2. Further Written Statements—Article 24
A. Text of the 2010 UNCITRAL Rule1
Article 24 of the 2010 UNCITRAL Rules provides:
(p. 492) B. Commentary
(1) General comments
Article 24 grants the arbitral tribunal discretion to order or authorize the submission of further written statements.2 The arbitral tribunal may use its discretion to initiate actions independently, or at the request of any of the parties,3 taking into account the specific needs of the particular arbitration. A pre-hearing conference or similar preliminary meeting can be arranged to provide the tribunal with an opportunity to evaluate such needs in direct consultation with the parties.4 Typically, the tribunal's decisions on the need for further written statements should be reflected in the provisional timetable, required in accordance with Article 17(2), though new developments in the arbitration also may require changes in scheduling or additional rounds of pleadings.
In a relatively simple arbitration, there may be no need for written statements other than the statements of claim and defence. This, however, normally presupposes not only that the hearing allows sufficient time for both parties to elaborate their cases, but also that the documentary evidence relied on has been submitted in connection with the submission of the statement of claim and the statement of defence. In most international arbitrations, further written statements are likely to be useful, unless the case is disposed of on jurisdictional or other preliminary grounds.5 Therefore, arrangements should be made for a second round of written pleadings, consisting of a reply (réplique) by the claimant to the statement of defence (and any counterclaim) and a rejoinder (duplique) by the respondent to the reply.6 In view of the fact that under the UNCITRAL Rules both the statement of claim and the statement of defence may be concise in nature,7 the arbitral tribunal may not merely order the parties to answer the points raised in the adversary's first written statement. Rather, the tribunal may schedule time for a second round of comprehensive “memorial” (claimant) and “counter-memorial” (respondent) statements containing elaborate (p. 493) legal argumentation,8 combined with the submission of documentary evidence, expert reports, and the like.9
A two-round exchange of written pleadings is thus quite often advisable; a third round may be added, depending on the particular circumstances of the case. If a very substantial oral hearing is contemplated, the tribunal may dispense with further scheduling of written statements. If, on the other hand, the time allotted for the hearing is limited or no hearing at all is envisaged,10 a third round of written statements consisting of rebuttal memorials or briefs may be in order. A three-stage or even four-stage schedule has been applied in many cases by the Iran–US Claims Tribunal, whose case load does not permit long hearing sessions.11 Proceedings before investor–state tribunals may also require additional rounds of submissions to allow for participation by non-disputing state parties12 or non-party amicus curiae.13
Further rounds of written statements of a general nature are likely to be redundant.14 Thus “[i]t has been the established practice of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal to close the exchange of written pleadings after the submission of Memorials in Rebuttal.”15 Special situations may, however, warrant granting the parties an opportunity to file further written statements or comments on some particular issue(s).
Examples of such situations include amendments made to the claim or defence,16 requests for interim measures by one of the parties,17 the appointment of an expert and the determination of his terms of reference, or objections to the production of documents or with respect to the testimony of a witness.18 There may also be jurisdictional issues or preliminary objections (“dilatory pleas”),19 the practical handling of which calls for separate (p. 494) briefing before the exchange of written statements of a more general nature.20 The fundamental principle of party equality may occasionally necessitate allowing the parties to submit post-hearing memorials or briefs. This may be the case where new arguments or evidence has been submitted, and admitted, by the tribunal on the very eve of or at the hearing, or where the time allotted for the hearing has proved to be too short for comprehensive treatment of all aspects of the case.21 As the orderly conduct of the proceedings is, however, another important consideration in arbitration, a predisposition against post-hearing submissions is appropriate.22 The general rule, as emphasized by the Iran–US Claims Tribunal, is that “no party shall submit any document for the first time at the Hearing, or so shortly before the Hearing that the other party cannot respond to it in an appropriate way.”23
Article 24 deals with “written statements,” ie, pleadings and legal argumentation, as distinct from documentary evidence.24 Efficient management of the arbitration proceedings may, however, make it desirable to have documentary evidence and written statements submitted together in one complementary package. The memorial and counter-memorial may be scheduled for filing together with documentary evidence,25 as has been the common practice of the Iran–US Claims Tribunal26 and other tribunals.27
(p. 495) Whatever the approach taken, the arbitral tribunal must always state clearly what kind of submission it expects.28
In case voluminous submissions containing documentary evidence are expected, the arbitral tribunal should facilitate the later handling of the documents, for example, by instructing the parties to use tabs or exhibit numbers for the identification of the documents.29
Article 24 concludes with the provision that the arbitral tribunal “shall fix the periods of time for communicating such statements.” Time limits will be discussed in connection with Article 25. Nevertheless, a relevant question here is whether the tribunal should order written statements to be submitted simultaneously or successively. The preceding discussion has already implied that the latter is preferable, “so that the claimant fires the first shot and the respondent answers.”30 As Mani points out, “where the plaintiff-defendant relationship is discernible simultaneous presentation is illogical in that it requires the defendant to produce a complete defence without knowing fully in advance of the arguments of the claimant.”31 Though this statement was made primarily with a view to pleadings discharged in a single round, it applies in principle to pleadings that take place in more than one exchange. Where, however, there has already been a substantial exchange of successively submitted pleadings, the simultaneous communication of final rebuttals (in a third or fourth round) may be a proper method to avoid delays with due respect for the equality of the parties. In the earlier practice of the Iran–US Claims Tribunal, the sequential exchange of statements of claim and defence, replies and rejoinders, as well as memorials and counter-memorials, was often followed by the simultaneous filing of rebuttals.32 Later, however, the practice was to allow the respondent to file the final rebuttal submission.33
Apart from rebuttals, simultaneous submission of written statements may be proper in those exceptional cases in which a clear claimant–respondent relationship is lacking, or where none of the parties agrees to be treated as a respondent.34 Simultaneous filings should also be ordered if the parties so wish.35 When ordering simultaneous pleadings, the arbitral tribunal should ensure that a party who intentionally withholds its own submission until it has been able to study that of its adversary obtains no unfair advantage thereby.36
(p. 496) The UNCITRAL Model Law contains no provision corresponding to the present Article 24. Such a provision is indeed more properly covered by a set of arbitration rules than by a law on arbitration.
(2) Comparison to the 1976 UNCITRAL Rules
Article 24 was adopted without any revision to corresponding Article 22 of the 1976 UNCITRAL Rules.
C. Extracts from the Practice of Investment Tribunals
Karaha Bodas Co LLC and Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, et al, Preliminary Award (September 30, 1999) (Ad Hoc Proceeding, 1976 UNCITRAL Rules, Concession Agreement), at 10–11:
Methanex Corp and United States of America, Minutes of Order of First Procedural Meeting (June 29, 2000) (ICSID administered, 1976 UNCITRAL Rules, NAFTA Chapter Eleven), at 4:
(p. 497) Methanex Corp and
United States of America, Minutes of Order of Second Procedural Meeting (September 7, 2000) (ICSID administered, 1976 UNCITRAL Rules, NAFTA Chapter Eleven), at 2:
United Parcel Service of America, Inc and Government of Canada, Award on Jurisdiction (November 22, 2002) (ICSID administered, 1976 UNCITRAL Rules, NAFTA Chapter Eleven), at 40:
Gami Investments Inc and Government of The United Mexican States, Procedural Order No 1 (January 31, 2003) (Ad Hoc Proceeding, 1976 UNCITRAL Rules, NAFTA Chapter Eleven), at 2–3:
D. Extracts from the Practice of the Iran–US Claims Tribunal
Control Data Corp and Islamic Republic of Iran, Case No 88, Chamber Three, Order of December 20, 1985:
Cabot Intl Capital Corp and Overseas Private Investment Corp and Islamic Republic of Iran, Case No 96, Chamber One, Order of March 25, 1983:
(p. 499) American Bell Intl Inc and
Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No 255–48–3 (September 19, 1986), reprinted in 12 Iran-US CTR 170, 172 (1986-III):
Sterling Drug Inc and Islamic Republic of Iran, Case No 491, Chamber Three, Order of January 11, 1985:
Varo Intl Corp and Islamic Republic of Iran, Case No 275, Chamber One, Order of March 13, 1986:
United States of America on behalf and for the benefit of Harrington & Associates, Inc and Islamic Republic of Iran, Case No 10712, Chamber Three, Order of October 23, 1986:
Fluor Corp, Fluor Intercontinental Inc and Islamic Republic of Iran, Case No 810, Chamber One, Order of February 16, 1987:
Harris Intl Telecommunications, Inc and Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No 323–409–1 (November 2, 1987), reprinted in 17 Iran-US CTR 31, 45–46 (1987-IV):
Commercial Development Centre and US State Dept (Ex US Embassy in Iran), Case No B65, Chamber Two, Order of September 28, 1987:
Brown & Root, Inc and Islamic Republic of Iran, Case No 432, Chamber One, Order of December 4, 1987:
General Electric Co, on behalf of its Aircraft Engine Business Group, and Islamic Republic of Iran, Case No 386 Chamber One, Order of December 10, 1987:
Agrostruct Intl, Inc and Iran State Cereals Organization, Award No 358–195–1 (April 15, 1988), reprinted in 18 Iran-US CTR 180, 187 (1988-I):
(p. 502) RanaNikpour and
Islamic Republic of Iran, Case No 336, Chamber One, Interlocutory Award No ITL 81–336–1 (February 18, 1993), reprinted in 29 Iran-US CTR 67, 68 (1993):
Joan Ward Malekzadeh and Islamic Republic of Iran, Case No 356, Chamber One, Order of August 12, 1993:
NinniLadjevardi (formerly Burgel) and Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No 553–118–1 (December 8, 1993), reprinted in 29 Iran-US CTR 367, 377 (1993):
Dadras Intl, et al and Islamic Republic of Iran, et al, Award No 567–213/215–3 (November 7, 1995), reprinted in 31 Iran-US CTR 127, 135–36 (1995) (footnotes omitted):
Vivian Mai Tavakoli, et al and Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No 580–832–3 (April 23, 1997), reprinted in 33 Iran-US CTR 206, 211 (1997):
Vera-Jo Miller Aryeh, et al and Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No581–842/843/844–1 (May 22, 1997), reprinted in 33 Iran-US CTR 272, 287 (1997):
Frederica Lincoln Riahi and Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No 600–485–1 (February 27, 2003) (citations omitted):
3. Time Limits on Submission—Article 25
A. Text of the 2010 UNCITRAL Rule37
Article 25 of the 2010 UNCITRAL Rule provides:
B. Commentary
(1) General comments
The contents of Article 25 reflect a compromise between two partly conflicting considerations: the need for speedy proceedings on the one hand and the practical impossibility of prescribing rigid time limits to enhance quick disposition of the cases on the other. A compromise has been achieved by setting a time limit that is “merely intended to serve as a general guideline.”38 Thus, although the periods in question “should not exceed forty-five days,” exceptions to this rule are possible within relatively wide limits.39
The 45-day rule can be modified initially by written agreement of the parties pursuant to Article 1(1).40 The Iran–US Claims Tribunal's modification of Article 23 of the 1976 UNCITRAL Rules serves as an example. Pursuant to Article III(4) of the Claims Settlement Declaration, as implemented in Article 18 of the modified 1976 UNCITRAL Rules,41 all statements of claim must be filed between October 20, 1981 and January 20, 1982, whereas the modified version of Article 19 sets the limit for the submission of statements of defence at 135 days.42 As modified in the Tribunal Rules, Article 23 sets the limit for additional written statements at 90 days.
The provisions just reviewed, with their rather extensive time periods, reflect the special nature of the arbitration process conducted before the Iran–US Claims Tribunal.43 However, in more conventional arbitration it is also possible, and sometimes advisable, for the (p. 506) parties to agree on modifications to the first sentence of Article 25. Modification with regard to the statement of claim should probably involve a shortening rather than a lengthening of the time limit.
Although the claimant may not have included his statement of claim in the notice of arbitration,44 by the time the proceedings commence, the claimant likely will already have been able to make necessary preparations and, consequently, may not need as long as 45 days to submit the statement of claim.45
The first sentence of Article 25 can be modified by a decision of the tribunal as well as by mutual agreement of the parties. The use of the word “should” rather than “shall” or “must” in Article 25 indicates the time specified is only a guideline to be adapted as necessary. Submission of the statement of claim is less likely to require an extension beyond the 45-day limit than subsequent written statements.
Whatever the period of time originally ordered or agreed upon, “the arbitral tribunal may extend the time-limits if it concludes that an extension is justified.” The power of the arbitral tribunal to grant an extension is not limited by any given number of days, nor is the tribunal prohibited from renewing or increasing an extension once granted.46 The only limitation, in addition to those imposed by the general provisions of Article 17—especially the principle of equality—is that in each case the extension be “justified.”
The burden of proving justification lies with the party requesting the extension. Legitimate reasons for an extension may include illness of counsel, communication problems, or unexpected problems in gathering evidence to be submitted in support of the written statement in question.47 It is up to the arbitral tribunal to assess their weight. The consent of the other party, or even its failure to object, makes it easier for the arbitral tribunal to accept the alleged justification.48 Whereas an initial extension may be granted fairly readily, further extensions may require more “compelling” reasons.49 In case of doubt the arbitral tribunal may ask a party to elaborate on the reasons for its request.50
The justification presented by a party in support of its extension request must be balanced against the possible prejudice that the extension may cause. An extension necessitating the postponement of previously scheduled oral proceedings, or threatening to hamper the orderly conduct of such proceedings, should be granted only for very exceptional (p. 507) reasons.51 The arbitral tribunal can also, of course, grant a shorter extension than that requested by the party. In some of its cases, the Iran–US Claims Tribunal has balanced its decision of granting an extension with the need of orderly proceedings by granting an extension for the submission of the statement of defence until a certain date and at the same time setting the deadline for the hearing memorial on the same date.52
Although, as a rule, granting an extension presupposes a request by the party concerned, the arbitrators may in principle also conclude proprio motu that an extension is justified by the circumstances. An example is provided by an order of the Iran–US Claims Tribunal in the Development and Resources Corporation case. The Tribunal denied Respondents’ motion to have the Claimant translate certain documents into Farsi but allowed an extension for Respondents’ next submission “in order to facilitate Respondents’ task in reviewing the documents under submission.”53 In general, the Tribunal's practice of granting extensions can be characterized as liberal.54
One of the most important questions to be addressed in connection with Article 25 pertains to the consequences of a failure to meet time limits (including extensions) set for the submission of written statements. In the unlikely event that the claimant who initiated the proceedings fails without sufficient cause to submit his claim, the arbitral tribunal, “shall” according to Article 30(1), “issue an order for the termination of the arbitral proceedings.”55 Similarly, should the respondent fail to communicate its statement of defence “without showing sufficient cause,” the arbitral tribunal shall, according to the same provision, “order that the proceedings continue.” The reference to the “showing of sufficient cause” implies that before making any decision under Article 30(1), the arbitral tribunal should provide the party with an opportunity to explain why the statement in question was not received.56 Although Article 30(1) addresses only the statement of claim and statement of defence, the sanction it provides for the failure to submit these documents on time, ie, continuation of the proceedings, also applies in cases involving untimely submission of other written statements.
A few words are warranted about the consequences of actually filing a submission with the arbitral tribunal after the prescribed time limit. Although logic may require that such a submission be rejected, in arbitration such a drastic measure should be reserved for more significant delays. A delay of a few days should not normally lead to the rejection of a written statement (or of evidence, for that matter).57 As stated by the Iran–US Claims Tribunal, (p. 508) “fundamental requirements of equality between, and fairness to, the Parties, and the possible prejudice to either Party” should be considered when deciding whether a late submission can be accepted.58 If a written statement (eg a rebuttal) from the other party is due after the delayed submission, any prejudice to that other party may be cured by accepting from it a correspondingly late filing.59 Where, however, the arbitral tribunal has decided not to grant any extension for the submission in question, whether because of previous delays or for other reasons, the orderliness of the proceedings may require that the submission be rejected even in case of a relatively short delay.60 Lack of explanation for the delay may also justify the rejection of a late-filed document.61 The decision on the admissibility of late-filed documents may also be reserved pending consideration of further explanations to be given at a forthcoming hearing.62 If rejection is considered too harsh, the arbitral tribunal may regard a delay in the submission of a document as a relevant consideration in allocating the costs of arbitration between the parties.63 In certain situations (notably where a post-hearing submission is allowed), undue delays may be prevented by granting an extension request while making it clear that deliberations (“note en délibéré”) and the finalization of the case will not be deferred pending the receipt of the submission.64
(2) Comparison to the 1976 UNCITRAL Rules
Article 25 was adopted without any revision to the text of corresponding Article 22 of the 1976 UNCITRAL Rules.
C. Extracts from the Practice of Investment Tribunals
No practice is being extracted in this area.
D. Extracts from the Practice of the Iran–US Claims Tribunal
Texaco Iran, Ltd and National Iranian Oil Company and Islamic Republic of Iran, Case No 72, Chamber Three, Order of September 9, 1983:
(p. 509) Hoffman Export Corp (a division of Gould Inc) and
Ministry of National Defence of Iran, Case No 50, Chamber Two, Order of December 8, 1983:
United States of America on behalf and for the benefit of Thomas A Todd and Islamic Republic of Iran, Case No 10856, Chamber One, Order of January 9, 1986:
Phillips Petroleum Co, Iran and Islamic Republic of Iran, Case No 39, Chamber Two, Order of November 7, 1986:
Thomas Earl Payne and Islamic Republic of Iran, Case No 335, Chamber Two, Order of February 14, 1986:
Computer Sciences Corp and Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No 221–65–1 (April 16, 1986) at 5–6, reprinted in 10 Iran-US CTR 269, 273 (1986-I):
(p. 510) Aeronutronic Overseas Services, Inc, and
Telecommunications Co of Iran, Case No 410, Chamber Three, Order of August 6, 1986:
Arco Exploration Inc and National Iranian Oil Co, Case No 20, Chamber One, Order of December 17, 1986:
The Bendix Corp and Islamic Republic of Iran, Case No 208, Chamber Two, Order of September 28, 1987:
W Jack Buckamier and Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No 528–941–3 (March 6, 1992), reprinted in 28 Iran-US CTR 353, 60–62 (1992):
Vera-Jo Miller Aryeh and Islamic Republic of Iran, Case Nos 842, 843 and 844, Chamber One, Order of February 15, 1993:
Unidyne Corp and Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No 551–368–3 (November 10, 1993), reprinted in 29 Iran-US CTR 310, 313 (1993):
(p. 512) Ouziel Aryeh, et al and
Islamic Republic of Iran, Case Nos 839 and 840, Chamber One, Order of May 13, 1994:
United States of America and Islamic Republic of Iran, Case No A/33, Full Tribunal, Order of February 28, 2002:
Footnotes:
1 Article 24 was adopted without any revision to the text of corresponding Article 22 of the 1976 UNCITRAL Rules.
2 See United Parcel Service of America, Inc (1976 Rules), and KarahaBodas Co LLC (1976 Rules), both reprinted in section 2(C).
3 The wording of Article 24 makes it clear that not even an agreement of the parties obliges the arbitral tribunal to order further written statements if it is not itself convinced of their utility. In contrast, both the Preliminary Draft and the Revised Draft (Article 19(2), and Article 10(1) respectively) deferred to the parties on this matter, providing the following sentence: “However, if such parties agree on a further exchange of written statements, the arbitrators shall receive such statements.” However, this sentence was eventually deleted from what became Article 22 of the 1976 UNCITRAL Rules. For the relevant discussion in Committee of the Whole (II), see Summary Record of the 8th Meeting of the Committee of the Whole (II), UNCITRAL, 9th Session, UN Doc A/CN.9/9/C.2/SR.8, paras 44–78 (1976). It is clear, however, that a unanimous party request should normally be followed by the Tribunal. Moreover, pursuant to Article 1(1), the parties may, by written agreement, modify the rules including Article 24. See also J van Hof, “UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, Section III, Article 22 [Further written statements],” in L Mistelis (ed), Concise International Arbitration (2010) 202.
4 See Chapter 2, discussing Article 17(2).
5 On the considerations motivating further written statements, see M Moses, The Principles and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration (2008) 159.
6 See Report of the Secretary-General on the Preliminary Draft Set of Arbitration Rules, UNCITRAL, 8th Session, UN Doc A/CN.9/97 (1974), reprinted in (1975) VI UNCITRAL Ybk 163, 175. P Sanders, “Commentary on UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules,” (1977) II Ybk Commercial Arb 204. As to the terminology, see A Redfern and M Hunter with N Blackaby and C Partasides, Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration (4th edn 2004) 347–8. For an example from the practice of NAFTA tribunals, see Methanex Corp (1976 Rules), Minutes of First Procedural Order, reprinted in section 2(C).
7 See Chapter 13, discussion on articles 20 and 21.
8 On “memorials” in the text of inter-state arbitration, see V S Mani, International Adjudication, Procedural Aspects (1980) 116–19. Only in complex cases is it advisable to permit reply/rejoinder and memorial/counter-memorial in separate stages in the proceedings. This may, however, be practicable where there is a counterclaim to which the main claimant has the right to reply. See Notes to Article 19 of the 1983 Tribunal Rules of the Iran–US Claims Tribunal, para 2, reprinted in Appendix 5. See also n 9.
9 For examples of somewhat differently worded orders asking for the submission of memorials, see Control Data Corp (1983 Tribunal Rules); and Varo Intl Corp (1983 Tribunal Rules); both reprinted in section 2(D).
10 See N Blackaby and C Partasides with A Redfern and M Hunter, Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration (5th edn 2009) 413 (noting the rarity of “documents only” arbitration).
11 According to A Mouri, The International Law of Expropriation as Reflected in the Work of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal (1994) 11, n 38, “[t]he Tribunal has generally allowed four rounds of filings: i) Statement of Claim and Statement of Defence; ii) Claimant's Reply and Respondent's Rejoinder; iii) Claimant's and Respondent's Memorial and Evidence; and iv) their Rebuttals to each others’ Memorials and Evidence.” On the other hand, Full Tribunal cases have often been regarded as ripe for a hearing after two rounds of written pleadings. See J Selby and D Stewart, “Practical Aspects of Arbitrating Claims Before the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal,” (1984) 18 Intl Lawyer 228. For examples of scheduling orders, see Control Data Corp (1983 Tribunal Rules); and Varo Intl Corp (1983 Tribunal Rules); both reprinted in section 2(D).
12 See NAFTA, art 1128, allowing submissions by a NAFTA Party on a question of interpretation of the NAFTA. See also Methanex Corp (1976 Rules), Minutes of Second Procedural Order, reprinted in section 2(C).
13 See Chapter 2, section 3(B) on non-party participation in UNCITRAL arbitration.
14 For an example of an exceptional case of the Iran–US Claims Tribunal in which two rounds of written pleadings were ordered after the Hearing Memorials, see Fluor Corp (1983 Tribunal Rules), reprinted in section 2(D).
15 General Electric Co (1983 Tribunal Rules), reprinted in section 2(D).
16 See Chapter 13 on Article 20.
17 See Chapter 17 on Article 26.
18 See T Webster, Handbook of UNCITRAL Arbitration: Commentary, Precedents and Materials for UNCITRAL Based Arbitration Rules (2010) 344.
19 See V S Mani, International Adjudication, Procedural Aspects, n 8, 123.
20 In the practice of the Iran–US Claims Tribunal, “[l]arge, involved claims, such as the large oil company claims, often were divided into phases—e.g. jurisdiction, liability, quantification, counter-claims—with separate exchanges and possibly separate hearing memorials and evidence for each.” See S Baker and M Davis, The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules in Practice: The Experience of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal (1992) 96, n 413.
21 See, eg, American Bell Intl (1983 Tribunal Rules); and United States of America on behalf and for the benefit of Harrington & Associates, Inc (1983 Tribunal Rules); both reprinted in section 2(D). On the practice of the Iran–US Claims Tribunal in this regard, see also J Selby and D Stewart, “Practical Aspects of Arbitrating Claims,”n 11, 231.
22 See, eg, Commercial Development Centre (1983 Tribunal Rules), reprinted in section 2(D).
23 See Harris Intl Telecommunications (1983 Tribunal Rules); Agrostruct Intl (1983 Tribunal Rules); Frederica Lincoln Riahi (1983 Tribunal Rules);Vera-Jo Miller Aryeh (1983 Tribunal Rules);Vivian Mai Tavakoli (1983 Tribunal Rules); Dadras Intl (1983 Tribunal Rules); and NinniLadjevardi (1983 Tribunal Rules); all reprinted in section 2(D).
24 In earlier drafts of the 1976 UNCITRAL Rules, what is now Article 24 was originally included as part of an article which addressed both further written statements and further documentary evidence. (See Article 19 of the Preliminary Draft and Article 20 of the Revised Draft of the 1976 UNCITRAL Rules). The provision concerning further documentary evidence ultimately was separated and became part of Article 24 of the Final Draft (now Article 27). For the discussion in the Committee of the Whole (II) leading to the separation of the two issues, see Summary Record of the 8th Meeting of the Committee of the Whole (II), UNCITRAL, 9th Session, UN Doc A/CN.9/9/C.2/SR.8, paras 61–78 (1976).
25 Sometimes the very concept of “Memorial” is used to imply that documentary evidence is included. See N Blackaby and C Partasides, Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration, n 10, 382.
26 See n 8 and accompanying text. This and other filing arrangements for written submissions are illustrated by the Tribunal's early practice, as described by informed authors in 1984:
Chamber Two has the most standardized approach, typically a three-step schedule: (i) claimant files a summary of all evidence on which it will seek to rely, together with all documentary evidence (including affidavits) and any written briefs; (ii) respondent files the same; and (iii) both parties file any rebuttal evidence and briefs. Chambers One and Three have normally issued more varied, tailor-made orders, frequently with detailed descriptions of specific documents and types of evidence to be submitted and often setting a hearing date. Chamber One, in keeping with its general attention to technical and jurisdictional points, is most likely to decide minor preliminary questions or to indicate its intention to decide a given jurisdictional issue (especially corporate nationality) on documents at some future time.
J Selby and D Stewart, “Practical Aspects of Arbitrating Claims,”n 11, 226–7.See also the various orders quoted in section 2(D).
27 See, eg, Gami Investments Inc (1976 Rules); and KarahaBodas Co LLC (1976 Rules); both reprinted in section 2(C).
28 As leading commentators note:
N Blackaby and C Partasides, Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration, n 10, 379–80.
29 See Joan Ward Malekzadeh (1983 Tribunal Rules) reprinted in section 2(D).
30N Blackaby and C Partasides, Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration, n 10, 381.
31 V S Mani, International Adjudication, n 8, 107.
32 Contrast Control Data Corp (1983 Tribunal Rules);Varo Intl Corp (1983 Tribunal Rules); and Cabot Intl Capital Corp (1983 Tribunal Rules); all reprinted in section 2(D).
33 See RanaNikpour (1983 Tribunal Rules), reprinted in section 2(D). See also A Mouri, The International Law of Expropriation, n 11, 11, n 38. Even in recent years, however, the Full Tribunal has ordered hearing memorials to be filed simultaneously.
34 Sovereigns may be reluctant to assume this role. An example is provided by the Aminoil case, Chapter 9,n 16. See N Blackaby and C Partasides, Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration, n 10, 381.
35 A common wish of this kind may be behind the order issued in Brown & Root (1983 Tribunal Rules), reprinted in section 2(D).
36 See Sterling Drug (1983 Tribunal Rules), reprinted in section 2(D).
37 Article 25 was adopted without any modification to the text of corresponding Article 22 of the 1976 UNCITRAL Rules.
38 Report of the Secretary-General on the Revised Draft Set of Arbitration Rules, UNCITRAL, 9th Session, Addendum 1 (Commentary), UN Doc A/CN.9/112/Add.1 (1975), reprinted in (1976) VII UNCITRAL Ybk 166, 175.
39 See, eg,GAMI Investments, Inc (1976 Rules), reprinted in section 2(C) (permitting respondent four months to file statement of defence).
40 Report of the Secretary-General on the Revised Draft Set of Arbitration Rules, UNCITRAL, 9th Session, Addendum 1 (Commentary), UN Doc A/CN.9/112/Add.1 (1975), reprinted in (1976) VII UNCITRAL Ybk 166, 175.
43 Many Iranian entities faced a multitude of claims directed against them—hence the 135-day period reserved for statements of defence was appropriate. The 90-day period stipulated in Article 23 of the 1983 Tribunal Rules in part also accounts for this heavy case load. As the disposition of the claims in any case is bound to take quite some time, it perhaps does not make much difference whether 45 or 90 days is the general period of time for written statements.
45 The Revised Draft envisaged a period of only 15 days for the statement of claim, reserving 45 days for other written statements. See Report of the Secretary-General on the Revised Draft Set of Arbitration Rules, UNCITRAL, 9th Session, Addendum 1 (Commentary), UN Doc A/CN.9/112/Add.1 (1975), reprinted in (1976) VII UNCITRAL Ybk 166, 175. In the Committee of the Whole II it was “agreed that this article should not contain any special provision concerning the communication of the statement of claim.” Report of the UNCITRAL on the Work of its Ninth Session, UN GAOR, 31st Session, Supp No 17, UN Doc A/31/17, para 120 (1976), reprinted in (1976) VII UNCITRAL Ybk 66, 75.
However, the parties of course retain their freedom to modify the time limits in accordance with Article 1(1).
46 See, eg, United States and Iran, Case No A/33 (1983 Tribunal Rules), reprinted in section 3(D).
47 Webster notes other possible justifications may depend on the complexity of an arbitration or the involvement of government entities. T Webster, Handbook of UNCITRAL Arbitration: Commentary, Precedents and Materials for UNCITRAL Based Arbitration Rules (2010) 346. Even absent reasonable justifications for an extension of time, a tribunal may find it difficult to reject late-filed documents that are material to the claims presented in the arbitration. See OuzielAryeh (1983 Tribunal Rules), reprinted in section 3(D).
48 Although there is no absolute duty to ask the other party to give its comments, in cases involving requests for more significant extensions that party should be provided an opportunity to lodge any protest it may have against the extension requested.
49 See Texaco Iran (1983 Tribunal Rules), reprinted in section 3(D).
50 See Thomas Earl Payne (1983 Tribunal Rules), reprinted in section 3(D).
51 See Texaco Iran (1983 Tribunal Rules), reprinted in section 3(D).
52 See Vera-Jo Miller Aryeh (1983 Tribunal Rules), reprinted in section 3(D).
54 Baker and Davis summarize this practice as follows:
The arbitral chambers settled into a pattern of granting any party three extensions of three months without requiring any explanation. The order granting the third extension normally included cautionary language warning that no further extensions would be granted “without specific and compelling reasons.” Iranian parties routinely responded to these orders by seeking a further extension, often asserting more specific reasons. The Tribunal normally denied fourth requests made without offering any particulars, but it nevertheless ordered that the filing be submitted “forthwith” or within an additional period of time. In egregious cases of delay, the Tribunal considered the filing waived and moved on to the next stage; as a practical matter, however, it normally accepted any submission filed sufficiently in advance of the hearing to provide the opposing party with an opportunity to respond.
S Baker and M Davis, The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules in Practice, n 20, 99–100 (citations omitted). See also S Toope, Mixed International Arbitration (1990) 328 et seq. For illustrations of the practice, see section 3(D).
55 See discussion of Article 28 in Chapter 19.
56 See P Sanders, “Commentary on UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules,”n 6, 206.
57 See Anaconda-Iran, Inc (1983 Tribunal Rules), reprinted in Chapter 13, section 3(D)(3).
58 See W Jack Buckamier (1983 Tribunal Rules), reprinted in section 3(D).
59 See Phillips Petroleum Co, Iran (1983 Tribunal Rules); and United States on behalf of and for the benefit of Thomas A Todd (1983 Tribunal Rules); both reprinted in section 3(D).
60 Computer Sciences Corp (1983 Tribunal Rules), reprinted in section 3(D).
61 Bendix Corp (1983 Tribunal Rules), reprinted in section 3(D).
62 See Arco Exploration, Inc (1983 Tribunal Rules); and Unidyne Corp (1983 Tribunal Rules), reprinted in section 3(D).
63 Aeronutronic Overseas Services, Inc (1983 Tribunal Rules), reprinted in section 3(D).
64 See Hoffman Export Corp (1983 Tribunal Rules), reprinted in section 3(D). This is not the only order of its kind issued by the Iran–US Claims Tribunal.