(1) Tribunal Rules, Article 19(1)
The Tribunal extends the time within which the Respondents shall file their Statements of Defence to 18 August 1982.
In view of the fact that the Statement of Claim and the Exhibits attached thereto set forth what is owed by each of the Respondents as well as the grounds for each claim, the Tribunal does not find reasons to grant the Respondents' request that the Claimant be directed to address its claims separately to each Respondent.
Pepsico, Inc. and The Islamic Republic of Iran, Case No. 18, Chamber One, Order of 30 Jun 1982, reprinted in 1 Iran-US CTR 173 (1981–82).
I dissent from the decision of the Chamber granting a second extension of time for filing the Statement of Defence in this case.
This claim is one of the earliest cases before the Tribunal, having been filed November 3, 1981. It involves transaction between Pepsico, Inc. and a number of Iranian bottling companies.
Article 19 of the Provisionally Adopted Tribunal Rules provides that a Chamber may extend time limits for filing Statements of Defence only
“if it concludes that such an extension is justified.” Note 1 to Article 19 sets forth certain criteria which will be taken into account in this regard. The first criterion is the “complexity of the case.” That criterion is not met in this instance because the transactions are relatively simple, the underlying contracts are identical and the Statement of Claim includes quite detailed documentation thereby facilitating response.
The second criterion of Note 1 to Article 19 justifying extension is any “special circumstances, including demonstrated hardship.” The fact that operations of some of the Iranian bottling companies covered by the claim may have been in what later became a war zone, as alleged by Respondents for the first time on June 3, does not excuse the Respondents not so located from filing their Statements of Defence on time, and may not even be a basis for delay as to those few Respondents who where in the war zone because, as noted above, all of the contracts are identical and there has been no showing that the same basic defences are not applicable to all.
Note 1 to Article 19 also provides that if a Chamber determines that a requirement to file a large number of cases would impose an unfair burden on a Respondent, “it will in some cases extend the time periods.” That clearly means that extension will be granted in some, not all, cases. That criterion was never intended to justify delay in responding to even the earliest claims filed, such as this, but was designed to relieve proven cumulative burden, if any, arising in later cases.
In summary, there is no showing to justify permitting a total of over eight months–more than twice the time originally granted–for filing the Statement of Defence in this case.
Pepsico, Inc. and The Islamic Republic of Iran, Howard M Holtzmann, Dissent from Decision Granting Second Extension of Time for Filing Statement of Defence (9 Jul 1982), reprinted in 1 Iran-US CTR 174 (1981–82).
In reply to your request for an extension of four months from 30 April 1983 to file a Defence in this case, I confirm by the present letter what I told you in my office and what I told Mr. Kashan in Mr. Lagergren's office, as well as what I told Mr. Mouri yesterday.
Since there were already three extensions of time, it seems difficult to grant a new one. Moreover, as the last given date was ordered by an award, it is impossible to modify it without the consent of all the Parties.
It should be on the other hand possible for the Respondents to give before the deadline a written statement with your counter–claim, if any, even if it is very short, to be completed in your further statements.(p. 418)
I regret not to be able to grant you the requested extension but legally I cannot do anything else.
Phillips Petroleum Company, Iran, et al. and The Islamic Republic of Iran, Cases Nos. 39 and 55, Chamber Two, Order of 27 Apr 1983, reprinted in 2 Iran-US CTR 283 (1983–I).
It is incumbent upon the Tribunal to provide all the parties to any given claim with sufficient time to defend its case properly. The interests of justice dictate that this Tribunal offer its sincere co–operation to the parties.
In your letter of 27 April 1983, issued in response to the request by the Agent of the Islamic Republic of Iran for an extension, you write:
Since there were already three extensions of time, it seems difficult to grant a new one. Moreover as the last given date was ordered by an Award, it is impossible to modify it without the consent of the parties.
I wonder to what extension your phrase, “three extensions of time” refers!
Therefore, by virtue of the facts briefly dealt with in this letter, I am obliged to point out that the reasons adduced in the Chamber's letter of 27 April 1983, issued in response to Mr. Eshragh's request for an extension, are entirely unjustified and that the Chamber's refusal of an extension is unconscionable on the grounds of justice and legality.
Phillips Petroleum Company, Iran, et al. and The Islamic Republic of Iran, Cases Nos. 39 and 55, Chamber Two, Order of 27 Apr 1983, Dissenting Opinion of Shafei Shafeiei (1 Jun 1983), reprinted in 2 Iran-US CTR 284 (1983–I).
(3) Tribunal Rules, Article 19(3)
Finally, in a Rejoinder filed 12 October 1982, the Air Force supplemented its Statement of Defence filed 20 April 1982 and added an additional counter–claim for Social Security insurance premium payments. The Tribunal notes that this counter–claim was filed six months after the Statement of Defence. Pursuant to Article 19 of its rules of procedure, the Tribunal can accept a late counter–claim if satisfied that the delay was justified under the circumstances, but in the present case the Tribunal finds no such justification and declines to accept the late counter–claim.
Intrend International, Inc. and The Imperial Iranian Air Force, Award No. 59–220–2 (27 Jul 1982) at 12, reprinted in 3 Iran-US CTR 110, 116 (1983–II).
In the Statement of Claim the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development are named as Respondents. The Ministry of Housing and Urban Development as well as some other government ministries and agencies have filed Statements of Defence, two of which contain counter–claims.
On 12 July the Claimant filed a “Motion to exclude extraneous parties and strike improper pleadings,” stating that only the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development is proper Respondent in this case.
The Tribunal, however, sees no reason for not allowing the Islamic Republic of Iran to file Statements of Defence and/or Counter–claims through the ministries and agencies in question. The Claimant's Motion is therefore dismissed.
William L Pereira Associates, Iran and The Islamic Republic of Iran, Case No. 1, Chamber Three, Order of 22 Sep 1982.
No experts will be appointed to study the counter–claims relating to
seismology insofar as those counter–claims were presented too late within the terms of Article 19(3), and our own Order of June, 1982 scheduling the proceedings. The use of our discretion under 19(3), to admit the late filing would be inappropriate in view of the uncertain and speculative nature of the alleged damages.
Richard D Harza and The Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. ITL 14–97–2 (23 Feb 1983) at 5, reprinted in 2 Iran-US CTR 68, 71 (1983–I).
On 31 January 1983, Claimant and MHUD filed their arguments and evidence.
On 1 March 1983, Gostaresh Maskan filed a Statement of Defence and sought to raise a counter–claim. MHUD also filed additional papers.
On 11 and 14 March 1983, Gostaresh Maskan filed additional material. Claimant objected to such late filings and moved to strike them from the proceedings. The hearing was held on 14 and 15 March 1983. During the course of the Hearing Gostaresh Maskan submitted a second counter–claim. The matter was submitted to the Tribunal at the conclusion of the Hearing.
By an Order of 19 April 1983, the Tribunal determined that the late filings of Gostaresh Maskan would be accepted, but that its late filed counter–claims would be rejected pursuant to Article 19(3) of the Tribunal Rules, no justification for the delay in presenting them having been shown. The Tribunal further decided that Claimant would have an opportunity to submit a reply to the accepted late filings, and it did so.
Blount Brothers Corp. and Ministry of Housing and Urban Development, Award No. 74–62–3 (2 Sep 1983) at 2–3, reprinted in 3 Iran-US CTR 225, 226 (1983–II).
As stated above, the Claimant was entitled to receive 255,205,242 rials for its supervisory services under the contract. It has already received 163,748,479 rials, including the 9,864,867 rials withheld for the 5.5 percent contract tax. From the balance of 91,456,763 rials still owing to the Claimant, 5.5 percent of the total amount due under the contract, representing the Iranian contract tax, must be deducted, because the parties agreed that it was to be withheld from all payments made to the Claimant, and it was in fact withheld from all such payments. 5.5 percent of 255,205,242 rials is 14,036,288 rials, of which 9,864,867 rials have already been withheld. Thus, 4,171,421 rials additional should be deducted. The Claimant is thus entitled to receive 87,285,342 rials from the Housing Organization.(p. 421)
The Housing Organization has also presented a counter–claim alleging, inter alia, that TCSB did not pay social insurance contributions due to the Social Security Organization in respect of TCSB's employees in Iran and owes a sum of money “as his due tax”. The former allegation was elaborated upon in a memorial filed 11 November 1983, it appears from a “Supplement” filed on 29 December 1983 that the latter allegation was meant to refer to “taxation in respect of revenues arising out of its (i.e., TCSB's) operations.”
Under Article II, paragraph 1, of the Claims Settlement Declaration the Tribunal has jurisdiction to decide
…any counter–claim which arises out of the same contract, transaction or occurrence that constitutes the subject matter of that national's claim, if such claims and counter–claims … arise out of debts, contracts … expropriations or other measures affecting property rights.…
Accordingly, a distinction must be made, in particular, between legal relationships arising out of the application of the law to a situation in which either party individually finds itself and the contractual relationship between the parties to the contract inter se. In the present case, the Tribunal holds:
Since the 5.5. percent tax has been taken into account in the present Award, the tax and social security counter–claims must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
TCSB, Inc. and The Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 114–140–2 (16 Mar 1984) at 15, 23–24, reprinted in 5 Iran-US CTR 160, 168, 173 (1984–I).
(i) Counter–claims based on Contract No. 112.
Respondents base their counter–claims in part on Contract Nos. 112, 118 and 138; however, they do not specify which amount are sought under each of these contracts.
ABII has not challenged the Tribunal's jurisdiction over the counter–claims insofar as they are based on the latter two contracts. The dispute concerns whether or not any counter–claim can be asserted on the basis of Contract No. 112. More specifically, the issue is whether such a counter–claim can be held to arise out of “the same contract, transaction or occurrence that constitutes the subject matter of that national's claim,” as required under Article II, paragraph 1, of the Claims Settlement Declaration.
The three contracts now mentioned were entered into successively. The first contract, No. 112, was a short term contract intended to cover ABII work under the Seek Switch Program during the negotiations of Contract No. 118. The Government of Iran entrusted the carrying out of that program to one company only, originally AT & T and later in actual fact ABII. Thus it was apparently foreseen that all the successive contracts would go to ABII. The subject matters of the three contracts were closely interrelated, within the framework of the Seek Switch Program.
In light of these particular circumstances, the Tribunal finds that the linkage between all three contracts must be considered sufficiently strong so as to make them form one single “transaction” within the meaning of the Claims Settlement Declaration.
Accordingly, the Tribunal concludes that it has jurisdiction over the counter–claims in so far as they are based on Contract No. 112.
American Bell International, Inc. and The Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. ITL 41–48–3 (11 Jun 1984) at 16–18, reprinted in 6 Iran-US CTR 74, 83–84 (1984–II) (footnotes omitted).
Article II, paragraph 1, of the Claims Settlement Declaration gives the Tribunal jurisdiction over certain claims of nationals of the United States or Iran and over counter–claims which “arise out of the same contract, transaction or occurrence that constitutes the subject matter of that national's claim.”
It is clear from both this language and from the Tribunal Rules that the Tribunal's jurisdiction extends only to counter–claims which are presented against claimants. Therefore, to the extent that the counter–claims seek recovery from Cofraran, they must be dismissed.(p. 423)
Claimant also contends that Contract 81 constitutes the subject matter of its claim and that the Tribunal's jurisdiction is limited to counter–claims which arise out of the same contract. Consequently, Claimant argues, counter–claims based on Contracts 87 and 88 do not fall within the Tribunal's jurisdiction.
MORT contends that Contracts 81, 87 and 88 are all part of the same “transaction”, that the claims arise out of this transaction and, therefore, that the counter–claims arise out of the same transaction which constitutes the subject matter of this claim.
The Tribunal, however, cannot share the view that Contracts 81, 87 and 88 are part of one single transaction. Although an early intention, as reflected in MORT's letter of intent of 14 April 1976, was to treat the whole motorway project as one whole in the sense that all the four contracts contemplated were to be given to the consortium, this intention was later abandoned. Thus, by the time that Contract 81 was signed, the prospects for the remaining contracts was a matter to be negotiated. This is supported by the language of Article 2(3) of Contract 81, which provides as follows:
After the performance of this Contract, the EMPLOYER will have no other obligation towards the CONTRACTOR, except what may derive from EMPLOYER's Letters of Intent to the CONTRACTOR, No. 6155 of 9 February 1975 and No. 1045/2 of 14 April 1976 to the CONTRACTOR, and from any subsequent contracts or agreements the parties hereto may have entered into. (Emphasis supplied.)
The contracts were executed on different dates, and involved different services to be performed at different times. There is no relation between the disputes concerning Contract 81, on the one hand, and those concerning Contracts 87 and 88 on the other hand. Findings with respect to Contract 81 would have no effect on claims and defences made in connection with Contracts 87 and 88. That the Contracts may refer to one another or may even contemplate the execution of another does not necessarily make the linkage between them sufficiently strong so as to make them form one single transaction within the meaning of the Claims Settlement Declaration. Compare American Bell International Inc. and The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Interlocutory Award No. 41–48–3 (11 June 1984).
Therefore the Tribunal concludes that, to the extent that they arise out of Contacts 87 and 88, the counter–claims do not arise out of the same
contract, transaction or occurrence which constitutes the subject matter of any of the claims.
Morrison–Knudsen Pacific Limited and The Ministry of Roads and Transportation, Award No. 143–127–3 (13 Jul 1984) at 51–54, reprinted in 7 Iran-US CTR 54, 82–84 (1984–III).
Without prejudice to the final decision the Tribunal … notes that the specific issue raised by the Agent of the Islamic Republic of Iran, a period of delay of one or two days in filing counter–claims, would not by itself ordinarily result in the dismissal of counter–claims.
Anaconda–Iran, Inc., and The Islamic Republic of Iran, et al., Case No. 167, Chamber Three, Order of 11 Oct 1984.
The indisputable fact remains that Claimant invoked the jurisdiction of the Tribunal by filing a Statement of Claim here and, under the Claims Settlement Declaration and Tribunal Rules, Respondents were thus entitled to file certain counter–claims. While Claimant remains free to withdraw any and all of its claims for relief, such withdrawal can have no effect on the Tribunal's jurisdiction over the counter–claims, unless the Tribunal were to determine that it had no jurisdiction over the claims as originally filed. To date, the claims have not been withdrawn and in any event the Tribunal finds no basis for holding that they do not fall within the scope of its jurisdictional grant.
Behring International, Inc., and The Islamic Republic Iranian Air Force, Award No. ITM/ITL 52–382–3 (21 Jun 1985) at 38, reprinted in 8 Iran-US CTR 238, 265 (1984–I).
Pursuant to Article II, paragraph 1, of the Claims Settlement Declaration, the Tribunal's jurisdiction over counter–claims is limited to those counter–claims “which arise out of the same contract, transaction or occurrence that constitutes the subject matter of” the main claim. The asserted obligation to pay taxes in this case is imposed not by the contract that is the subject matter of the claim, but by operation of the applicable Iranian tax law. The Respondent itself states that “[t]he claim is based on the taxation laws of the Islamic Republic of Iran.” The obligation to pay taxes is a legal relationship that arises out of the application of the law to a factual situation of a person or legal entity rather
than a contractual relationship that exists between the parties to a contract by virtue of that contract. For these reasons, the Respondent's counter–claim for taxes is outside the Tribunal's jurisdiction.
dd) Social security premiums
Pursuant to Article II, paragraph 1, of the Claims Settlement Declaration, the Tribunal's jurisdiction over counter–claims is limited to those counter–claims “which arise[ ] out of the same contract, transaction or occurrence that constitutes the subject matter of ” the main claim. The asserted obligation to pay social security premiums in this case is imposed not by the contract that is the subject matter of the claim, but by operation of the applicable Iranian Social Security law. Any such obligation is, as the Tribunal found in Award No. 114–140–2 of 16 March 1984 in T.C.S.B., Inc., and Iran, at 24, and confirmed in Award No. 180–64–1 of 27 June 1985 in Sylvania Technical Systems, Inc. and The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, at 41, a “legal relationship arising out of the application of the law to a situation in which either party individually finds itself ” rather than a “contractual relationship between the parties to the contract inter se.” The Tribunal thus has no jurisdiction over the Respondent's counter–claim for social security premiums.
Questech, Inc., and The Ministry of National Defence of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 191–59–1 (25 Sep 1985) at 38–40, reprinted in 9 Iran-US CTR 107, 134–36 (1985–II).
In its Memorial filed 2 January 1985, just 22 days before the Hearing, AFIRI sets forth for the first time several counter–claims for damages allegedly caused by ITP Export's breaches of the Civil Works Contract. These counter–claims were not timely filed, and no explanation for the delay has been provided. Tribunal Rules, Article 19, paragraph 3. The Tribunal orders that they be dismissed.
International Technical Products Corp. and The Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 196–302–3 (28 Oct 1985) at 29–30, reprinted in 9 Iran-US CTR 206, 226–27 (1985–II).
The Claimant contends that public law debts may not be offset against private law claims. Even if a tax counter–claim was justifiable as a claim for set–off, in the Claimant's view it is clear from Article II, paragraph 1, of the Claims Settlement Declaration that such a set–off is governed by the same jurisdictional standards as a counter–claim. According to the
Claimant, Article 19, paragraph 3, of the Tribunal Rules subjects counter–claims and claims for the purpose of a set–off to the same jurisdictional restrictions.
The Tribunal determines that as far as its jurisdiction is concerned claims for set–off are generally governed by the same standards as counter–claims. The concept of set–off necessarily presupposes the existence of a claim that can be used for such set–off. When a respondent seeks to offset alleged tax arrears against contract claims, he can use his alleged right to the payment of taxes for set–off only if this right is an admissible claim under the Claims Settlement Declaration. As the Full Tribunal has decided in Case No. A2, Decision DEC 1–A2–FT (13 Jan. 1982), the Claims Settlement Declaration does not grant the Tribunal jurisdiction over claims against nationals of either State party unless those claims are brought as counter–claims. Claims for taxes can thus only be used for set–off if they fulfill the requirements for counter–claims as laid down in Article II, paragraph 1, of the Claims Settlement Declaration. This conclusion is confirmed by the provision of Article 19, paragraph 3, of the Tribunal Rules which states that
…the Respondent may make a counter–claim or a claim for the purpose of a set–off, if such counter–claim or set–off is allowed under the Claims Settlement Declaration (emphasis added).
This provision incorporates by explicit reference the requirements of the Claims Settlement Declaration for counter–claims. The Claims Settlement Declaration does not mention set–off explicitly. But it is clear from a comparison of Article 19, paragraph 3, of the UNCITRAL Rules with that provision as modified in the Tribunal Rules that counter–claims and claims for the purpose of set–off must meet the same jurisdictional requirements. Article 19, paragraph 3, of the UNCITRAL Rules stipulates that
…the Respondent may make a counter–claim arising out of the same contract or rely on a claim arising out of the same contract for the purpose of set–off.
Because the description of the qualification of admissible counter–claims in the Claims Settlement Declaration was different from the one in the UNCITRAL Rule, this qualification was modified accordingly. By substituting the two identical qualifications in the UNCITRAL Rules of counter–claims and claims for the purpose of set–off with the single reference to the Claims Settlement Declaration, Article 19, paragraph 3, of the Tribunal Rules makes clear that, as under the original UNCITRAL
Rule, both counter–claims and claims for the purpose of set–off are governed by the same jurisdictional standards.
The Tribunal has held in a number of cases that the obligation to pay taxes other than withholding taxes specifically provided for in the parties contract arises from the tax laws of Iran rather than from the contract, even where the contract otherwise identifies which contractual party is responsible for the payment of taxes. It consequently has dismissed, tax counter–claims other than counter–claims for such withholding taxes for lack of jurisdiction, see International Technical Products Corporation et al. and The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Final Award No. 196–302–3; p. 29 (28 October 1985), and decisions cited therein. The Tribunal confirms these holdings in the present case and finds that the Ministry's tax counter–claim does not arise out of the Contracts, none of which required IACI or ISIRAN to deduct income tax from payments.
Computer Sciences Corporation and The Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 221–65–1 (16 Apr 1986) at 51–54, reprinted in 10 Iran US CTR 269, 309–11 (1986–I).
American Bell International Inc., and The Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 255–48–3 (19 Sep 1986), reprinted in 12 Iran-US CTR 170, 225 (1986–III).
The Tribunal notes two Counter–claims filed on 16 June 1987 by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, The Islamic Republic of Iran Navy and Bank Tejarat naming as Counter–Respondents Collins Systems International (“Collins”) and City Bank of New York in one and Collins and Bank of America, International, Houston, Texas (“Bank of America”) in the other. The Tribunal also notes the Claimant's comments on these Counter–claims filed on 15 September 1987.
The Tribunal further notes that Bank Tejarat, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, City Bank of New York and Bank of America are not Parties in this Case. Therefore, the Counter–claims against City Bank of New York and Bank of America cannot be admitted and neither Bank Tejarat nor the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran have standing to assert counter–claims in this Case.
Collins Systems International, Inc., and The Navy of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Case No. 431, Chamber Two, Order of 23 Sep 1987.
Interfirst Bank Dallas, NA and The Islamic Republic of Iran, Decision No. DEC 66–338–2 (9 Oct 1987), reprinted in 16 Iran-US CTR 291 (1987–III).
c) Late Counter–claim
Harris International Telecommunications Inc., and The Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 323–409–1 (2 Nov 1987), reprinted in 17 Iran-US CTR 31, 57–61 (1987–IV) (footnotes omitted).
Houston Contracting Company and National Iranian Oil Company, Award No. 378–173–3 (22 Jul 1988), reprinted in 20 Iran-US CTR 3, 36–38 (1988–III).
Distinction between the concepts of “Set–off” and “Counter–claim”
“Set–off. Remedy employed by defendant to discharge or reduce plaintiff's demand by an opposite one arising from transaction extrinsic to plaintiff's cause of action. Edmonds v. Stratton, MO. APP., 457 S.W. 2d 228, 232.” Black's Law Dictionary.
“Set–off. A defence or an independent demand made by the defendant to counterbalance that of plaintiff, in whole or in part. Mack v. Hugger Bros. Constr. S. 153 Tenn. 260, 283 SW 448, 46 ALR 389.” Ballentine's Law Dictionary.
“A counter demand which a defendant holds against a plaintiff, arising out of a transaction extrinsic to the plaintiff's cause of action, 20 Am J2d Council section 2.” Ibid.
“When two persons are indebted to one another, their mutual debts are to be set off in the manner provided for in the following Articles.” Civil Code of Iran, Article 294.
“In this connection, it will be immaterial whether the two debts arise from the same or different causes, because a difference of cause does not lead to a different effect. Therefore, [even] if one of those two debts arises from a sale and the other from a loan or lease, the two debts are set off against one another.” Emani, Hoquq–e Madani, vol. I, p. 345.
“La compensation s'opère de plein droit par la seule force de la loi, même a l'insu des debiteurs; les deux dettes s'èteingnent reciproquement, à l'instant où elles se trouvent exister à la fois, jusqu'à concourence de leurs quotités respectives.” Article 1290, French Civil Code.
“No counter–claim is required if the defendant wants to set off liquidated debt against the plaintiff's claim. Such a set–off, called compensation legale, is considered a defence on the merits (Dalloz, Repertoire de procedure civile et commerciale, Demande reconventionelle, at No. 14).” P Herzog, Civil procedure in France, Martinus Nijhof, 1967, p. 277.(p. 435)
“Set–off. Generally, in set–off, it is not necessary that the defendant's claim arise from the contract or transaction sued on or be connected with the subject matter thereof.” 80 C.J.S., Section 35.
“The distinguishing feature of counter–claim, as opposed to set–off, is that it arises out of the same transaction as that described in the complaint.…” Ibid., Section 36.
The Distinction between the two concepts of “counter–claim” and “set–off” can be clearly understood from the legal texts cited above. That is to say, the counter–claim is an independent claim which is brought vis–à–vis the original claim. In other words, the original claim provides the motive or justification for bringing the counter–claim, and the latter must therefore be related to it. As for the set–off, it is brought as a distinct claim as well, but it indicates the existence of a debt which in itself, by the operation of law, sets off and extinguishes all or part of the claimant's claims in advance. Thus, the legal set–off constitutes a substantive rule and principle and, as we saw in the above cited texts, it is one of the respondent's grounds of defence.
The First National Bank of Boston and The Islamic Republic of Iran, Decision No. DEC 83–202–2 (19 Sep 1988), Separate Opinion of Seyed Khalil Khalilian (23 Sep 1988) at 3–4, reprinted in 19 Iran-US CTR 310, 311–12 (1988–II).
CBS Incorporated and The Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 486–197–2 (28 Jun 1990), reprinted in 25 Iran-US CTR 131, 149–50 (1990–II).
The Islamic Republic of Iran and The United States of America (Case No. B1 (Counter–Claim)), Award No. ITL 83–B1–FT (9 Sep 2004) (footnotes omitted).