Footnotes:
1 Corresponding Article 34 of the 1976 UNCITRAL Rules provides:
2 According to Berger, the parties are under a “procedural obligation” to inform the arbitral tribunal of the settlement so it may dispense with the arbitration. See
K Berger, International Economic Arbitration (1993) 590–1;
S Baker and M Davis, The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules in Practice: The Experience of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal (1992) 183. But see
N Blackaby and C Partasides with A Redfern and M Hunter, Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration (5th edn 2009) 526 (maintaining there is no such obligation, although it would be “a normal act of courtesy” to inform the tribunal of any settlement).
3 In a letter dated April 27, 1987, the US Agent made a conditional request that the Tribunal not withdraw the US claim until it received confirmation that payment had been made. Upon receipt of the confirmation, the Tribunal terminated the proceedings in accordance with Article 34(1) of the Tribunal Rules. See Government of the United States and Islamic Republic of Iran, Case No B-25, Chamber One, Order of November 17, 1987.
4 See Report of the Secretary-General on the Revised Draft Set of Arbitration Rules, UNCITRAL, 9th Session, Addendum 1 (Commentary), UN Doc A/CN.9/112/Add.1 (1975), reprinted in (1976) VII UNCITRAL Ybk 166, 179 (Commentary on Draft Article 29) (“A settlement recorded in the form of an award on agreed terms acquires the legal force of an award.”);
P Sanders, “Commentary on UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules,” (1977) II Ybk Commercial Arb 172, 212 (noting award on agreed terms is “final and binding on the parties and will be carried out by them without delay”).
5 See Article 30(2) of the Model Law, as amended (“The award on agreed terms has the status of any other award on the merits.”); A van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention of 1958: Towards a Uniform Judicial Interpretation (1981) 49–50 (“The award on agreed terms … can be deemed to come within the purview of the Convention, provided that in the country of origin such award is considered a genuine award, which is almost always the case.”).
6 The arbitral tribunal's discretion to record a settlement agreement is discussed below in section 2(B)(1)(b).
7 UNCITRAL, 9th Session, Addendum 1 (Commentary), UN Doc A/CN.9/112/Add.1, n 4, (Commentary on Draft Article 29). Another reason for obtaining a recorded settlement is “the desirability (particularly where a state or state agency is involved) of having a definite and identifiable ‘result’ of the arbitral proceedings, in the form of an award which may be passed to the appropriate paying authority for implementation.”
N Blackaby and C Partasides, Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration, n 2, 525.
8 See
K Berger, International Economic Arbitration, n 2, 583. In the context of the Model Law, it has been noted that a request may come from only one party if no doubt remains that the request was made on behalf of the other party with that party's full consent.
H Holtzmann and J Neuhaus, A Guide to the UNCITRAL Model Law on Commercial Arbitration: Legislative History and Commentary (1989) 822–3.
It is useful practice for all parties to the proposed settlement agreement to place their signatures on the joint request so that the tribunal has the appropriate contact information to confirm each party's consent, if necessary. The signatures of all the parties also informs the tribunal that, unless otherwise stated, the joint request is for an award on agreed terms that resolves all, not a part of, the arbitral claims.
J Selby and D Stewart, “Practical Aspects of Arbitrating Claims Before the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal,” (1984) 18(2) Intl Lawyer 211, 241.
9 Although the contents of the settlement agreement will vary depending on the circumstances of the dispute, the parties may wish to consider the terms of the standard settlement agreement used by parties before the Iran–US Claims Tribunal: “(1) termination of all pending litigation by both parties wherever filed; (2) mutual release and discharge of claims; (3) indemnity and hold harmless against future claims by related parties; (4) transfer of all rights of property; (5) waiver of claims of costs and attorneys; and (6) agreement to submit jointly to the arbitral tribunal a request for approval of the settlement agreement and requiring approval for the agreement to have legal effect provision that agreement would have no legal effect if not approved.” See
P Trooboff, “Settlements,” in D Caron and J Crook (eds) The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal and the Process of International Claims Resolution (2000) 295.
11 See TCW Group, Inc (1976 Rules), reprinted in section 2(C), and Sun Co, Inc (1983 Tribunal Rules), reprinted in section 2(D)(1).
12 One commentator notes that “the parties are free to settle their claims as they wish, but they are not free to require that the tribunal exercise its own authority to approve that settlement” and to do so would “misconceiv[e] an arbitral tribunal's adjudicatory role”
G Born, International Commercial Arbitration (2009) 2437.
13 See Report of the UNCITRAL, 8th Session, Summary of Discussion of the Preliminary Draft, UN Doc A/10017, para 194 (1975), reprinted in (1975) VI UNCITRAL Ybk 24, 42–3. See Summary Record of the 11th Meeting of the Committee of the Whole (II), UNCITRAL, 9th Session, UN Doc A/CN.9/9/C.2/SR.11, at 10, para 79 (1976) (Comment by Mr Melis, Austria).
14 UNCITRAL, 9th Session, UN Doc A/CN.9/9/C.2/SR.11, n 13, at 10, para 195; UNCITRAL, 9th Session, Addendum 1 (Commentary), UN Doc A/CN.9/112/Add.1, n 4, (Commentary on Draft Article 29(1)). See also Summary Record of the 151st Meeting of the UNCITRAL, 8th Session, UN Doc A/CN.9/SR.167, at 203 (1975) (Comment by Mr Holtzmann, United States, stating that the “arbitrators should be left free to decide whether they agreed or refused to record a settlement in the form of an arbitral award” because without this discretion “arbitrators [would be] at the mercy of possible abuses by the parties”).
15 K Berger, International Economic Arbitration, n 2, 586.
16 K Berger, International Economic Arbitration, n 2, 586.
17 K Berger, International Economic Arbitration, n 2, 586.
18 This accords with the drafters’ likely intention of narrow discretion,
J Castello, “UNCITRAL Rules,” in F Weigand (ed) Practitioner's Handbook on International Commercial Arbitration (2nd edn 2009) 1516–17 (noting that the drafters “evidently expected the tribunal's discretion to be narrow, since they appeared to discuss only two grounds for refusing a request: ‘the settlement agreed on by the parties might be unlawful or contrary to public policy’”).
19 P Sanders, “Commentary on UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules,” n 4, 212 (“as a rule … the arbitrators will be prepared to incorporate the settlement into an award signed by them.”). In the context of the Model Law, Holtzmann and Neuhaus believe that refusal should occur only in “exceptional cases,” such as violations of law and policy, along with affronts to “fundamental notions of fairness and justice.”
H Holtzmann and J Neuhaus, A Guide to the UNCITRAL Model Law, n 8, 824–5 (citing Commission Report, UN Doc A/40/17, para 249 (August 21, 1985).
20 H Holtzmann and J Neuhaus, A Guide to the UNCITRAL Model Law, n 8, 824–5.
21 See
J van Hof “UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, Section IV, Article 34 [Settlement or other grounds for termination]” in L Mistelis (ed) Concise International Arbitration (2010) 220.
22 See UNCITRAL, 9th Session, UN Doc A/CN.9/9/C.2/SR.11, n 13, at 10, para 82;
P Sanders, “Commentary on UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules,” n 4, 212. See also UN Doc A/CN.9/SR.167, n 14, at 202 (Comment by Mr Gueiros, Brazil, proposing language that provides: “If the arbitrators are of the opinion that the settlement would be against public policy or against the rights or interests governed by the statutes of mandatory trade rules, they should refuse to record the settlement in the form of an arbitral award. … ”).
23 Seventh Secretariat Note, Analytical Commentary on Draft Text, UN Doc A/CN.9/264, at para 2 (March 25, 1985), reprinted in
H Holtzmann and J Neuhaus, A Guide to the UNCITRAL Model Law, n 8, 832.
24 See
N Blackaby and C Partasides, Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration, n 2, 526–7.
25 See Iran and United States, Case A/1 (Issue II), Decision (May 14, 1982), reprinted in 1 Iran-US CTR 144 (1981–1982).
26 Iran and United States, Case A/1 (1983 Tribunal Rules), at 152.
27 Iran and United States, Case A/1 (1983 Tribunal Rules), at 152.
28 Iran and United States, Case A/1 (1983 Tribunal Rules), at 152.
29 Iran and United States, Case A/1 (1983 Tribunal Rules), at 153.
30 Iran and United States, Case A/1 (1983 Tribunal Rules), at 153.
31 Iran and United States, Case A/1 (1983 Tribunal Rules), at 153. For an in depth discussion, see
J Carter, “The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal: Observations on the First Year,” (1982) 29 UCLA Law Review 1076, 1097–102; J Selby and D Stewart, “Practical Aspects of Arbitrating Claims,” n 8, 241.
32 In some cases before the Iran-US Claims Tribunal, the arbitral proceedings were not terminated until the parties fulfilled the conditions of the award on agreed terms. See, eg, Iran Chevron Oil Co (1983 Tribunal Rules), reprinted in section 2(D)(1). It is unlikely, as a practical matter, that this practice would extend to ad hoc commercial arbitration where the panel normally ceases to exist once the period for requesting correction, additional award, or interpretation has passed.
33 See UNCITRAL, 9th Session, Addendum 1 (Commentary), UN Doc A/CN.9/112/Add.1, n 4 (Commentary on Draft Article 29(1)).
34 For a continued discussion see
H Raeschke-Kessler, “Making Arbitration More Efficient: Settlement Initiatives by the Arbitral Tribunal,” (2002) 6 Vindobona J Intl Commercial L and Arb 245; see also
M Schneider, “Combining Arbitration with Conciliation,” in A van den Berg (ed) ICCA Congress Series No 8, International Dispute Resolution: Towards an International Arbitration Culture (1998) 57.
35 In fact, the UNCITRAL drafters anticipated such conduct. See Report of the Secretary-General on the Preliminary Draft Set of Arbitration Rules, UNCITRAL, 8th Session, UN Doc A/CN.9/97 (1974), reprinted in (1975) VI UNCITRAL Ybk 163, 179 (noting that a settlement might be reached during a hearing with the arbitrators’ assistance). According to Sanders, a settlement might also be facilitated after the hearing.
P Sanders, “Commentary on UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules,” n 4, 212.
36 One commentator notes that it is possible for the Tribunal to exclude any evidence not in the arbitral record, however, “many sceptics regard this requirement as impossible to satisfy.” D Plant, “ADR and Arbitration,” in
L Newman and R Hill (eds) The Leading Arbitrators’ Guide to International Arbitration (2nd edn 2008) 255; see also M Schneider, “Combining Arbitration with Conciliation,” in A van den Berg (ed) ICCA Congress Series No 8, International Dispute Resolution: Towards an International Arbitration Culture (1998) 57, 94–5.
37 See C Rogers, “The Ethics of International Arbitrators,” in
L Newman and R Hill (eds) The Leading Arbitrators’ Guide to International Arbitration (2nd edn 2008) 647. For example, the IBA Rules of Ethics for International Arbitrators, Rule 8 allows for the arbitrator to be involved in settlement proposals if the parties consent, and notes that “the arbitral tribunal should point out to the parties that it is undesirable that any arbitrator should discuss settlement terms with a party in the absence of the other parties ….”
38 D Plant, “ADR and Arbitration,” n 36, 253 et seq.
39 D Plant, “ADR and Arbitration,” n 36, 253 et seq.
40 Conciliation offers a heightened standard of confidentiality in comparison to the UNCITRAL Rules and is increasingly recommended by experienced arbitrators. See
P Sanders, The Work of UNCITRAL on Arbitration and Conciliation (2001) 18;
K Berger, International Economic Arbitration, n 2, 581. However, at least one commentator is uncertain whether confidentiality applies when parties to an arbitration pursue conciliation unsuccessfully and then return to arbitration. See Berger, 450–1.
41 In particular, Article 14 provides:
Article 19 provides further:
Finally, Article 20 provides:
In 2002, UNCITRAL adopted the Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation as a guide for establishing or improving national legislation governing the use of conciliation and mediation techniques.
42 Mobil Oil Iran, Inc, et al and Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran et al, Award No 311–74/76/81/150–3 (July 14, 1987), reprinted in 16 Iran-US CTR 3, 55 (1987-III). See also Iran and United States, Decision No DEC A1(I, III & IV)-FT (August 3, 1982), reprinted in 1 Iran-US CTR 189, 190–1 (1981–1982).
43 See UNCITRAL, 9th Session, UN Doc A/CN.9/9/C.2/SR.11, n 13, at 9, para 74 (Comments by Messrs Roehrich, France, and Mantilla-Molina, Mexico).
44 Withdrawal may be unilateral, see, eg, Seaboard Flour Corp (1983 Tribunal Rules), Union Special Corp (1983 Tribunal Rules), and Charles W Boyle (1983 Tribunal Rules), mutual, see, eg, Brown & Root (1983 Tribunal Rules), or conditional, see, eg, Xtra Inc (1983 Tribunal Rules), all reprinted in section 2(D)(2).
Article 32(2)(a) of the Model Law explicitly establishes withdrawal as grounds for termination of the arbitral proceedings. For commentary, see
H Holtzmann and J Neuhaus, A Guide to the UNCITRAL Model Law, n 8, 869.
45 See, eg, W Jack Buckamier and Islamic Republic of Iran, et al, Award No 528–941–3 (March 6, 1992), reprinted in 28 Iran-US CTR 53, 75–6 (1992).
46 See Tchacosh, Inc and Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No 540–192–1 (December 9, 1992), reprinted in 28 Iran-US CTR 371, 376–7 (1992) (finding one claimant had authorization to withdraw the claims of two other claimants since those claimants had not submitted any documents since filing the statement of claim, and since all three claimants shared the same lawyer).
47 Mercantile Trust Co National Association (1983 Tribunal Rules), reprinted in section 2(D)(2).
48 For example, in the Poura case the claimant filed a statement of claim alleging he owned three parcels of land in Iran that were expropriated by the Iranian Government. The claimant, however, neither identified with particularity the location of the plots of land at issue nor provided the relevant land registration numbers. The claimant, a dual national, also failed to adduce evidence in support of the claim that his dominant and effective nationality was that of the United States. In light of the lack of evidence on which to rule, the Tribunal made repeated requests that the claimant provide evidence in support of his claims, to which the claimant failed to respond. Consequently, the Iranian Agent filed a letter with the Tribunal requesting that the Tribunal terminate the case since the claimant's failure to file any evidence signified his intention to withdraw his claim. Approximately one year later, on January 20, 1993, the Tribunal issued an order indicating that it assumed that the claimant did not intend to pursue his claim and requesting comments by the claimant to the contrary. Having received no comments, the Tribunal terminated the proceedings in accordance with Article 34(2) approximately five weeks later. Isaac Poura (1983 Tribunal Rules), reprinted in section 2(D)(2). See
also P Sanders, “Commentary on UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules,” n 4, 206.
49 See UN Doc A/CN.9/SR.167, n 14, at 203 (Comment by Mr Krispis, Greece).
50 Bank Markazi Iran (1983 Tribunal Rules), reprinted in section 2(D)(2).
51 For a discussion of the consequences of the parties to make deposits, see Chapter 27, section 5.
52 See Settlement of Commercial Disputes: Revision of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, Note by the Secretariat, UNCITRAL, UN Doc A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.157/Add.2 at 4–5, para 10 (2009). Accord J Castello, “UNCITRAL Rules,” n 18, 1518.
53 UNCITRAL, 9th Session, Addendum 1 (Commentary), UN Doc A/CN.9/112/Add.1, n 4, (Commentary on Draft Article 29(1)) (“[a] settlement recorded in the form of an award on agreed terms acquires the legal force of an award.”).
54 See, eg, Frederica Lincoln Riahi and Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Partial Award on Agreed Terms No 596–485–1 (February 24, 2000); Partial Award on Agreed Terms No 568–A13/A15(I and IV:C)/A26(I, II, and III)-FT, para 9 (February 22, 1996), reprinted in 32 Iran-US CTR 207 (1996); Westinghouse Electric Corp and Islamic Republic of Iran, et al, Partial Award on Agreed Terms No 177–389–2 (May 10, 1985), reprinted in 8 Iran-US CTR 183 (1985–I).
55 See Settlement of Commercial Disputes: Revision of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, Note by the Secretariat, UNCITRAL, UN Doc A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.151/Add.1 at 15, para 33 (2008).
56 In a preliminary draft of the 1976 Rules, the arbitral tribunal was permitted to terminate the proceedings “unless a party objects,” which effectively granted each party a veto power. See Draft Article 29(1) of the Revised Draft. As adopted under the 1976 UNCITRAL Rules, the substance of Article 36(2) provides that a party's grounds for objections are only cognizable insofar as they are determined to be “justifiable” by the arbitral tribunal. UNCITRAL, 9th Session, UN Doc A/CN.9/9/C.2/SR.11, n 13, at 11, para 89 (Comment by Mr Dey, India, noting that the inconsistency in the provision since first sentence granted the arbitrators discretion while the second granted the parties the right to object).
Note in many cases, the request for justifiable objections may represent the parties’ last formal opportunity to communicate with the arbitral tribunal. This is by no means an open invitation for the parties to rehash the merits, but may provide a vehicle for bringing legitimate concerns to the arbitral tribunal's attention. For example, in Islamic Republic of Iran and United States of America (Case Nos A/3 and A/8), the United States objected to termination of the arbitration unless it received an award of costs. The objection prompted the Tribunal to undertake a full assessment of the matter. See Ministry of National Defence of the Islamic Republic of Iran and United States of America, et al, Decision No DEC 100-A3/A8-FT (November 22, 1991), reprinted in 27 Iran-US CTR 256 (1991-II).
57 Gloria Jean Cherafat, et al and Islamic Republic of Iran, Decision No DEC 106–277–2 (June 25, 1992), reprinted in 28 Iran-US CTR 216 (1992).
58 Gloria Jean Cherafat (1983 Tribunal Rules) at 222.
59 Settlement of Commercial Disputes: Revision of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, Note by the Secretariat, UNCITRAL, UN Doc A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.149 at 18, para 69 (2007).
60 UNCITRAL, UN Doc A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.149, n 59, at 18, para 69.