitable. The fact that the laws applicable to this arbitration, were it situated in New York City, have been in place longer than Canada’s Commercial Arbitration Act, and therefore are judicially more elaborated, does not, in the view of the Tribunal, significantly affect their comparative suitability.

(p. 105)

Criterion (c) of the Notes–“the convenience of the parties and the arbitrators, including the travel distances”–likewise seems not be significantly better served by one proposed alternative as opposed to any other. As to the Tribunal, the President, who normally is resident in Cologne, Germany, can travel with more or less equal ease to New York City, Ottawa and Toronto. Mr. Lalonde, a resident of Montreal, can travel to Ottawa or Toronto just as well as Judge Brower can from his Washington, DC residence to New York City. By the same token, Judge Brower would be no more and no less inconvenienced by travel to Ottawa or Toronto than would Mr. Lalonde be by the need to appear in New York City.

The situation of the parties is substantially similar. Canada has noted … that:

The investment which Ethyl Corporation alleges has been damaged is the wholly owned subsidiary, Ethyl Canada, which has its head office in Mississauga, adjoining the City of Toronto, in the Province of Ontario. Its blending facility, where it processes MMT, is in Coronna, in the Province of Ontario.

In response to this Ethyl simply contends … that it has “its head office in [the Commonwealth of] Virginia” and that the “location of subsidiary offices is not a relevant factor for this arbitration.” For purposes of criterion (c) alone this may well be correct. If it is, there is no significant difference in the convenience factor between Canada having to travel to New York City and Ethyl having to be present in Ottawa or Toronto. If it is not, then a degree of preference would be indicated for a Canadian venue.

Canada has introduced as a consideration the location of counsel to the parties, emphasizing that Ethyl’s counsel has an office in Toronto as well as in New York City. Ethyl disputes the relevance of counsel’s convenience, while nonetheless pointing out … that “The Government of Canada also maintains a large consulate in New York City as well as a Permanent Mission to the United Nations which can support the needs of the Government of Canada’s legal team …” Canada terms this latter assertion “incorrect,” as “[t]hese are diplomatic offices and are not set up to act as alternative legal offices, such as [Claimant’s counsel] apparantly [sic] has available to him.”

The Tribunal is inclined to the view that the convenience of counsel is a relevant consideration, subsumed under the “convenience of the parties.” Certainly the convenience of attorneys appointed by the parties, which translates into cost factors, affects their clients. The Tribunal also (p. 106) believes that the availability for temporary use by government lawyers of facilities at a consular post or diplomatic mission is not comparable to a dedicated office of counsel. Accordingly, the Tribunal concludes that it is relevant to consider that fixing the place of arbitration in either Ottawa or Toronto will serve the convenience of counsel collectively better than New York City.

We now turn to criterion (d), “availability and cost of support services needed.” It is clear that all necessary support services for this arbitration are available in all three of the cities that have been proposed. The Tribunal believes it appropriate to take judicial notice of the fact that such services inevitably will be more costly in New York City than in either Ottawa or Toronto. This includes transportation, hotels, meal service, hearing rooms and counsel rooms, and certified stenographic reporting services. Therefore application of criterion (d) favors Ottawa or Toronto over New York City, but does not discriminate between them.

The Tribunal does not, however, take into consideration in this regard, as Canada has proposed, the presence and availability in Ottawa of NAFTA Secretariat facilities… [T]o avail itself of such facilities could be viewed as inconsistent with at least the spirit of the requirement of the UNCITRAL Rules (Articles 9–10) that it act so as to leave no doubt whatsoever as to its complete independence of any party. This is all the more so where, as here, Ethyl has registered its objection … that the use of such facilities “would be inappropriate.”

The last criterion of the Notes–“(e) location of the subject–matter in dispute and proximity of evidence”–finally turns the Tribunal definitely to selection of a place of arbitration in Canada. Clearly the subject–matter in dispute is fixed in Canada. Ethyl charges …–that certain legislative and other acts of Canada “remov[ing] MMT […] from Canadian gasoline” have resulted in breaches by Canada of Article 1102, 1106 and 1110 of NAFTA, thereby “harm[ing] Ethyl Corporation and the value of its Canadian investment, Ethyl Canada.” The “location of the subject–matter in dispute” is not subject to serious debate.

The parties have little to say as regards “the proximity of evidence.” … Thus the Tribunal is afforded little insight into just how any considerations of the proximity of evidence should affect its decision.

Traditionally arbitrating parties, desiring both the reality and the appearance of a neutral forum, incline to agree on a place of arbitration outside their respective national jurisdictions. This is especially the case where a sovereign party is involved. Where an arbitral institution or a (p. 107) tribunal must make the selection, this tendency is, if anything, even greater, and for the same reasons. Article 16(1) of the UNCITRAL Rules easily accommodates this consideration as one of the “circumstances of the arbitration.”

Here, however, NAFTA Article 1130(b) circumscribes our powers, limiting possible places of arbitration to either of the two States here involved or Mexico. A Mexican venue surely would represent neutrality in this case, and in all such cases. The Tribunal concludes, however that had the NAFTA Parties felt that every arbitration under Chapter 11 must be sited in the NAFTA Party not involved in the dispute they would have said so and would not have remitted us to Article 16(1) of the UNCITRAL Rules. The Tribunal has readily concluded that a Mexican venue would not serve other important “circumstances” of this arbitration.

The Tribunal concludes on the basis of all of the foregoing that, on balance, the place of arbitration should be in Canada… Most significantly, Canada indisputably is the location of the subject–matter in dispute. In addition, a Canadian venue offers less costly support services and overall would better suit the convenience of counsel for the parties. It is far less certain, but likely, that Canada overall is more convenient for the parties themselves and as regards the proximity of evidence…

Once the Tribunal has determined to select a Canadian venue, none of the specific factors considered weighs strongly in favor of Toronto, Canada’s alternative proposal, rather than Ottawa. The Tribunal has some reluctance, however, to choose Ottawa. This is due to the fact that it is the capital of Canada. The Tribunal therefore has determined to designate Toronto as the place of arbitration, for the reason that while it is no more, and no less, appropriate than Ottawa when measured by the other applicable criteria, it is likely to be perceived as a more “neutral” forum.

Ethyl Corporation and The Government of Canada, Decision Regarding the Place of Arbitration (NAFTA Chapter Eleven, 28 Nov 1997), reprinted in (1999) 38 ILM 702, 702–06.

–Introduction

  1. 1.  The Disputing Parties did not agree on the place of arbitration… [E]ach of the Disputing Parties was invited by the Tribunal to identify the place of arbitration to be selected by the Tribunal in the exercise of its discretion under Article 1130 of the [NAFTA] and Article 16 of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules

  2. (p. 108)
  3. 2.  … The Tribunal observes that Article 16(1) refers to the legal place or seat of the arbitration as distinct from the geographical place of the arbitration’s hearing or hearings and deliberations by the Tribunal, a distinction to which the Tribunal returns below.

  4. II  –The Disputing Parties’ Cases

  5. 5.  [B]oth Parties referred to the factors listed in paragraph 22 of the UNCITRAL Notes on Organizing Arbitral Proceedings (the “UNCITRAL Notes”) … The UNCITRAL Notes are not legally binding, both specifically in this case and more generally as paragraph 2 of the Notes makes clear. Nonetheless this list of factors provides a helpful starting–point to the practical exercise required under Article 16(1) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.

    [The Claimant and the Respondent argued, respectively, that the place of arbitration be in Canada, namely Toronto, or the United States, namely Washington, DC. The Tribunal weighed the parties’ arguments with respect to each of the factors enumerated in the Notes, along with arguments with respect to a “neutrality” factor not contained in the Notes.]

  6. III  –The Tribunal’s Reasons

  7. 23.  In the absence of the parties’ agreement on the place of arbitration (save to exclude any place outside Canada and the USA), the Tribunal is required to choose for this arbitration a place of arbitration in either Canada or the USA in accordance with Article 1130(b) of NAFTA and Article 16(1) of the UNCITRAL Rules. Both Canada and the USA have enacted the 1958 New York Convention, satisfying the requirements of Article 1130(b); and the issue turns on the application of Article 16(1) to the particular circumstances of this arbitration.

  8. 24.  Under Article 16(1) of the UNCITRAL Rules, the place of the arbitration is the legal place, or “seat”, of the arbitration; and the Tribunal here makes no decision as to the geographical place of any particular hearing. Any such hearing could be held at a geographical place elsewhere than the legal place of arbitration in accordance with Article 16 (2) of the UNCITRAL Rules, depending upon the convenience of witnesses, the parties and their legal representatives, together with other relevant circumstances…

  9. 26.  The Tribunal begins, as did the parties, with the factors listed in the UNCITRAL Notes. As regards Factors A and B, the Tribunal accepts that there is little to choose between Toronto and Washington DC in regard to suitability of the law on arbitral procedure and enforcement. The Tribunal concludes that, for all practical (p. 109) purposes in regard to this arbitration, the two potential places of arbitration may be considered equally in terms of the law on arbitral procedure and enforcement.

  10. 28.  As to Factor C, the Tribunal considers that the convenience of the three arbitrators is irrelevant in this case when measured against other factors invoked by the Disputing Parties. As regards the convenience of the parties, the Claimant is correct in describing it here more as the balance of “inconvenience” rather than “convenience”. The Tribunal also accepts that this balancing exercise must take into account both the parties and their Counsel, because the latter’s extra traveling time and expenses will be borne ultimately as costs by the parties. [The Tribunal finds that Washington, DC is not inconvenient for the Claimant, which has a substantial permanent office in that city, while Toronto is unduly inconvenient for the Respondent whose various government departments involved in the dispute are located in Washington, DC.]

  11. 32.  As to Factor D relating to the availability and costs of support services, the necessary support services would be available in both Toronto and Washington DC…

  12. 33.  As to Factor E relating to the location of the subject–matter of the dispute, the Tribunal considers that it points to a place in the USA as the place of arbitration. [Noting that Claimant’s arbitral claims involve actions of the State of California, the Tribunal concludes that] the subject–matter of the dispute is not located in Canada; and accordingly, whilst this factor bears only slight importance or this arbitration, the Tribunal considers that it favours Washington DC over Toronto.

  13. 34.  In summary, in the Tribunal’s considerations so far, the factors cited from the UNCITRAL Notes favour Washington DC over Toronto. The Tribunal now turns to the separate issue of neutrality, or perceived neutrality, which the claimant invokes to favour Toronto over Washington DC.

  14. 35.  For the purpose of the present case, the Tribunal does not place any great weight on the fact that neutrality as a factor was removed from the final version of the UNCITRAL Notes. The Tribunal’s discretion turns on the broad concept of “circumstances” in Article 16 (2) of the UNCITRAL Rules; and there is no linguistic or logical basis for excluding neutrality as a factor in an appropriate case. Accordingly, the Tribunal has considered neutrality as a possible circumstance in this arbitration.

  15. (p. 110)
  16. 36.  However, in assessing the significance of neutrality or perceived neutrality, the Tribunal bears in mind (i) that it was open to the NAFTA Parties to agree that in the interests of neutrality Chapter Eleven disputes should be arbitrated in the territory of any third Party not directly involved in the dispute, yet they did not do so; and (ii) that in circumstances where (as in this case) the disputing parties have further limited the choice of place of arbitration by their arbitration tribunal to one or the other’s state, a neutral national venue is simply not possible…

  17. 38.  For this arbitration, the Tribunal considers that the requirements of neutrality are sufficiently met if the place of arbitration lies outside British Colombia (as the home of the Claimant), California (responsible for the legislative measure in issue) and Texas (as the home of Methanex US). Once these three locations are excluded, the question then arises whether Washington DC should also be excluded on grounds of neutrality because it is the Respondent’s capital city, thereby (it might be said in sporting terms) requiring the Claimant to play away from home in its opponent’s home stadium.

  18. 39.  As to actual neutrality, from the information currently available before it, the Tribunal can find no evidence of any difficulties for the Claimant. As to perceived neutrality, the point is answered by accepting ICSID’s offer of the World Bank’s facilities … Whilst Washington DC is of course the seat of federal government in the USA, it is also the seat of the World Bank and ICSID. The World Bank is an independent international organisation with juridical personality and broad jurisdictional immunities and freedoms …; and ICSID similarly has international legal personality and benefits from a wide jurisdiction immunity… The Tribunal considers that the requirements of perceived neutrality in this case will be satisfied by holding such hearings in Washington DC as the seat of the World Bank, as distinct from the seat of the USA’s federal government.

  19. 40.  Decision: Balancing all these factors as circumstances relevant to the exercise of its discretion under Article 16(1) of the UNCITRAL Rules, the Tribunal considers that Washington DC, USA should be designated as the place of the arbitration …

Methanex Corporation and The United States of America, Order on the Place of Arbitration (NAFTA Chapter Eleven, 7 Sep 2000), at 3, 9–15, available) at http://www.state.gov/s/l/c3439.htm (footnotes omitted).

(p. 111)

  1. 1.  The parties do not agree on the place where the arbitration is to be held… The Investor submits that the place of the arbitration should be in the United States and proposes Washington DC, Boston MA or San Francisco CA, while Canada submits that the hearing should be in Canada and proposes Ottawa or alternatively Toronto, Montreal or Vancouver.

  2. 3.  [Article 16 of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules] makes it plain that there is a difference between the “place where the arbitration is to be held” and the particular places at which different aspects of the work of the Tribunal may be carried out. The provision also does not in its terms purport to regulate the law of the arbitration. In a general way, article 1131 of NAFTA does that by directing the Tribunal to decide the issues in dispute in accordance with the Agreement and applicable rules of international law…

  3. 4.  In particular UPS contends that there would be inequality were the place of the arbitration to be Canada because of the provisions of the Canadian Evidence Act which prevent the disclosure of confidences of the Canadian cabinet. We do not consider that this matter is significant. As Canada points out, any such claim by Canada might be made whatever the place of the arbitration. As mentioned, such a claim would have to be assessed not under the law of Canada but under the law governing the Tribunal…

  4. 5.  The UPS submission also calls attention to the critical principle of the equal treatment of the parties, a principle which is emphasized as well by NAFTA and by the UNCITRAL Rules.

  5. 6.  On more specific matters, both parties referred us to the UNCITRAL notes on organising arbitral proceedings… Although the notes are not binding … other Chapter 11 Tribunals have found them a helpful framework for consideration. We also find them to be of value…

  6. 7.  We consider [the five factors enumerated in Paragraph 22 of the UNCITRAL notes] in turn.

  7. A.  Suitability of the law on arbitral procedure of the place of arbitration

  8. 8.  UPS contends that the position of the Canadian government in litigation relating to another NAFTA arbitration (the Metalclad Corporation v Mexico case) and the position of the Canadian courts provide insufficient deference to the rulings of Chapter 11 Tribunal. It calls attention in particular to the fact that in argument in that case Canada submitted that the leading Canadian authorities supporting deference to arbitral tribunals ought to be rejected and that (p. 112) awards of Chapter 11 Tribunals “are not worthy of judicial deference and are not supposed to be protected by a high standard of review”. The submission continued that Chapter 11 Tribunals are neither expert nor specialised Tribunals…

  9. 11.  The Tribunal is troubled by Canada’s submission on this issue in the Metalclad case.

    [The Tribunal finds the second factor, the existence of an applicable treaty on the enforcement of arbitral awards, to be neutral because Canada and the United States are both parties to the New York Convention.]

  10. C.  Convenience of the Parties and the arbitrators including travel distances

  11. 13.  … [T]his factor includes not just the Parties but also their counsel because their extra travelling time and expenses will ultimately be borne as costs by the disputing Parties. [Because the Canadian agencies involved in the dispute, Canada’s counsel, and its investment UPS Canada are all in Canada], [t]he balance of the convenience therefore strongly favours Canada over the United States…

  12. D.  Availability and cost of support services

  13. 14.  … [UPS] calls attention to the fact that the Tribunal has … proposed that the administrative services of ICSID be used and if that decision were made this would be a strong reason in favour of Washington as a convenient location for the arbitration. Canada responds to that point by recalling that, when the Tribunal suggested to the parties that they consider ICSID as the body to provide administrative services, the Tribunal made it clear that that suggestion was without prejudice to the determination of the place of arbitration…

  14. E.  Location of the subject matter in dispute and the proximity of the evidence

  15. 15.  Canada argues that this factor weighs very heavily in favour of Canada and in particular Ottawa… All the records relating to the impugned measures and the individual decision–makers implicated by the Investor in its claim are in Canada. [As to the argument that the place of arbitration should be Canada because Canada is alleged to have breached NAFTA Chapter 11, UPS states] [t]o give this criterion undue weight would lead to the result that the place of arbitration under Chapter 11 arbitrations would nearly always be in the territory of the respondent party. This was clearly not the intention of the NAFTA parties and the (p. 113) text does not provide for that result… So far as the evidence is concerned, although it is difficult to assess this issue at this early stage in the arbitration, it can be said with some certainty that the arbitration will be largely based on documentation and expert evidence. With modern information technology, the handling of documentation should not be an issue in this arbitration particularly given that the disputing parties have a high degree of expertise and sophistication in the handling of information. So far as witnesses and experts are concerned, there is no clear balance of convenience. Witnesses will be from throughout North America and likely from Europe. There is neither advantage nor disadvantage for either disputing party if the arbitration is located in either the United States or Canada.

    The Tribunal’s assessment

  16. 16.  Of the factors mentioned so far two are neutral–B and C (although in the usual course travel from New Zealand to the United States is marginally more convenient that it is to Canada); two weigh slightly in UPS’s favour (A, because of the attitude of the Canadian government in the Metalclad litigation and D because the Tribunal, although without prejudice, has already suggested to the Parties that they consider ICSID as its registry); and another is in Canada’s favour (E, but the importance of that factor in the arbitration is not clear at present).

  17. 17.  Neutrality had been identified as a factor relevant to the place of arbitration (although it is not in the UNCITRAL list), for instance in the Methanex decision paras 35–39. Canada addressed it in its submission. That factor is plainly relevant given the broad reference to “the circumstances of the arbitration” in Article 16(1) of the UNCITRAL rules (para 2 above).

  18. 18.  In one sense a neutral place is not available given that the claimant is a United States corporation and Canada is the respondent and the place of the arbitration is to be in one or other country. It is however relevant that it is Canada’s measures that are in issue, even if it has been the place of arbitration in all Chapter 11 investment disputes in which it has been the respondent. It is also relevant that Washington DC can be seen as having the neutrality of being the seat of the World Bank and ICSID, rather than the seat of federal government in the United States of America. And UPS’s headquarters are in Atlanta, GA.

  19. 19.  While the matter is finely balanced, the Tribunal considers that the balance does favour the United States of America as the place of (p. 114) arbitration and in particular Washington, DC. The Tribunal so decides.

United Parcel Service of America Inc. and Government of Canada, Decision on the Place of Arbitration (NAFTA Chapter Eleven, 17 Oct 2001), reprinted in (2002) 14(1) WTAM 33, 34–40.

Extracts from the Practice of Other Tribunals

  1. [22]  The session before the District Court lasted four and one–half hours. The following morning, at 9 a.m., the Court issued its judgment rejecting the Republic of Indonesia’s request for injunction. The written judgment disposed of, inter alia, the two following arguments raised by the Republic of Indonesia:

    1. (i)  that the Arbitral Tribunal had violated its mandate by determining that a hearing should take place in The Hague; the District Court rejected this argument by noting that Art. 16(2) of the UNCITRAL Rules explicitly permits arbitrators to hear witnesses and to hold meetings “at any place it deems appropriate.”

Himpurna Energy Ltd and Republic of Indonesia, Final Award (Ad Hoc UNCITRAL Proceeding, 16 Oct 1999), reprinted in (2000) XXV YCA 186, 190.

  1. B. III.  Place of Arbitration

    By the first sentence of paragraph 1 of its Order of March 18, 1987, the Tribunal decided that “Having regard to the circumstances of these arbitral proceedings, the place of arbitration shall be The Hague, the Netherlands.” This determination is in accordance with Article 16(1) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.

  2. B.  Iv. Arbitral Law

    By the second sentence of paragraph 1 of its Order of March 18, 1987, the Tribunal provided that the procedure of the arbitration shall be governed by the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, as agreed by the Parties in the Agreement of October 22, 1986, subject to any mandatory provisions of the Netherlands Arbitration Law, which, in the event of conflict with any of the UNCITRAL Rules, shall prevail. The Tribunal has concluded that its Partial Award on Liability, determining the substance of the claims on both jurisdiction and the merits, and proposed Final Award (See XX hereof) are consistent with the UNCITRAL Arbitration (p. 115) Rules and in no respect in conflict with any of the mandatory provisions of the Netherlands Arbitration Law.

Wintershall AG, et al., and The Government of Qatar, Partial Award (Ad Hoc UNCITRAL Proceeding, 5 Feb 1988), at 6–7, reprinted in (1989) 28 ILM 795, 801.

  1. [32]  The Republic of Indonesia’s conduct, according to the claimant, was a “naked use of … powers to deny claimants effective representation”. The claimant accordingly asked the Arbitral Tribunal that in the absence of unequivocal assurances that the claimant’s employees, witnesses, counsel and the arbitral tribunal itself will be free from harassment or arrest … we will request that the Tribunal convene the hearings at another appropriate location in accord with Art. 16 of the UNCITRAL Rules.

  2. [35]  In its letter to the Parties of 12 July 1999, the Arbitral Tribunal replied as follows:

    the Arbitral Tribunal wishes first of all to remind counsel that these are extremely serious proceedings involving large financial stakes and, directly or indirectly, bilateral relations between two important countries. Your clients are entitled to a respectful debate. The claimants are part of a publicly traded company whose shareholders are entitled to a resolute defence of their economic interests; the Republic of Indonesia is equally entitled to a resolute protection of its own position. The economic problems at the heart of this case have hurt many people, and each side must understand that the other has weighty responsibilities. This is a most inappropriate forum for counsel to indulge in inflammatory rhetoric which the Arbitral Tribunal finds neither helpful nor humorous. Misplaced similes (“like wayang puppets”), ill–considered metaphors (“ever ready to rattle the government’s saber”), or chatty language used for sarcastic effect (“whine to this Tribunal”, “we are not qualified in psychiatry”) have no place before this Arbitral Tribunal, and will not advance the interests of either side. The Arbitral Tribunal is interested in precise and reliable factual information, and in cogent arguments of law. Counsel would make a better impression on the Arbitral Tribunal if they resisted the temptation to speculate on the motives of opposite counsel, and did not proffer lectures on proper forensic behaviour. The Arbitral Tribunal feels it must (p. 116) admonish you that you are crossing the line of acceptable discourse.

    This being said, the concerns raised by Messrs Lathams & Watkins are serious, and have not, behind the rhetoric, been assuaged by Messrs Karim Sani’s letter of 9 July. As that letter itself recognises, there may be exceptional circumstances when the physical venue of proceeding under the UNCITRAL Rules is moved. (Of course Karim Sani does not accept that they are extant in this case, but that does not affect the principle.)

If the Republic of Indonesia fails to disprove the claimants’ contentions that, as a matter of fact:

  • –  a government–controlled entity has instituted legal proceedings in Indonesian courts designed to obstruct the implementation of the Terms of Appointment signed by the Republic of Indonesia;

  • –  although a party to those proceedings, the Republic of Indonesia has not only failed to oppose this attempted obstruction, but has to the contrary manifested a degree of complicity;

  • –  another government–controlled entity has threatened to bring a criminal complaint against the claimants’ counsel on account of comments on the dispute attributed to him–but denied by him–which as a matter of principle could lead to a sentence of imprisonment;

  • –  government officials have harassed the claimants, with the result that witnesses have been intimidated;

  • –  although the Republic of Indonesia says it will formally oppose the motion for injunction, it nevertheless reserves the right to initiate court actions for “fines … and/or imprisonment” if the arbitrators were to proceed in accordance with the Terms of Appointment; and ultimately

  • –  rather than use its judicial and governmental processes to implement the Terms of Reference signed by it, the Republic of Indonesia is attempting to use them to divest this Arbitral Tribunal of its jurisdiction;

the Arbitral Tribunal must seriously reconsider the physical venue for any hearings in this case.

Messrs Karim Sani are therefore invited to furnish any further factual information that would bear on these issues, in particular proof as to the position taken by the Republic of Indonesia in relation to the Indonesian court proceedings, such as previous (p. 117) pleadings; previous correspondence between the Government, on the one hand, and Pertamina and PLN, on the other hand; or any other evidence of the respondent’s sincerity in seeking to implement the Terms of Appointment as signed.

  1. [73]  After extensive deliberations among all its members, the Arbitral Tribunal delivered the following Procedural Order on 7 September 1999 [which provides in relevant part]:

    the Arbitral Tribunal hereby decides and orders that:

    The Republic of Indonesia is in default under the Terms of Appointment.

    Hearings are hereby convened in the small Hall of Justice in the Peace Palace, The Hague, beginning at 10.30 a.m. on Wednesday 22 September and continuing as far as necessary the two following days. Given the Republic of Indonesia’s default, as well as its affirmation that it will not participate in the arbitration, the convenience of its counsel, or such witnesses as it might have presented if it had not been in default, will not be taken into account. The Arbitral Tribunal will test the evidence presented by the claimants, who will be required to prove their case to the satisfaction of the arbitrators irrespective of the default of the Republic of Indonesia; and will consider all arguments raised by the Republic of Indonesia.

    The Arbitral Tribunal has chosen the place for this hearing in the exercise of its authority under Art. 16(2) of the UNCITRAL Rules without changing the legal seat of the arbitration, which, in accordance with paragraph 3(c) of the Terms of Appointment, remains Jakarta.

    In the exercise of its procedural discretion the Arbitral Tribunal hereby informs counsel to the Republic of Indonesia that in the event they formally advise the Arbitral Tribunal on or before 17 September 1999 that the injunction has been withdrawn, and that they are authorised to stipulate that the Republic of Indonesia will fully and irrevocably participate in these arbitral proceedings, then the schedule would be modified as an extraordinary accommodation to the Republic of Indonesia. If said stipulation is made to the Arbitral Tribunal, the Republic of Indonesia’s submission of documentary evidence, including statements of all witnesses upon whom it intends to rely, as defined in paragraph 5(f) of the Terms of Appointment, should also be made on 17 September 1999, and the hearing would be rescheduled thereafter.

  2. (p. 118)
  3. [111]  The position of the Arbitral Tribunal is thus based on its appreciation of the facts of this case, and founded on the authority granted by the Parties when they agreed to arbitration under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.

  4. [114]  Nor did the decision to hear witnesses at a location outside Indonesia crystallise into any imaginary struggle between the Indonesian courts and the Arbitral Tribunal–to the contrary. The Jakarta Court’s injunction purported to forbid pursuit of the arbitration. The jurisdiction of that court is perforce limited to Indonesian territory. Whether or not the Arbitral Tribunal is to be deemed to be “international”, it avoided offending the Jakarta court by convening the hearing of witnesses outside Indonesia. It did so pursuant to Art. 16 of the UNCITRAL Rules, with the compelling justification that the cause of this choice of physical meeting place was directly attributable to an event which the Republic of Indonesia could have avoided.

  5. [115]  The Republic of Indonesia is in no position to contend that the Arbitral Tribunal was precluded in principle from hearing witnesses outside Indonesia. For not only is such a possibility consistent with Art. 16 of the UNCITRAL Rules, but the Republic of Indonesia itself acknowledged, in the letter of 9 July 1999 from its counsel quoted in Paragraph [33] as well as in the further letter of 26 August 1999 (see Paragraph [65]) that Art. 16 would allow hearings in another location in the event of “extraordinary circumstances”. Moreover, as seen in Paragraph [69], on 31 August 1999 the Republic of Indonesia proposed a hearing in London devoted to the expert testimony of Professors Lalive and Rogers, to be followed by “further deliberations of the Tribunal”. Having admitted that “extraordinary circumstances” permit hearings outside Indonesia, one of the Parties is not entitled to impose its evaluation of what constitutes “extraordinary circumstances”, or to insist that the Arbitral Tribunal bow to its preference for London over The Hague.

Himpurna California Energy Ltd and Republic of Indonesia, Interim Award (Ad Hoc UNCITRAL Proceeding, 26 Sep 1999), reprinted in (2000) XXV YCA 112, 124–26, 145–46, 168–69.

(p. 119)

  1. I.  The Parties’ Position

  2. [3]  Indonesia maintains that the arbitral tribunal may not hold a hearing in The Hague rather than in the contractually agreed place of arbitration, Jakarta. Indonesia alleges breach of contract (wanprestatie) or unlawful behaviour (onrechtmatige daad) under the parties’ agreements, including the Terms of Reference. The Terms of Appointment indicate Jakarta as the place of arbitration. Art. 16(1) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, which the parties declared applicable, provides that the place of arbitration is (in principle) the place chosen by the parties. It is certainly not in the Minister of Finance’s interest to deviate from this general rule, since by choosing a different venue he does not escape the prohibition and the penalty of the Indonesian court’s injunction, as is the case with Himpurna and Patuha, whose seat is [not in Indonesia]. On the other hand, his failure to appear at the hearing of 22 September may result in his being ordered to pay US $573 million.

  3. [4]  Himpurna, Patuha and Paulsson maintain that the present case is an international arbitration, in which national courts play no or a very limited role. (International) arbitrators examine and ascertain their own jurisdiction according to, inter alia, the UNCITRAL Rules; proceedings are regulated by the applicable arbitration rules, as provided in the Terms of Reference and/or the Terms of Appointment, and enforcement takes place at the parties’ initiative, possibly with the assistance of the national courts. Dutch courts must refrain as much as possible from any intervention in the arbitral process, and promote the smooth flow of the arbitration. Further, Dutch courts have no jurisdiction if there are no sufficient connecting factors.

  4. II.  The Court’s Decision

  5. [7]  First, we must examine whether Dutch courts have international jurisdiction. On this issue we reason as follows. The fact that in the present international arbitration a hearing is to be held on Dutch territory is in itself a connecting factor with the Dutch legal system. The hearing shall take place in the Peace Palace in The Hague. The arbitrators apparently obtained the permission therefor from the International [rectius] Permanent Court of Arbitration [“PCA”]. This does not in itself mean that the arbitration takes place “under the auspices” of the PCA, a case which is regulated in the agreement concluded by the Netherlands on 30 March 1999 in replacement of (p. 120) the 1899 agreement. If this were an arbitration “under the auspices” of the PCA, defendants 3 through 5 [Jan Paulsson, Antonino Albert De Fina and Priyatna Abdurrasyid] would be, according to the new agreement as submitted, PCA arbitrators and would enjoy immunity. If this were the case, it would be logical to presume that there is insufficient connection with the Dutch legal system. [However], since the status of the arbitrators is unclear, we must presume in this summary proceedings that the arbitration at issue does have sufficient connection with the Dutch legal system and that, therefore, Dutch courts have jurisdiction.

  6. [8]  Subsequently, we must examine whether the arbitrators violated their mandate by deciding that a hearing would take place in The Hague and/or whether Himpurna and Patuha would be in breach of their contract with Indonesia by participating in this hearing. Indonesia maintains that this is the crux of the dispute.

  7. [9]  The President leaves aside the question whether the arbitration at issue must be considered a domestic arbitration according to the Indonesian legal view, as alleged by Indonesia. The parties stipulated in their Terms of Appointment that the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules apply where the parties have not otherwise agreed. Art. 16(2) of the Rules explicitly allows the arbitral tribunal to hear witnesses and to hold meetings “at any place it deems appropriate”. This power is not limited by the UNCITRAL Rules or by the Terms of Appointment. Hence, we must conclude that the arbitral tribunal may decide that a hearing shall take place here in The Hague. The question under [[8]] must therefore be answered in the negative.

Republic of Indonesia v. Himpurna California Energy Ltd, Patuha Power Ltd, Paulsson, De Fina, Abdurrasyid, (Dutch Court of First Instance (Arrondissementsrechtbank), 21 Sep 1999), translated and reprinted in (2000) XXV YCA 469, 471–73.

Footnotes:

The text of the UNCITRAL Rule was modified in the Tribunal Rules of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal in the following manner:

  1. Paragraph 1 of Article 1 of the UNCITRAL Rule is modified to read as follows:

    1. Within the framework of the Algiers Declarations, the initiation and conduct of proceedings before the arbitral tribunal shall be subject to the following Tribunal Rules which may be modified by the Full Tribunal or the two Governments.

  2. Paragraph 2 of Article 1 of the UNCITRAL Rules is maintained unchanged.

  3. The following is added to Article 1 of the UNCITRAL Rules as paragraph 3:

    1. The Claims Settlement Declaration constitutes an agreement in writing by Iran and the United States, on their own behalfs and on behalf of their nationals submitting to arbitration within the framework of the Algiers Declarations and in accordance with the Tribunal Rules.

For a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of arbitration as compared to other forms of dispute settlement, See A Redfern & M Hunter with N Blackaby & C Partasides, Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration (4th edn, 2004) at 26 et seq.

On the use of the UNCITRAL Rules, see above, Chapter 1.

For example, according to s. 3 of the Finnish Arbitration Act of 1992, Act No. 1992/967, an arbitration agreement must be made in writing.

Report of the Secretary–General on the Revised Draft Set of Arbitration Rules, UNCITRAL, 9th Session, Addendum 1 (Commentary), UN Doc. A/CN.9/112/Add.1 (1975), Reprinted in (1976) VII UNCITRAL Ybk 166, 167. See also S Baker & M Davis, The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules in Practice: The Experience of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal (1992) 8; J van Hof, Commentary of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules: The Application by the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal (1991) 15.

Hereinafter the New York Convention (New York, 10 June 1958; 330 TS 3 (1959)). Article II requires an “agreement in writing.”

For a discussion of the acceptance of an arbitration agreement in the course of electronic commerce or by tacit or oral conduct, see Possible Future Work in the Area of International Commercial Arbitration, UNCITRAL, 32nd Sess, UN Doc A/CN.9/460 (1999), paras 20–31, Reprinted in (1999) XXX UNCITRAL Ybk 395, 398–99 [hereinafter “Possible Future Work”].

Such modification has occurred in the context of NAFTA Chapter Eleven arbitrations. See Canfor Corporation and Glamis Gold Ltd, Reprinted below, section C.

P Sanders, “Commentary on UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules,” (1977) II YCA 177, 179.

10  The Tribunal Rules were adopted by the Tribunal provisionally on 10 March 1982 and finally on 3 May 1983. On the drafting of the Tribunal Rules, See H Holtzmann, “Drafting the Rules of the Tribunal,” in D Caron & J Crook (eds), The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal and The Process of International Claims Resolution (2000) 75.

11  According to Article III(2) of the Claims Settlement Declaration, “the Tribunal shall conduct its business in accordance with the [UNCITRAL Rules] except to the extent modified by the Parties or by the Tribunal to ensure that this Agreement can be carried out.” See also Article 1(1) of Tribunal Rules above, section A. See also para 3 of the last–mentioned Article, according to which the “[t]he Claims Settlement Declaration constitutes an agreement in writing by Iran and the United States … on behalf of their nationals …” See Chapter 8, section B(5) below.

12  See S Baker & M Davis above, n 6, at 7; J van Hof above, n 6, at 13–14. The adaptability of the UNCITRAL Rules is of course a separate question from limitations in law of the place of arbitration or in the New York Convention. As to the applicability of the New York Convention to non–contractual disputes, see I Eliasoph, “A Missing Link: International Arbitration and the Ability of Private Actors to Enforce Human Rights Norms,” (2004) 10 New England Journal of International and Comparative Law 83.

13  See above, n. 1.

14  In the Larsen arbitration, the selection of the UNCITRAL Rules raised an important preliminary question for the tribunal, namely the applicability of the UNCITRAL Rules to a non–contractual dispute. The tribunal found “no reason why the UNCITRAL Rules cannot be adapted to apply to a non–contractual dispute.” See Lance Paul Larsen, Award, para 10.7, Reprinted below, section D(1). Noting the “nonprescriptive” and “noncoercive” nature of the Rules, the tribunal concluded that parties who agree to arbitrate under the Rules are able to adapt the terms of the Rules, either expressly or by implication, to suit their dispute, including a dispute where one of the parties is alleged to be a state. Ibid, paras 10.5–10.7. Specifically, the tribunal found that “[t]he parties to this arbitration effectively have agreed to apply the UNCITRAL Rules with such necessary adaptations as arise from the terms of the Arbitration Agreement and the nature of the issues referred to arbitration.” Ibid,para 10.10.

15  According to Article 15(1), discussed below in section 3, “[s]ubject to these Rules, the arbitral tribunal may conduct the arbitration in such manner as it considers appropriate …”

16  This fundamental tenet of international arbitration is widely recognized by international tribunals. See, e.g. Wintershall AG and Himpurna California Energy Ltd, Reprinted below, section D(2). In the case of arbitration arising under a bilateral investment treaty or Chapter Eleven of the NAFTA, the procedural law may be circumscribed by the specific terms of the treaty. See NAFTA, Chapter Eleven, Subchapter B, Art 1120(2) (“The applicable arbitration rules shall govern the arbitration except to the extent modified by this subchapter.”).

17  For a general discussion, see Böckstiegel, The Relevance of National Arbitration Law for Arbitrations Under the UNCITRAL Rules, (1984) 1 JIA 223–236.

18  Article 15 was adopted by the Iran-US Claims Tribunal without modification, but with the following notes:

  1. As used in Article 15 of the UNCITRAL Rules, the terms “party” and “parties” mean the arbitrating party or parties, as the case may be.

  2. In applying paragraph 2 of Article 15, the arbitral tribunal shall determine without hearing any written requests or objections of the concerned arbitrating parties with respect to procedural matters unless it invites oral argument in special circumstances.

  3. In complying with paragraph 3 of Article 15, an arbitrating party shall follow the procedures set forth in Article 2 of the Tribunal Rules.

  4. The arbitral tribunal may make an order directing the arbitrating parties to appear for a pre–hearing conference. The pre–hearing conference will normally be held only after the Statement of Defence in the case has been received. The order will state the matters to be considered at the pre–hearing conference.

  5. The arbitral tribunal may, having satisfied itself that the statement of one of the two Governments—or, under special circumstances, any other person—who is not an arbitrating party in a particular case is likely to assist the tribunal in carrying out its task, permit such Government or person to assist the tribunal by presenting oral and written statements.

19  See Dames & Moore, Reprinted below, section C(1).

20  H Bagner, “Enforcement of International Commercial Contracts by Arbitration: Recent Developments,” (1982) 14 Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 573, 577. In the UNCITRAL Model Law, the main elements of the present provision are contained in two separate articles, Articles 18 and 19. Together they have been called the “Magna Charta of Arbitral Procedure.” See H Holtzmann & J Neuhaus, A Guide to the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration: Legislative History and Commentary (1989) 550, 564.

21  See A Redfern & M Hunter above, n 2, at 27–28. See also S Baker & M Davis above, n 5, at 75–76 (discussion on the “principle of flexibility” as applied by the Iran-US Claims Tribunal); UNCITRAL Notes on Organizing Arbitral Proceedings, UNCITRAL, UN GAOR, 51st Session, para 4, UN Doc A/51/17 (1996), Reprinted in (1996) XXVII UNCITRAL Ybk 45, 46 [hereinafter “UNCITRAL Notes”] (“This [procedural flexibility] is useful in that in enables the arbitral tribunal to take decisions on the organization of proceedings that take into account the circumstances of the case, the expectations of the parties and of the members of the arbitral tribunal, and the need for a just and cost–efficient resolution of the dispute.”).

Examples of the application of Article 15 powers by the Iran-US Claims Tribunal are Reprinted below, section 3(C): Watkin–Johnson Company (rejecting submission after closure of written record), General Electric Company (same), Gloria Jean Cherafat (refusing to reinstate terminated case), The Austin Company (holding settlement conference), White Consolidated Industries, Inc. (refusing to hold preliminary hearing), Parvin Mariam Samrad (granting request to extend filing deadline), World Farmers Trading, Inc. (refusing to hold oral hearing unless requested by parties), New York Blower Company (same), Tai, Inc. (rejecting request to make interlocutory award), Case Nos. A3, A8, A9, A14 and B16 (holding pre–hearing conference), Dadras International (refusing to admit unauthorized, late–filed documents into evidence), Vivian Mai Tavakoli (same), and Vera–Jo Miller Aryeh (same). Examples from the NAFTA Chapter Eleven context are Reprinted below, section D: Methanex Corporation (admission of amicus submissions and establishing deadlines) and United Parcel Services of America, Inc. (admission of amicus submissions). Other examples are found in Lance Paul Larsen (determining preliminary issues but refusing to issue preliminary award) and CME Czech Republic BV (adopting, as appropriate, the IBA Rules on Taking Evidence), Reprinted below, section E.

22  H Holtzmann & J Neuhaus above, n 20, at 564.

23  See M Aden, Internationale Handelsschiedsgerichtsbarkeit (1988) 50–51, 53–54, who notes, inter alia, that given their relatively detailed quality, the UNCITRAL Rules provide for more legal scrutiny than other rules.

24  According to the drafters of the UNCITRAL Rules, Article 24(3) is “a specific example of the general rule in article [15(1)] to the effect that ‘the arbitrators may conduct the arbitration in such a manner as they consider appropriate.’” Report of the Secretary General on the Revised Draft Set of Arbitration Rules, UNCITRAL, 9th Session, Introduction, para 17, UN Doc A/CN.9/112 (1975), Reprinted in (1976) VII UNCITRAL Ybk 157, 160.

25  See Methanex Corporation and United Parcel Service of America, Inc., Reprinted below, section D.

26  Notably, both tribunals found that the scope of Article 15(1) was limited to procedural matters and thus granted no authority to treat third parties as parties to the arbitration. See Methanex Corporation, para 29, and United Parcel Services of America, Inc., para 39, Reprinted below, section D.

27  See M Aden above, n 23, at 24–25 (a violation of the procedure agreed upon by the parties may lead to the setting aside (Aufhebung&8;) of the award under German Law).

28  According to Article V(1)(d) of the Convention recognition and enforcement may be refused, inter alia, where the “arbitral procedural was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties …” See above, n 6. See also W Craig, “Uses and Abuses of Appeal from Awards,” (1988) 4 Arb Intl 174, 189.

29  For a discussion of the principle of audiatur et altera pars, See B Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals (1987) 290–98.

30  Report of the Secretary–General on the Preliminary Draft Set of Arbitration Rules, UNCITRAL, 8th Session, UN Doc A/CN.9/97 (1974), Reprinted in (1975) VI UNCITRAL Ybk 163, 172–73.

31  See Report of the UNCITRAL, 8th Session, Summary of Discussion of the Preliminary Draft, UN Doc A/10017, para 99 (1975), Reprinted in (1975) VI UNCITRAL Ybk 24, 35 (“In this context, the comment was made that what was important was not the imposition of an obligation to observe the principle of equal treatment, since in certain circumstances (such as where the parties made conflicting requests to an arbitral tribunal) such treatment was impossible; the real need was to stress that both parties should receive fair treatment. It was suggested, however, that the best course might be to modify the paragraph so as to impose an obligation on the arbitrators to treat the parties both with equality and fairness.”). For further discussion concerning the amendment in question and its legislative history, See S Baker & M Davis above, n 5, at 76–77; J van Hof above, n 5, at 102. For an application of the principle of equality by a NAFTA Chapter Eleven tribunal, see Pope & Talbot, Inc., Reprinted below, section D.

32  The language of arbitration is discussed in connection with Article 17 in Chapter 9, below.

33  See Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, Arbitration in Sweden (2nd rev edn, 1984) 111, which predates the present Swedish Arbitration Act of 1999 but contains discussion that is of general relevance today. On the Swedish law, See F Madsen, Commercial Arbitration in Sweden: A Commentary on the Arbitration Act (1999) (199: 116) and the Rules of the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (2004).

34  See Foremost Tehran Inc., Reprinted below, section C(1).

35  The quoted requirement does not only prohibit discrimination in the presentation of the parties’ respective positions, but also prohibits the deprivation of the right to present one’s case even if this affects both parties “equally.” This kind of “equality,” however, amounts to arbitrariness which is likely to be beneficial to one party and disadvantageous to the other, i.e., to mean virtually a negation of equality in the material sense discussed above. It may be mentioned that the Revised Draft which followed the Preliminary Draft (but preceded the final text) required treatment “with equality and with fairness.” The text of the Revised Draft is reproduced in (1976) VII UNCITRAL Ybk 160. The Preliminary Draft had contained only the provision, referred to above, on “absolute equality.” Article 18 of the UNCITRAL Model Law (“the parties shall be treated with equality and each party shall be given a full opportunity of presenting his case”) does not contain the words “at any stage.” This phrase was omitted because “it was feared that it might be relied upon to prolong the proceedings unnecessarily.” H Holtzmann & J Neuhaus above, n 20, at 552. In the application of the UNCITRAL Rules. Articles 22–23 (see below, Chapter 14) provide means to eliminate such fears.

36  See P Sanders, The Work of UNCITRAL on Arbitration and Conciliation (2001) 6 (“Non–observance of equal treatment or not giving parties a full opportunity to present their case will make the award subject to an action for setting aside.”).

37  See below, section (b).

38  For examples from the practice of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal, see the Foremost Tehran case referred to above, n 34, and the Watkins–Johnson Company and General Electric Company cases, Reprinted below, section C(1). See generally J van Hof above, n 5, at 103–05. For an example from the practice of a NAFTA Chapter Eleven tribunal, see Methanex Corporation, Reprinted below, section D.

39  See, e.g. Case Nos. 33, 87 and 174, Dissent of Howard M Holtzmann from Orders Permitting Post–Hearing Statements, 20 June 1983, Reprinted in 3 Iran-US CTR 87–88 (1983–11); Ford Aerospace & Communications Corporation and The Islamic Republic of Iran, Case No. 93, Dissenting Opinion of Mohsen Mostafavi to the Order of 28 Feb 1986, 4 Mar 1986, Reprinted in 10 Iran-US CTR 108, 109 (1986–1).

40  See Klöckner and Cameroon, Decision of the Ad Hoc Committee, 3 May 1985, Reprinted in (1986) ICSID Rev–FILJ 90, para 88 (“it suffices to note that the Claimant has not established that it made a timely protest against the serious procedural irregularities it now complains of.”). See also J Thieffry, “The Finality of Awards in International Arbitration,” (1985) 1(3) JIA 27, 45 (“In practice, it appears that the courts will take into consideration a violation of the adversarial principle to deny enforcement of an international arbitral award only where such violation is serious in nature.”).

On the other hand, it is doubtful whether in domestic judicial proceedings mere lack of objection can cure clearly discriminatory treatment automatically by virtue of Article 30 of the Rules, according to which “[a] party who knows that any provision of, or requirement under, these Rules has not been complied with and yet proceeds with the arbitration without promptly stating his objection to such non–compliance, shall be deemed to have waived his right to object.” As the principles of non–discrimination and audi alterem partem are likely to be mandatory norms in most domestic systems, courts might be reluctant to accept that their violation can be made good on the basis of the quoted provision. The same is the case with excess of jurisdiction. The question of mandatory norms is discussed below in this section.

41  P Sanders above, n 9, at 179. See above, section 2.

42  See Article 1(1) of the Tribunal Rules above, section 2. See also J Selby & D Stewart, “Practical Aspects of Arbitrating Claims Before the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal”, (1984) 18 Intl Lawyer 211, 219, n 23 (“It is not possible … to waive mandatory requirements set forth in the Algiers Accords.”).

43  See Article 1(2) above, section 2.

44  K Böckstiegel, “The Relevance of National Arbitration Law for Arbitrations under the UNCITRAL Rules,” (1984) 1(3) JIA 223, 227.

45  For a NAFTA Chapter Eleven tribunal’s treatment of Canada’s refusal to comply with a document production request based on Crown privilege under Canadian law, see Pope & Talbot Inc., Reprinted below, section D(1).

46  This is a generally accepted principle in international arbitration law and theory. See A Redfern & M Hunter, above, n 3, at 98–99; K Böckstiegel above, n 44, at 230–31; P Sanders above, n 9, at 195; G Sacerdoti, “The New Arbitration Rules of ICC and UNCITRAL,” (1977) 11 JWTL 2 (on the standard adopted in the New York Convention of 1958); W Park, “The Lex loci Arbitri and International Commercial Arbitration,” (1983) 32 and ICLQ 21, 23; F Mann, “Lex Facit Arbitrum,” in International Arbitration–Liber Amicorum for Martin Domke (1967) 157, 160–61. See A Redfern & M Hunter above, n 2, at 98–99.

47  See K Böckstiegel above, n 44, at 231; F Mann above, n 46, at 161. See also M Ferrante, “About the nature (national or a–national, contractual or jurisdictional) of ICC awards under the New York Convention,” in The Art of Arbitration (1982) 129, 134–135; and Y Derains, “France as a Place for International Arbitration,” ibid, at 111, 112. See also M Aden above, n 23, at 24.

48  A Redfern & M Hunter, Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration (2nd edn, 1991) 88. See also W Craig above, n 28, at 180 (“The State where the arbitration takes place has the power to regulate how an arbitration procedure shall be held on its territory or, for that matter, whether it shall be held at all.”).

49  In practice this has not been frequently done either. See A van den Berg, The New York Convention of 1958 (1981) 292.

50  See, e.g. W Craig above, n 28, at 183.

51  On the concept of “a–national” (also called “floating” or “delocalised”) arbitration, as well as on pros and cons regarding that concept, see generally A Avanessian, Iran-US Claims Tribunal in Action (1993) 283–90; W Park, “Judicial Controls in the Arbitral Process,” (1991) 3 Arb Intl 230, 242–54; J Paulsson, “Delocalisation of International Commercial Arbitration; When and Why it Matters,” (1983) 32 ICLQ 53; A Redfern & M Hunter above, n 2, at 98–99; S Toope, Mixed International Arbitration (1990) 17 et seq.

52  K Böckstiegel above, n 44, at 230. This, however, is not the interpretation preferred by Böckstiegel himself.

53  But see the Belgian law on international arbitration as discussed below in connection with Article 16(1). See A Redfern & M Hunter above, n 2, at 108.

54  For example, an agreement on a modification to the UNCITRAL Rules, whereby Article 1(2) has been omitted from the Rules as applied in a particular arbitration.

55  See nn 27 and 28 above.

56  See P Sanders, The Work of UNCITRAL on Arbitration and Conciliation (2nd rev edn, 2004) 173–74; A Redfern & M Hunter, above, n 2, at 32; W Craig, W Park, J Paulsson, International Chamber of Commerce Arbitration (3rd edn, 2000) 311.

57  See Article 52, WIPO Arbitration Rules; Article 30.1, LCIA Rules; and Rule 34, AAA International Arbitration Rules. For Professor Sanders’ views on supplementing the Rules with provisions on confidentiality, See P Sanders, “Has the Moment Come to Revise the Arbitration Rules of UNCITRAL?”, (2004) 20(3) Arb Intl 243, 266–67.

58  The UNCITRAL Notes observe: “there is no uniform answer in national laws as to the extent to which the participants in an arbitration are under the duty to observe the confidentiality of information relating to the case.” UNCITRAL Notes above, n 21, at para 31.

59  See Ali Shipping Corporation v. Shipyard Trogir [1999] 1 WLR 314. Limitations on the general duty of confidentiality with respect to the award are set forth in Associated Electric and Gas Insurance Ltd v. The European Reinsurance Company of Zurich [2003] UK PC 11.

60  Esso Australia Resources Lt and ors v. The Honourable Sidney James Plowman and ors (1995) 128 ALR 391, (1995) 183 Commonwealth Reports 10; United States v. Panhandle Eastern Corp., (1988) 118 FRD 346 (D Del); AI Trade Finance Inc v. Bulgarian Foreign Trade Bank Ltd, [1998] Stockholm City Court, Case No. T–111–98.

61  Panhandle, 118 FRD at 349–50.

62  According to the NAFTA Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions:

  • Nothing in the NAFTA imposes a general duty of confidentiality on the disputing parties to a Chapter Eleven arbitration, and, subject to the application of Article 1137(4), nothing in the NAFTA precludes the Parties from providing public access to documents submitted to, or issued by a Chapter Eleven tribunal. In ICSID arbitration, the ICSID system does not expressly require the parties to keep awards confidential.

Notes of Interpretation, s. A(1), adopted by NAFTA Free Trade Commission on 31 July 2001, Reprinted in (2001) 13(6) WTAM 139. See also M Stevens, “Revisiting Confidentiality,” News from ICSID, Spring 2000 (vol 17(1)).

63  New Zealand’s Arbitration law provides:

  1. 14.  Disclosure of information relating to arbitral proceedings and award prohibited

  2. Subject to subsection (2), an arbitration agreement, unless otherwise agreed by the parties, is deemed to provide that the parties shall not publish, disclose, or communicate any information relating to arbitral proceedings under the agreement or to an award made in these proceedings.

  3. Nothing in subsection (1) prevents the publication, disclosure, or communication of information referred to in that subsection

    1. If the publication, disclosure, or communication is contemplated by this Act; or

    2. To a professional or other adviser of any of the parties.

64  See, e.g. Panhandle, 118 FRD at 349–50.

65  Such a form may also include penalties for disclosure. See L Trakman, “Confidentiality in International Commercial Arbitration,” (2002) 18(1) Arb Intl 1, 9.

66  For example, in accordance with Articles 38 and 41 of the Rules, the arbitral tribunal may apportion the costs of additional proceedings caused by a breach of confidentiality to the breaching party. See Pope & Talbot Inc. and The Government of Canada, Decision (NAFTA Chapter Eleven, 27 Sep 2000), available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/NAFTA-en.asp (investor to pay costs of pleadings caused by breach of confidentiality by investor’s counsel with understanding that investor’s counsel was personally to assume all costs). Where confidentiality measures are in place and a party still refuses to produce information to the tribunal on grounds that it is sensitive, the arbitral tribunal may consider drawing an adverse inference against the defaulting party pursuant to Article 28(3).

67  UNCITRAL Notes above, n 21, para 32 (numbers added).

68  Even then, as Fouchard, Gaillard, and Goldman observe, “the difficulty with confidentiality agreements becomes apparent if a document does become public knowledge. It will never be easy to establish which party is responsible for the document’s release, and it may be difficult for the disclosing party to prove that it suffered loss as a result of any breach by its adversary.” E Gaillard & J Savage (eds) Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman on International Arbitration (1999) 693. The confidentiality order and the third–party confidentiality agreement used in the United Parcel Services case are Reprinted below in section D.

69  In the NAFTA context, for example, disclosure may be necessary pursuant to the US Freedom of Information Act or the Canadian Access to Information Act.

70  See Methanex and United Parcel Services of America, Reprinted below, section D(2). In another case, Glamis Gold Ltd, Reprinted below, section D(2), the parties agreed that non–party submissions could be filed contemporaneously with other case filings. See Glamis Gold Ltd and the United States of America, Procedural Order No. 6 (NAFTA Chapter Eleven, 15 Oct 2005), at 2–3, available at http://www.state.gov/s/1/c3439.htm.

71  See Note 5 of the Tribunal Rules above, n 18. In Case No. A/17 between the United States and Iran, the Tribunal applied Note 5 to permit a third–party financial institution to attend Tribunal hearings. The United States of America and The Islamic Republic of Iran, Decision No. DEC 37–A17–FT (13 May 1985), Reprinted in 8 Iran-US CTR 189, 191 n 5 (1985–I). See also United Parcel Services of America, para 64, Reprinted below, section D (citing the practice of the WTO and distinguishing that of the ICJ).

72  For example, in United Parcel Services of America, the tribunal deemed amicus submissions on the questions of jurisdiction and the place of arbitration inappropriate. United Parcel Services of America, para 71, Reprinted below, section D(2).

73  According to UNCITRAL, “[w]hile ensuring the privacy of proceedings does not necessarily also ensure confidentiality, privacy assists by limiting the number of people who have access to the arbitration hearing.” Possible Future Work, n 7 above, para 63.

74  Most arbitral institutions facilitate the exclusivity of commercial arbitration by employing strict internal rules and measures on privacy.

75  United Parcel Services of America, para 70, Reprinted below, section D(2).

76  Thus the Bill, discussed below, on the applicability of Dutch law to the Tribunal proceedings would have governed only the cases mentioned in Article II(1) of the Claims Settlement Declaration (“… Claims of nationals of the United States against Iran and claims of nationals of Iran against the United States, and any counterclaim which arises out of the same contract, transaction or occurrence …”).

77  See W Lake & J Tucker Dana, “Judicial Review of Awards of the Iran-United States Claim Tribunal: Are the Tribunal’s Awards Dutch,” (1984) 16 Law and Policy in International Business 755, 771–73.

78  See ibid 733–80; See also n 52 above.

79  For an example of a case (not decided by the Iran-US Claims Tribunal) in which the tribunal has explicitly addressed the question of compatibility of its proceedings with mandatory local law, see Wintershall AG, Reprinted below, section 4(D) (under Article 16).

80  Amman & Whitney, Reprinted below, section C(1).

81  Fedders Corporation, Reprinted below, section C(1).

82  An English translation can be found in (15 Jul 1983) IALR 6,899. On the contents of the Bill, See also W Lake & J Tucker Dana above, n 77 at 783–86.

83  The Bill was criticized basically on two grounds: first, for facilitating the enforceability of the awards, as Dutch arbitral awards, under the New York Convention and, second, for limiting the grounds of challenge against the awards so as to make the setting aside of them a very unlikely possibility. Letter of Mohammed K Eshragh, the Agent of the Islamic Republic of Iran before the Iran-US Claims Tribunal to the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 24 Feb 1984, Reprinted in Mealey’s Litigation Reporter 394 (6 Apr 1984). See also W Lake & J Tucker Dana above, n 77, at 778, 786–87.

84  W Lake & J Tucker Dana above, n 77, at 759 et seq.

85  See L Hardenberg, “The Awards of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal Seen in Connection with the Law of the Netherlands,” (September 1984) IBL 337. See A van den Berg, “Proposed Dutch Law on the Iran-U.S. Claims Settlement Declaration–A Reaction to Mr. Hardenberg’s Article,” ibid, at 341.

86  W Lake & J Tucker Dana above, n 77, at 778.

87  A van den Berg above, n 85, at 343. See also van den Berg above, n 49, at 24–43. Support for this argument is believed to be found, inter alia, in Article V(1)(d) of the Convention, according to which the recognition and enforcement of an award may be refused if the “composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with the law of the country where the arbitration took place.” van den Berg above, n 49, at 34–39 (emphasis added).

88  W Craig above, n 28, at 201. Indeed, Article V(1) (d) of the New York Convention relied on by the authors referred to in the previous note can also be construed as envisaging control by national law and party agreement as alternatives. Moreover, an award not subject to judicial control at the seat of arbitration as such is not excluded by the basic definition contained in Article 1(1) of the Convention: “This Convention shall apply to the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards made in the territory of a State other than the State where the recognition and enforcement of such awards are sought…” For views favoring the enforceability under the New York Convention of awards not subject to the law of the place of arbitration, see W Lake & J Tucker Dana above, n 77, at 789 et seq.; V Saario, “Asianosaisautonomia kansainväliseen kauppaan liittyvässä välimiesmenettelyssä” (Party Autonomy in International Commercial Arbitration, in Finnish) in Juhlajulkaisu (Essays in Honor of) Matti Ylöstalo (1987) 341, 345.

89  W Lake & J Tucker Dana above, n 77, at 778.

90  Gould Marketing, Inc. and Ministry of Defence of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 136–49/50 (29 Jun 1984), Reprinted in 6 Iran-US CTR 272 (1984–II).

91  See Chapter 1 above.

92  The Islamic Republic of Iran and The United States of America, Decision No. DEC 62–A21–FT (4 May 1987), Reprinted in 14 Iran-US CTR 324 (1987–1). The Tribunal, however, held that it is “incumbent on each State Party to provide some procedure or mechanism whereby enforcement may be obtained within its national jurisdiction, and to ensure that the successful party has access thereto.” Ibid, para 15, 14 Iran-US CTR 331 (1987–1).

93  Ministry of Defence of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. Gould, Inc., CV 87–03673 RG, Order of 14 Jan 1988, Reprinted in (1988) MIAR 3.

94  Ministry of Defence of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. Gould, Inc., Decision filed 23 Oct 1989, [1989] CDOS 7832.

95  The District Court concluded that the award could not be recognized and enforced on the basis of “federal question jurisdiction.” On this question, which essentially turned on whether the Algiers Accords are “self–executing,” see the 14 January Order, n 93, above, at 4–5, and R Lewis, “What Goes Around Comes Around: Can Iran Enforce Awards of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal in the United States,” (1987) 26 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 515, 528–49. The Court of Appeal did not reach the question, because it held that jurisdiction existed under section 203 of the Federal Arbitration Act concerning the New York Convention. Ministry of Defence of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. Gould, Inc., [1989] CDOS at 7836.

96  Article II(1) of the New York Convention.

97  See Ministry of Defence of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. Gould, Inc., [1989] CDOS at 7835. The Court of Appeal distinguished the English case Dallal v. Bank Mellat, Queens Bench Division (Commercial Court), [1986] 1 All ER 239, in which what appears to be a contrary conclusion concerning the arbitration agreement was reached. See ibid. In Dallal, the Tribunal award was, however, recognized on the basis of “international comity,” as a consequence of which the claim before the English Court was struck out. For the award by the Tribunal, see Dallal and The Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 53–149–1 (10 Jun 1983), Reprinted in 3 Iran-US CTR 10 (1983–III).

98  Ministry of Defence of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. Gould, Inc., [1989] CDOS at 7835.

99  Ibid.

100  Ibid at 7836.

101  Iran Aircraft Industries and Iran Helicopter Support and Renewal Company v. Avco Corporation, 980 F 2d 141 (US Ct of Apps 2nd Cir, 1992), Reprinted in (1992) 7(12) MIAR A–1.

102  Ibid, at A–6.

103  Ibid, at A–5.

104  Certain of Avco’s claims were based on a large number of invoices which were not presented to the Tribunal. At the pre–hearing conference held in May 1985 Avco was notified by the then Chairman of the Chamber, Judge Mangård, that the Tribunal was not “very much enthusiastic” (ibid, at A–3) about getting all the invoices, but that Avco should have an independent audit of the invoices. In its Award of 18 July 1988, the Tribunal, in a different composition, held–as stated with regard to one of the claims in question–that it “cannot grant Avco’s claim solely on the basis of an affidavit and a list of invoices, even if the existence of the invoices was certified by an independent audit.” Avco Corporation and Iran Aircraft Industries, Award No. 377–261–3 (18 Jul 1988), Reprinted in 19 Iran-US CTR 200, 214 (1988–II). Respondents (and Counterclaimants) Iran Aircraft Industries and Iran Helicopter Support and Renewal Co. were awarded $3.5 million (against the dissent of Judge Brower, ibid at 231).

105  As long as awards against Iran are satisfied from the Security Account, this control, of course, may only work in favor of unsuccessful American parties before the Tribunal. This lack of balance is compensated only to a very limited extent by the control exercised in connection with payments made by the Federal Reserve to American claimants. In Gordon Williams, Award No. 342–187–3 (18 Dec 1987), Reprinted in 17 Iran-US CTR 269 (1987–III), in which the named claimant turned out to be a fictitious entity created by an Iranian national, no payment was made. The funds were returned to The Hague after a US court had concluded that the award had been obtained by fraud. See D Bederman, “Nationality of Individual Claimants before the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal,” (1993) 42 ICLQ 119, 121.

106  Although the question is open in light of the case–law, much can be said in favor of the view that the Tribunal proceedings are governed by the Dutch legal system. For an extensive analysis to this effect, See D Caron, “The Nature of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal and the Evolving Structure of International Dispute Resolution,” (1990) 84 AJIL 104. See also below, Chapter 8. For further discussion on this question, see S Toope above, n 51, at 263 et seq. A Avanessian above, n 51, at 272 et seq. D Jones, “The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal: Private Rights and State Responsibility,” (1984) 24 VJIL 259.

107  The question is addressed in detail in section 5 of Chapter 24 on revision.

108  Ram International Industries and The Air Force of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Decision No. DEC 118–148–1 (28 Dec 1993), para 20 (footnote omitted). See also Cherafat, Reprinted below, section C(1). The Gordon Williams Award above, n 105, has not been vacated by the Tribunal. See also A Mouri, “Striking a Balance between the Finality of Award and the Right to a Fair Judgment: What is the Contribution of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal?” (1993) IV FYIL 1.

109  K Böckstiegel above, n 44, at 232.

110  See P Sanders above, n 9, at 195; M Aden above, n 23, at 50–51.

111  In this particular respect resort may be had to the supplementary IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International Commercial Arbitration. See below, Introduction to Chapter 16 on Article 24.

112  For the text of note 5 of the Tribunal Rules, see above, n 18. For the application, see the Drucker and E–Systems cases, Reprinted below, section C(1). For a general discussion of the involvement of non–disputing parties, such as amicus curiae, see above, section 3(B)(1)(b).

113  In 1982 UNCITRAL adopted certain guidelines for both arbitral and related institutions willing to conduct administered arbitration under the UNCITRAL Rules and those ready to take a more limited role as appointing authority and a provider of administrative services. See Recommendations to Assist Arbitral Institutions and Other Interested Bodies with regard to Arbitrations under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, Reprinted in (1982) XIII UNCITRAL Ybk 420, and in I Dore, Arbitration and Conciliation under the UNCITRAL Rules: A textual Analysis, Appendix 3 (1986). See also Chapter 1 above.

114  See Report of the Secretary–General on the Preliminary Draft Set of Arbitration Rules, UNCITRAL, 8th Session, UN Doc A/CN.9/97 (1974), Reprinted in (1975) VI UNCITRAL Ybk 163, 173 (Draft Articles 13(2) and (3)).

115  See Report of the Secretary–General on the Preliminary Draft Set of Arbitration Rules, UNCITRAL, 8th Session, Addendum 2 (Suggested Modifications), UN Doc A/CN.9/97/Add 2, para 15 (1975), Reprinted in (1975) VI UNCITRAL Ybk 182, 183. See also Summary Record of the 6th Meeting of the Committee of the Whole (II), UNCITRAL, 9th Session, UN Doc A/CN.9/9/C.2/SR.6, at 2–4, paras 9–28 (1976).

116  Article 24(1) of the Model Law:

  • Subject to any contrary agreement by the parties, the arbitral tribunal shall decide whether to hold oral hearings for the presentation of evidence or for oral argument, or whether the proceedings shall be conducted on the basis of documents and other materials. However, unless the parties have agreed that no hearings shall be held, the arbitral tribunal shall hold such hearings at an appropriate stage of the proceedings, if so requested by a party.

117  H Holtzmann & J Neuhaus above, n 20, at 673.

118  See Chapter 17 on Article 25(2), below.

119  Summary Record of the 6th Meeting of the Committee of the Whole (II), UNCITRAL, 9th Session, UN Doc A/CN.9/9/C.2/SR.6, at 4, para 24 (1976) (Comment by Mr. Lebedev, USSR).

120  See Chapter 12 on Article 21(4), below.

121  In the discussion concerning what became Article 21(4) the representative of Sierra Leone stressed that “[i]t should be quite clear that the question of jurisdiction was a preliminary question which must be decided prior to the hearing.” Summary Record of the 8th Meeting of the Committee of the Whole (II), UNCITRAL, 9th Session, UN Doc A/CN.9/9/C.2/SR.8, at 5, para 35 (1976).

122  Note 2 to Article 15 above, n 18.

123  See Component Builders, Reprinted below, section C(2). But see Ladjevardi, Reprinted below, section C(2).

124  See above, nn 27–28.

125  H Holtzmann & J Neuhaus above, n 20, at 674.

126  See Report of the Secretary–General on the Preliminary Draft Set of Arbitration Rules, UNCITRAL, 8th Session, Addendum 2 (Suggested Modifications), UN Doc A/CN.9/97/Add. 2, para 15 (1975), Reprinted in (1975) VI UNCITRAL Ybk 182, 183; see generally Chapter 25, s. 4 on apportionment of costs.

127  See H Holtzmann & J Neuhaus above, n 20, at 673–74. Note that Article 24(1) of the Model Law (n 117, above) contains a provision on the holding of a hearing “at the appropriate stage of the proceedings.”

128  See Tchacosh Company, Reprinted above, section C(2), and the other case mentioned therein. See also J van Hof above, n 5, at 107.

129  See Ladjevardi, Reprinted below, section C(2).

130  See Tchacosh, Reprinted below, section C(2). See the Sylvania and World Farmers Trading cases, Reprinted below, section C(2).

131  Arbitration in Sweden above, n 33, at 114.

132  See above, n 18. Although “pre–hearing conferences” or the like find their basis in Article 15(1) rather than 15(2), they can conveniently be discussed in connection with hearings.

133  See Phelps Dodge, Reprinted below, section C(2).

134  See The Austin Company, Reprinted below, section C(2). See generally J Selby & D Stewart above, n 42, at 222–26 and S Baker & M Davis above, n 5, at 123 (“The purported goals of pre–hearing conferences at the Tribunal were twofold: (1) to allow parties to exchange views; and (2) to narrow and clarify issues.”).

135  See, on the one hand, J Selby & D Stewart above, n 42, at 222, according to whom the utility of the conferences “is in many cases doubtful,” and, on the other, S Belland, “The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal: Some Reflections on Trying a Claim,” (1984) 1 JIA 240–41, who regards the pre–hearing conference as “a good idea” and the guidance afforded by comments made during it as “invaluable.”

136  See Tai, Inc., Reprinted below, C(2), and The Islamic Republic of Iran and The United States of America (Case Nos. A3, A8, A9, A14 and B16), Order of 3 Dec 1992, Reprinted below, section C(2).

137  See Tai, Inc., Reprinted below, section C(2). The additional benefits of a pre–hearing conference are described in P Sanders above, n 36, at 7–8.

138  According to S Baker & M Davis above, n 5, at 123, this was because gradually “pre–hearing conferences were recognized as being of dubious value.”

139  The Islamic Republic of Iran and The United States of America, Reprinted below, section C(2). It may be mentioned that as of 26 July 2005 the Tribunal had held 301 hearings, 165 pre–hearing conferences and 8 combined pre–hearing and hearing conferences. Communique No. 05/3 of 26 July 2005, issued by the Office of the Secretary–General of the Tribunal.

140  See Report of the Secretary–General on the Preliminary Draft Set of Arbitration Rules, UNCITRAL, 8th Session, UN Doc A/CN.9/97 (1974), Reprinted in (1975) VI UNCITRAL Ybk 163, 173 (Commentary of Draft Article 13(4)).

141  See J Thieffry above, n 40, at 44–45.

142  See Note 3 to Article 15 of the Tribunal Rules of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal, above, n 18. See also Chapter 10, below.

143  Article 24(3) of the Model Law reads as follows: “[a]ll statements, documents or other information supplied to the arbitral tribunal by one party shall be communicated to the other party. Also any expert report or evidentiary document on which the arbitral tribunal may rely in making its decision shall be communicated to the parties.” The wording of the first sentence differs from that of Article 15(3) of the UNCITRAL Rules “in order to accommodate the practices of some arbitral institutions, under which documents are sent first to the institution or the tribunal which then transmits them to the arbitrators and the other party.” H Holtzmann & J Neuhaus, n 20, above, at 674.

144  Article 16 was adopted by the Iran-US Claims Tribunal without modification.

145  See Report of the Secretary–General on the Preliminary Draft Set of Arbitration Rules, UNCITRAL, 8th Session, UN Doc A/CN.9/97 (1974), Reprinted in (1975) VI UNCITRAL Ybk 163, 173 (Commentary on Draft Article 14). A similar provision is to be found, inter alia, in Article 12 of the ICC Arbitration Rules and in Article 20(1) of the UNCITRAL Model Law, which provides: “The parties are free to agree on the place of arbitration. Failing such agreement, the place of arbitration shall be determined by the arbitral tribunal having regard to the circumstances of the case, including the convenience of the parties.”

146  In a recent NAFTA Chapter Eleven arbitration the parties, Glamis Gold Ltd and the United States of America, agreed on Washington, DC as the place of arbitration, in their Agreement on Certain Procedural Matters, dated 20 January 2004.

147  See P Sanders above, n 9, at 194; K Rauh, Die Shieds– und Schlichtungs–Ordnungen der UNCITRAL 89 (1983). But see above n 116.

148  See P Sanders above, n 9, at 194.

149  See M Aden above, n 23, at 230 (“Die Parteien sind Herren des Verfahrens. Sie können auch in ein bereits begonnenes Verfahren eingreifen, es abbrechen oder neu beginnen, sie können daher auch, wenn sie nunmehr zu einer gemeinschaftlichen Entscheidung kommen, den vom Schiedsgericht bestimmten Ort ändern.”).

150  See A Redfern & M Hunter (4th edn, 2004) above, n 2, at 321; H Holtzmann, “The Importance of Choosing the Right Place to Arbitrate an International Case,” in Private Investors Abroad–Problems and Solutions in International Business (1977) 183, 188–91; K Lionnet, “Erfahrungen mit der internationalen Schieds–gerichtsbarkeit im Anlagenbau aus der Sicht der Partei,” in K Böckstiegel (ed), Vertragsgestaltung und Streiterledigung in der Bauindustrie und im Anlagenbau (1984) 291, 302 (KH Böckstiegel (ed), 1984). See the Model Arbitration Clause above, section 2(A). See also Report of the Secretary General on the Revised Draft Set of Arbitration Rules, UNCITRAL, 9th Session, Introduction, para 17, UN Doc A/CN.9/112 (1975), Reprinted in (1976) VII UNCITRAL Ybk 157, 160.

151  Ibid. See also R David, Arbitration in International Trade (1985) 282.

152  H Holtzmann above, n 150, at 189.

153  The UNCITRAL Notes above, n 21, para 22, enumerate a number of similar, non–binding “factual and legal factors” that may influence the choice of the place of arbitration:

  1. (a)  suitability of the law on arbitral procedure of the place of arbitration;

  2. (b)  whether there is a multilateral or bilateral treaty on enforcement of arbitral awards between the State where the arbitration takes place and the State or States where the award may have to be enforced;

  3. (c)  convenience of the parties and the arbitrators, including travel distances;

  4. (d)  availability and costs of support services needed; and

  5. (e)  location of the subject–matter in dispute and proximity of evidence.

These factors have figured prominently in a number of NAFTA Chapter Eleven cases in which the parties disputed the appropriate place of arbitration. See below, section D.

154  A Redfern & M Hunter above, n 2, at 284. See also e.g. Y Derains above, n 47, at 111–112; K Lionnet above, n 150, at 303. The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, signed in Helsinki in 1975, urges the participating states, inter alia, to “[r]ecommend, where appropriate, to organizations, enterprises and firms in their countries, to include arbitration clauses in commercial contracts … and permit arbitration in a third country …” (1975) 14 ILM 1292, 1304.

155  H Holtzmann above, n 150, at 187.

156  See, e.g. A Redfern & M Hunter above, n 2, at 321–22; Y Derains above, n 47, at 111.

157  In some cases the parties, however, may have difficulties in agreeing on a neutral venue. Thus certain developing countries may refuse, or at least be very reluctant, to submit disputes involving their governmental entities or agencies for settlement outside their own boundaries. See J McLaughlin, “Arbitration and Developing Countries,” (1979) 13 Intl Lawyer 211, 217–19. This attitude used to be shared by some Eastern European countries, but the situation has changed decisively. In certain Latin American countries arbitrations concerning investment and related contracts is prohibited unless it takes place in the country which received the investment. H Holtzmann, above, n 150, at 201–02. On investment arbitration and Latin America, See also G Naón, “Arbitration in Latin America: Overcoming Traditional Hostilities,” (1989) 5 Arb Intl 131, 141–42. It should be noted, however, that where a state or state entity has, in derogation from its domestic law, consented to arbitration in a neutral venue, it should be regarded as estopped from relying on the national rules in order to get rid of its commitment. See G Delaume, “The Finality of Arbitration Involving States,” (1989) 5 Arb Intl 21, 26 and the cases mentioned therein. Note also that in maritime cases the parties’ freedom to choose a neutral place may be curtailed by international regulations such as the Hamburg rules. See H Holtzmann & J Neuhaus above, n 20, at 595.

158  For example, in an arbitration initiated by a Dutch corporation against the Czech Republic the place of arbitration was determined to be Stockholm. See CME Czech Republic BV and The Czech Republic, Partial Award (Ad Hoc UNCITRAL Proceeding, 13 Sep 2001), Reprinted in (No. 3, 2002) 14 WTAM 109, 121.

159  Thus “[t]he legal rules applicable to arbitral proceedings in the respective countries may differ, and they could be more burdensome or otherwise less satisfactory to a party in one country than in the other. In addition, arbitral proceedings conducted in the respective countries will be controlled by different courts, which may exercise differing degrees of control over the proceedings.” UNCITRAL, Legal Guide on Drawing Up International Contracts for the Construction of Industrial Works (1988) 317. See also I Hertzfeld, “Applicable Law and Dispute Settlement in Soviet Joint Ventures,” (1988) 3 ICSID Rev–FILJ 249, 258, which provides:

  • [S]uch split jurisdictional clauses, which leave doubt as to the ultimate forum for litigation, may pose certain problems in practice. They may, for example, cause a party to act in such a manner as to oblige the opposing party to commence an action, in order that the action be brought in the first party’s home jurisdiction. They may also give rise to multiple actions in different jurisdictions with the rise of contradictory decisions.

  • Ibid. The author refers to agreements concluded between the former USSR Chamber of Commerce and certain foreign chambers in which arbitration in the respondent’s country is recommended.

160  A Redfern & M Hunter above, n 48, at 429.

161  See discussion concerning Article 15(1) in section 3(B), above.

162  See Wintershall AG, Reprinted below, section E.

163  See K Böckstiegel above, n 44, at 223–34.

164  Surveys on various domestic arbitration laws and regimes are conveniently located in the ICC publication Arbitration Law in Europe and in the ICCA publication, Yearbook of Commercial Arbitration, which cover national reports on the subject from 1976 to 1988, and The International Handbook on Commercial Arbitration, where the national reports are covered since 1989.

165  See H Holtzmann above, n 150, at 183.

166  See below, section (d).

167  In general, see A Redfern & M Hunter above, n 2, at 163–72; H Arfazadeh, Ordre public et arbitrage international à l’épreuve de la mondialisation (2005) 79–109; H Holtzmann above, n 150, at 198–204; K Böckstiegel above, n 44, at 234.

168  See A Redfern & M Hunter above, n 2, at 164; W Park, “Judicial Controls in the Arbitral Process,” (1991) 3 Arb Intl 230, 253–54. An important US decision confirming, in principle, the arbitrability of international antitrust disputes was rendered by the Supreme Court in 1985 in Mitsubishi v. Soler, 473 US 614 (1985). For a comment, See S Jarvin, “Arbitrability of Anti–Trust Disputes: The Mitsubishi v. Soler Case,” (1985) 2(3) JIA 69. See also PD O’Neill, Jr, “Recent Developments in International Commercial Arbitration: an American Perspective,” (1987) 4(1) JIA 7. See also R Brand, “International Trade Law and the Arbitration of Administrative Law Matters: Farrel Corp v. US International Trade Commission”, (1993) 31 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 181.

169  A Redfern & M Hunter above, n 2, at 172.

170  See ibid (references to two cases involving an exclusive distributorship agreement and an international employment contract respectively).

171  See ibid at 109–10.

172  See above, n 157.

173  See H Holtzmann above, n 150, at 204–06.

174  Thus under the general rule of Saudi Arabian law an “arbitrator shall be a Saudi national or Muslim expatriate.” According to an authority on that law, what in this respect “is applicable in national arbitration is not necessarily so in international arbitration.” A El–Ahdab, “Arbitration in Saudi–Arabia under the New Arbitration Act, 1983 and its Implementation Rules of 1985,” Part One, (1986) 3(3) JIA 27 and Part Two, ibid at (No. 4, 1986) 23. See also A Redfern & M Hunter above, n 2, at 325–326.

175  Further, see below, Chapter 3 on Article 33(1).

176  If no particular procedural law has been designated for the arbitration, the law of the place presumptively is also the law applicable to the interpretation of the UNCITRAL Rules. See M Aden, above n 23, at 34–35. This aspect, however, is likely to be of such a limited importance as not to play a role in the choice of the place.

177  As will be discussed later in this section, non–compliance with the mandatory rules of the law of the place of arbitration may also negatively influence the chances of having the award enforced in other jurisdictions.

178  For a comparative analysis of the appeal and review possibilities under the arbitration laws of selected countries, See D Kolkey, “Attacking Arbitral Awards: Rights of Appeal and Review in International Arbitrations,” (1988) 22 Intl Lawyer 693.

179  See K Böckstiegel above, n 44, at 233. See also M Aden above, n 23, at 24 (“Im Grunde scheint es nur eine wirklich zwingende Verfahrensregel zu geben, nämlich die ‘audiatur et altera pars’, auf welche sich alle anderen, jeweils nach den nationalen Rechten bestehenden zwingenden Verfahrensregeln zurühführen lassen”) and at 50.

180  See below, Chapter 17 on Article 25(5).

181  See Arbitration in Sweden above, n 33, at 66.

182  See A Redfern & M Hunter above, n 2, at 462–63 and Chapter 3, section 2(B)(2) on Article 33(2), below.

183  A Redfern & M Hunter above, n 21, at 310–11. See below, Chapter 12 on Article 21.

184  The underlying philosophy behind this distinction is well illustrated in the following example by Craig: “Think of the difference between the criminal procedure that the Anglo–American observer is familiar with and criminal proceedings in any other country. If judged by these standards, any Japanese, French … case, for example, would be found to have numerous ‘errors.’ However, we can still look at the same case and say it was procedurally just. When we do, we are making a judgment about procedural fairness that is no longer tied to our own national standards.” See W Craig above, n 28, at 197–98.

185  P Sanders above, n 10, at 179–80. “More restrictive” here denotes the narrower scope of public policy considerations which in international cases, as distinct from domestic cases, may affect the validity of the award. See Arbitration in Sweden above, n 33, at 120 (“Affidavits are looked upon with suspicion in Sweden … A more lenient attitude towards affidavits prevails in connection with international arbitration proceedings in Sweden, however…”).

186  See Craig above, n 28, at 197, and the French cases referred to therein.

187  Law of 27 March 1985 amending Article 1717 of the Code of Civil Procedure. For the text in English with an Introductory Note by E Gaillard, see (1986) 25 ILM 725. The Belgian solution has been the subject of criticism. Thus the shifting of all judicial control from the place of arbitration (a neutral site) to the courts of the country of enforcement (usually the home country of one of the parties) may run counter to the very purpose why the neutral place was selected. See W Craig above, n 28, at 201–02. As to the argument that this kind of “non–national” award is not enforceable at all under the New York Convention, see above, section 3(B)(1).

188  Now the parties to an international arbitration are allowed to opt out of local control. See A Redfern & M Hunter above, n 2, at 108. See B Hanetiou & G Block, “La, les du 19 mai modifrant la legislation belge relative à l’arbitrage”, Bulletin de l’Association Suisse de l’Arbitrage 1998, 528 et seq.

189  In Australia the Arbitration (Foreign Awards and Agreements) Act 1974, as amended on the basis of the UNCITRAL Model Law, specifies that, in case of international commercial arbitration, an award is in conflict with the public policy to the extent justifying its setting aside or the refusal of its enforcement where: “(a) the making of the award was induced or affected by fraud or corruption; (b) a breach of the rules of natural justice occurred in connection with the making of the award.” See C Croft above, n 164, at 190. As to France and its Decree No. 81–500 of 12 May 1981, see, e.g. A Redfern & M Hunter above, n 2, at 304; W Craig above, n 28, at 196–97. The first award to be successfully challenged under Article 1502 of the new Code of Civil Procedure concerned the ICC arbitration in the so–called Pyramids case, in which the French Court, unlike the arbitral tribunal sitting in Paris, held that Egypt had not consented to arbitration. (i.e., there was no valid arbitration agreement). Arab Republic of Egypt v. Southern Pacific Properties, Ltd, et al., Court of Appeal of Paris, 12 Jul 1984, Reprinted in (1984) 23 ILM 1048. The original award is reproduced in (1983) 22 ILM 752. See also n 22 in Chapter 17, below.

190  Arbitration Act 1996. See also A Redfern & M Hunter above, n 2, at 503.

191  See s. 51 of the Swedish Arbitration Act of 1999; Art 192 of the Act on Swiss Public International Law (Loi sur le droit international public suisse). See also H Arfazadeh above, n 167, at 77.

192  A Redfern & M Hunter above, n 2, 499.

193  Model Law, Article 34(2). See H Holtzmann & J Neuhaus above, n 20, at 911 et seq. See also M Kerr, “Arbitration and the Courts: the UNCITRAL Model Law,” (1985) 34 ICLQ.

194  See S Jarvin, “Canada’s Determined Move Towards International Commercial Arbitration,” (1986) 3(2) JIA 111, as well as R Paterson, “Implementing the UNCITRAL Model Law: The Canadian Experience,” 2 The Arb. and Dispute Resolution Law Journal 159 (1996).

195  This is the case, for example, with the Spanish arbitration law adopted in 2003. See F Mantilla–Serrano, Ley de Arbitraje: Una Perspectiva International (2005) 31–33.

196  See generally M Savola (ed), Law and Practice of Arbitration in Finland (2004). See also E Gaillard, “The UNCITRAL Model Law and Recent Statutes on International Arbitration in Europe and North America,” (1987) 2 ICSID Rev–FILJ 424.

197  See A Redfern & M Hunter above, n 2, at 108 n 75, who point out that while a claimant may be interested in speedy proceedings which are not interrupted by court, the respondent may formulate his priorities quite differently.

198  A Redfern & M Hunter above, n 2, at 390.

199  See below, Chapters 46.

200  See below, discussion on Article 26(3) concerning interim measures ordered by a court in Chapter 15.

201  As noted in connection with Article 15 above, there is some uncertainty as to the international enforceability of a–national awards.

202  See A Redfern & M Hunter above, n 2, at 518.

203  Ibid at 518. It is for this reason that arbitration in the respondent’s home country, instead of in a neutral place, is recommended in some cases. See UNCITRAL Guide above, n 159, at 317 (“The enforcement of an award against a party in his own country that was rendered in that country would not encounter the problems associated with the enforcement of a foreign award.”).

204  See, e.g. the Inter–American Panama Convention of 1975, reproduced in (1978) III YCA 15.

205  330 UNTS 3 (New York, 10 Jun 1958). On the “predecessor” of this Convention, the Geneva Convention of 1927, See A Redfern & M Hunter above, n 2, at 521–23. A thorough commentary is provided by A van den Berg above, n 49. See also H Holtzmann above, n 150, at 195–97. As to the New York Convention and a–national awards, see above n 87–88 in section 3(B) dealing with Article 15.

206  Article 1(3). According to this provision, a state may also declare that it will apply the Convention only to differences arising out of legal relationships, whether contractual or not, “which are considered commercial under the national law of the state making such declaration.” A “commercial reservation” is rarely likely to hamper the enforcement of an award rendered by a tribunal applying the UNCITRAL Rules. See generally A Redfern & M Hunter above, n 2, at 525–26.

207  States which have not made any of the two reservations mentioned apply to the main rule of Article I(1) according to which:

  • This convention shall apply to the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards made in the territory of a State other than the state where the recognition and enforcement of such awards are sought, and arising out of differences between person, whether physical or legal. It shall also apply to arbitral awards not considered as domestic awards in the State where the recognition and enforcement are sought.

208  A Redfern & M Hunter above, n 2, at 326. See also H Holtzmann above, n 150, at 196.

209  “R” denotes what has been referred to in the text accompanying note 208 as the “reciprocity reservation.” (This designation does not include reservations by contracting parties, such as Belarus, Russian Federation, and Ukraine, which apply the provisions of the Convention with respect to awards made in the territories of non–contracting states only to the extent to which they grant reciprocal treatment.) “C” stands for “commercial reservation,” as explained above in note 206. The list reflects the situation as of 6 June 2005. Up–to–date information on the status of ratifications, accessions, and reservations to the New York Convention is available in the Multilateral Treaties Collection (Chapter XXII on Commercial Arbitration) in the UN Treaty Database, available at http://www.untreaty.un.org/English/access.asp.

210  Article V reads as follows:

  1. Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at the request of the party against whom it is invoked, only if that party furnishes to the competent authority where the recognition and enforcement is sought, proof that:

    1. the parties to the agreement referred to in article II were, under the law applicable to them, under some incapacity, or the said agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law of the country where the award was made; or

    2. the party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case; or

    3. the award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration, provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, that part of the award which contains decisions on matters submitted to arbitration may be recognized and enforced; or

    4. The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with the law of the country where the arbitration took place; or

    5. the award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has been set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of which, that award was made.

211  Article V(1)(e). As indicated earlier, in the application of the UNCITRAL Rules law other than the lex loci arbitri should never be designated as the applicable procedural law (lex arbitri&8;). For discussion of the requirement in Article V(1)(e) that an award be binding on the parties, see below Chapter 22, section (2)(B)(2) on Article 32(2) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. See also A J van den Berg above, n 49, at 333 et seq.

212  For more detailed discussion concerning Article V of the New York Convention, See van den Berg above, n 49, at 275, et seq.; A Redfern & M Hunter above, n 2, at 528–45.

213  Article 34 (setting aside) was partly reproduced above following n 193. Provisions on recognition and enforcement, which also concern domestic awards, are contained in Articles 35 and 36. See H Holtzmann & J Neuhaus above, n 20, at 1006 et seq.

214  In general, see H Holtzmann above, n 150, 206–10; A Redfern & M Hunter above, n 3, at 322.

215  See P Sanders above, n 9, at 194–95.

216  In two relevant cases, the Secretary–General has acted in the way just indicated. He appointed the President of the Supreme Court of the Netherlands as Appointing Authority for the Iran-US Claims Tribunal at The Hague, and the principal arbitral institution of the Federal Republic of Germany as Appointing Authority for an arbitration in which the parties had chosen the Federal Republic as the place of arbitration. See A Redfern & M Hunter above, n 48, at 482–85 and the Commentary of Article 7 in Chapter 4, below.

217  UNCITRAL Legal Guide above, n 159, at 317. See also section (3), below.

218  See UNCITRAL Notes above, n 21, para 23 (geographical flexibility allows the “arbitral proceedings to be carried out in a manner that is most efficient and economical”); K Lionnet above, n 150, at 302 and the Commentary on paras 2 and 3 of Article 16, below.

219  As to certain concrete indications, See A Redfern & M Hunter, Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration (3rd edn, 1999) 288–90. See also H Holtzmann above, n 150, at 211–21, who tests (with positive results) the suitability of Sweden and the United States as places of arbitration according to the various relevant criteria.

220  P Sanders above, n 9, at 194. Similarly see K Rauh above, n 147, at 80, and M Aden above, n 23, at 230. Aden indicates–correctly, it is believed–that the presiding arbitrator can only decide “purely procedural questions” (reine Verfahrensfragen). Decision–making is dealt with in Article 31 of the UNCITRAL Rules discussed below, in Chapter 21.

221  See A Redfern & M Hunter above, n 2, at 438.

222  Article VI(1), Reprinted below, section C.

223  Initially there had been some discussion about locating at least one Chamber in London, but these plans never materialized. S Baker & M Davis above, n 5, at 78.

224  See R David above, n 151, at 281 (“[I]t is unimportant from a legal point of view whether arbitration takes place in one town or another within a same state. On the other hand it is important to know whether arbitration will take place in one state or in another.”). As to “town,” however, See M Blessing, “The New International Arbitration in Switzerland–A Significant Step Towards Liberalism,” (No. 2, 1988) 5 JIA 9, 21, who with a view to arbitration in Switzerland recommends the naming of the city in the arbitration agreement. Failing such a designation, “it might be difficult to determine the state judge whose assistance may be called on by the parties, or the arbitral tribunal…” Ibid.

225  The parties, of course, are free to select even the locale, if they so wish.

226  Due to the lack of any far–reaching legal consequences, this kind of decision clearly falls under procedural matters in the sense of Article 31(2), which is discussed below in Chapter 21. See also previous subsection.

227  Failure to do this is about the only conceivable situation in which the determination of the locale (as distinct from the place) of arbitration could entail legal consequences (because of breach of the principle of equality of the parties).

228  P Sanders above, n 9, at 196.

229  Ibid.

230  For example, in the Himpurna California Energy Ltd case, Himpurna, the claimant, won an arbitral award against PT Perusahaan Listruik (“PLN”), an entity controlled by the Republic of Indonesia. See Himpurna California Energy Ltd and PT (Persero) Perusahaan Listruik Negara, Reprinted in (2000) XXV YCA 13. PLN failed to pay damages. In a separate but related arbitration against the Republic of Indonesia, Himpurna claimed that Indonesia failed to ensure PLN’s payment of damages. See Himpurna California Energy Ltd and Republic of Indonesia, (2000) XXV YCA 112. Shortly thereafter, Pertamina, another entity controlled by Indonesia, successfully sought an injunction in the courts of Jakarta enjoining the arbitral proceedings and imposing a fine of US $1 million per day for any breach of the injunction. As the seat of the arbitration was Jakarta, the arbitral tribunal felt it necessary to move the hearing from Jakarta to The Hague, without changing the legal seat of the arbitration. See Himpurna, Interim Award, Reprinted below, section E. In an effort to block the tribunal’s decision, Indonesia sought (unsuccessfully) an injunction in the Dutch court to enjoin the arbitral tribunal from holding the hearing in The Hague. See Himpurna, Dutch Decision, and Himpurna, Final Award, Reprinted below, section E.

231  See below, section 3.

232  See Report of the Secretary–General on the Revised Draft Set of Arbitration Rules, UNCITRAL, 9th Session, Addendum 1 (Commentary), UN Doc A/CN.9/112/Add.1 (1975), Reprinted in (1976) VII UNCITRAL Ybk 166, 172 (Commentary on Draft Articles 15(2) and (3)).

233  Article 20(2) reads as follows: “Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (1) of this article, the arbitral tribunal may, unless otherwise agreed by the parties, meet at any place it considers appropriate for consultation among its members, for hearing witnesses, experts or the parties, or for inspection of goods, other property or documents.”

234  See H Holtzmann & J Neuhaus above, n 20, at 595–96.

235  See M Blessing above, n 224, 22–23, who refers to the difficulties which may arise if an arbitral tribunal having its formal seat in Switzerland (or London) conducts most of its proceedings in Germany. According to German doctrine, an award rendered under such circumstances may come to be regarded as a German award, while in Switzerland (London) it may be considered a Swiss (an English) award.

236  A Redfern & M Hunter above, n 2, at 101. Similar respect for the sovereignty of the territorial state, which always makes it incumbent on the arbitral tribunal to pay due respect to the mandatory norms of the place of arbitration, should also be taken into account where a part of the proceedings are conducted outside the principal place.

237  Ibid.

238  Ibid.

239  See Article 25(1) discussed below in Chapter 17.

240  Report of the Secretary–General on the Revised Draft Set of Arbitration Rules, UNCITRAL, 9th Session, Addendum 1 (Commentary), UN Doc A/CN.9/112/Add.1 (1975), Reprinted in (1976) VII UNCITRAL Ybk 166, 172 (Commentary on Draft Article 15(4)).

241  See A van den Berg, above, n 49, at 294–95; A Redfern & M Hunter above, n 2, at 104–05, 328.

242  See A van den Berg above, n 49, at 295; A Redfern & M Hunter above, n 2, at 105.

243  See F Mann, “Where is an Award ‘made’?” (1989) 5 Arb Intl 107, 108 (while arguing that, regardless of the actual place of the signing of the award, an award is “made” at the place of arbitration admits that “the view suggested … attributes a somewhat strained meaning to the word ‘made’.”)

244  See Summary Record of the 6th Meeting of the Committee of the Whole (II), UNCITRAL, 9th Session, UN Doc A/CN.9/9/C.2/SR.6, at 8–10, paras 70–89 (1976). See also P Sanders above, n 36, at 9 (“An award may be circulated to the arbitrators for signing at their convenience.”).

245  A Redfern & M Hunter above, n 2, at 328. By so doing the arbitral tribunal may avoid the risk of the award being regarded by a court as having been rendered in breach of the agreement by the parties.

246  See M Aden above, n 23, at 231–32.

247  Apparently most laws allow this kind of flexibility. See the document referred to above in n 214, para 81 (Comment by Mr. Melis, Austria).

248  Holtzmann & J Neuhaus above, n 20, at 596.