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6 The Arbitral Award

Reinmar Wolff

From: Commercial Arbitration in Germany

Richard Kreindler, Reinmar Wolff, Markus S. Rieder

From: Oxford Legal Research Library (http://olrl.ouplaw.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2023. All Rights Reserved. Subscriber: null; date: 06 June 2023

Subject(s):
Arbitral rules — Arbitral agreements — Arbitral tribunals — Arbitrators — Place of arbitration — Preliminary proceedings

(p. 279) The Arbitral Award

A.  Overview

6.1  Arbitration is characterized by, on the one hand, largely flexible arbitral proceedings (Chapter 4) and, on the other hand, an outcome, the award, that not only is tantamount to a state court judgment (paras 6.108 et seq.), but also is equipped with restricted remedies (paras 6.145 et seq. and 6.156 et seq.) and facilitated means of enforcement both domestically (paras 6.246 et seq.) and internationally (paras 6.287 et seq.). Before the making of an award is discussed (paras 6.86 et seq.), the different ways to resolve the dispute— by decision of the arbitral tribunal and by settlement of the parties (paras 6.2 et seq.)— and the rules which the arbitral tribunal applies when deciding on the merits and on costs (paras 6.46 et seq.) are described. In some cases, the arbitral proceedings end with a termination order instead of an award (paras 6.128 et seq.).

B.  Procedures of Dispute Resolution

6.2  The standard procedure for the resolution of the dispute that the parties have brought before the arbitral tribunal is the tribunal’s decision on that dispute (p. 280) (paras 6.3 et seq.) by way of an arbitral award. Alternatively, the parties may amicably settle the case (paras 6.19 et seq.) and relieve the tribunal of the duty to render a decision on the dispute. In conformity with German court tradition, arbitral tribunals in Germany often encourage the parties to consider making a settlement. To facilitate enforcement of the terms of any such settlement, it may be recorded by the arbitral tribunal in the form of an award on agreed terms.

I.  Resolution by Decision of the Arbitral Tribunal

6.3  If the arbitral tribunal is to decide the dispute, it will typically follow a two- step procedure, consisting of deliberations (paras 6.4 et seq.) followed by voting (paras 6.16 et seq.).

1.  Deliberation

6.4  The tribunal’s deliberation is at the heart of the decision- making process. While the structure and conduct of any deliberation are not legally prescribed (paras 6.5 et seq.), the process is protected by the secrecy of deliberations (paras 6.8 et seq.) and restrictions on the participants (paras 6.13 et seq.).

a)  Form and Style

6.5  The style of deliberations may vary considerably without being limited to specific forms. The arbitrators may deliberate in a physical meeting, by telephone conference, by correspondence, by exchange of emails, etc.1 The exchange of views and arguments is as little standardized as the design and effectiveness of the deliberations. If the arbitrators disagree on these questions of style, it will be for the chairman to decide.2 In practice, however, the style of deliberations often depends more on the personalities of the arbitrators (including the chairman) than on the formal right to determine the style of deliberations. This is one of the core reasons why a careful selection of arbitrators can hardly be emphasized sufficiently (cf paras 3.56 et seq.). As a matter of law, the parties may agree on stipulations regarding the tribunal’s deliberations.3 Again, owing to the dominant influence of the arbitrators’ respective personalities, such party agreements would be of limited effect and are rare in practice.

6.6  It is best practice to conduct the deliberations promptly after the oral hearing of witnesses has concluded and the arbitrators’ recollection is still fresh.4 Often the chairman will lead and structure the deliberations but ask the co- arbitrators for their views before voicing his or her own opinion. Occasionally, arbitrators adopt the court practice of circulating a full assessment of the case (Votum), sometimes (p. 281) even in the form of a draft award.5 While the arbitrators may base their deliberations on such full- fledged draft, its unannounced circulation may also be perceived as inappropriate, in particular if it is issued by a co- arbitrator.

6.7  The prevailing view restricts the scope of deliberations to the outcome of the case and assumes that the legal reasoning need not be deliberated.6 Since, however, at least the majority of the arbitrators must sign the award and will likely refuse to do so if not comfortable with its reasoning, the deliberations will invariably extend to the reasoning leading to the agreed outcome of the case. In addition, differences of opinion that may exist between and among the arbitrators will often relate not to the outcome of the case only but rather also to the underlying reasoning.

b)  Secrecy of Deliberations

aa)  Relevance and Protective Function

6.8  The arbitrators are under an obligation of secrecy regarding the content and course of the deliberations.7 This duty is usually rooted in the arbitrator contract even if not expressly stipulated there.8 Similar to the conflict disclosure obligation (paras 3.128 et seq.), it should also be understood as a duty that is directly attached to the arbitrator’s office and that exists regardless of the validity of the arbitrator contract.9

6.9  The secrecy of deliberations does not only protect the arbitrators (whose conduct and position during the deliberations shall not be disclosed), but also the integrity of the arbitral process as such.10 Since arbitration is deemed to be a dispute resolution mechanism equivalent to state court proceedings, it must be ensured that the arbitrators decide according to their best knowledge. This again requires an open discussion of the case, including an equally open exchange of pros and cons and frank addressing of the respective strengths and weaknesses. Such an open atmosphere could be seriously endangered if the arbitrators had to take into consideration that the parties or other third persons would become privy to the content of the deliberations.

bb)  Waivability and Constraints

6.10  Since the secrecy of the deliberations also aims to protect the integrity of the proceedings, it is not within the parties’ or the arbitrators’ power to abandon such secrecy.11 It is therefore somewhat incongruous that the prevailing view allows for the parties to agree that the deliberations be held in their presence (para 6.15).

(p. 282) 6.11  The secrecy of deliberations is constrained by law, in particular by s 1052 para 2 ZPO (para 6.18). It is further acknowledged that the secrecy of deliberations does not bar an arbitrator from informing the parties of evident bias on the part of another arbitrator.12 Although such bias will often become apparent only in the deliberations, the secrecy of the deliberations cannot yield to any ground for challenge (s 1036 para 2 ZPO, paras 3.112 et seq.) or even any ground that is to be disclosed under s 1036 para 1 ZPO (paras 3.116 et seq.) even if the respective party is thereby deprived of its right to challenge. In light of its significance for the arbitral procedure as such (para 6.9), the secrecy of deliberations may allow at best for the disclosure of such grounds for challenge that would also qualify as grounds for setting aside the award (cf para 6.215). Any further allowance would serve to demote the arbitrators to agents of a party’s procedural remedies.

cc)  Consequences

6.12  An obvious consequence of the arbitrator’s duty to keep deliberations confidential is his or her right to refuse to give evidence in court proceedings.13 At the same time, a breach of the confidentiality obligation is not a criminal offence under s 203 StGB inasmuch as this provision does not address arbitrators. It is a matter of dispute whether it is impermissible in light of the arbitrator’s secrecy obligation to issue a dissenting opinion (paras 6.102 et seq.).14 The more elegant solution may in any event be to make clear within the award that certain issues are the result of a majority decision.15

c)  Presence of Third Persons

6.13  Third persons may attend the deliberations if all arbitrators agree and the third persons do not influence the outcome of the case.16 Uncontroversial examples of such attendance include secretaries (performing administrative tasks like taking notes)17 and trainees.18 Tribunal- appointed experts or advisers must not attend deliberations since such attendance would run the risk of influencing the outcome of the case.19 Nevertheless, the prevailing view is more generous and allows for the attendance of advisers if the tribunal leaves neither the factual nor the legal assessment of the case to the adviser20 or at least (p. 283) if the tribunal maintains a critical stance and does not merely adopt the adviser’s decision.21 This view, however, deprives the parties of their right to be heard.22 If the tribunal seeks to include third- party advice, it may appoint its own expert and question the expert in the oral hearing. The parties’ right to comment on the expert’s views cannot be circumvented by making the expert the tribunal’s private adviser.

6.14  To what extent (administrative) secretaries may be involved in the decision- making process has been subject to a lively discussion during the last few years. Internationally, a number of institutional23 and best practice guidelines24 have been released on this topic. German law will take no offence as long as the secretary’s duties are limited to purely administrative tasks like organizing the files, arranging hearing logistics, typing the award etc.25 Conversely, it is clear that a secretary must not act as a fourth arbitrator:26 the parties have mandated the arbitrators in person to decide the dispute and the arbitrators cannot delegate this task to a secretary.27 The exact borderline, however, is difficult to determine. The prevailing view allows for the secretary to draft the award based on the tribunal’s decision of the dispute.28 In international arbitrations, the secretary is even deemed to be permitted to submit a draft award which only in a second step is subject to the tribunal’s deliberation.29 Such procedure, however, entails the risk that the tribunal abdicates its duties by merely rubber- stamping the secretary’s draft without forming an own opinion. It is in any event not best practice for a responsible tribunal to transfer its core duties to a secretary in such way.

6.15  The prevailing view allows for the attendance of the parties during the deliberations if all arbitrators and parties agree.30 However, since the secrecy of deliberations also protects the integrity of the arbitral process (para 6.9), the better arguments suggest that the parties’ attendance constitutes a ground for setting aside the award under s 1059 para 2 no 1 lit d ZPO, and in actual best practice attendance of the parties in the deliberations is essentially unheard of, and rightly so.

(p. 284) 2.  Voting (s 1052 ZPO)

6.16  If the arbitral tribunal consists of a sole arbitrator, the arbitrator simply applies the law to the facts (para 6.47). With more than one arbitrator, the specific procedure needed for making the decision is enshrined in s 1052 ZPO. This provision adopts art 29 Model Law and adds rules on the refusal of an arbitrator to participate in the voting (para 6.18).

6.17  If the parties have not agreed on a voting procedure, the content and order of voting proposals is to be determined by the chairman.31 In practice, the voting is often not a formalized act, but rather an iterative process in the course of the deliberations. Each arbitrator has one vote and the decision is taken by the absolute majority of votes.32 In case of a tie, ie if the arbitrators cannot reach a decision, the arbitration agreement becomes incapable of being performed (s 1032 para 1 ZPO)33 and the arbitral tribunal issues a termination order under s 1056 para 2 no 3 ZPO.34 The parties can agree that in case of a tie the chairman’s vote shall be decisive35 or that another procedure shall apply.

6.18  As the arbitrators are appointed to decide the dispute, each arbitrator is under a duty to vote; to abstain from voting violates this duty.36 If an arbitrator abstains from voting, the other arbitrators can take the decision without the abstaining arbitrator (s 1052 para 2 cl 1 ZPO). Even in that case, any decision is to be taken with the absolute majority of all members of the arbitral tribunal (para 6.17).37 The remaining arbitrators must give the parties advance notice of their intention to make the award without the abstaining arbitrator (s 1052 para 2 cl 2 ZPO). Therewith, the parties shall be given an opportunity to exert influence on the refusing arbitrator,38 eg by reminding him or her to adhere to his or her duties and threatening to jointly remove him or her from office as arbitrator (cf para 3.172). If no such notice is given or if it is given at too short notice as to allow for influencing the arbitrator, the award is subject to setting aside under s 1059 para 2 no 1 lit d ZPO.39

II.  Resolution by Settlement (s 1053 ZPO)

6.19  Since the parties are the masters of the arbitral proceedings, they can at any time end their dispute including by agreeing on a settlement (paras 6.20 et seq.). While (p. 285) a settlement puts an end to the dispute, it is not an executory title. The parties can, however, request the arbitral tribunal to transform the settlement into an award on agreed terms, which allows for enforcement of the terms of the settlement in the same way as any contested arbitral award (paras 6.34 et seq.). With these stipulations, s 1053 ZPO implements art 30 Model Law, the sole modification being that the tribunal is in principle not at liberty to decline to issue an award on agreed terms (para 6.37). German law also attributes advanced effects to an award on agreed terms (s 1053 paras 3 and 4 ZPO, paras 6.43 et seq.).

1.  Settlement (s 1053 para 1 cl 1 ZPO)

a)  Conclusion of a Settlement

6.20  Section 1053 para 1 cl 1 ZPO merely requires that the parties (para 6.22) settle (para 6.21) the dispute (paras 6.23 et seq.) during the arbitral proceedings (para 6.25).

aa)  Settlement

6.21  A settlement in any event requires a contractual agreement under the law chosen by the parties or otherwise applicable under conflict of law rules.40 Beyond this basic prerequisite, it is disputed whether a settlement always requires mutual concessions as demanded under German substantive law (s 779 para 1 cl 1 BGB)41 or whether one party’s concession suffices.42 The prevailing view apparently is in favor of such requirement. The better view, however, speaks for making a distinction between the procedural requirements for a settlement (as defined in s 1053 ZPO) and the substantive requirements under the law governing the settlement (eg s 779 BGB).43 While s 779 BGB may indeed invalidate settlements to the extent that it applies (para 6.28), there is little reason why the “settlement” under s 1053 para 1 cl 1 ZPO (and, subsequently, the award on agreed terms) should be available only if the parties compromise.44 The wording of s 1053 ZPO is flexible enough to accommodate the practical need to extend the provision to acknowledging claims, and the drafting history of art 30 Model Law, the provision’s blueprint, provides no support for such restriction either.45

bb)  Settlement Between the Parties

6.22  The settlement must be concluded between the parties, ie the parties to the arbitral proceedings, not necessarily the parties to the arbitration agreement.46 As long as at least two parties to the arbitral (p. 286) proceedings are parties to the settlement, additional third parties can also join the settlement.47 Not all parties to the arbitral proceedings need to be involved in the settlement;48 the arbitral proceedings can, however, be terminated only with regard to the parties to the settlement.

cc)  Settlement of the Dispute

6.23  The parties need to settle the dispute. Similar to the involvement of the parties (para 6.22), the settlement needs to encompass at least partially the matter in dispute49 but may also go beyond it.50 The arbitral tribunal can terminate the proceedings only to the extent that the matter in dispute is settled.51 A full settlement of “the dispute” which allows for a termination of the proceedings consists of a substantive law solution plus the procedural law agreement that the arbitral proceedings shall be terminated.52 Without the latter, the tribunal cannot terminate the proceedings as stipulated by s 1053 para 1 cl 1 ZPO (cf s 1056 para 2 no 2 ZPO).53

6.24  The “dispute” to be settled also comprises the allocation of costs. If the parties fail to agree on an allocation of costs, the tribunal must render an (adversarial) arbitral award on costs under the standard of s 1057 ZPO (paras 6.48 et seq.). Section 98 ZPO, according to which in case of a settlement before the state courts the costs shall be deemed to have been cancelled against each other absent any agreement of the parties to the contrary, applies neither directly nor by way of analogy.54 However, this cost allocation may be reached by way of interpretation of the settlement or as a standard for inspiration of the arbitral tribunal when allocating the costs under s 1057 ZPO.

dd)  Settlement During the Arbitral Proceedings

6.25  Section 1053 ZPO furthermore requires the settlement to be reached during arbitral proceedings, ie after the commencement of the proceedings (s 1044 ZPO).55 Some authors extend the scope of the provision to pre- arbitral settlements, arguing with the practical need for transforming a settlement reached within a mediation or elsewhere into an arbitral award.56 However, the constitution of an arbitral tribunal (and the remuneration (p. 287) of its members) will usually not be a viable option for the parties, whether in terms of time or cost, in particular since s 796a ZPO allows for the enforcement of settlements reached between attorneys. Absent a relevant practical need, the scope of s 1053 para 1 cl 1 ZPO should not be extended to pre- arbitral agreements. Section 1053 ZPO applies to settlements reached outside and within the arbitral proceedings, be it with or without the assistance of the arbitral tribunal.57 Such assistance can often be observed in domestic arbitrations seated in Germany since it is a distinct feature of German civil procedural law to actively encourage the parties to settle the case (para 1.28). In particular in international proceedings, however, the arbitral tribunal must carefully avoid giving rise to grounds for a later challenge (para 3.125).

b)  Validity of the Settlement

6.26  Only a valid settlement has legal effects. The validity of the settlement is to be assessed under the law chosen by the parties or otherwise applicable to it under choice of law rules58 with the exception of form requirements if the settlement is transformed into an award on agreed terms (paras 6.43 et seq.).59 Some authors contend that the parties’ freedom to choose the law applicable to the settlement is even extended as under s 1051 ZPO (cf paras 2.183 et seq.).60 At first sight, it is indeed plausible that s 1051 ZPO could be extended by way of analogy from the substantive law governing the merits of the case to the substantive law governing the settlement of the case. While, however, the arbitral tribunal’s decision on the merits is not subject to further review in setting aside proceedings (para 6.187), the validity of the settlement can be reviewed under s 1059 para 2 no 1 lit d ZPO (para 6.32). Extending the scope of s 1051 ZPO would therefore make sense only if the state court were bound by s 1051 ZPO (which is not the case). Section 1051 ZPO applies directly to the parties’ choice of law if any dispute about the validity of the settlement is submitted to an arbitral tribunal.

6.27  No valid settlement can be concluded if the law thus determined does not entitle the parties to conclude such a settlement even if the matter in dispute is nonetheless arbitrable (cf s 1030 para 1 cl 1 ZPO, paras 2.49 et seq.).61 Neither can the requirements under the applicable contract law be ignored nor can the mere fact that arbitral proceedings are pending between the parties extend the parties’ ability to settle a dispute.62

(p. 288) 6.28  If German substantive law governs the settlement, s 779 BGB contains specific grounds for invalidity. The provision requires that the dispute be resolved by way of mutual concession; minor concession is considered sufficient, including on the allocation of costs.63 If the fact situation (or the realization of a claim) that the parties had considered as definite turns out not to comport with reality and if the dispute would not have arisen had the facts been known, then the settlement is invalid under s 779 BGB.

6.29  Settlements before German courts are often concluded with the reservation of a right to revoke within a defined time frame. Such reservation is usually to be interpreted as a condition precedent to the validity of the settlement.64 Only once the time frame has lapsed without revocation does the settlement become valid and can it serve as the basis for an award on agreed terms.65

c)  Legal Effects

6.30  While the settlement reshapes the substantive legal situation, it does not directly terminate the arbitral proceedings. Rather, the arbitral tribunal will terminate the proceedings (s 1053 para 1 cl 1 ZPO) in a separate procedural step, be it by making an award on agreed terms under ss 1053, 1054 ZPO (paras 6.34 et seq.) or, if the procedural prerequisites for an award on agreed terms are not met, by issuing a termination order under s 1056 para 2 no 2 ZPO (para 6.135). Such termination order requires that the parties have agreed on the termination of the proceedings, which will usually be part of the settlement. Even if the settlement is silent on the termination of the proceedings, such agreement can usually be derived by way of (supplementary) interpretation. If exceptionally the parties have made clear that they did not agree on the termination of the proceedings and no other termination ground under s 1056 para 2 ZPO exists, the arbitral tribunal must decide the dispute by way of an (adversarial) award based on the substantive legal situation as it has been reshaped by the settlement.66

d)  Effects of Invalid Settlements

6.31  The arbitral tribunal must examine the validity of the settlement before taking further procedural steps.67 If it turns out to be invalid, the arbitral tribunal cannot terminate the arbitral proceedings. Until the arbitral tribunal has terminated the arbitral proceedings, the parties can urge the invalidity of the settlement before the arbitral tribunal.

(p. 289) 6.32  If the arbitral tribunal has issued an award on agreed terms (paras 6.34 et seq.), the invalidity of the settlement can be asserted only as a ground for setting aside the award. Beyond this (time- limited) remedy, the award is protected by its res judicata effect.68 The setting aside application can be based on the irregularity of the procedure (s 1059 para 2 no 1 lit d ZPO).69 A lack of jurisdiction (s 1059 para 2 no 1 lit c ZPO) can be invoked if the tribunal has ruled on the validity of the settlement principally and the arbitration agreement does not encompass this subject matter. Jurisdiction is not at issue, however, if the validity of the settlement has been tested only as a preliminary question.70 If in their arbitration agreement the parties have empowered the arbitral tribunal to decide on the validity of the settlement, then an award principally doing so has binding effect in setting aside proceedings (s 1055 ZPO).71

6.33  If the arbitral tribunal has issued a termination order under s 1056 para 2 no 2 ZPO (para 6.135), this order serves to terminate the arbitral proceedings (s 1056 para 1 ZPO), including the office of the arbitrators (s 1056 para 3 ZPO), regardless of the validity of the settlement.72 If an incorrect termination does not render the arbitration agreement incapable of being performed under s 1032 para 1 ZPO (para 2.158), the arbitration agreement remains in force in its original scope.73 The legal situation is similar to the arbitration agreement surviving the setting aside of an arbitral award rendered on this basis (s 1059 para 5 ZPO).74 Whether the invalidity of the settlement must be claimed before an arbitral tribunal or a state court depends on whether the arbitration agreement also encompasses the validity of the settlement.75 The original dispute can in any event be brought before a (newly constituted) arbitral tribunal, which will examine the validity of the settlement as a preliminary question.

2.  Award on Agreed Terms

6.34  Elevating the party settlement to an award on agreed terms pursues mainly one aim, namely facilitating enforcement. If a party does not comply with a settlement voluntarily, it must be enforced before the competent state court or arbitral tribunal before it can actually be executed against the debtor. An award on agreed terms has the same effect as any other award (s 1053 para 2 cl 2 ZPO) and can be enforced similarly, including abroad under the New York Convention (para 6.302). International enforcement was decisive for the legislature’s decision to replace the former “arbitral settlement,” a discrete executory title that was not (p. 290) recognized internationally, by the award on agreed terms.76 It is generally advisable for the parties to request an award on agreed terms and appropriate for the arbitral tribunal to suggest such requests.

a)  Procedure for Issuing an Award on Agreed Terms (s 1053 para 1 cl 2 ZPO)

6.35  The award on agreed terms is issued by the arbitral tribunal upon a request by the parties (paras 6.36 et seq.). If the tribunal considers that the settlement is valid (paras 6.31 et seq.)77 and complies with German public policy (para 6.38), the arbitral tribunal issues the award on agreed terms without further scrutiny.

aa)  Request by the Parties

6.36  An award on agreed terms can be issued only if both parties so request, although not necessarily jointly.78 The request will often already be included in the settlement.79 All parties to the settlement need to request that the (full) settlement be recorded as an award on agreed terms.80 If only some of these parties file the request, then the award on agreed terms must be limited to the requesting parties. Once filed, the request cannot be withdrawn unilaterally.81

6.37  An award on agreed terms can be issued only between at least two parties to the arbitration. While third parties can readily become party to the settlement agreement (para 6.22), they cannot be included in an award unless they have previously acceded to the arbitration agreement and become party to the arbitration.82 The third party’s joinder and its accession to the arbitration agreement is impliedly contained in the request to render an award on agreed terms.83 Each request to issue an award on agreed terms similarly includes the submission to the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal of any additional matter not encompassed by the arbitration agreement.84

(p. 291) bb)  No Public Policy Violation

6.38  Under art 30 para 1 Model Law, the settlement is recorded as an arbitral award if not objected to by the arbitral tribunal. The German legislature found this requirement too broad and too unspecific.85 It was thus replaced by the requirement that the contents are not in violation of public policy (s 1053 para 1 cl 2 ZPO). The standard for (domestic) public policy is the same as under s 1059 para 2 no 2 lit b ZPO (paras 6.225 et seq.).86

b)  Form and Content of an Award on Agreed Terms (s 1053 para 2 cl 1 ZPO)

6.39  Form and content of the award on agreed terms follow the same general rules that govern form and content of any other award (s 1053 para 2 cl 1 ZPO). It is in particular to be signed by the arbitrators (s 1054 para 1 ZPO). Additional signatures by the parties do not invalidate the award on agreed terms but may question the arbitral tribunal’s intention to issue an award.87

6.40  Two exceptions to the rule exist: first, the award on agreed terms must state that it is an award (s 1053 para 2 cl 1 ZPO). This serves to avoid confusion with a protocol taken by the arbitral tribunal.88 Second, the award on agreed terms does not need to give reasons upon which it is based (s 1054 para 2 ZPO) and in fact cannot, since the tribunal did not make the decision but merely transformed the parties’ decision. For this reason, it is advisable to state in the award that it is an award on agreed terms although such declaration is not legally required.89

c)  Effects of an Award on Agreed Terms

aa)  Same Effect as any Other Award (s 1053 para 2 cl 2 ZPO)

6.41  The award on agreed terms has the same effect as any other award on the merits of the case (s 1053 para 2 cl 2 ZPO), ie the same effect as a final and binding court judgment (s 1055 ZPO, paras 6.108 et seq.). Like any other award, the award on agreed terms can be enforced in Germany after it has been declared enforceable (s 1060 ZPO).90 For recognition and enforceability abroad, the award on agreed terms constitutes an award under the New York Convention as under most other enforcement regimes.91

6.42  Like any other award, the award on agreed terms is subject to setting aside proceedings under s 1059 ZPO.92 The content of the award, however, is not the result (p. 292) of legal proceedings before the arbitral tribunal, but rather traces back directly to the parties. Procedural deficiencies during the arbitral proceedings before the settlement, including the constitution of the arbitral tribunal, will therefore usually not affect the award.93 The arbitral tribunal likewise cannot interpret the award on agreed terms (s 1058 para 1 no 2 ZPO), since it did not make (but rather only issue) the decision.94

bb)  Substitution of Form Requirements (s 1053 para 3 ZPO)

6.43  If a settlement in state court proceedings is recorded in the court record, this recording substitutes for notarial certification (s 127a BGB) which German substantive law requires for a number of contracts, including on the transfer of real estate (s 311b para 1 BGB) and of shares in a limited liability company (s 15 para 4 GmbHG). Section 1053 para 3 ZPO extends this effect to awards on agreed terms.95 However, the prevailing view— in light of s 1055 ZPO: unconvincingly— requires the award on agreed terms to be declared enforceable (s 1060 ZPO) before the land registry (Grundbuchamt) registers a transfer of title (para 6.256).

6.44  Section 1053 para 3 ZPO does not apply to sham awards on agreed terms. Such “awards” stem from arbitral proceedings which were initiated for the sole purpose of saving notarization costs.96 While case law has thus far been called upon to address only clear- cut cases, the borderline between “real” and “sham” arbitrations will often be somewhat blurred.

d)  Declaration of Enforceability (s 1053 para 4 ZPO)

6.45  Since an award on agreed terms is tantamount to an adversarial award (s 1053 para 2 cl 2 ZPO, paras 6.41 et seq.), it can be declared enforceable by the higher regional court like any other award (s 1060 ZPO). Moreover, in light of the consensual content of the award on agreed terms,97 the parties can agree to have the award on agreed terms declared enforceable by a public notary. The notary’s declaration as enforceable serves as an executory title98 for which lower fees are due than for proceedings for a declaration of enforceability before the higher regional courts.99 As opposed to the state court which performs a full review of the award on agreed terms pursuant to all six grounds under s 1060 para 2 cl 1, s 1059 para 2 ZPO, the notary’s review is restricted to violations of public policy (s 1053 para 4 cl 2, para 1 cl 2 ZPO). The notary’s declaration of enforceability in turn does (p. 293) not preclude grounds for setting aside the award; s 1059 para 3 cl 4 ZPO does not apply.100

C.  Rules Applicable to the Arbitral Tribunal’s Decision on the Merits and on Costs

6.46  If the arbitral tribunal is to decide the dispute, it will first determine its jurisdiction over the dispute. To the extent that the arbitral tribunal lacks jurisdiction (paras 2.3 et seq.), it cannot decide on the merits and will dismiss the claim. Only if the arbitral tribunal finds that it has jurisdiction will it decide the dispute under the applicable rules (para 6.47) and render an award on the merits, either granting or dismissing the claim. If the parties settle the case, the arbitral tribunal’s decisions are replaced by the parties’ agreement; the arbitral tribunal’s tasks are then significantly reduced (paras 6.19 et seq.).

I.  Decision on Substance (s 1051 ZPO)

6.47  The arbitral tribunal will decide the dispute on the merits by applying the rules of law that the parties have chosen (s 1051 para 1 cl 1 ZPO). By submitting to arbitration, the parties broaden their freedom to choose the applicable law as compared to dispute resolution before German state courts. This includes the right to agree on rules of law other than national laws (s 1051 para 1 cl 1 ZPO), the right to agree on an ex aequo et bono decision under s 1051 para 3 ZPO, and the extended freedom from substantive law limits. If the parties have not elected a substantive law, the arbitral tribunal applies the law of the state with which the subject matter of the proceedings is most closely connected (s 1051 para 2 ZPO). For details on the legal rules which the arbitral tribunal shall apply to the merits of the dispute, see paras 2.183 et seq.

II.  Decision on Costs (s 1057 ZPO)

1.  General Overview

6.48  While it may at first sight seem uneventful, the decision on costs often belongs to the more challenging tasks of an arbitral tribunal. Remarkably, a provision addressing the decision on costs is one of the few additions that the German legislature made to the Model Law, inasmuch as costs are of importance at the termination of (p. 294) any arbitral proceedings and the parties frequently do not enter into cost- related stipulations.101

a)  Procedure on Costs in State Court Proceedings

6.49  Since the particularities of cost procedures in German arbitration are easier to understand when contrasted with the cost procedures in German state court arbitration, a short overview over the former will be given as background information.

6.50  In German state court proceedings, two cost decisions are to be taken: the first one allocates the costs between the parties and is taken by the court as part of the judgment. Although the court allocates the costs sua sponte (s 308 para 2 ZPO), parties usually request a cost decision in their favor. Pursuant to the general rule of s 91 para 1 cl 1 ZPO, the party that has not prevailed in the dispute is to bear the costs of the legal dispute. This general rule is supplemented by rules for specific procedural settings including costs for unsuccessful appellate remedies (s 97 ZPO), costs for withdrawn claims (s 269 para 3 cl 2 and 3 ZPO), and costs incurred as a result of default by a party (s 344 ZPO). The decision on cost allocation rendered by the court does not determine any amounts, but rather indicates which party has to bear the costs fully or in which portion.

6.51  The amounts to be borne by a party are determined in a second step. The party that is entitled under the court’s cost allocation decision must apply to the court registrar (Rechtspfleger) and request fixing of the amounts due based on the court’s cost allocation (ss 103 et seq. ZPO). The registrar will fix only such costs as the party is entitled to receive under s 91 ZPO, in particular costs that were necessitated to appropriately bring or defend against the court action. Lawyer’s fees are to be refunded only up to the amounts of the statutory lawyer’s fees (s 91 para 2 cl 1 ZPO, see also para 3.178). Lawyer’s fees as well as court fees depend on the amount in dispute, which is to be determined by court order.

b)  Procedure on Costs in Arbitral Proceedings

6.52  The provision on costs in arbitral proceedings, s 1057 ZPO, takes up on the distinction between allocation of costs and fixing the amount of costs. For both steps, however, the arbitral tribunal is in charge since arbitral tribunals do not have registrars for fixing the costs and the state court registrars are not competent to determine costs based on arbitral awards.102

6.53  In the first step, the arbitral tribunal will allocate the costs between the parties to the arbitration. Unlike a German state court, the arbitral tribunal enjoys broad discretion as to the criteria for cost allocation (paras 6.60 et seq.).

(p. 295) 6.54  The second step again consists of fixing the amount of costs to be awarded. The arbitral tribunal can indeed issue a separate cost award for this purpose. If it does so, it can restrict the main award to the allocation of costs and then collect the relevant figures only after the main award has been issued. The procedurally more efficient and more often chosen route, however, is to request the parties’ cost submissions towards the end of the proceedings.103 This route, which is mandatory in ICC proceedings (art 37 para 4 ICC Rules), allows the arbitral tribunal to render one final award which already includes the complete cost decision. Regardless of which route the arbitral tribunal chooses, it has equally broad discretion to determine the amount of costs to be borne by each party (para 6.68).

c)  Jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal

6.55  The arbitral tribunal has jurisdiction to decide on costs unless the parties have excluded this jurisdiction fully or in part. This follows from the explicit wording of s 1057 para 1 cl 1 ZPO, which is referenced by the provision’s second paragraph (“also”). While it is rare in practice for parties to exclude the tribunal’s jurisdiction to allocate costs, certain institutional rules such as the ICC Rules entrust the institution with fixing at least some kinds of costs, in particular the arbitrator’s fees and expenses. To the extent that the arbitral tribunal has jurisdiction to rule on costs, it will decide sua sponte, ie even if the parties have not requested a cost decision.104

6.56  A specific issue arises in the event the arbitral tribunal declines its jurisdiction due to the lack of a valid arbitration agreement encompassing the dispute. In that case, the parties have not validly empowered the arbitral tribunal to issue binding decisions on them. This would generally also include decisions on costs;105 under that approach, the parties would need to bring claims for cost recovery under substantive law before the state courts.106 The prevailing view under German law, however, assumes a residual jurisdiction stemming from the (invalid or otherwise insufficient) arbitration agreement.107

d)  Relevant Relationship for Cost Decisions

6.57  It is important to identify which exact relationship is encompassed by the arbitral tribunal’s cost decision.108 The arbitration agreement as the source of the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction empowers it to make rulings only with effect between the parties to the arbitration (s 1055 ZPO). Therefore, the sole contents of the cost decision are how the costs (p. 296) are allocated between the parties and which amount shall be borne by each party, again only with regard to the other party.

6.58  It follows from the cost decision’s confinement to the relationship between the parties that the cost decision cannot and does not govern the relationship between the parties and third persons including the arbitrators, the arbitral institution, the parties’ lawyers, experts, witnesses, translators, court reporters, and others.109

6.59  If the cost decision, for example, fixes a certain amount as an arbitrator’s fees, it only obliges one party vis- à- vis the other either to pay its share of the arbitrator’s fees to the arbitrator or to refund such payments as were already made by the other party.110 Such cost decision does not have any legal effect on the relationship between the parties and the arbitrator.111 Neither does it entitle the arbitrator vis- à- vis the parties nor provide for an executory title for the arbitrator’s fee claim.112 It does not even fix the amount due to the arbitrator with binding effect for the arbitrator (para 6.72). Any dispute arising between the parties and the arbitrator regarding his or her fees must be settled before the competent state court (unless the arbitrator agreement exceptionally provides for an arbitration agreement itself).113 In these proceedings, the state court is not bound by the cost decision contained in the arbitral award.

2.  Allocation of Costs

a)  Standard for Allocation

6.60  The arbitral tribunal allocates the costs of the arbitration as between the parties (s 1057 para 1 cl 1 ZPO). It enjoys broad discretion as to the standard under which the allocation shall be made (s 1057 para 1 cl 2 ZPO). The law does not provide for a specific standard under which the allocation is to be made, but instead merely stipulates that the circumstances of the case, in particular the outcome of the proceedings, shall be taken into consideration. This solution provides for the necessary flexibility.114 At the same time, it expresses the expectation that the principle of “cost follows the event,” with its statutory modifications as defined in ss 91 et seq. ZPO, will in most cases be followed.115 German arbitration practice indeed puts specific weight on this (p. 297) principle, in particular in domestic cases.116 Arbitral tribunals seated in Germany likewise often apply the cost rules for specific procedural settings in state court proceedings (para 6.50) by way of analogy.117

6.61  It is less common but still within the arbitral tribunal’s discretion to apply a totally different standard for the allocation of costs,118 including the so- called American Rule whereby each party bears its own costs regardless of the outcome of the case.119

6.62  More often, arbitral tribunals seated in Germany will modify the “cost follows the event” rule rather than fully replace it.120 Criteria for such modifications include the legal and factual decisiveness of the decision121 and in particular the conduct of the parties during the arbitral proceedings (cf art 37 para 5 ICC Rules).122 Although some tribunals are still reluctant to impose cost sanctions for dilatory or even so- called guerrilla tactics, it is recommended123 and has proven effective to use the allocation of costs to encourage efficient conduct of the proceedings. In doing so, the arbitral tribunal can take into account failure or delay to pay advances on costs, abusive requests for or responses to requests for evidence, excessive submissions or exhibits, excessive document requests, or failure to comply with procedural orders.124

6.63  The arbitral tribunal’s discretion is limited by party agreements on a cost allocation standard.125 The parties can in particular bind the arbitral tribunal to apply the cost allocation rules for state court proceedings (ss 91 et seq. ZPO).126 Such party agreements are not rare in domestic proceedings. They have the advantage that from the outset the parties can better assess the cost risks associated with an arbitration.127 However, the price paid for such foreseeability is the lack of flexibility when it comes to finding a suitable cost allocation for a specific case.

b)  Form of Decision and Remedies

6.64  The arbitral tribunal decides on the cost allocation by means of an arbitral award (s 1057 para 1 cl 1 ZPO), be it a final (p. 298) award or a separate cost award (cf s 1057 para 2 cl 2 ZPO). A cost award must fully comply with the formal requirements of s 1054 ZPO (paras 6.91 et seq.) and is subject to setting aside and declarations of enforceability.128

6.65  The main award and the cost decision are closely connected. If the cost decision is set aside (with or without the main arbitral award) and the case is not remitted to the arbitral tribunal under s 1059 para 4 ZPO (para 6.244), the parties can rely only on a substantive law cost recovery claim which they must bring either before the arbitral tribunal or the state court (s 1059 para 5 ZPO, para 6.243).129

6.66  If only the main award is set aside, the prevailing view assumes that the cost decision shares this fate, regardless of whether the main award is set aside fully or in part and of whether the cost decision was rendered as a separate cost award.130 In fact, main award and cost decision are interrelated. An award can therefore be set aside in part only if the defective part is separable from the remaining award. The main decision and cost decision are also not separable irrespective of whether the cost decision is part of the main award or has been issued as a separate cost award. An application for setting aside must therefore refer to both the main award and the cost decision (in the same award or in a separate cost award). By way of interpretation, an application to set aside a main award is to be extended to encompass its cost decision including in a separate cost award. If, however, only the main award has been set aside, the prevailing view may be supported by the parallel legal situation before German state courts, in which the order fixing the costs becomes baseless once the cost allocation decision is quashed or amended.131

3.  Amount of Costs

a)  Fixed Costs

6.67  The decision on which amounts are to be borne by each party can be made only for such amounts as are “fixed.” Costs are fixed if the arbitral tribunal knows the amount in which they were incurred.132 The arbitral tribunal cannot itself fix the amount in which costs were incurred since this would be beyond its jurisdiction (paras 6.57 et seq.). It needs to await cost submissions from the parties (para 6.54) if the costs are not its own or otherwise already known.

b)  Standard for Decision on the Amount to be Borne

6.68  The arbitral tribunal has broad discretion to determine in which amount costs are to be borne by a (p. 299) party. The law does not restrict this discretion— with one exception: the costs incurred by the parties are compensable only to the extent that they were necessary for the proper pursuit of their claim or defense (s 1057 para 1 cl 1 ZPO). Costs incurred by the parties include costs for legal representation and expenses of the parties (paras 6.79 et seq.). As the case may be, costs for taking evidence (paras 6.77 et seq.) may also be incurred by the parties. The determination of which party costs are necessary in a given case is again in the hands of the arbitral tribunal. As a general rule, costs which are refundable under the (rather strict) rules for state court proceedings will not be unnecessary in arbitral proceedings.133 The arbitral tribunal is at liberty to acknowledge higher costs, in particular for legal representation (para 6.80). Costs which are not incurred by a party and the reimbursement of which is not limited by necessity include arbitrators’ fees and expenses (paras 6.71 et seq.), fees of the arbitral institution (para 6.74), and court fees (paras 6.75 et seq.).

6.69  The arbitral tribunal’s discretion also allows it to take into account the broader picture, in particular to compare the amounts spent by the parties overall and for specific cost items such as lawyer’s fees or experts. If both parties have spent high amounts, the arbitral tribunal may more easily regard these costs as compensable than in the case that one party has limited its expenses to a more reasonable amount.134 Conversely, there may be valid reasons why one side has spent significantly more money on the pursuit of its case than the other, eg where there are multiple parties on one side, necessary translations, or one side had significantly more work in making its case for reasons of sustaining its burden of proof.

6.70  The rules on compensable costs are subject to deviating party agreements. The parties can tie the arbitral tribunal’s decision to the statutory rules for state court proceedings (even though this will often not be advisable), can— either directly or, more commonly, by reference to institutional rules (eg the ICC Note on Personal and Arbitral Tribunal Expenses or the DIS Guidelines for the Reimbursement of Arbitrators Expenses)— define a standard at least for some types of costs like travel and accommodation costs, or can include or exclude specific cost items from refund.135 The parties can even agree to exclude refunding of costs entirely.136 Finally, in particular institutional rules commonly bind the arbitral tribunal to an amount determined as refundable at least for some cost items, for example the fees and expenses of the arbitrators and the ICC administrative expenses under art 37 para 1 ICC Rules.

(p. 300) c)  Individual Types of Costs

aa)  Arbitrators’ Fees and Expenses

6.71  The amount of the arbitrators’ fees results from the fee arrangement in the arbitrator contract (para 3.177). Besides some other fee schemes, the most common calculation methods for arbitrators’ fees depend on the amount in dispute which, in turn, is to be determined by the arbitral tribunal. Institutional rules like the ICC Rules or the DIS Rules also follow this approach.

6.72  Since the cost decision does not go beyond the relationship between the parties (paras 6.57 et seq.), the amount of the arbitrators’ fee claim remains unaffected by their cost decision.137 The arbitral tribunal’s determination of the amount in dispute serves as a specification of the performance under the arbitrator contract by one of the parties to that contract.138 Such specification is to be made at the reasonably exercised discretion of the arbitral tribunal (s 315 para 1 BGB).139 If the determination is not equitable, the parties to the arbitration can apply to the state courts to revise the specification (s 315 para 3 BGB).140 The cost decision in the award is binding (only) between the parties to the arbitration (s 1055 ZPO). Each party can, however, have a cost decision in an award set aside under s 1059 para 2 no 1 lit d ZPO if it is based on a non- equitable amount in dispute.141 Such non- equitable determination is not binding on the parties to the arbitration (s 315 para 3 cl 1 BGB) so that the amount of the arbitrators’ fees is not yet fixed as required by s 1057 para 2 cl 1 ZPO.

6.73  The Federal Supreme Court’s earlier case law had mistakenly invoked the notion that nobody shall judge on one’s own behalf and that an arbitral tribunal that determines the amount in dispute and includes its fees calculated on that basis in the cost decision in its award violates public policy.142 According to the court, the only exception was if the arbitrators’ fees thus established were fully covered by advances on costs already.143 While it is true that the arbitral tribunal would indeed violate public policy if it ruled on its own fee claim in its arbitral award,144 it in fact does not do so (para 6.72). In a landmark decision of 2012, the Federal Supreme Court has rightfully given up this restriction.145

(p. 301) bb)  Fees of the Arbitral Institution

6.74  Arbitral institutions charge fees for their services, in particular for administering the case under the institution’s rules. The fee schedules of the institutions usually determine the fees as a certain fraction of the amount in dispute. These fees form part of the reimbursable costs.146

cc)  Court Fees

6.75  Court fees form part of the costs of the arbitration if the court’s cost decision did not result from contentious proceedings that on the merits resolved a dispute.147 This is in particular the case if the court proceedings merely supported the arbitral proceedings, as it is particularly evident for judicial assistance proceedings under s 1050 ZPO (paras 4.200 et seq.): it cannot make a difference whether for example the taking of evidence was accomplished in arbitral proceedings or instead outsourced to a state court.148 Fees for a court decision under s 1032 para 2 ZPO, on the other hand, result from a self- contained dispute in which both parties take opposing positions.149 No need exists to correct the cost allocation of these contentious proceedings by adding their costs to the costs of the arbitration. The fees for a court appointment of an arbitrator under s 1035 paras 3 or 4 ZPO will be costs of the arbitration at least if the appointment was not due to a party’s failure: if the party- appointed arbitrators cannot agree on a chairman, his or her appointment by the court does not resolve a dispute between the parties. Moreover, it is random which party files the court application and thus “wins” the court appointment procedure.

6.76  Costs stemming from court proceedings in a matter that is encompassed by the arbitration agreement are not costs of the arbitration and can therefore not be included in the cost decision under s 1057 ZPO even if the court, like US courts under the American Rule, does not order reimbursement of costs.150 Bringing such claim may, however, be a violation of the arbitration agreement and give rise to a substantive law claim for damages. Such a claim for damages needs to be brought in the arbitration as a main claim, not only in the cost submission.

dd)  Costs for Taking Evidence

6.77  The costs for taking evidence belong to the costs of the arbitration, which may be incurred by the parties or may pertain to the general costs of the arbitration. If they belong to the general costs of the arbitration, the costs for taking of evidence are fully recoverable subject to the arbitral tribunal’s cost decision (para 6.68). These costs include any costs that were triggered by the (p. 302) arbitral tribunal, eg costs for hearing venues, court reporters, tribunal- appointed experts, reimbursement of witness expenses promised by the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral tribunal’s travel expenses for taking evidence.151 The costs for tribunal- appointed experts form part of the general costs of the arbitration irrespective of whether the expert contract was concluded with members of the arbitral tribunal or with the parties to the arbitration.

6.78  Costs for taking evidence that were incurred by the parties are recoverable only to the extent that they were necessary (para 6.68). These costs include the fees and expenses for party- appointed experts (cf s 1049 para 2 cl 2 ZPO) as well as fees and expenses for witnesses. The latter may be promised and paid by a party if their amount stays within reasonable limits and the witness is not contractually committed to a specific testimony.152

ee)  Costs for Legal Representation

6.79  As party- incurred expenses, the costs for legal representation can be recovered by the parties only to the extent that they were “necessary for the proper pursuit of their claim or defense” (para 6.68). This phrase is inspired by s 91 para 1 cl 1 ZPO, which applies to state court proceedings and restricts the reimbursable lawyer’s fees and expenses to the statutory fees and expenses as set out in the German Law on the Remuneration of Attorneys (s 91 para 2 cl 1 ZPO). It is therefore not unusual for arbitral tribunals to adopt this standard for their cost decision and it is indeed common that an arbitral tribunal will align its cost decision with ss 91 et seq. ZPO, in particular in domestic or smaller proceedings.153

6.80  However, for larger disputes commonly lawyers are engaged on the basis of hourly rates or other fee arrangements. Moreover, the German Law on the Remuneration of Attorneys does from the outset not apply to lawyers from foreign jurisdictions who frequently act in international arbitrations. In recognizing these facts, it is accepted that arbitral tribunals do not exceed their discretion when they include lawyer’s fees beyond the statutory standard in their cost decision.154

6.81  Costs for inhouse counsel replacing or complementing external counsel are not refundable in German state court proceedings.155 Again, the arbitral tribunal’s discretion covers both consideration and non- consideration of such costs.156 An (p. 303) argument in favor of a deviation from the rules in state court proceedings is that inhouse counsel may well assume parts of the work that otherwise would have to be done by outside counsel. In particular if one party has significantly involved inhouse counsel while the other party has not, the cost decision may otherwise become imbalanced.157 It may, however, be difficult or undesirable to calculate and disclose the inhouse counsel’s salary that is to be allotted to the arbitral proceedings.158

6.82  The arbitral tribunal may also include the costs for a party’s employees who are not lawyers, again deviating from the practice of German state courts. Again, well- prepared documents and other facts can significantly reduce the workload (and fees) of outside counsel and thus contribute to cost- efficient proceedings.159

ff)  Other Expenses of the Parties

6.83  The arbitral tribunal can include other necessary (para 6.68) expenses of the parties in its cost decision, inter alia travel and accommodation costs, postal and courier fees, costs for copies and telecommunication.160 In order not to jeopardize an otherwise good impression that a party may have made on the tribunal, parties and their counsel are well advised to refrain from including excessive costs in their cost submission.

gg)  Interest on Costs

6.84  German state courts may award interest on costs based either on a substantive or procedural basis. Substantive law claims may be based on s 291 BGB, which grants interest on payment claims as of their pendency in the amount of five percentage points above base rate. Procedurally, s 104 para 1 cl 2 ZPO allows for interest in the same amount from the filing of a request to that effect or the pronouncement of the judgment, whichever is later. A claim based on s 291 BGB can be awarded by the arbitral tribunal if German substantive law applies (s 1051 ZPO) and the prevailing party has so requested.161 Whether s 104 para 1 cl 2 ZPO applies by way of analogy under German arbitration law is a matter of dispute.162

d)  Form of Decision and Remedies

6.85  The arbitral tribunal determines the amount of costs that are to be reimbursed by one party to the other by means of an award, be it in the main award or a subsequent cost award. Procedural efficiency calls for only one award, but if costs can be fixed only later, then a separate cost award is necessary (s 1057 para 2 cl 2 ZPO). The cost award must meet the (p. 304) formal requirements of s 1054 ZPO and is subject to the same remedies as any other award (para 6.64). For specific issues resulting from the close connection between the main award and the cost decision, see paras 6.65 et seq.

D.  Making of the Arbitral Award

6.86  The formal requirements for making an award under s 1054 ZPO are manageable, in particular if compared to the strict rules that govern the making of a judgment under German civil procedural rules. With the lowering of the formal requirements, the German legislature intended to meet the practical needs of international arbitration.163 Not even all of the few formal requirements affect the arbitral award if violated: while some requirements are essential for the notion of an award with its res judicata and other effects (para 6.92), the violation of others results in a ground for setting aside only (para 6.99) or does not have any effect on the award (para 6.101).

I.  Scope of Applicability: Notion of an Arbitral Award

6.87  The formal rules of s 1054 ZPO apply only to awards, not to other decisions of the arbitral tribunal like procedural orders. While no abstract definition exists for what an arbitral award is, it is understood from its legal effect (s 1055 ZPO, paras 6.112 et seq.) that arbitral awards are characterized by an element of finality.164 Arbitral awards therefore include awards on agreed terms (s 1053 para 2 cl 1 ZPO; paras 6.34 et seq.), separate cost awards (s 1057 para 2 cl 2 ZPO),165 partial awards deciding a part of the dispute in a final manner, for instance one of several requests,166 partial awards ordering reimbursement of the other party’s cost advances that have been voluntarily paid,167 and interim awards containing a final decision for a fixed term (para 5.88). Section 1054 ZPO does not apply to preliminary rulings under s 1040 para 3 ZPO (para 4.102)168 or to interim measures under s 1041 ZPO (para 5.89). If the arbitral tribunal finds that it does not have jurisdiction, the prevailing view allows the tribunal to decide by means of an arbitral award although the parties did not empower the tribunal (para 6.56).169

(p. 305) 6.88  The most difficult area is that of interlocutory decisions including interlocutory awards (Zwischenschiedssprüche), ie decisions on individual issues in dispute that are preliminary to the parties’ requests like jurisdiction and liability.170 Such interlocutory decisions may have res judicata effect under s 1055 ZPO (paras 6.112 et seq.) and may be set aside and enforced, they may bind only the arbitral tribunal for the subsequent proceedings or they may not even have such a binding effect. Compliance with s 1054 ZPO is required only in the first case, ie if the award has the effects under s 1055 ZPO.171 While some authors also apply s 1054 ZPO to interlocutory decisions binding the arbitral tribunal,172 this view unnecessarily needs to postulate different notions of an award for its form (s 1054 ZPO) and effects (s 1055 ZPO). Interlocutory decisions which do not qualify as awards therefore do not need to comply with s 1054 ZPO (or with other form requirements) regardless of whether they bind the arbitral tribunal.173

6.89  Interlocutory decisions are awards if the parties have empowered the arbitral tribunal to decide the interlocutory question only while the remaining dispute is to be decided by the state courts.174 This is because in such cases the arbitral tribunal’s decision must also be final and binding for the state court. Since the parties can choose another forum for the remaining part of the dispute, they can also agree that the arbitral tribunal may issue an interlocutory award if the arbitral tribunal has jurisdiction to decide the entire dispute.175 In other cases, the arbitral tribunal cannot issue an interlocutory award.176 Whether such decision of an interlocutory question is binding for the arbitral tribunal depends on the arbitral tribunal’s will as it becomes evident from its decision.177 If the arbitral tribunal (incorrectly) labels its decision as an (interlocutory) award, this indicates its will to be bound by it.178

6.90  Awards under the reservation that the arbitral tribunal is still to decide on a set- off defense (paras 2.134 et seq.) are not deemed to be awards under s 1054 ZPO179 while they are classified as awards if a state court is to decide on such defense.180 If (p. 306) the arbitration agreement stipulates that the parties can appeal against the award to a supreme arbitral tribunal, the first arbitral tribunal’s decision is an arbitral award only if the appeal was not filed or if it was dismissed by the supreme arbitral tribunal.181

II.  Form and Content of the Arbitral Award (s 1054 paras 1 to 3 ZPO)

1.  Typical Elements of an Arbitral Award

6.91  An arbitral award will typically consist of a cover page also identifying the parties to the arbitration and the arbitral tribunal, a table of contents, a table of abbreviations, the procedural history, the facts of the case and the parties’ requests, the arbitral tribunal’s legal reasoning, the dispositive part, and the signatures of the arbitrators. The exact composition of the arbitral award and its elements is subject to the arbitrators’ background; in particular in domestic proceedings it is not rare that an arbitral award’s structure closely mirrors that of a German state court judgment. This diversity, however, does no harm, as only few elements are legally required under s 1054 ZPO.182 For successful enforcement, however, the court will need to identify two elements that are not mandatory under this provision, namely the parties to the arbitration183 and the dispositive part.184 For DIS arbitrations, s 34.2 DIS Rules is more demanding as it requires full identification of the parties to the arbitral proceedings and their legal representatives and the names of the arbitrators who have rendered the award. The award is to be made in the language determined under s 1045 ZPO.185

2.  Form (s 1054 para 1 ZPO)

6.92  The arbitral award needs to be made in writing and to contain the arbitrators’ signatures (s 1054 para 1 ZPO). As long as these form requirements are not complied with, the award is legally not in existence, does not have res judicata effect (s 1055 ZPO), does not terminate the arbitral proceedings (s 1056 para 1 ZPO), and cannot be set aside (s 1059 ZPO) or declared enforceable (s 1060 ZPO).186 As can be concluded from s 1054 para 2 ZPO, all of the requirements under s 1054 para 1 ZPO are not susceptible to a party agreement to the contrary.187

a)  Written Form

6.93  Written form in practice means physical production of a paper document although legally written form can be substituted by electronic (p. 307) form for which a qualified electronic signature under the German Signature Act is needed (s 126 para 3, s 126a BGB).188 Pronouncing the award orally is in any event insufficient.189

b)  Signatures

6.94  The arbitrators must sign the arbitral award (s 1054 para 1 cl 1 ZPO). Any signature needs to be made by the arbitrator in person and can, like most duties of an arbitrator (para 3.173), not be delegated to a proxy.190 All arbitrators need to sign one and the same document, and be it on different pages.191 The arbitrators can provide a blank signature192 and agreed amendments can be made to the award after signature.193 Often, after the arbitrators have agreed on the award, only the signature pages will be circulated and signed while the chairman finally assembles the full copies of the award.

6.95  However, the majority of signatures suffices if an award states the reason for the omitted signature (s 1054 para 1 cl 2 ZPO). Different from the parallel provision for deliberations (s 1052 para 2 ZPO), s 1054 ZPO does not require refusal (or even obstruction) on the side of the arbitrator194 even though this was the primary motive for the provision.195 In fact, indicating the reason why signatures have been omitted merely allows for distinguishing between drafts which are not yet fully signed and final awards.196 Even an incorrect reason stated in the award does not affect its validity.197 It is, however, good practice to have the award signed by all arbitrators whenever possible.198 The majority of signatures is sufficient regardless of the number of missing signatures199 and regardless of whether the chairman has signed the award.200

6.96  The prevailing view allows the arbitrators to re- enter into the deliberations until the award is signed by all arbitrators if a majority of them decides to do so.201 Once (p. 308) the award has been signed by all arbitrators, amendments to the award can be made only by unanimous decision.202 If the award has been delivered to at least one party (paras 6.105 et seq.), the arbitrators can no longer amend their decision.203

3.  Reasons (s 1054 para 2 ZPO)

6.97  The award must state the reasons upon which it is based (s 1054 para 2 ZPO). These reasons do not need to meet a high standard;204 in particular they do not need to be correct in a way that they legally justify the arbitral tribunal’s decision.205 Such high standard would not take into account the fact that the parties have entrusted solely the arbitral tribunal with the decision of the dispute. The reasons must, however, not be contradictory and need to comment at least along general lines on the principal points of the parties’ arguments.206 Although they should sensibly do so, the reasons do not need to demonstrate that the arbitral tribunal has fully granted both parties the right to present their case.207

6.98  The reasons are dispensable if either the award is an award on agreed terms (s 1053 ZPO, paras 6.34 et seq.) or if the parties have waived this requirement (s 1054 para 2 ZPO). Given the weight of the award’s reasons for its acceptance, such waiver should not be assumed lightly. An agreed waiver of remedies against the award does not suffice for that purpose.208

6.99  If under these rules reasons are necessary but fail to meet the required standard, this does not deprive the decision of its qualification as an arbitral award. The prevailing view acknowledges a ground for setting aside under s 1059 para 2 no 1 lit d ZPO209 although this ground requires a causal link between the procedural deficiency and the outcome of the proceedings, and such link will hardly ever exist in case of insufficient reasons. Classification as a ground for setting aside and an (p. 309) extension of s 1059 para 2 no 1 lit d ZPO are, however, the lesser evil compared to no sanction at all.210

4.  Date and Place of Arbitration (s 1054 para 3 ZPO)

6.100  The date of the award and the place of arbitration (s 1043 para 1 ZPO, paras 2.174 et seq.) must be stated in the arbitral award (s 1054 para 3 cl 1 ZPO). Section 1054 para 3 cl 2 ZPO stipulates a fiction against which no counter- evidence can be brought:211 the award is deemed to have been made at that date and at that place. The place of arbitration is decisive for the arbitral award’s nationality and the jurisdiction of the higher regional court under s 1062 para 1 ZPO (paras 6.174 et seq.). By contrast, the date of the award— to which the fiction was extended without a template in the Model Law212— has no legal relevance since the deadline for the setting aside application under s 1059 para 3 ZPO starts with receipt of the arbitral award and not with its making.213

6.101  At first sight, s 1054 para 3 ZPO reads as if the indication of date and place of arbitration, which are both mandatory requirements, were an integral part of the arbitral award. However, the failure to indicate the place of arbitration was not understood to be sanctioned under the German arbitration law in force before 1998 and the reform explicitly aimed at alleviating (rather than tightening) the form requirements for arbitral awards.214 Omission of date or place of arbitration therefore results neither in a non- award nor in a ground for setting aside the award.215

III.  Dissenting Opinions

6.102  It is a matter of dispute under German law whether issuance of dissenting opinions is reconcilable with the secrecy of deliberations (para 6.12). The German legislature refrained from implementing a provision on dissenting opinions and indicated that the prevailing view under former German law allowed dissenting opinions.216 (p. 310) Regardless of their general admissibility, it is recognized that dissenting opinions should be avoided whenever possible and that implementation of dissenting views in the reasons of the award is preferable, not least for the sake of an increased acceptance of the award by the parties.217

6.103  If dissenting opinions are considered admissible at all, they must not disclose the course and content of the deliberations.218 It will be subject to a majority decision of the arbitral tribunal whether the (admissible) dissenting opinion is delivered alongside the award to the parties.219 Issuance of an inadmissible dissenting opinion does not constitute a ground for setting aside the award, but may give rise for a claim for damages against the defaulting arbitrator.220 Some of these issues may be avoided if the arbitral tribunal seeks the parties’ consent on the delivery of dissenting opinions.

IV.  Scrutiny of an ICC Award by the ICC Court of Arbitration (art 33 ICC Rules)

6.104  Before an ICC arbitral award is signed and delivered to the parties, it must undergo the scrutiny process by the ICC Court of Arbitration (art 33 ICC Rules). This scrutiny aims to ensure a high quality (and an increased likeliness of enforceability) of the award and it is a distinctive feature under the ICC Rules.221 Article 33 cl 2 ICC Rules distinguishes between questions of form and of substance: questions of form include typographical, clerical, and computational issues222 as well as missing information under the ICC Award Checklist and others.223 The Court can instruct the arbitral tribunal to adjust the arbitral award according to its comments on form. Questions of substance are treated differently, as the Court will solely draw the arbitral tribunal’s attention to such issues. Whether or not the arbitral tribunal makes amendments to its draft accordingly is left to its own decision; art 33 cl 2 ICC Rules explicitly confirms that the arbitral tribunal’s liberty of decision shall not be affected. Questions of substance may include whether the tribunal has neglected any issues or has decided issues not raised by the parties, has given reasons for all decisions, whether the dispositive section of the award is clearly formulated, and whether costs and interests are properly addressed.224

(p. 311) V.  Delivery of the Arbitral Award (s 1054 para 4 ZPO)

6.105  A copy of the award signed by the arbitrators is to be delivered to each party (s 1054 para 4 ZPO). Delivery has replaced deposit under the former German law;225 such deposit with a German state court nowadays is not even any longer possible.226 Delivery must be made to the party, its counsel, or any other authorized receiving agent.227 While the law does not prescribe a specific form of delivery, a registered letter with return receipt or a courier are advisable as they provide for evidence of the date of delivery, which in turn is dispositive under s 1059 para 3 ZPO.228 Section 1054 para 4 ZPO also allows electronic transmission,229 though this practice has not been made broad use of. Often arbitral tribunals distribute the award via complementary email in addition to its hard- copy delivery. The parties can agree on a specific form of delivery including by registered letter with return receipt to the parties’ counsel.230

6.106  It is important to note that each party is to receive an award with the original signatures of (the majority of) the arbitrators.231 A simple copy of an originally signed award does not suffice even if it was certified by the chairman, the arbitral institution, or any other body.232 The parties cannot waive the requirements under s 1054 para 4 ZPO.233 As long as no award with original signatures has been delivered to a party, the deadline for setting aside applications under s 1059 para 3 ZPO does not commence.

6.107  Under institutional rules, usually the arbitral institution rather than the arbitral tribunal will deliver the award to the parties (art 34 para 1 ICC Rules, s 36.2 DIS Rules). The award will not be delivered until the costs of the arbitral proceedings have been fully addressed (art 34 para 1 ICC Rules, s 36.3 DIS Rules). Arbitral tribunals in ad hoc proceedings will usually also withhold the arbitral award until the costs have been fully paid.234

(p. 312) E.  Effects of the Arbitral Award

6.108  The main effect of an arbitral award is addressed by s 1055 ZPO, pursuant to which the arbitral award has the same effects between the parties as a final and binding court judgment (paras 6.109 et seq.). As a separate effect, the arbitral award terminates the arbitral proceedings (paras 6.126 et seq.).

I.  Effects of a Final and Binding Court Judgment (s 1055 ZPO)

6.109  The arbitral award has the same effects between the parties as a final and binding court judgment (s 1055 ZPO). This provision, which has no equivalent in the Model Law but rather was perpetuated from the former German arbitration law,235 references a bundle of effects that German civil procedure law attaches to a state court judgment (paras 6.112 et seq.). These effects are transferred to any arbitral award (paras 6.110 et seq.).

1.  Requirement of an Arbitral Award

6.110  German law distinguishes between procedural and substantive res judicata. Substantive res judicata is one of the main effects of procedural res judicata. A matter gains procedural res judicata effect once no remedy is available which suspends the res judicata effect and brings the matter before a court of higher instance (s 705 ZPO). If applied to arbitral awards, any award would instantly gain procedural res judicata effect, since awards are never open to a full review.236 However, since s 1055 ZPO ties the effects of a judgment with (procedural) res judicata effect up to any arbitral award, it is futile to discuss the award’s procedural res judicata.

6.111  Section 1055 ZPO rather requires an award (paras 6.87 et seq.), ie a final and binding decision which was made in writing and bears the signatures of the (majority of the) arbitrators (s 1054 para 1 ZPO, paras 6.92 et seq.). The effects under s 1055 ZPO moreover require the award to be delivered to each party under s 1054 para 4 ZPO (paras 6.105 et seq.). The effects under s 1055 ZPO occur only with the delivery to the last party237 since a party cannot be bound by a decision of which it has not and cannot have knowledge.

2.  Substantive

a)  Effects of Substantive res judicata

6.112  While procedural res judicata means formal non- appealability (para 6.110), substantive res judicata— as one of the (p. 313) main effects of procedural res judicata— implies that the content of the decision is definite between the parties.238 This definiteness becomes obvious in subsequent proceedings: it does, on the one hand, hinder subsequent proceedings on the same matter (res judicata in a narrower sense) while, on the other hand, it facilitates subsequent proceedings in which the earlier decision must not be reviewed again if it becomes relevant as a preliminary issue (prejudicial effect).239

6.113  If, for example, a plaintiff has obtained a first judgment that a rent contract between the parties is valid and has not been terminated and this decision has become res judicata, a second claim filed by the defendant based on the same facts and requesting a declaration that the contract has been validly terminated would be inadmissible. If, however, the plaintiff initiates follow- up proceedings and requests payment under this contract, the court must not take into account the defense that the contract has been validly terminated based on the same facts. Section 1055 ZPO extends these effects to arbitral awards.

6.114  According to the prevailing view, substantive res judicata of an arbitral award differs in two respects from that of a court judgment. Both of these differences are rooted in the understanding that access to state court justice is a scarce resource while arbitration is available against payment. First, while a state court will take into account the res judicata effect of an earlier judgment on its own motion, it will consider the res judicata effect of an arbitral award only upon a party’s objection.240 Second, while the parties to a judgment cannot jointly waive its res judicata effect, the parties to an arbitral award are legally allowed to waive the award’s res judicata effect.241

b)  Objective Scope of res judicata

6.115  German law is restrictive when it comes to the scope of which elements of a decision are covered by the res judicata effect. This effect is limited to the matter in dispute (Streitgegenstand) as it has been decided in the decision’s dispositive part (s 322 para 1 ZPO)242 and its opposite, eg the non- existence of the claim that has been awarded (kontradiktorisches Gegenteil).243 It neither covers the reasoning (which may be relevant only for (p. 314) interpretation of what is covered by the dispositive part244) nor— contrary to common law concepts— facts or legal consequences of facts which are essential for the cause of action or defense.245 By way of example, a decision awarding a seller’s payment claim gains res judicata effect only to the extent that the buyer is obligated to pay. Although such decision legally requires a sales contract to have been validly concluded, the existence and validity of such contract does not become res judicata. If the seller wishes to extend the res judicata effect to preliminary questions like the existence of a valid contract, he or she needs to request a separate decision (cf s 256 para 2 ZPO).246

6.116  The matter in dispute (Streitgegenstand) is defined by the request plus the underlying set of facts.247 As an example, if payment of a specific sum of money has been requested based on a sales contract and awarded (or such claim has been dismissed) in the decision’s dispositive part, only the (non- ) existence of a payment claim based on these facts becomes res judicata. If the buyer has negotiated a bill of exchange in the same amount, a payment claim based on such bill of exchange is considered to be another matter in dispute than the contractual payment claim.248 A seller whose request for payment based upon the contractual payment was dismissed in a final and binding decision can therefore bring another claim for the same amount based on the bill of exchange without being restricted by the first decision’s res judicata effect.

6.117  An exception to the rule that res judicata does not extend to preliminary issues (para 6.115) exists for the set- off defense. According to s 322 para 2 ZPO, a decision that the counterclaim does not exist becomes res judicata up to the amount for which the set- off has been asserted. If the court or arbitral tribunal has denied the set- off defense because it found the counterclaim to be non- existent, subsequent proceedings in which payment of the counterclaim is requested would be inadmissible for reasons of res judicata. If, however, the set- off defense was dismissed for other reasons than the non- existence of the counterclaim, eg for grounds of a prohibition of set- off, the existence of the counterclaim does not become res judicata.249

c)  Subjective Scope of res judicata

6.118  The res judicata effect is limited to the parties to the dispute250 as explicitly confirmed by s 1055 ZPO. Third parties are included only exceptionally as in the res judicata effect of a judgment, in (p. 315) particular singular and universal successors to a party and executors, insolvency administrators, or administrators of estates to a party.251 Common law concepts like the extension to privies or the application of issue preclusion in subsequent litigation with third parties are unknown under German law.

6.119  The strict limitation of res judicata to the parties to the dispute time and again creates the risk to be caught between two stools. A typical situation would be where a seller is successfully sued by his or her buyer for damages due to defective goods while he or she cannot gain refund from his or her seller since he or she cannot establish the defectiveness of the goods. Similar situations often occur in chains of contractors where the res judicata effect of a judgment or arbitral award that the customer has obtained against the general contractor does not extend to the subcontractor. Before state courts, the third party can be included in the litigation and bound to the judgment by way of a third- party notice (ss 72 et seq. ZPO). While third- party notices generally also work in arbitration, the underlying arbitration clauses need careful drafting and need to include also the third party notice addressee (para 2.137).

d)  Temporal Scope of res judicata

6.120  Res judicata cannot change the legal situation to stone. German civil procedural law allows for remedies terminating the binding effect (or enforceability) where new facts occur. Under s 767 ZPO, the debtor can assert objections against the claim itself as established by the judgment by filing a corresponding court action (paras 6.276 et seq.). Such objections, however, can be brought only if they occurred after the close of the hearing in which they could have been brought last. In case of a judgment ordering recurrent performance becoming due in the future, s 323 ZPO provides each part with a remedy for the modification of the judgment if the new facts result in a material change to the factual or legal circumstances on which the decision is based. Section 323 ZPO is also limited to grounds that have arisen after the hearing on the facts in the preceding proceedings was closed.

6.121  These remedies are to be brought before the arbitral tribunal if they are covered by the arbitration agreement.252 The arbitral tribunal has jurisdiction for the s 767 ZPO action if the arbitration agreement covers the new objection.253 If under these rules the arbitral tribunal has jurisdiction, a new arbitral tribunal needs to be constituted since the office of the arbitrators had ended with their award (para 6.127).254

(p. 316) 3.  Other Effects

6.122  Apart from substantive res judicata, procedural res judicata has some other effects which s 1055 ZPO also extends to arbitral awards. These effects include the binding effect under which the court (or arbitral tribunal) is bound to its judgment (or arbitral award) for subsequent decisions.255 By way of exception, the arbitral tribunal can correct and interpret its arbitral award subject to s 1058 ZPO (paras 6.145 et seq.). The procedural res judicata also gives rise to the effect that substantive law provisions tie in with a final and binding judgment.256 For example, under s 864 para 2 BGB certain claims of a possessor lapse if a final and binding judgment declares that the debtor has a (specific) right to the property.

6.123  For judgments, the procedural res judicata also triggers enforceability as final and binding judgments serve as executory titles (s 704 ZPO). Contrary to the wording of s 1055 ZPO, arbitral awards are not executory titles which allow for enforcement. According to s 1060 para 1 ZPO, enforcement of the award only takes place if the award has been declared enforceable. Only the higher regional court’s order declaring the arbitral award enforceable serves as an executory title (s 794 para 1 no 4a ZPO). Such declaration of enforceability is also required for arbitral awards that order the respondent to make a declaration of intent. According to s 894 ZPO, such declaration shall be deemed to have been made as soon as the judgment has become final and binding. As part of the enforcement law, this fiction, however, applies only once the award has been declared enforceable (s 1060 para 1 ZPO).257

6.124  German law foresees a limited number of judgments changing a legal right or status; this effect occurs with procedural res judicata. For example, a general partnership can be dissolved by way of a judgment (s 133 HGB). While it is acknowledged that decisions changing a legal right or status can be requested from an arbitral tribunal, it is a matter of dispute whether an award changing a legal right or status (Gestaltungsschiedsspruch) must be declared enforceable under s 1060 ZPO to effectuate that change. The prevailing view postulates the need for a declaration of enforceability (para 6.255)258 although the better grounds advocate the opposite: s 1060 para 1 ZPO pierces the full equalization of an arbitral award with a final and binding judgment (s 1055 ZPO) only as to enforcement. The effect of changing a legal right or status, however, under German law does not belong to enforcement but is a separate and independent effect.259

(p. 317) 4.  Foreign Awards

6.125  Section 1055 ZPO applies only to awards with a place of arbitration in Germany (s 1025 para 1 ZPO). For the res judicata effect of foreign awards, German law of civil procedure refers to the lex arbitri, ie to the arbitration law at the place of arbitration (para 6.290).

II.  Termination of the Proceedings (s 1056 para 1 ZPO)

6.126  Besides having the effects of a final and binding judgment (paras 6.109 et seq.), the arbitral award also terminates the arbitral proceedings (s 1056 para 1 ZPO). Just like for the effects under s 1055 ZPO (cf para 6.111), the award needs to meet the formal requirements of s 1054 para 1 ZPO and must have been delivered to all parties in order to terminate the proceedings.260 Moreover, only the final award, ie the award deciding the last part of the matter in dispute, has terminating effect; partial awards may become res judicata but never terminate arbitral proceedings.261

6.127  Simultaneously with the termination of the arbitral proceedings, the arbitrators’ office terminates (s 1056 para 3 ZPO); they become functus officio. The law sets out only three tasks for which the arbitrators are deemed to be still in office: for a separate cost award under s 1057 para 2 ZPO (para 6.85), for correction, interpretation, and an additional award under s 1058 ZPO (paras 6.145 et seq.), and for remission of the case after the award has been set aside under s 1059 para 4 ZPO (para 6.244). For other newly arising arbitral tasks, a new arbitral tribunal needs to be constituted.262

F.  Termination Order

6.128  While the arbitral proceedings are designed to end with a final award, they can under specific circumstances also end without an award. As a second termination instrument, the law provides for a termination order (s 1056 para 1 ZPO).

6.129  It is a matter of dispute whether arbitral proceedings can terminate only with a final award or with a termination order, in other words whether s 1056 para 1 ZPO is exhaustive. The prevailing view assumes that all arbitral proceedings need an award or a termination order to terminate.263 While legal certainty indeed speaks in favor of this position, at least some cases exist in which arbitral proceedings must (p. 318) end without an award or termination order. One example would be the death of a sole arbitrator who was agreed upon in the arbitration agreement and who was decisive for the choice to arbitrate (cf para 2.165). The better reasons therefore speak in favor of s 1056 para 1 ZPO’s non- exhaustive nature.

I.  Prerequisites

6.130  Section 1056 para 2 ZPO sets out a number of grounds for termination orders, most of which have been adopted from art 32 Model Law. The German legislature has added the failure of the claimant to state its claim (s 1056 para 2 no 1 lit a ZPO).264 It has furthermore transformed art 32 para 2 lit c Model Law, according to which a termination order is to be issued if the arbitral tribunal finds that the continuation of the proceedings has for any other reason become unnecessary or impossible, into the more specific provision of s 1056 para 2 no 3 ZPO.265

6.131  The termination order under s 1056 para 2 ZPO is mostly understood to be constitutive for the termination of the arbitral proceedings.266 A termination order also ends the arbitral proceedings if none of the grounds enlisted in the law is met (para 6.143). According to the prevailing view, s 1056 para 2 ZPO is of mandatory nature,267 which view is supported by the need for legal certainty.

1.  Failure of Claimant to State its Claim (s 1056 para 2 no 1 lit a ZPO)

6.132  The arbitral tribunal issues a termination order if the claimant fails to submit its statement of claim within the time limit set under s 1046 para 1 ZPO and if such default has not been justified to the tribunal’s satisfaction under s 1048 para 4 ZPO (s 1056 para 2 no 1 lit a ZPO). Unlike a dismissal of the claim in an award, such termination order leaves the parties with nothing but costs (paras 6.140 et seq.) and an unresolved dispute.268 Whether in light of this result the arbitral tribunal needs to inform the parties before it issues a termination order269 appears to be a more theoretical question since without such information the arbitral tribunal will not be able to determine that the default has not been justified.

2.  Withdrawal of Claim (s 1056 para 2 no 1 lit b ZPO)

6.133  A termination order is also to be issued if the claimant withdraws its claim, unless the respondent objects and the arbitral tribunal recognizes a legitimate interest on (p. 319) the part of the respondent in obtaining a final settlement of the dispute (s 1056 para 2 no 1 lit b ZPO). It is obvious that the arbitral proceedings must end if both parties are in agreement on the withdrawal. The arbitral tribunal will usually set a deadline for obtaining such consent.

6.134  If the respondent objects, the tribunal needs to decide whether the respondent has a legitimate interest in obtaining an award that settles the dispute in a final and binding manner. Such legitimate interest is to be assumed if the claimant could otherwise initiate proceedings anew: it is unacceptable to lose a favorable procedural situation just in order to be exposed to the same claim later again. The respondent lacks a legitimate interest in obtaining an award only if the claimant waives its claim,270 if a new claim would be inadmissible due to a preclusive time limit, or if the claimant cannot initiate new arbitral proceedings for other reasons. Obtaining a cost award will usually not constitute a legitimate interest in continuation of the proceedings since in the event of a termination the arbitral tribunal still needs to decide on costs (para 6.141).271

3.  Party Agreement on the Termination of the Proceedings (s 1056 para 2 no 2 ZPO)

6.135  As long as they are in agreement, the parties can terminate the arbitral proceedings for any reason including settlement or performance by the respondent.272 Upon such agreement, the arbitral tribunal will issue a termination order (s 1056 para 2 no 2 ZPO). The party agreement on the termination of the proceedings may simultaneously include a waiver of the arbitration agreement so that the state courts have jurisdiction over future disputes.273 Whether the parties also intended to waive the arbitration agreement is subject to interpretation of their termination agreement.

4.  Parties’ Failure to Pursue the Proceedings (s 1056 para 2 no 3 option 1 ZPO)

6.136  Another ground for a termination order is that the parties fail to pursue the arbitral proceedings (s 1056 para 2 no 3 option 1 ZPO), eg by non- payment of the advances on costs,274 by non- appearance in a hearing,275 or by other means.276 The arbitral tribunal needs to request the parties to continue to pursue the proceedings before (p. 320) it issues a termination order. For that purpose, it will make sense to set a deadline and point the parties to the legal consequences of their inactivity.277 If the parties jointly stay the proceedings, the arbitral tribunal cannot issue a termination order under s 1056 para 2 no 3 option 1 ZPO.278 The arbitrators may, however, terminate their arbitrator contracts for cause under appropriate circumstances (para 3.199).279

5.  Impossibility of Continuation of the Proceedings (s 1056 para 2 no 3 option 2 ZPO)

6.137  Finally, a termination order can be issued when the continuation of the proceedings has become impossible (s 1056 para 2 no 3 option 2 ZPO). Impossibility may have legal or factual grounds;280 oftentimes it results in the arbitration agreement becoming incapable of being performed (s 1032 para 1 ZPO).281 Examples for impossible continuation are a tie decision in the arbitral tribunal282 or extraordinary conditions such as war or hostilities that prevent a party from participating in the arbitral proceedings.283 If the ground for the impossible continuation simultaneously deprives the arbitral tribunal of its jurisdiction, a termination order cannot be issued based on the prevailing view that a decision denying jurisdiction is made by means of an arbitral award (para 6.56).284 Such grounds include the termination of the arbitration agreement, its challenge or a judgment under s 1032 para 2 ZPO. If the dispute before the arbitral tribunal is res judicata of a state court judgment or inadmissible on other grounds than jurisdiction, the claim in any event needs to be dismissed by means of an award.285

6.  Other Reasons

6.138  The parties may agree on further reasons for issuing a termination order although s 1056 ZPO does not explicitly open that avenue (see also para 6.131 on mandatory nature).286 However, legal certainty is not affected if the parties extend the grounds (p. 321) for terminating the proceedings. Those who posit that an arbitral tribunal declining its jurisdiction has no power to render its decision as an award (para 6.56) need to allow for the issuance of a termination order in these cases.287

II.  Form and Content

6.139  There are no legal requirements as to form and content of a termination order under s 1056 ZPO. Since the termination order is not an award irrespective of its denomination,288 s 1054 ZPO does not apply. Thus, a termination order could also be issued orally. In practice, arbitral tribunals will issue the termination order in writing and signed by at least the chairman, will specify the arbitration including parties and arbitral tribunal, will issue the termination, and will indicate the grounds on which it is based.289

III.  Effects

1.  Termination of the Proceedings (s 1056 para 1 ZPO)

6.140  The termination order has the same terminating effect as an arbitral award on the arbitral proceedings (s 1056 para 1 ZPO, para 6.126) and on the office of the arbitrators (s 1056 para 3 ZPO, para 6.127).

6.141  Similar to an award (para 6.126), the termination order terminates the proceedings only if the entire dispute including the costs has been resolved (cf para 6.24). This will often be the case if the parties amicably settle the dispute (para 6.24). If the parties do not resolve the allocation of costs, the arbitral tribunal needs to issue a separate cost award (paras 6.48 et seq.).290

2.  Other Effects

6.142  The termination order is furthermore relevant for the suspension of limitation that began to run with the commencement of the arbitral proceedings (s 204 para 1 no 11 BGB); it ends six months after the termination order has been issued (s 204 para 2 BGB).291 Since it puts an end to the arbitration, the termination order indirectly also renders the arbitrators’ fee claims due (s 614 cl 1 BGB).292

(p. 322) IV.  Remedies

6.143  Since the termination order is not an award (para 6.139), the remedies against an arbitral award (s 1059 ZPO) are unavailable for a termination order.293 In fact, procedural orders are not subject to review at all. An arbitral award terminates the arbitral proceedings under s 1056 para 1 ZPO regardless of whether it later is successfully set aside; s 1059 para 4 ZPO only exceptionally allows for continuation of the already terminated arbitral proceedings. The terminating effect of arbitral awards irrespective of their validity and indeed future existence is justified by the need for legal certainty regarding the pendency of arbitral proceedings. As demonstrated by s 1056 para 1 ZPO, this need is the same for termination orders as for arbitral awards. At the same time, the law does not set out an option to remit the case to the arbitral tribunal as under s 1059 para 4 ZPO if the termination order was invalid. Even if a termination order was not based on a ground for termination, it therefore maintains its terminating effect.294

6.144  However, the parties are free to agree on a reopening of the proceedings.295 Since the office of the arbitrators has ended (para 6.127), the arbitrators also need to approve the reopening.296 Whether the arbitration agreement is affected by the termination of the proceedings is to be assessed under general rules (waiver or s 1032 para 1 ZPO).

G.  Correction, Interpretation, and Supplementation of the Arbitral Award (s 1058 ZPO)

6.145  The arbitral award is binding on the tribunal (para 6.122). Once it has been delivered to the parties, the arbitral tribunal can therefore not amend its findings even if it finds that it incorrectly decided the case. Section 1058 ZPO is no exception to this rule, as the arbitral tribunal is allowed to change its word but not its will. However, s 1058 ZPO takes account of deficiencies that the award may suffer from beyond the correct application of the law to the facts. The need for such clarification is significant in light of the low requirements for an award (paras 6.91 et seq.). Section 1058 ZPO applies to any award that meets the requirements of s 1054 paras 1, 4 ZPO (paras 6.92 et seq.).297

(p. 323) I.  Correction (s 1058 para 1 no 1 ZPO)

6.146  The arbitral tribunal can correct any errors in computation, any clerical or typographical errors or any errors of similar nature in the award (s 1058 para 1 no 1 ZPO). Errors of similar nature need to be as obvious as computational, clerical, or typographical errors are.298 Once there can be any doubt whether the award is incorrect, such ambiguity may be cured by way of interpretation (para 6.147) but cannot be corrected.299 Correction is an instrument to obtain what the arbitral tribunal has decided but accidentally did not express; it is a means to correct the expression of the tribunal’s decision, not the underlying decision.300 Correction does not allow for adding legal reasoning.301 As long as these guidelines are adhered to, the correction may significantly amend or even reverse the decision in its dispositive part (eg if the arbitral tribunal confused the party roles or omitted a “not”).302 Violation of these rules constitutes a ground for setting aside the correction award under s 1059 para 2 no 1 lit d ZPO.303 Since correction aims at obvious errors, the arbitral tribunal can also correct errors in awards on agreed terms even though it did not make the underlying decision.304 Otherwise, the parties would have no remedy at all to correct errors in such awards.

II.  Interpretation (s 1058 para 1 no 2 ZPO)

6.147  Similar to its correction, the (authentic) interpretation of the award under s 1058 para 1 no 2 ZPO must not amend the decision that the arbitral tribunal has reached.305 Interpretation rather serves only to clarify ambiguous parts of the award (not the entire award306). Interpretation may in particular be an instrument to rephrase the dispositive part of the award in a way that it becomes enforceable.307 If the interpretation award exceeds these limits, it is subject to setting aside under s 1059 para 2 no 1 lit d ZPO.308

(p. 324) III.  Additional Award (s 1058 para 1 no 3 ZPO)

6.148  An additional award under s 1058 para 1 no 3 ZPO can be made if the arbitral tribunal has made a final award which, however, does not cover the entire matter in dispute as defined by the parties’ requests. Whether these requests have been referenced in the award is irrelevant.309 An additional award can also be made on costs if the cost decision was not included in the final award.310 The putatively final award triggering an additional award under s 1058 para 1 no 3 ZPO is to be distinguished from a partial award in which the arbitral tribunal deliberately does not adjudicate the entire matter in dispute. The award following a partial award requires neither a party request nor observance of the deadline under s 1058 para 3 ZPO.311

IV.  Request

1.  Request by a Party (s 1058 paras 1, 4 ZPO)

6.149  The interpretation of an award and an additional award can be made by the arbitral tribunal only if requested by at least one party (s 1058 para 1 ZPO). Only the correction can likewise be made on the tribunal’s own initiative (s 1058 para 4 ZPO).

2.  Deadline (s 1058 para 2 ZPO)

6.150  Any party request under s 1058 ZPO needs to be filed within the deadline of one month after the award has been received by that party (s 1058 para 2 ZPO). This deadline runs for each party individually.312 The parties may agree on another deadline, even after the original deadline has lapsed.313 The arbitral tribunal, however, cannot extend the deadline; each party can legitimately rely on the fact that the award is subject to interpretation only within the set time frame and that an additional award can be rendered only within that time frame as well.314 If the arbitral tribunal interprets the award or renders an additional award although the request did not meet the relevant deadline, its decision is subject to being set aside under s 1059 para 2 no 1 lit c and d ZPO.315 A belated request for correction can be understood as a suggestion for a correction on the tribunal’s own initiative;316 (p. 325) a correction issued upon a belated request is therefore not subject to setting aside for that reason.

6.151  Only the party request is subject to the deadline set out by s 1058 para 2 ZPO. If the arbitral tribunal corrects its award on its own motion, it is not bound by a deadline.317 This is in compliance with the wording of the provision and meets a practical need for correction that becomes obvious only later.

V.  Procedure

1.  Right to be Heard

6.152  The procedure follows the general rules of ss 1042 et seq. ZPO.318 Before the arbitral tribunal renders a decision on the interpretation or on an additional award, it needs to give all parties the opportunity to present their case (s 1042 para 1 cl 2 BGB). While it is best practice to grant the parties the right to be heard also for the correction of obvious mistakes, this is not legally necessary319 since a state court would not need to hear the parties before such decision320 and the due process standard in arbitral proceedings is not higher than in German state court proceedings.

2.  Deadline (s 1058 para 3 ZPO)

6.153  The arbitral tribunal should make the correction or give the interpretation within one month and make an additional award within two months (s 1058 para 3 ZPO). This deadline serves only as a guideline for the arbitral tribunal; if it exceeds the deadline, the tribunal’s decision is not subject to setting aside or other sanctions.321

3.  Form of Decision (s 1058 para 5 ZPO)

6.154  Section 1054 ZPO applies to the correction or interpretation of the award and to an additional award (s 1058 para 5 ZPO). Any decision under s 1058 ZPO that does not dismiss the request therefore has to meet the form requirements of an award (paras 6.92 et seq.).

6.155  As it contains a separate decision, an additional award (s 1058 para 1 no 3 ZPO) is indeed an award and subject to the same remedies including setting aside.322 (p. 326) Interpretation and correction, conversely, become part of the original award so that both decisions can be set aside and enforced only together.323 Only if interpretation or correction exceed their borders, eg amend the underlying award, can they be set aside separately.324 The deadline for a request to set aside the award is extended by s 1059 para 3 cl 3 ZPO (para 6.179).

H.  Setting Aside of Arbitral Awards (s 1059 ZPO)

I.  Spirit and Purpose

6.156  The setting aside application as set out in s 1059 ZPO is one of the most important elements in German arbitration for a number of reasons. First, it provides for a state court review of the arbitral award without (the possibility of) which the effects of a state court judgment could not be attached to an arbitral award. Section 1059 ZPO therefore serves as a— constitutionally required325counterpart to s 1055 ZPO.326 Notably, the effects of an award under s 1055 ZPO are not contingent on an actual court review. Although the review under s 1059 ZPO at least in part serves public interests, it cannot be initiated by the court on its own motion. The application is rather solely in the hands of the parties. The law could establish such mechanism since at least one party will usually be interested in filing the setting aside application (“private enforcement”).

6.157  Second, s 1059 ZPO sets out an exhaustive list of criteria for state court review which balance the powers between the arbitral tribunal and the state court. As s 1059 ZPO does not go beyond an internationally recognized set of grounds for setting aside an arbitral award which the courts do not apply in an unduly extensive interpretation, it is also the essential provision for establishing the arbitration- friendliness of German law.

6.158  Third, although the number of setting aside applications in Germany is small as compared to the number of arbitral proceedings, the grounds for setting aside legally limit the broad discretion that the arbitral tribunal enjoys in procedural matters. Moreover, having one’s own award set aside for the violation of procedural standards does not contribute to an arbitrator’s good reputation. The sanction that the setting aside proceedings provide will, even if the parties do actually not make use of this remedy, often admonish the arbitrators to comply with their duties.

(p. 327) II.  Application for Setting Aside as the Only Recourse (s 1059 para 1 ZPO)

1.  Binding Effect of an Arbitral Award not yet Set Aside

6.159  An arbitral award (preliminarily) has the same effect as a final and binding state court judgment (s 1055 ZPO) regardless of how defective the arbitral proceedings have been. Only if successfully set aside does the arbitral award cease to be binding with retrospective effect (para 6.242).

2.  No Incidental Review of an Arbitral Award

6.160  In order to protect its legal effects under s 1055 ZPO, the arbitral award can be reviewed by a state court for grounds for setting aside (and can consequently be treated as non- binding) only within setting aside proceedings under s 1059 ZPO. Outside setting aside proceedings, no court may review the arbitral award for grounds for setting aside. Unless the award has been set aside, no court may disregard the effects of the award. In particular the award debtor cannot raise the defense that the arbitral award suffers from grounds for setting aside in subsequent proceedings.327

3.  Other Remedies Against the Arbitral Award

6.161  German law recognizes two procedural remedies which only apparently seem to violate the rule that the setting aside application is the only remedy against an arbitral award (para 6.160). The first of these is the application for a declaration of enforceability under s 1060 ZPO which, if unsuccessful, results in a refusal of the declaration of enforceability and the setting aside of the award (s 1060 para 2 cl 1 ZPO). While the proceedings for a declaration of enforceability indeed mirror the setting aside proceedings, they are not a remedy against the award but rather a remedy to enhance the effects of an award (para 6.247).

6.162  The second seeming exception is the request to declare that an award does not meet the requirements of s 1054 ZPO (paras 6.92 et seq.) and thus does not have the effects of an arbitral award. This request for declaratory relief under general rules of civil procedure (s 256 ZPO) is not barred by s 1059 para 1 ZPO328 since s 1059 ZPO applies only to arbitral awards that meet the requirements of s 1054 ZPO. Relief against an award that fails to meet these requirements therefore is beyond the scope (and the exhaustive character) of s 1059 ZPO.

6.163  As the only remaining exception from s 1059 para 1 ZPO, the prevailing view under German law acknowledges a substantive law claim for damages under s 826 (p. 328) BGB.329 Pursuant to this provision, a person who intentionally inflicts damage on another person against good morals is liable for damages. Case law approves liability under this provision if executory titles are misused in particularly severe cases.330 This requires the award to be incorrect on the merits and that such incorrectness not be due to the negligence of the award debtor.331 Furthermore, special circumstances must apply for the award creditor’s conduct to violate good morals.332 The award creditor must usually have obtained the award by fraud; in cases without such fraud, it must have been highly unfair and almost intolerable to utilize the award.333 The award creditor is generally not liable if the award debtor can make use or could have made use of remedies without further ado or has failed to do so.334 The award creditor must act at least with qualified intent regarding all other prerequisites including the damage occurring.335 The claim under s 826 BGB aims at restoring the position that would exist if the circumstances giving rise to damages had not occurred (s 249 para 1 BGB), in particular omission of any enforcement actions and compensation for already completed enforcement actions.336

6.164  Although it is generally questionable to allow for a substantive law claim for damages to complement procedural law remedies,337 the better grounds speak in favor of the prevailing view338 that applies s 826 ZPO to arbitral awards, at least on the basis that this provision is applied to executory titles in any event. It is irrelevant that in all cases covered by s 826 ZPO German public policy is likewise violated.339 A public policy violation will not affect the arbitral award once the three- month deadline under s 1059 para 3 ZPO has lapsed and a setting aside application can no longer be filed.340 Arbitral awards violating public policy can indeed not be declared enforceable even after this deadline has lapsed. However, reliance on this option is useless in the case of arbitral awards that do not need to be declared enforceable, eg declaratory awards.341 The claim under s 826 BGB is (p. 329) to be brought before an arbitral tribunal if it is covered by an arbitration agreement. If the arbitration clause refers to “all disputes arising out of or in connection with this contract,” it is decisive whether the s 826 BGB claim as a dispute arising out of a party’s conduct in the arbitration is still “in connection” with the underlying contract. Since the claim aims to rectify the incorrect decision on substance (which is in the hands of the arbitral tribunal), the better grounds speak in favor of a broad interpretation of the clause which constitutes the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction.342

4.  Waiver of Remedies

6.165  According to the prevailing view, a party cannot wholly waive its right to apply for setting aside of an arbitral award.343 A party can, however, waive its right to rely on individual grounds for setting aside, but only after the award has been rendered and in awareness of the ground for setting aside344 and, moreover, only the grounds under s 1059 para 2 no 1 ZPO. The grounds under s 1059 para 2 no 2 ZPO are said to be non- waivable since they serve public interests.345 This, in turn, is said to be indicated by the fact that the grounds under s 1059 para 2 no 2 ZPO are to be considered on the courts’ own motion, regardless of whether the party relied on them.346

6.166  While s 1059 para 2 no 2 ZPO indeed serves public interests, denial of waivability is difficult to reconcile with the private enforcement approach underlying s 1059 ZPO (para 6.156): no public interest obliges a party to apply for setting aside of an award even if grounds under s 1059 para 2 no 2 ZPO exist347 and letting the application deadline lapse has the same effect as waiving grounds for setting aside. The reason for restricting waivability therefore cannot be a public interest, but rather the protection of the party and/or the integrity of the arbitral process.

(p. 330) III.  Admissibility

6.167  The requirements for filing a claim under German civil procedural law also apply to the application to set aside an arbitral award to the extent that the German arbitration law in ss 1025 et seq. ZPO does not contain more specific diverging provisions. While the general requirements are described in paras 5.17 et seq., the following comments focus on the specific rules for the setting aside procedure.

6.168  Setting aside proceedings are to be conducted in German as the official language used in court (s 184 cl 1 GVG). This holds true regardless of the language in which the award has been drafted.

1.  Domestic Award

6.169  The setting aside application is available only for decisions qualifying as arbitral awards (paras 6.170 et seq.), including void awards (para 6.172), with a place of arbitration in Germany (para 6.173).

a)  Limitation to Arbitral Awards

6.170  A setting aside application is admissible only against arbitral awards. This remedy is neither available against other decisions of arbitral tribunals like procedural orders, interim measures (s 1041 ZPO), or preliminary rulings (s 1040 para 3 ZPO) nor against any decisions of bodies that are not arbitral tribunals, including association courts (Vereinsgerichte, para 2.40). The notion of the arbitral award is the same as in s 1054 ZPO and s 1055 ZPO;348 for more detail see paras 6.87 et seq. Like s 1055 ZPO (para 6.111), s 1059 ZPO requires the award to be made in writing and to bear the signatures of the (majority of the) arbitrators (s 1054 para 1 ZPO, paras 6.92 et seq.). Unlike under s 1055 ZPO, s 1059 ZPO does not require the award to be delivered to each party under s 1054 para 4 ZPO but only to the party filing the setting aside application (see s 1059 para 3 ZPO).

6.171  The prevailing view rightfully denies the opportunity to challenge decisions that only appear to be arbitral awards: a non- award (or pseudo- award) cannot be set aside349 and the state courts will test this requirement on their own motion in every instance.350 Doubts as to whether a decision qualifies as an arbitral award may be clarified by way of a request under s 256 ZPO to declare that a decision is not an award (cf para 6.162), be it that the decision was not rendered by an arbitral tribunal or that it does not meet the formal requirements under s 1054 para 1 ZPO. (p. 331) Such declaratory request can be brought before the higher regional court; s 1062 para 1 no 4, para 5 ZPO applies by way of analogy.351 The jurisdiction of the same court that is competent for setting aside an award allows for requesting setting aside as an alternative request to a declaratory request under s 256 ZPO and vice versa. Since alternative requests are sufficient to meet the deadline for filing the setting aside application under s 1059 para 3 ZPO, the party burdened by a decision the classification of which is unclear is well advised to file such an alternative request.

b)  Void Awards

6.172  As an exception to the rule that any award is binding until it is successfully set aside (para 6.159), German law recognizes the existence of void awards. Awards are considered void if they so obviously suffer from such severe defects that they cannot even have a preliminary binding effect until the award is set aside.352 Examples of void awards are awards that assume jurisdiction contrary to a court decision under s 1032 para 2 ZPO,353 awards that decide an obviously non- arbitrable matter,354 or awards that have been rendered by a “man in the street” without any indication of an arbitration agreement between the parties355. Although void awards do not have effects that need to be terminated by setting them aside, the setting aside application is also considered admissible against void awards.356 Contrary to its usual effect, the setting aside of a void arbitral award is only declaratory in nature.357

c)  Limitation to Domestic Awards

6.173  In line with the Model Law, German courts do not assume jurisdiction for setting aside foreign awards. To the contrary, only domestic awards can be challenged with the setting aside application. This requirement is not contained in the wording of s 1059 ZPO, but follows from s 1025 para 1 ZPO. As set out in this provision, s 1059 ZPO applies only if the place of arbitration is located in Germany.358

2.  Competent Court (s 1062 ZPO)

6.174  The competent court for setting aside an arbitral award is the higher regional court at the place of arbitration (s 1062 para 1 no 4 ZPO). The place of arbitration is deemed to be the one that is indicated in the arbitral award (s 1054 para 3 ZPO, (p. 332) para 6.100).359 While the parties can agree on the (local) jurisdiction of another higher regional court in their arbitration agreement (s 1062 para 1 ZPO) or by later amendment to the arbitration agreement360, they cannot agree on the (subject matter) jurisdiction of the court of another level.361 The higher regional courts usually do not serve as courts of first instance in civil matters; by s 1062 para 1 ZPO the legislature acknowledged that setting aside an arbitral award is more similar to an appeal than to proceedings of first instance.362

6.175  If several higher regional courts exist in the territory of a federal state, that federal state may concentrate the competence with one higher regional court (s 1062 para 5 ZPO). Bavaria has provided the Oberlandesgericht München (Munich Higher Regional Court) with competence for the entire federal state,363 while Rhineland- Palatinate has concentrated setting aside competence with the Oberlandesgericht Koblenz (Koblenz Higher Regional Court).364 The higher regional courts that have been deprived of their competence by such concentration cannot again be provided jurisdiction by agreement of the parties.365 If the parties agree on such a court in their arbitration agreement, such agreement is regularly to be interpreted as denominating the court at which jurisdiction was concentrated.366

3.  Proper Representation (s 1063 para 4, s 78 para 3 ZPO)

6.176  Parties generally need to be represented before higher regional courts by a lawyer admitted to the German bar (s 78 para 1 cl 1 ZPO). For arbitration- related court proceedings, however, s 1063 para 4 ZPO allows for an exception: as long as no oral hearing has been ordered by the court, applications and declarations may be put on record at the court registry and for such filings no party needs to be represented by a lawyer (s 78 para 3 ZPO). Since the court has to order an oral hearing in all setting aside proceedings (s 1063 para 2 ZPO), parties need to mandate a lawyer at a later stage of the setting aside proceedings in any event. Not least since s 1059 para 3 ZPO sets limits to later submissions (para 6.191), parties are well advised to retain a lawyer from the very beginning of such proceedings.

(p. 333) 4.  Specified Request for Relief

6.177  As its specified request for relief (s 253 para 2 no 2 ZPO), the setting aside application needs to request the full or partial setting aside of an arbitral award. The award must be sufficiently specified in the request, eg by indicating parties, date, and arbitrators.367 While only s 1059 para 2 no 1 lit c ZPO explicitly allows for setting aside only parts of an arbitral award, this option is available for all grounds for setting aside if only the part of the award which is affected by the ground for setting aside is separable.368 The setting aside application cannot contain a request to amend the arbitral award.369

5.  Application Deadline (s 1059 para 3 cls 1– 3 ZPO)

6.178  The setting aside application must be filed within three months if the parties have not agreed on another deadline (s 1059 para 3 cl 1 ZPO). The deadline starts to run for each party separately once it has received an arbitral award that meets the requirements of s 1054 paras 1, 4 ZPO.370 A setting aside application that has been filed after this deadline has lapsed will not be successful, whether based on the grounds under s 1059 para 2 no 1 ZPO or under s 1059 para 2 no 2 ZPO. Only the former are, however, also precluded as objections in proceedings for a declaration of enforceability (s 1060 para 2 cl 3 ZPO).

6.179  If a request under s 1058 ZPO has been made, the deadline is extended to the extent that the applicant has at least one month after receipt of the decision on that request (s 1059 para 3 cl 3 ZPO).371 If, however, the arbitral tribunal has made a decision on an additional award (s 1058 para 1 no 3 ZPO) or has exceeded the limits of correction or interpretation (para 6.155), the applicant must be given the full application deadline under s 1059 para 3 ZPO.372

6.180  A setting aside application can exceptionally be filed after the deadline has lapsed if the applicant would be entitled to damages under s 826 BGB since the other party has intentionally inflicted damage against good morals by obtaining the arbitral award (paras 6.163 et seq.).373

(p. 334) 6.  No Declaration of Enforceability (s 1059 para 3 cl 4 ZPO)

6.181  Setting aside an award cannot be requested if the award has been declared enforceable by a German court (s 1059 para 3 cl 4 ZPO). Since all grounds for setting aside could have been brought in these proceedings for a declaration of enforceability (s 1060 para 2 cl 1 ZPO), no need exists for another opportunity to make submissions on these grounds.374

7.  Grievance

6.182  It is disputed whether only a party that is burdened by the arbitral award can file a setting aside application.375 While a prevailing party theoretically may have an interest in setting aside an incorrect award, such parties are rare in practice.

8.  Legitimate Reason to Take Legal Action

6.183  As any other court action, the setting aside application requires a legitimate reason to take legal action (Rechtsschutzbedürfnis). The applicant has no such reason inter alia if it can achieve legal protection more easily or more effectively by other means (para 5.17). Since pending proceedings to declare the award enforceable allow for submitting all grounds for setting aside within these pending proceedings (s 1060 para 2 cl 1 ZPO), no legitimate reason for filing a setting aside application exists.376

6.184  If within pending setting aside proceedings a counter- application for declaring the award enforceable is filed, this counter- application pursues the more extensive aim since it may lead to declaring the award enforceable or to setting it aside (s 1060 para 2 cl 1 ZPO). Once the application for declaring the arbitral award enforceable has been filed, the party that had applied for setting aside the award loses any legitimate reason to take legal action and the setting aside application will be dismissed as inadmissible for that reason.377 To avoid this result and the cost decision associated with it, the applicant may declare the main issue settled (Erledigung der Hauptsache) and therewith obtain a cost decision as if the counter- application had not been filed.378

(p. 335) IV.  Merits

6.185  The setting aside application will be successful on the merits if it is brought against the correct opposing party (para 6.186), if a ground for setting aside exists, and if it is not excluded (paras 6.187 et seq.).

1.  Party Opposing the Application

6.186  The application for setting aside an award is to be brought against the other party to the arbitration or its legal successor.379 In case of singular succession after the award has been rendered, the setting aside application can be filed either against the opposing party in the arbitration or its successor.380 If the arbitral award’s res judicata effect is extended to non- parties, the setting aside application is to be filed against all parties to the arbitration.381

2.  Grounds for Setting Aside (s 1059 para 2 ZPO)

a)  General

aa)  Exhaustive Character

6.187  The grounds for setting aside are exhaustively listed in s 1059 para 2 ZPO as the wording (“only”) demonstrates.382 The exhaustive character of s 1059 para 2 ZPO distinguishes setting aside applications from appeals as it in particular excludes the incorrect decision of the dispute as a ground for setting aside (no révision au fond).383 The parties cannot add additional grounds for setting aside by agreement.384 Individual grounds can, however, be waived by party agreement (paras 6.165 et seq.).

bb)  No Mutual Exclusivity

6.188  The grounds for setting aside are not mutually exclusive. Rather, one and the same factual situation can constitute various grounds for setting aside, for example a violation of the right to be heard may result in grounds for setting aside under s 1059 para 2 no 1 lit b and no 2 lit b ZPO.385

cc)  Burden of Proof

6.189  The burden of proof that a ground for setting aside exists lies with the applicant, both for grounds under s 1059 para 2 no 1 and no 2 ZPO.386 An (p. 336) exception is discussed for the (non- )existence of a valid arbitration agreement.387 While it is true that the arbitration agreement forms the basis of the entire arbitration and that claimant has the burden to prove its existence in the arbitral proceedings, no need exists to extend this burden of proof to the setting aside proceedings.388 An exception is to be made only if the applicant was not informed of the arbitral proceedings or did not otherwise have a sufficient opportunity to raise its objection during the arbitral proceedings.389

dd)  No Binding Effect of the Arbitral Tribunal’s Findings

6.190  In order to allow for an effective review of the arbitral award, the court is not bound by the arbitral tribunal’s factual findings390 and legal assessment.391 While the arbitral tribunal’s decision on the merits cannot be reviewed by the court (para 6.187), its decision assuming jurisdiction is subject to a full court review. Clauses that expressly waive or limit this review are considered null and void, but do not affect the validity of the arbitration agreement.392

ee)  Sufficient Cause for Grounds for Setting Aside Under s 1059 para 2 no 1 ZPO

6.191  The court will consider a lack of arbitrability and a public policy violation on its own motion (s 1059 para 2 no 2 ZPO) since they also involve public interests. By contrast, the applicant must show sufficient cause for the grounds under s 1059 para 2 no 1 ZPO. To show sufficient cause, the applicant must designate the specific procedural irregularities on which it bases the application.393 The designation as one particular ground or several of the grounds under s 1059 para 2 no 1 ZPO, conversely, is not required.394 Since these irregularities define the matter that is in dispute,395 any later addition amounts to an amendment of the application which can be brought only within the deadline under s 1059 para 3 ZPO.396

(p. 337) 6.192  Subsequently, another distinction is made: while in the fact situations underlying some grounds for setting aside, the arbitral tribunal has not been sufficiently empowered by the parties to decide the dispute (paras 6.193 et seq.), the remaining grounds for setting aside describe egregious procedural flaws (paras 6.206 et seq.).

b)  Lack of Legitimation of the Arbitral Tribunal

6.193  The first group of grounds for setting aside consists of grounds in which the arbitral tribunal lacked jurisdiction to decide the dispute, be it that the parties had not concluded an arbitration agreement at all or that it is invalid (paras 6.194 et seq.), including for reasons of a party’s incapacity (para 6.201) or the subject matter’s lack of arbitrability (para 6.202),397 or that a valid arbitration agreement exists but does not encompass the dispute between the parties (paras 6.203 et seq.). By contrast, the incorrect denial of jurisdiction by an arbitral tribunal does not constitute a ground for setting aside under the clear wording of s 1059 para 2 ZPO398 even if such decision is to be classified as an arbitral award (paras 6.56, 6.87).

aa)  Invalidity of the Arbitration Agreement (s 1059 para 2 no 1 lit a option 2 ZPO)
(1)  General Grounds for Invalidity

6.194  The arbitral award can be set aside if the underlying arbitration agreement is invalid (s 1059 para 2 no 1 lit a ZPO); this holds true all the more if an arbitration agreement has not even been concluded.399 Both questions are governed by the law that the parties have chosen for the validity of the arbitration agreement or, failing such agreement, German law (s 1059 para 2 no 1 lit a ZPO). For details on the validity of an arbitration agreement governed by German law, see paras 2.44 et seq.

6.195  The decisive point in time for determining whether the arbitral award was based on a valid arbitration agreement is when the arbitral tribunal has last granted an opportunity to comment.400 The parties can, however, even subsequently conclude an agreement (or approve the previous conclusion of an arbitration agreement by an agent without authority), thus subsequently providing the necessary jurisdiction.401

(2)  Lack of Form

6.196  The lack of form is not only particularly important as a ground for setting aside, but is also subject to specific rules including for the governing law. Section 1059 para 2 no 1 lit a option 1 ZPO references “the arbitration agreement referred to in ss 1029 and 1031” and therewith presupposes an arbitration (p. 338) agreement that meets the (German) form requirements under s 1031 ZPO (for details on these requirements, see paras 2.67 et seq.).402 While the wording of option 2 (“arbitration agreement”) is less clear than in art 34 para 2 lit a (i) Model Law (“said agreement”),403 the German legislator intended to generally exclude the form requirement from the parties’ choice of law and to generally submit it to German law.404 According to an alternative view, the arbitration agreement needs to comply with the form requirements of both German law and the law applicable to the arbitration agreement.405

6.197  The arbitration agreement does not lack its required form if such lack is cured by entering into argument on the substance of the dispute in the arbitral proceedings (s 1031 para 6 ZPO). Since, as a result, the arbitration agreement is not invalid due to a lack of form, the arbitral award cannot be set aside under s 1059 para 2 no 1 lit a option 2 ZPO.

(3)  No Exclusion of the Ground for Setting Aside

6.198  The applicant can also be barred from relying on the invalidity of the arbitration agreement (caused by whatever defect) for a number of reasons. First, a party cannot rely on the invalidity of the arbitration agreement if doing so would be contrary to good faith (s 242 BGB), in particular if it acted contrary to prior conduct (venire contra factum proprium).406 Examples include that the applicant who relies on the invalidity of the arbitration agreement had previously initiated the arbitral proceedings, had invoked the arbitration agreement in preceding state court proceedings (s 1032 para 1 ZPO),407 or had explicitly relied on the validity of the arbitration agreement before the other party had initiated arbitral proceedings.408

6.199  The respondent must object to the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction at the latest in its statement of defense (s 1040 para 2 cl 1 ZPO). If the objection has not been filed timely (and with reference to the specific facts that are in question in the setting aside proceedings409), the respondent is precluded from relying on the invalidity of the arbitration agreement in setting aside proceedings.410 The same holds true if the arbitral tribunal has assumed its jurisdiction by means of a preliminary ruling (p. 339) (s 1040 para 3 cl 1 ZPO) and the respondent has failed to request a court ruling under s 1040 para 3 cl 2 ZPO.411

6.200  If a court has already decided on the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal and this state court decision has become res judicata, it also has binding effect for setting aside proceedings. Relevant state court decisions may have been rendered upon request prior to the constitution of the arbitral tribunal (s 1032 para 2 ZPO) or against the arbitral tribunal’s preliminary ruling (s 1040 para 3 cl 2 ZPO).412

bb)  Incapacity of a Party (s 1059 para 2 no 1 lit a option 1 ZPO)

6.201  A party that is incapable of concluding an arbitration agreement cannot validly conclude such an agreement (para 2.64). An arbitral award based on such invalid arbitration agreement is therefore subject to setting aside under s 1059 para 2 no 1 lit a option 1 ZPO. The provision goes beyond its Model Law template413 by providing the law governing the capability, ie the law applicable to the party. The law applicable to a party is determined by the citizenship of natural persons (arts 7, 12 EGBGB), by the seat for corporations within the scope of the right of establishment under Arts 49, 54 TFEU, Art 31 EEA Agreement, and under Art XXV para 5 German- American Friendship Treaty, and by the law under which the corporation has been established for all other corporations.414 For details on the (fairly rare) incapacity of a party under German law, see paras 2.64 et seq.

cc)  Lack of Arbitrability (s 1059 para 2 no 2 lit a ZPO)

6.202  An arbitral award that decides a non- arbitrable matter on the merits is to be set aside under s 1059 para 2 no 2 lit a ZPO. Since it is of public interest that non- arbitrable matters are not decided in arbitration, the court will find this ground on its own motion even if the applicant has not pleaded it. For similar reasons, arbitrability is not included in the choice of law provision under s 1059 para 2 no 1 lit a option 2 ZPO (para 6.194) but regardless of the parties’ choice to be determined under German law.415 Arbitrability under German law is defined by s 1030 ZPO (for details, see paras 2.48 et seq.) and likewise rarely an issue.

dd)  Award Exceeding the Scope of the Arbitration Clause (s 1059 para 2 no 1 lit c ZPO)

6.203  An arbitral award can be set aside if it exceeds the scope of the arbitration clause, as s 1059 para 2 no 1 lit c ZPO stipulates. As opposed to the aforementioned grounds for setting aside, here a (valid) arbitration clause exists which, however, does not cover the dispute. As with the determination of whether a valid arbitration agreement exists, the arbitral tribunal’s determination of the scope of such agreement is subject to full review (para 6.190).

(p. 340) 6.204  Some assume that decisions ultra petita, ie beyond what has been requested by the parties, can also be set aside under s 1059 para 2 no 1 lit c ZPO.416 While it is clear that the arbitral tribunal cannot award more than has been requested, this procedural rule is detached from the arbitral tribunal’s (contractual) legitimation, which is the rationale underlying awards exceeding the scope of the arbitration clause (para 6.203). This can also be derived from the fact that state courts are similarly concerned with the prohibition of decisions ultra petita. While decisions exceeding the request may be set aside under s 1059 para 2 no 1 lit d ZPO (para 6.220) or even under s 1059 para 2 no 2 lit b ZPO (para 6.228), they do not constitute a ground for setting aside under lit c.417

6.205  If the arbitral award exceeds the scope of the arbitration agreement only in separable parts, setting aside can be restricted to the affected part while the unaffected part remains in force. This stipulation in s 1059 para 2 no 1 lit c ZPO expresses a general rule (para 6.177).

c)  Severe Irregularities

6.206  The second group of grounds for setting aside is concerned with serious irregularities in the arbitral proceedings, including a party’s inability to fully present its case (paras 6.207 et seq.), the incorrect composition of the arbitral tribunal (paras 6.213 et seq.), the violation of procedural rules (paras 6.219 et seq.), and, finally, the violation of public policy (paras 6.225 et seq.). These grounds for setting aside overlap significantly (see para 6.188).

aa)  Party’s Inability to Present its Case (s 1059 para 2 no 1 lit b ZPO)

6.207  Section 1059 para 2 no 1 lit b ZPO makes the inability of a party to present its case a ground for setting aside the award. That the party was not given proper notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings are merely examples (“otherwise”) that the provision names. The ability to present one’s case is synonymous with the right to be heard as guaranteed by s 1042 para 1 cl 2 ZPO (see paras 4.22 et seq.). The right to be heard is at least at its core part of German public policy (para 6.229) so that often fact situations in which a ground under s 1059 para 2 no 1 lit b ZPO is given simultaneously constitute a ground under s 1059 para 2 no 2 lit b ZPO.

6.208  The right to be heard is usually understood to consist of three parts, namely notice to the party, opportunity to comment, and consideration of comments.418 First, proper notice must be given to the party in advance of any decision. Violation of (p. 341) this requirement includes the two examples explicitly provided for in s 1059 para 2 no 1 lit b ZPO (para 6.207), namely that no proper notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings was given. No proper notice is also given to the respondent if the statement of claim is not delivered to it,419 if a party is not invited to attend the taking of evidence,420 or if the respondent is incapable of suing.421 While the arbitral tribunal is not under a duty to discuss its views with the parties prior to rendering the arbitral award,422 it must refrain from issuing “surprise decisions,”423 ie deviate from previously voiced views or rely on views that are entirely different from those discussed during the arbitral proceedings.424 If its requirements are met, the fiction provided for by s 1028 ZPO allows for the sufficiency of a notice which has not been received.425

6.209  Second, no opportunity to comment may be granted if insufficient time for preparation is granted in case of an exchange in legal representation,426 if no oral hearing is held despite a party request,427 if an interpreter is rejected,428 or if a final decision on a plea is made without having invited comments.429 The arbitral tribunal must take evidence that is relevant to the case, but such relevance is to be determined by the arbitral tribunal alone.430 No opportunity to comment is given if a motion to admit evidence is dismissed arbitrarily and without substantive discussion.431 By contrast, it does not constitute a ground for setting aside if the arbitral tribunal provides no reasons for dismissing a motion to admit evidence or if such reasons are incorrect.432

(p. 342) 6.210  Third, the arbitral tribunal must consider the comments provided by the parties. The right to be heard may therefore be violated if the arbitral tribunal precludes party submissions although the delay has been sufficiently justified433 or if it classifies disputed facts as undisputed.434 By contrast, the arbitral tribunal is not obliged to comment on any party submission in the arbitral award’s reasons.435

6.211  Although the wording of s 1059 para 2 no 1 lit b ZPO does not require a causal link between the violation of the right to be heard and the content of the arbitral award, the better grounds speak in favor of such requirement. As under lit d (para 6.216), a potentially existing causal connection suffices; a ground for setting aside is to be denied only if the violation cannot have had an effect on the outcome of the proceedings.436

6.212  A party cannot rely on a violation of its right to be heard if such reliance contradicts previous conduct (venire contra factum proprium).437 For that reason, a party cannot rely on s 1059 para 2 no 1 lit b ZPO if, upon inquiry by the arbitral tribunal, it confirmed that it had sufficient opportunity to present its case.438 The parties can also stipulate in their arbitration agreement that each party may within a given deadline file an objection with the arbitral tribunal if the arbitral award violated the party’s right to be heard.439 A party that does not make use of such remedy in time cannot rely on a violation of its right to be heard in setting aside proceedings.440

bb)  Flawed Composition of the Arbitral Tribunal (s 1059 para 2 no 1 lit d option 1 ZPO)

6.213  The award can be set aside if the composition of the arbitral tribunal was not in accordance with a provision of ss 1025 et seq. ZPO or with an admissible agreement of the parties and this presumably affected the award (s 1059 para 2 no 1 lit d option 1 ZPO). As compared to art 34 para 2 lit a (iv) Model Law, the German provision not only clarifies that the violation must have affected the award, but also simplifies the determination of the relevant rules that are violated.441 In fact, the applicable procedural rules must be determined according to the hierarchy of applicable procedural rules in arbitration (paras 4.3 et seq.), (p. 343) ie first mandatory law, second party agreement including arbitration rules, and third non- mandatory law.442

(1)  Flawed Composition

6.214  The arbitral tribunal is incorrectly constituted if the decision is made by other than those who have been appointed as arbitrators, ie if appointed arbitrators do not decide or if arbitrators decide who have not been appointed.443 The latter also includes secretaries to the arbitral tribunal who have assumed decision- making tasks (para 6.14).444 The arbitral tribunal is furthermore incorrectly constituted if the applicable rules on constitution (paras 6.213, 3.2 et seq.) have not been adhered to.445 If both parties are aware of the incorrect composition and do not object, this may constitute an implied amendment to the arbitration agreement.446

6.215  Another example for the arbitral tribunal’s flawed composition is the participation of a biased arbitrator. However, with issuance of the award the other party has an increased interest in legal certainty under the law. Therefore, not any ground that would allow for challenging an arbitrator (paras 3.112 et seq.) suffices for setting aside the arbitral award. Rather, the impartiality and independence must be particularly severe and evident to constitute a ground for setting aside,447 eg judging on one’s own behalf (see also para 6.228).448 Finally, since a person who is legally incapacitated cannot be appointed as arbitrator (para 3.20), the composition of an arbitral tribunal that includes such person is flawed.449

(2)  Impact on the Arbitral Award

6.216  The incorrect composition must have presumably affected the award. This requirement avoids the setting aside of the arbitral award on grounds of mere formalities and the commencement of new arbitral proceedings that lead to the very same result.450 The mere possibility that the arbitral tribunal would have decided differently in correct composition is, however, sufficient451— which is almost always the case: in an arbitral tribunal with more than one arbitrator, it can never be excluded that deliberations would have resulted in a different decision if another person had participated or one of the present (p. 344) persons had not participated.452 The contributions of an arbitrator to the deliberations can always influence the decision- making process.453 This holds even more true for a sole arbitrator.

(3)  Preclusion and Binding Prior Decisions

6.217  The applicant is precluded from raising any ground that it could have raised in the arbitral proceedings but failed to do so. This holds true in particular for grounds that could have justified a challenge under ss 1036 et seq. ZPO (paras 3.112 et seq.). If a party fails to challenge an arbitrator within the deadline under s 1037 ZPO, it is precluded from relying on such ground in setting aside proceedings,454 since otherwise the deadline would be futile. A party is likewise precluded from raising the ground for setting aside under s 1059 para 2 no 1 lit d option 1 ZPO if it did not request a court decision on the challenge within the deadline set out by s 1037 para 3 cl 1 ZPO.455

6.218  The setting aside court may be bound by prior court decisions that are relevant for the constitution of the arbitral tribunal and that have become res judicata. The setting aside court is, in particular, bound by a prior court decision accepting (or dismissing) a challenge under s 1037 para 3 cl 1 ZPO.456

cc)  Flawed Arbitral Procedure (s 1059 para 2 no 1 lit d option 2 ZPO)

6.219  An arbitral award can be set aside under s 1059 para 2 no 1 lit d option 2 ZPO if the arbitral procedure did not comply with the applicable procedural rules (para 6.213) and this presumably affected the award. In light of its broad scope (paras 6.220 et seq.), this ground for setting aside is of considerable importance. It is, however, effectively restricted by the additional requirement of an impact on the arbitral award (para 6.223) and can easily be precluded (para 6.224).

(1)  Flawed Procedure

6.220  Examples for the violation of procedural rules set by law or party agreement include decisions ultra petita, ie beyond what has been requested as relief (see also para 6.204),457 receiving the oath,458 unjustified (p. 345) rejection of counsel,459 denial of an oral hearing that has been requested (see also para 6.209),460 or use of a report rendered by an obviously unqualified expert.461

6.221  According to the prevailing view, deficient reasons may justify setting aside the award, but only if the reasons are lacking entirely,462 are absurd, or do not comment on the main points of the party’s pleading (para 6.97).463 The impact of deficient reasons on the award, however, is difficult to assess (para 6.99).464

6.222  A flawed procedure needs to be distinguished from an incorrect decision on the dispute. While the former leads to setting aside the arbitral award, the latter is not subject to review by the state court (no révision au fond, para 6.187).465 An incorrect application of the law to the facts concerns the decision (as opposed to the proceedings) only, even if mandatory rules under the applicable law are violated.466 By contrast, application of an incorrect standard including of a national law other than that chosen by the parties or a decision ex aequo et bono without express authorization is considered a violation of procedure.467 The determination of the applicable law by applying conflict of law rules again belongs to the decision on the dispute, which is not subject to court review.468

(2)  Impact on the Arbitral Award

6.223  Both options of s 1059 para 2 no 1 lit d ZPO share the requirement that the violation of rules must presumably have affected the award. For both options, the mere possibility of a causal link suffices (para 6.216).469 While, however, an incorrect constitution of the arbitral tribunal will usually be relevant for the outcome of the arbitral award (para 6.216), the need for a potential impact gains more relevance in the case of flawed arbitral proceedings. The use of a language other than the language of the proceedings (s 1045 ZPO), for example, does not even potentially influence the decision on the dispute if all persons involved are fully capable of communicating in the language actually used. A record of a hearing that was required but not made cannot influence the (p. 346) outcome of the dispute.470 If witness evidence has mistakenly not been taken, the applicant needs to submit what the witness would have testified and why this could have had an impact on the arbitral award.471 The requirement of potential impact has replaced the restriction under former German arbitration law that only the violation of “significant” provisions constitutes a ground for setting aside.472

(3)  Preclusion

6.224  A party is precluded from relying on a violation of procedural rules if it had to object under s 1027 ZPO but failed do so.473 The violation can furthermore be cured for example if the party is later given the opportunity to comment.474

dd)  Public Policy Violation (s 1059 para 2 no 2 lit b ZPO)

6.225  As the last ground for setting aside, s 1059 para 2 no 2 lit b ZPO defines the violation of public policy. In practice, this ground belongs to the grounds that are invoked most often and at the same time are least successful.475 Like non- arbitrability (para 6.202), the public policy violation involves the protection of public interests and is therefore to be determined on the court’s own motion (s 1059 para 2 no 2 ZPO). Again like non- arbitrability (para 6.202), public policy in s 1059 para 2 no 2 lit b ZPO serves as a safety- valve protecting specifically German interests476 and is therefore not subject to the parties’ choice of law.477

(1)  Standard

6.226  Public policy provides for a wide net to eliminate awards that, in the words of s 1041 para 1 no 2 ZPO’s pre- reform version, “obviously violate basic principles of German law.”478 German public policy does not include all procedural or substantive rules (no révision au fond) even if they happen to be mandatory.479 According to a common definition, public policy consists of those (p. 347) rules that regulate crucial issues which affect the basis of public and economic life due to specific political or economical visions or fundamental ideas of justice.480

6.227  The public policy standard to be applied in s 1059 ZPO is that of so- called national public policy.481 National public policy is the national standard for domestic awards as opposed to international public policy as the national standard for foreign awards. International public policy is considered even more broad than national public policy (para 6.316) as the arbitral award is rooted in another legal order with different moral values and principles.482 In Germany, international public policy is applied only to awards with a foreign place of arbitration even if the nationality of the parties and arbitrators, the applicable substantive law, and other criteria are not German.483 Within German national public policy, the violation of basic principles of German procedural law (procedural public policy, paras 6.228 et seq.) and of German substantive law (substantive public policy, paras 6.231 et seq.) are distinguished.

(2)  Procedural Public Policy

6.228  Procedural public policy is violated if recognition of the award leads to a result which obviously violates basic principles of German procedural law,484 ie if the arbitral proceedings violated basic principles of procedural fairness.485 Examples of such basic principles include the principle of neutral administration of justice486 including the prohibition against judging on one’s own behalf (para 6.73), the proper representation of a party in the arbitral proceedings,487 and observance of the res judicata effect of previous decisions.488 An award whose content remains contradictory or unintelligible even after interpretation likewise violates procedural public policy.489 The principle of ne ultra petita has (p. 348) also been deemed to be part of procedural public policy so that in at least one case an award holding respondents liable jointly and severally even though joint and several liability had not been requested was set aside.490

6.229  Another important part of procedural public policy is the right to be heard (paras 6.207 et seq. and 4.22 et seq.),491 at least in its core.492 The right to be heard is violated in its core if for example a party is disparaged to a mere object of the proceedings.493 As under s 1059 para 2 no 1 lit b ZPO (para 6.211), the violation of the right to be heard must at least potentially have affected the arbitral award.494

6.230  Procedural public policy finally includes cases of procedural fraud as contained in the grounds for an action for retrial under s 580 nos 1 to 6 ZPO which had been referenced by the former German arbitration law as grounds for setting aside.495 The prevailing view accepts the grounds for an action for retrial under s 580 nos 1 to 5 ZPO only if the offender has been finally convicted for its criminal offence or if criminal proceedings cannot be initiated or implemented for other reasons than the lack of evidence (s 581 ZPO).496 This view significantly reduces the scope of the underlying grounds.

(3)  Substantive Public Policy

6.231  Substantive public policy is violated if recognition of the arbitral award violates rules that regulate the basis of public and economic life or that are intolerably inconsistent with the German legislature’s fundamental ideas of justice and therewith lead to a blatant violation of substantive justice.497 Not every violation of mandatory rules results in a violation of substantive public (p. 349) policy.498 Only the result (as opposed to the reasoning) of the award can violate substantive public policy.499

6.232  Examples of violations of substantive public policy include where compliance with the award would constitute a criminal offence,500 violate price fixing provisions,501 competition law,502 foreign currency law,503 import or export restrictions,504 treat insolvency creditors unequally,505 and contravene German506 or European507 antitrust law. Severe commercial consequences of the award culminating in the award debtor’s insolvency are of no relevance for setting aside the award.508

V.  Procedure

6.233  While the procedural requirements for a setting aside application have been discussed in paras 6.167 et seq. above, the setting aside proceedings entail certain specific rules that in part deviate from general procedural rules of civil procedure. These specific rules are discussed in this section.

1.  Right to be Heard (s 1063 para 1 cl 2 ZPO)

6.234  The right to be heard is guaranteed under the German constitution (art 103 para 1 GG). Section 1063 para 1 cl 2 ZPO confirms that the party opposing the setting aside application is to be granted the opportunity to comment before the decision is made. While it would constitutionally not be required to hear the opposing party if the court will in any event dismiss the application,509 s 1063 para 1 cl 2 ZPO requires that the opposing party be heard regardless of the court’s decision on the application.510

(p. 350) 2.  Oral Hearing (s 1063 para 2 ZPO)

6.235  While proceedings that result in a court order (para 6.240) usually do not require an oral hearing to be held, this rule does not apply to setting aside proceedings (s 1063 para 2 ZPO). Once the court has ordered an oral hearing, the parties must be represented by a lawyer admitted to the German bar (para 6.176).

3.  No Default Judgments

6.236  Under the general rules of civil procedure, severe sanctions apply if a party fails to appear in an oral hearing: if the plaintiff does not appear, its claim will be dismissed (s 330 ZPO), if the defendant fails to appear, the facts alleged by the plaintiff are deemed undisputed (s 331 ZPO). Such default judgments are, however, not available in setting aside proceedings and other court proceedings under the German arbitration law since the remedies available against default judgments are irreconcilable with the remedies under ss 1062 et seq. ZPO.511 If either party (or both) does not appear in the oral hearing, the application must be decided by the court based on the entirety of the parties’ oral and written submissions.512

4.  Court Fees, Lawyer’s Fees, and Amount in Dispute

6.237  The costs of setting aside proceedings including court fees and lawyer’s fees are allocated between the parties according to ss 91 et seq. ZPO, ie primarily under the “costs follow the event” rule. If the other party immediately acknowledges the claim and has not given cause for the application to be brought, the applicant bears the costs of the proceedings pursuant to s 93 ZPO.513 If the application is withdrawn, the applicant bears all costs (s 269 para 3 cl 2 ZPO).514

6.238  For an application for setting aside, two court fees are due (no 1620 KV GKG). While under s 12 GKG, a claim is serviced only after the court fees have been paid in advance, this provision does not apply to setting aside applications.515 Lawyer’s fees incur pursuant to nos 3100, 3104 VV RVG if the party did not agree with the lawyer on another basis for remuneration.

6.239  The amount of both the court fees and the lawyer’s fees depends on the amount in dispute fixed by the court. The amount in dispute is fixed on the basis of the applicant’s commercial interest in the application, ie the value of the (part of the) arbitral award that it applies for setting aside.

(p. 351) VI.  Decision and Remedies

1.  Form of Decision (s 1063 para 1 cl 1 ZPO)

6.240  The court decides on the setting aside application not by means of a judgment but by means of an order (s 1063 para 1 cl 1 ZPO). This form of decision entails some deviations from regular court proceedings. For example, orders are to be formally pronounced only if an oral hearing had taken place (s 329 para 1 cl 1 ZPO); otherwise, informal communication to the parties suffices (s 329 para 2 cl 1 ZPO).516 The order must identify the award, eg by stating its date and the names of the arbitrators.517

2.  Effects of an Order Setting Aside the Award

6.241  A court order setting aside the arbitral award mainly renders the award null and void from the beginning (para 6.242) but does not decide the dispute in lieu of the arbitral tribunal. For resolving the underlying dispute, either the state court or the arbitral tribunal may be competent (para 6.243). If the arbitral tribunal remains the competent forum, the final question is whether the arbitral tribunal that has rendered the award remains in office or whether it must be newly constituted (para 6.244). In any event, an arbitral award will be set aside partly if only a separable part is affected (para 6.177).

a)  Effects on the Arbitral Award

6.242  Any arbitral award— with the exception of void awards (para 6.172)— has binding effect between the parties even if it suffers from grounds for setting aside (para 6.159). The order setting aside the arbitral award deprives it retroactively of its binding effect.518 Like any other decision changing a legal right or status, this effect takes place once the court order becomes procedurally res judicata (para 6.109).519

b)  Effects on the Arbitration Agreement (s 1059 para 5 ZPO)

6.243  After the arbitral award has been set aside, the dispute has to be brought before an arbitral tribunal again if a valid arbitration clause exists between the parties which encompasses the dispute. Whether the original arbitration agreement between the parties also covers arbitral proceedings following the setting aside is to be answered by way of interpretation of the original arbitration agreement.520 If this interpretation does not return clear results, s 1059 para 5 ZPO stipulates an assumption for continuation in force of the arbitration agreement. It does for good cause, since usually the reasons why the parties have chosen arbitration (paras 1.48 et seq.) (p. 352) will persist.521 The arbitration agreement can obviously not continue in force if it had not been concluded validly (including for lack of arbitrability of the subject matter or incapability of a party) or does not cover the dispute.522

c)  Remission of the Case (s 1059 para 4 ZPO)

6.244  Where appropriate and requested by a party, the court may pronounce along with the setting aside of the award that the matter is to be remitted to the arbitral tribunal. In this case, the (former) arbitrators continue in office (s 1056 para 3 ZPO) and no new arbitral tribunal must be constituted. Remitting the case is not appropriate if the arbitral tribunal has no jurisdiction to decide the case, if remission would give rise to additional procedural efforts, or if grounds for challenging at least one arbitrator exist.523

3.  Remedy (s 1065 ZPO)

6.245  The appeal on a point of law is available as a remedy against the higher regional court’s order on the setting aside application (s 1065 para 1 cl 1 ZPO). The appeal on a point of law must be based on the fact that the order has violated federal law or a rule whose territorial scope extends beyond the district of one higher regional court (s 576 para 1 ZPO) or that the order is based on a violation of a treaty (s 1065 para 2 cl 1 ZPO). It brings the setting aside application before the Federal Supreme Court. The appeal on a point of law is admissible only if the legal matter is of fundamental significance or if the development of the law or safeguarding uniform case law requires a decision by the Federal Supreme Court (s 574 para 1 no 1, para 2 ZPO). If these prerequisites are met, the party’s grievance need not have any minimum amount in dispute.

I.  Enforceability of Domestic Arbitral Awards (s 1060 ZPO)

6.246  German law distinguishes between domestic and foreign arbitral awards when it comes to recognition and enforceability. Domestic and foreign arbitral awards differ in their place of arbitration: if the place of arbitration is within Germany, the award is domestic and s 1060 ZPO governs the award’s declaration of enforceability. Otherwise the award is foreign and s 1061 ZPO (paras 6.287 et seq.) applies to its enforceability.

6.247  As the reference to the grounds for setting aside in s 1060 para 2 ZPO demonstrates, s 1060 ZPO closely mirrors s 1059 ZPO. While the setting aside application is the remedy against the award (usually employed by the unsuccessful party (p. 353) to the arbitration), the application for a declaration of enforceability allows for the recognition of the arbitral award in favor of the party that has been successful in the arbitration.

I.  Spirit and Purpose

1.  Recognition, Enforcement, and Declaration of Enforceability

6.248  Under German law, usually a right is enforced against a debtor in two steps: first, the creditor pursues regular court proceedings (Erkenntnisverfahren) which are intended to result in a judgment. The judgment establishes with binding effect that the awarded claim exists (substantive res judicata). It simultaneously serves as the most prominent example of an executory title (Vollstreckungstitel). Only based on such executory titles may coercive enforcement proceedings (or execution proceedings, Vollstreckungsverfahren) in the debtor’s assets be pursued if the debtor does not comply voluntarily with the judgment.

6.249  A domestic arbitral award readily assumes binding effect between the parties (substantive res judicata). This is called recognition. While recognition of an arbitral award under arts 35 et seq. Model Law requires separate court proceedings, German law is more generous524 and provides recognition without the need for a separate court confirmation (s 1055 ZPO). On the contrary, the award debtor must apply for setting aside in order to terminate the binding effect of the arbitral award (para 6.159).

6.250  On the other hand and contrary to the wording of s 1055 ZPO (which is too broad in this regard), the arbitral award is not an executory title which could directly serve as a basis for enforcement proceedings into the assets of the debtor. Contrary to recognition, enforcement of the award takes place only if it has been declared enforceable in proceedings under s 1060 ZPO. Technically, only the decision which declares an arbitral award enforceable (rather than the award itself) serves as an executory title (s 794 para 1 no 4a ZPO).

6.251  Since they are required in order to create an executory title, the proceedings for a declaration of enforceability are not enforcement proceedings but rather regular proceedings of their own kind.525 Hence, the rules— including, for example, on state immunity— for regular proceedings apply.526

6.252  Terminology in the field of recognition and enforcement is inconsistent and confusing.527 The term “enforcement” is commonly used not only for enforcement of (p. 354) an executory title in the debtor’s assets but also for declaring an award enforceable. An example for such inaccurate use of terminology is s 1061 ZPO, the first paragraph of which refers to “[r]‌ecognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards” while its second paragraph continues to regulate the case “[i]f the declaration of enforceability is to be refused.” Both paragraphs refer to the same thing, namely the declaration of enforceability.

2.  Need for a Declaration of Enforceability

a)  Basis for Enforcement

6.253  The declaration of enforceability is required for any enforcement (ss 704 et seq. ZPO) of a domestic award in Germany. This is the only purpose of a declaration of enforceability set out by s 1060 para 1 ZPO. As part of the German enforcement law, s 894 ZPO, pursuant to which a declaration of will shall be deemed to have been made as soon as the judgment has become final and binding, also requires a declaration of enforceability (para 6.122).

b)  Fortification Against Grounds for Setting Aside?

6.254  The prevailing view moreover allows the declaration of enforceability of arbitral awards that lack enforceable content.528 Such awards include declaratory awards, awards changing a legal right or status, awards dismissing a claim (apart from a cost decision contained therein; see also paras 6.56, 6.87), or awards that do not meet the strict requirements for certainty under German enforcement law. Enforcement proceedings cannot be initiated based on such awards even if they have been declared enforceable. A declaration of enforceability does, however, de facto also fortify the award against grounds for setting aside (s 1059 para 3 cl 4 ZPO, para 6.181). This is deemed a sufficient ground for invoking s 1060 ZPO by the prevailing view— not convincingly, however, since it ignores the clear wording and rationale of s 1060 para 1 ZPO529 and satisfies a need that does not exist in light of the tight deadline under s 1059 para 3 ZPO.530

c)  Basis for Altering a Legal Right or Status?

6.255  The declaration of enforceability is also not a prerequisite for an award changing a legal right or status (Gestaltungsschiedsspruch) to gain this effect of altering of rights.531 Since this effect (p. 355) is distinct from enforcement, requiring a declaration of enforceability would be irreconcilable with the immediate recognition of arbitral awards by s 1055 ZPO.

d)  Basis for Recognition by Public Authorities?

6.256  Public authorities have to recognize an arbitral award for such purposes as entry into public registers and others regardless of whether a declaration of enforceability has been issued.532 A diverging position was taken in pre- reform case law,533 but is irreconcilable with s 1055 ZPO.

3.  Other Means to Enforce an Arbitral Award

a)  Declaration of Enforceability of an Award on Agreed Terms by a Public Notary

6.257  Awards on agreed terms can also be declared enforceable by a public notary (s 1053 para 4 ZPO, para 6.45). This provides for a faster and more cost- effective means than applying to a state court for a declaration of enforceability.

b)  Actions Based on the Duty to Comply with the Award

6.258  No action can be based on the award debtor’s duty to comply with the award. While such duty may indeed be derived from the arbitration agreement,534 an action to enforce this duty would constitute a “shortcut” that circumvents the proceedings for a declaration of enforceability under s 1060 ZPO. These proceedings are not only the easiest means to enforce the award, but also those specifically provided by the law and those properly protecting the defenses of the award debtor.535

6.259  Actions for a declaration that the arbitral award does not suffer from grounds for setting aside are inadmissible. They lack the legitimate reason to take legal action536 since the arbitral award already has binding effect regardless of any grounds for setting aside (para 6.159) and enforcement in any event requires s 1060 ZPO proceedings.

c)  Actions Based on the Awarded Claim

6.260  Actions to enforce the substantive law claim awarded in the arbitral award are likewise generally inadmissible by reason of the arbitral award’s res judicata effect.537

II.  Admissibility

6.261  Since the proceedings for a declaration of enforceability mirror the setting aside proceedings, unsurprisingly both are admissible under similar conditions. Reference (p. 356) can therefore be made to the requirements for admissibility of a setting aside application (paras 6.167 et seq.), in particular as to the competent court (s 1062 para 1 no 4, para 5 ZPO, paras 6.174 et seq.) and proper representation (s 1063 para 4, s 78 para 3 ZPO, para 6.176). The particularities of an application for a declaration of enforceability will be explained subsequently. Unlike for setting aside applications (paras 6.178 et seq.), no deadline exists for filing the application for a declaration of enforceability.538

1.  Domestic Award

6.262  As evidenced by its official heading, s 1060 ZPO applies only to domestic awards, ie to awards with a place of arbitration in Germany (s 1025 para 1 ZPO). The notion of an arbitral award is the same as underlies s 1059 ZPO (para 6.162), ie the award must meet the prerequisites under s 1054 para 1 ZPO.539 Defects of form may be cured in the course of the proceedings.540 If the arbitration clause allows for an arbitral tribunal of second instance, the decision of first instance is an award and can be declared enforceable only if appeal is no longer available by reason of a deadline passed or a waiver of the right to appeal.541 Void awards (para 6.172) are not capable of being declared enforceable.542

2.  Specified Request for Relief

6.263  The application for a declaration of enforceability must contain a specific request for relief (s 253 para 2 no 2 ZPO), namely that the award is to be declared enforceable in its entirety or in part. The award is to be sufficiently specified in the request, eg by indicating parties, date, and arbitrators, and its dispositive part should be included in the request.543 Like setting aside applications (para 6.177), the application for a declaration of enforceability may be limited to a separate claim under the award.544 If not otherwise indicated, an unrestricted application for a declaration of enforceability is to be understood as limited to that part of the award that is favorable to the applicant.545

(p. 357) 6.264  Pursuant to s 1064 para 1 ZPO, the application must be accompanied by the award or a certified copy of the award. While it is advisable to attach at least such a certified copy, the failure to do so does not put the admissibility of the application at risk (para 6.281). For an award drafted in a language other than German, the court may request a certified translation (s 142 para 3 ZPO).546 While some courts do so as a matter of routine even for English- language awards, others, eg the Higher Regional Court in Frankfurt, request translations of such awards only in exceptional cases.

3.  Legitimate Reason to Take Legal Action

6.265  The application for a declaration of enforceability requires a legitimate reason to take legal action (Rechtsschutzbedürfnis). The applicant has no such reason if it can achieve legal protection more easily or more effectively by other means or if it has no interest that is deemed worthy of protection (para 5.17). Such need for protection may also be assumed if the debtor’s obligations pursuant to the award are not yet owing (cf ss 257 et seq. ZPO).547 To what extent the legitimate reason to take legal action is to be denied in s 1060 ZPO proceedings depends on the purpose of s 1060 ZPO. If that purpose is rightfully (and in line with s 1060 para 1 ZPO) limited to providing a basis for enforcement (paras 6.253 et seq.), the legitimate reason to take legal action is to be denied if enforcement cannot be based on the award for other reasons including its non- enforceable content (para 6.254) or if the other party has already indisputably complied with the award.548

6.266  By contrast, if the purpose of a declaration of enforceability is understood to fortify the arbitral award against grounds for setting aside (para 6.254), any application within the deadline under s 1059 para 3 ZPO would generally be made with legitimate reason to take legal action.549 If the purpose of s 1060 ZPO is even understood to provide “additional moral value” to the award,550 not even the lapse of this deadline restricts the legitimate reason to take legal action.

6.267  Regardless of the rationale behind s 1060 ZPO, no refusal of the award debtor is required in order to provide the award creditor with legitimate reason to take legal action.551 However, the applicant has to bear the costs of the proceedings if the defendant immediately acknowledges and has not given cause for the application to be brought (s 93 ZPO). Some courts have granted the award debtor a fortnight (p. 358) to comply with the award before he or she gives cause for the application for a declaration of enforceability.552 Other courts hold that the award debtor has given cause for the application to be brought if his or her conduct has created the award creditor’s impression prior to the filing of the application that he or she will not gain redress without the enforcement court’s decision.553 This formula is difficult to reconcile with the prevailing view that s 1060 ZPO also serves to fortify the arbitral award against grounds for setting aside (para 6.254) as it is hard to imagine how the award debtor could have accorded redress before filing of the application if, for example, the award only grants declaratory relief.554

6.268  Since s 1060 ZPO proceedings are more far- reaching than setting aside proceedings in terms of the effect of a court order, pending setting aside proceedings do not contest the legitimate reason to take legal action to initiate proceedings for a declaration of enforceability.555

III.  Merits

6.269  The application for a declaration of enforceability is successful on the merits if it is directed against the correct opposing party (para 6.270) and if no grounds for setting aside the award exist (para 6.271) on which the opposing party can rely (paras 6.272 et seq.). Although not stipulated in s 1060 ZPO, the declaration of enforceability may also be denied if the opposing party raises specific substantive law objections against the claim underlying the award (paras 6.276 et seq.).

1.  Party Opposing the Application

6.270  The correct parties to proceedings for a declaration of enforceability are generally the parties that are named in the arbitral award. In case of legal succession, the application may be filed by or against the successor. This follows from s 727 ZPO, which applies by way of analogy.556 The applicant is, however, not restricted to the means of taking evidence as listed in that provision.557

2.  Non- existence of Grounds for Setting Aside (s 1060 para 2 cl 1 ZPO)

6.271  The application for a declaration of enforceability is to be refused if grounds for setting aside exist (s 1060 para 2 cl 1 ZPO). This provision references s 1059 para 2 (p. 359) ZPO (for details, see paras 6.187 et seq.). Also in s 1060 ZPO proceedings, the party invoking the grounds under s 1059 para 2 no 1 ZPO must show sufficient cause for their existence while the court assesses the grounds under s 1059 para 2 no 2 ZPO on its own motion.558

3.  Exclusion of Grounds for Setting Aside

a)  Final Rejection of an Application for Setting Aside (s 1060 para 2 cl 2 ZPO)

6.272  Under s 1060 para 2 cl 2 ZPO, grounds for setting aside are disregarded if at the time the application for a declaration of enforceability is served an application for setting aside based on such grounds has been finally rejected. Although the court will always consider the grounds under s 1059 para 2 no 2 ZPO on its own motion, these grounds are excluded only if they had actually been made the subject matter of the setting aside proceedings.559 If the court rejects a setting aside application after the application for a declaration of enforceability is served, the grounds considered therein are likewise excluded, this time by the setting aside decision’s prejudicial effect.560

b)  Expiry of the Time Limit for Filing a Setting Aside Application (s 1060 para 2 cl 3 ZPO)

6.273  Under s 1060 para 2 cl 3 ZPO, grounds for setting aside under s 1059 para 2 no 1 ZPO are likewise excluded if the deadline set by s 1059 para 3 ZPO has expired without an application for setting aside the award having been made. This safeguards the deadline for filing setting aside applications which would be rendered meaningless if the burdened party could simply await s 1060 ZPO proceedings.561 Hence, the party opposing the declaration of enforceability can rely on the non- arbitrability and public policy violation (s 1059 para 2 no 2 ZPO) grounds only if it had not timely filed an application for setting aside the award. These two grounds, however, remain available even if the underlying facts simultaneously constitute an (excluded) ground under s 1059 para 2 no 1 ZPO.562 This is often the case with violations of the right to be heard (s 1059 para 2 no 1 lit b ZPO), which can be brought only if they amount to a public policy violation (s 1059 para 2 no 2 lit b ZPO).

6.274  If the proceedings under s 1060 ZPO were commenced within the deadline under s 1059 para 3 ZPO, s 1060 para 2 cl 2 ZPO does not apply. Once proceedings for a declaration of enforceability are pending, subsequent setting aside applications are inadmissible (para 6.183) and the opposing party cannot be requested to initiate inadmissible proceedings.563

(p. 360) c)  Waiver of Grounds for Setting Aside

6.275  The party opposing application for a declaration of enforceability also cannot rely on grounds for setting aside which it had validly waived; for details on waivability of such grounds, see paras 6.165 et seq.

4.  Substantive Law Objections Against the Awarded Claim

6.276  Pursuant to the wording of s 1060 para 2 ZPO, the application for a declaration of enforceability is to be rejected only if grounds for setting aside exist. Even if the award debtor has in the meantime already paid, set off, or otherwise extinguished the claim underlying the award, this objection would not affect the declaration of enforceability. The debtor would need to file for a separate court action under s 767 ZPO in order to have enforcement declared inadmissible. Section 767 ZPO is available for any substantive law objection that arose only after the debtor had the last opportunity to assert objections within the regular proceedings (s 767 para 2 ZPO). Objections that arose earlier can be brought under s 767 ZPO only if the arbitral tribunal has refrained from deciding the objection since it— rightfully or wrongfully— found that it lacked jurisdiction to do so.564 This is particularly relevant for the set- off defense (paras 2.134 et seq.), which generally requires that the tribunal have jurisdiction over the counterclaim. The arbitral tribunal’s finding that it lacks jurisdiction to decide on such defense does not bind the state court in s 1060 ZPO proceedings.565

6.277  The prevailing view permits the raising of objections that could be brought in proceedings under s 767 ZPO already in the proceedings for a declaration of enforceability under s 1060 ZPO.566 This is permitted for reasons of procedural efficiency even though no such objections are foreseen in s 1060 ZPO and the higher regional court having competence over the s 1060 ZPO proceedings would not have jurisdiction over s 767 ZPO proceedings.

6.278  Depending on the content of the arbitration agreement and its interpretation, the substantive law objections under s 767 ZPO may well be within (p. 361) the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal.567 If that is the case and the applicant raises the arbitration objection, the higher regional court cannot consider the substantive law objections (s 1032 para 1 ZPO).568 An exception applies only if the objection, in case of a set- off defense in particular the counterclaim, is undisputed569 or if the arbitral tribunal has already rendered an award on the counterclaim.570

IV.  Procedure

6.279  The proceedings for a declaration of enforceability follow mainly the same rules as the setting aside proceedings (paras 6.234 et seq.), in particular regarding the form of the decision (s 1063 para 1 cl 1 ZPO, paras 6.240 et seq.), court fees, lawyer’s fees, and the amount in dispute (paras 6.237 et seq.) as well as available remedies (s 1065 ZPO, para 6.245). Below, only issues that do not arise in setting aside proceedings will be discussed.

1.  Right to be Heard (s 1063 para 1 cl 2 ZPO)

6.280  The party opposing the application shall be given an opportunity to comment before a decision is taken (s 1063 para 1 cl 2 ZPO). This opportunity is— contrary to the prevailing view— to be given in all cases governed by this provision even if the application is to be dismissed (para 6.234). In proceedings for a declaration of enforceability, the opposing party has a specific interest in being heard even if the court intends to dismiss the application on non- curable grounds since it can have a legitimate interest in a refusal of the declaration of enforceability and the setting aside of the arbitral award (para 6.286).571

2.  Documents to Supply (s 1064 ZPO)

6.281  At the time of the application, the award or a certified copy of the award are to be supplied (s 1064 para 1 cl 1 ZPO). The certification may also be made by counsel to the applicant (s 1064 para 1 cl 1 ZPO). This document, however, is not understood to be necessary for the proceedings for a declaration of enforceability to be admissible, but rather only to be a means of evidence if the content of the award is (p. 362) in dispute between the parties.572 It is in any event advisable to attach a certified copy of the award to the application (see also para 6.264).

3.  Oral Hearing (s 1063 para 2 ZPO)

6.282  In proceedings for a declaration of enforceability, the court orders an oral hearing to be held if grounds for setting aside are to be considered (s 1063 para 2 ZPO). While the grounds for setting aside under s 1059 para 2 no 2 ZPO are always “to be considered,” the grounds under s 1059 para 2 no 1 ZPO are “to be considered” only if they are pleaded with substantiation.573

4.  Interim Measures (s 1063 para 3 ZPO)

6.283  Under s 1063 para 3 ZPO, the presiding judge of the court senate hearing the application may order ex parte interim measures which must, however, not go beyond measures of protection. By requesting such interim measures, the applicant can preserve its interest in effective enforcement, eg by prohibiting the award debtor from moving domestic assets abroad.574 The party opposing the application can prevent enforcement by providing security even if it has not been expressly ordered (s 1063 para 3 cl 3 ZPO).

V.  Effects of an Order on the Declaration of Enforceability

1.  Order Granting a Declaration of Enforceability

6.284  The order declaring an arbitral award enforceable constitutes an executory title that serves as a basis for enforcement if this decision is final and binding or has been declared provisionally enforceable (s 794 para 1 no 4a ZPO, paras 6.250 et seq.). An order granting the declaration of enforceability under s 1060 ZPO is to be declared provisionally enforceable (s 1064 para 2 ZPO), thus allowing for immediate enforcement.

6.285  The operative part of the court order will usually include the operative part of the arbitral award that it declares enforceable.575 While the court cannot amend the arbitral tribunal’s decision as to substance,576 it can rephrase the operative part in a way that it meets the strict requirements of German enforcement law.577 If, (p. 363) for example, the arbitral tribunal made clear in the reasoning of the award that it intended to let the claimant participate in the distribution of respondent’s assets under insolvency law, an operative part ordering payment may be rephrased to a determination of the insolvency schedule.578 The order may limit the declaration of enforceability to a separable part of the arbitral award.579

2.  Order Denying a Declaration of Enforceability

6.286  The content of an order denying a declaration of enforceability depends on the reason why the declaration was denied: if the application was inadmissible (paras 6.261 et seq.) or the other party successfully raised substantive law objections against the awarded claim (paras 6.276 et seq.), only the application is dismissed.580 The award remains in effect.581 If, however, the application is denied because grounds for setting aside were found, the court dismisses the application and sets aside the award (s 1060 para 2 cl 1 ZPO) even if the latter has not been requested.582 In this case, s 1059 paras 4 and 5 ZPO (paras 6.244, 6.243) apply by way of analogy.583

J.  Recognition and Enforceability of Foreign Arbitral Awards (s 1061 ZPO)

6.287  Historically, recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards have been one of the core elements of international arbitration. The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention, NYC, Annex B) of 1958 laid the foundation for effectively harmonizing international arbitration. Later, the grounds for denial of recognition and enforcement under Art V NYC were adopted almost verbatim in the UNCITRAL Model Law of 1985. The German legislature, however, did not adopt the provisions governing recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards when Germany became a Model Law country in 1998. Rather, it considered it redundant to be a member state to the New York Convention and have a nearly identical domestic enforcement regime in its arbitration law.584 The legislature therefore opted simply to reference the New York Convention as the applicable enforcement regime in s 1061 ZPO. The results, however, are similar to those under the Model Law.

(p. 364) I.  Spirit and Purpose

1.  Recognition, Enforcement, and Declaration of Enforceability

6.288  The relationship between recognition, enforcement, and the declaration of enforceability has been explained in detail in paras 6.248 et seq.: recognition acknowledges the binding effect of a decision while enforcement entails coercive execution proceedings in the debtor’s assets to satisfy the creditor. Enforcement is based on an executory title, which the arbitral award does not qualify as. This gap is bridged by the declaration of enforceability, which constitutes the required executory title.

6.289  Section 1061 ZPO provides, as its second paragraph sets out correctly (para 6.252), for the declaration of enforceability for foreign arbitral awards, which generally is to be granted on the merits if none of the grounds for denial of recognition (Art V NYC) exists. This declaration of enforceability serves as the necessary executory title (s 794 para 1 no 4a ZPO) that allows for enforcement proceedings under ss 704 et seq. ZPO.585

6.290  As s 1061 para 1 ZPO and Art V NYC indicate, the recognition of a foreign arbitral award is to be granted under similar prerequisites as the declaration of its enforceability. It is, however, acknowledged that recognition does not require a separate recognition procedure, but rather occurs automatically if it has become binding under the law applicable to it (para 6.313) and if no grounds under Art V NYC exist.586 Absent a provision prohibiting the incidental review of a foreign arbitral award for the substantive requirements for recognition (as s 1059 para 1 ZPO does for domestic arbitral awards, para 6.160), any court or public authority may incidentally recognize the foreign award.587 However, such incidental review has no binding effect on other courts or public authorities.588

6.291  Alternatively, recognition can also be granted by way of a court order under s 1061 para 1 cl 1 ZPO, Art V NYC. Such court order recognizes the foreign arbitral award with binding effect for any subsequent decisions.589 Unlike the recognition of foreign judgments (s 328 para 1 no 5 ZPO), recognition of a foreign arbitral award does not require reciprocity.590

2.  Other Court Actions in the Context of Foreign Arbitral Awards

6.292  Similar to the legal situation for domestic arbitral awards, actions cannot be based on the duty to comply with a foreign award (paras 6.258 et seq.) or on the awarded claim (para 6.260).591

(p. 365) 6.293  As a counter- action to the recognition under s 1061 ZPO (para 6.291), the award debtor may request a declaration that the arbitral award is not to be recognized in Germany.592 Such request also allows the award debtor to gain a decision on the (denial of) recognition that is as binding as the decision under s 1061 ZPO (para 6.291). This request lacks legitimate reason to take legal action if the award creditor has already applied for a declaration of enforceability as the more far- reaching action.593 Recognition is detached from a declaration of enforceability (paras 6.288 et seq.) so that the request does not require the award to have enforceable content.594

6.294  Since— under the preferable view— the award creditor cannot request a declaration of enforceability if the award is of non- enforceable content (para 6.254), it is permissible to file a request for a declaration that the arbitral award be recognized in Germany.595 For other awards, the award creditor has no legitimate reason to take such legal action since the request under s 1061 ZPO is the more far- reaching court action.

6.295  Although foreign declarations of enforceability may be judgments, they cannot be recognized as such in Germany by way of a “double exequatur” since their effect is limited to the underlying decision’s enforceability in the country in which the declaration of enforceability was issued.596 Formerly, case law had made an exception to this rule for foreign decisions declaring foreign arbitral awards enforceable if they, as under the US doctrine of merger, went beyond a declaration of enforceability and fully incorporated the award.597 This exception has, however, properly been revoked, inasmuch as it allowed for a separate, second avenue to enforce a foreign arbitral award and thereby undermined the procedural requirements that s 1061 ZPO specifically sets up for arbitral awards (such as, for example, the denial of a declaration of enforceability on the grounds of a lack of a valid arbitration agreement).598

II.  Admissibility

6.296  The admissibility of a request to declare a foreign arbitral award enforceable is governed by the same rules as the admissibility of a request to declare a domestic (p. 366) arbitral award enforceable (paras 6.261 et seq.). However, the subject matter of the proceedings is limited to foreign (rather than to domestic) awards (para 6.303) and modifications apply for the competent court (para 6.304) and the legitimate reason to take legal action (para 6.305).

1.  Foreign Award

a)  Limitation to Arbitral Awards

6.297  Section 1061 para 1 cl 1 ZPO applies only to (foreign, para 6.303) arbitral awards. The provision does not allow recognizing or declaring enforceable either decisions of dispute resolution bodies other than arbitral tribunals or other decisions of an arbitral tribunal. It is difficult to determine what the notion of an arbitral award for purposes of s 1061 ZPO is since that provision refers to the New York Convention. The Convention also refers to the notion of an arbitral award and both notions do not necessarily match. Moreover, it is a matter of dispute whether the notion of an arbitral award underlying Art I NYC is to be determined autonomously, by reference to the national law of the state where the award was made or where enforceability is requested, or a combination of several of these criteria.599

6.298  In light of the German legislature’s pro- enforcement approach, it cannot be assumed that decisions that would qualify as arbitral awards if they were domestic decisions, ie that meet the German standard for awards (para 6.262), cannot be recognized and declared enforceable under s 1061 ZPO.600 On the other hand, Germany is a signatory state to the New York Convention and is under a duty as a matter of public international law to recognize and declare enforceable all awards within the scope of the Convention.601 Since Germany has withdrawn its reservation of reciprocity under Art I para 3 cl 1 NYC,602 this duty extends to awards made in any country other than Germany.603 Even if the notion of an arbitral award in s 1061 para 1 cl 1 ZPO were restricted to the German standard, it would need to be extended by direct application of the New York Convention.604 In light of this, it is more elegant to broaden the term “award” in s 1061 ZPO and to include any decision that meets the standard under Art I NYC.605

6.299  Only an arbitral award that is binding between the parties can be successfully recognized and declared enforceable under s 1061 ZPO. While the binding effect would indeed belong to the notion of an arbitral award under German law (p. 367) (paras 6.87 et seq.), this cannot hold true for a foreign arbitral award: Art V para 1 lit e NYC provides for the non- binding character as a ground for denying recognition and enforceability of a foreign award (paras 6.313 et seq.) so that the binding effect cannot yet put into question the classification as an arbitral award.606 What sounds merely dogmatic at first sight has the practical effect that the state court takes the non- binding character into account on the merits only if proven by the party opposing the application while the state court would review it on its own motion if it was part of the application’s admissibility.607

6.300  By contrast, finality is part and parcel of the notion of the arbitral award. A decision against which ordinary means of recourse to a state court or to another arbitral tribunal are available does not qualify as an arbitral award.608 Likewise, an arbitral tribunal’s decision is not (yet) an award if under the applicable arbitration law it requires a formal recognition to become final.609

6.301  The form requirements of an award are governed by its lex arbitri, ie the arbitration law of the country in which it was made.610 Therefore, an award does not need to meet the formal requirements under s 1054 para 1 ZPO in order to be recognized and declared enforceable under s 1061 ZPO.611

6.302  It is acknowledged that recognition and a declaration of enforceability can be sought for various types of awards including partial awards,612 awards on agreed terms,613 and awards on costs.614 It is controversial whether or not s 1061 ZPO applies to interlocutory awards (Zwischenschiedssprüche);615 interim awards (para 5.88) are assumed to be arbitral awards.616 Decisions like the Italian lodo irrituale which have contractual force only between the parties and require subsequent (p. 368) court action to become binding are not considered to be arbitral awards.617 Foreign interim measures usually are not classified as arbitral awards618 if not issued in the form of an interim award (para 5.88)619 but can, under the preferable view, be recognized and granted leave of enforcement under s 1041 ZPO (paras 5.67 et seq.).

b)  Limitation to Foreign Awards

6.303  Only foreign awards can be recognized and declared enforceable under s 1061 ZPO. An award is foreign if its place of arbitration is outside Germany (s 1025 paras 4 and 1 ZPO).620 The approach under the German pre- reform arbitration law to determine the nationality of an arbitral award by the arbitration law chosen by the parties or otherwise applicable to the arbitral award has been abandoned. Only by selecting the place of arbitration can the parties determine the nationality of an arbitral award.621 So- called a- national awards that are supposedly not anchored in a national arbitration law may— if this concept is to be acknowledged— be enforced under s 1060 ZPO or s 1061 ZPO depending on their place of arbitration.622

2.  Competent Court (s 1062 ZPO)

6.304  The application for a declaration of enforceability is to be filed with a higher regional court (s 1062 para 1 no 4, paras 2, 5 ZPO; paras 6.174 et seq.). The court of local jurisdiction is to be determined in a two- step procedure: first, all higher regional courts are competent in the district in which the party opposing the application has its place of business or place of habitual residence, or where assets of that party or the property in dispute or affected by the measure is located. If more than one of these courts has jurisdiction, the applicant may choose at its convenience.623 If none of these is competent, the Berlin Higher Regional Court (Kammergericht) shall be competent (s 1062 para 2 ZPO). Some assume that a sufficient connection to Germany is required in order to establish the Kammergericht’s jurisdiction624 and that this criterion is not met if the foreign award debtor neither has assets in Germany nor is expected to have such domestic assets in the future.625 In that case, however, the applicant has no legitimate reason to take legal action so that its (p. 369) application would be inadmissible in any event.626 Therefore, there is little need to deny the court jurisdiction.

3.  Legitimate Reason to Take Legal Action

6.305  As in the case of any other court action, the s 1061 ZPO proceedings are admissible only if the applicant has legitimate reason to take legal action (para 5.17). The application lacks such interest if for example the award does not have enforceable content (para 6.254)627 or if the foreign award debtor does not have and will not have property located in Germany (para 6.304). The amounts owed under the award need not yet be due.628

III.  Merits

6.306  The application will be successful on the merits under s 1061 ZPO if it is directed against the correct opposing party (para 6.307), if no grounds for denial of recognition and enforceability exist (paras 6.308 et seq.) on which the opposing party can rely (paras 6.323 et seq.), and if the opposing party does not successfully raise specific substantive law objections against the claim underlying the award (para 6.327).

1.  Party Opposing the Application

6.307  The correct parties to an application for the recognition and a declaration of enforceability of a foreign arbitral award are the parties named in the arbitral award or their legal successors (for details, see para 6.270).629

2.  Non- existence of Grounds for Denial of Recognition and Enforceability (Art V NYC)

6.308  The application under s 1061 ZPO will be denied if grounds under Art V NYC exist. While the word “may” in Art V paras 1 and 2 NYC internationally— including in the US, France, and Switzerland— is read to provide the court with discretion to recognize the foreign award and declare it enforceable,630 the prevailing view in German jurisprudence and commentary is notably more restrictive and has seen fit to read “may” as “must.”631 This is in line with the fact that German law never allows for court discretion in the context of recognition and enforceability.632

(p. 370) 6.309  The grounds listed in Art V NYC almost literally match the grounds listed in s 1059 para 2 ZPO. This does not come as a surprise since Art V NYC served as the blueprint for art 34 Model Law, which in turn was adopted into German law in 1998.633 German courts tend to interpret and apply the grounds under s 1059 para 2 ZPO and Art V NYC similarly so that reference can be made to the former (paras 6.193 et seq.) including the general remarks in paras 6.187 et seq. Specific details are, however, to be discussed with regard to the grounds for denial of recognition and enforceability under Art V para 1 lit a option 2 (paras 6.310 et seq.), para 1 lit e (paras 6.313 et seq.), and para 2 lit b (paras 6.315 et seq.) NYC.

a)  Invalidity of the Arbitration Agreement (Art V para 1 lit a option 2 NYC)

6.310  By expressly referencing the “agreement referred to in article II,” Art V para 1 lit a option 2 NYC also incorporates the “in writing” requirement for arbitration agreements and the lack of such form as a ground for invalidity which would allow for denial of recognition and enforceability. Under Art II para 2 NYC, the term “agreement in writing” shall include an arbitral clause in a contract or an arbitration agreement, signed by the parties or contained in an exchange of letters or telegrams.634 In line with no 1 of the 2006 UNCITRAL Recommendation (Annex C), this provision is to be interpreted in a non- exhaustive manner:635 “include” allows for an understanding according to which the subsequently listed requirements are nothing but examples for what accounts as “in writing.” Article VII para 1 NYC, which— in line with no 2 of the 2006 UNCITRAL Recommendation— is to be applied by way of analogy to arbitration agreements, furthermore allows for applying more favorable form requirements under national law.636

6.311  It is a matter of dispute under German law as to the form requirements of which national law could apply as more favorable by operation of Art VII para 1 NYC. The Federal Supreme Court deems it sufficient if the form requirements either under German law (s 1031 ZPO, paras 2.67 et seq.) or under the law determined under general German conflict of law rules (art 11 EGBGB) are met.637 This result goes beyond the rationale of Art VII para 1 NYC: the most- favorable- law provision makes clear that the New York Convention is not to be understood as an exclusive instrument for recognizing and declaring enforceable foreign arbitral awards (or (p. 371) recognizing foreign arbitration agreements respectively), but that the otherwise applicable rules remain applicable if they are more favorable. If Art II NYC did not exist, a German court would need to determine the law governing form requirements for arbitration agreements under its conflict of law rules, ie under Art V para 1 no 1 NYC.638

6.312  However, Art VII para 1 NYC does not open additional avenues such as recourse to national form provisions that the legislature had not contemplated applying to foreign arbitration agreements and, in fact, expressly excluded from application (s 1025 para 1 ZPO).639 The Federal Supreme Court’s reasoning that otherwise foreign awards would be more difficult to enforce in Germany than domestic awards640 cannot supersede this clear rationale.641

b)  Non- binding Award (Art V para 1 lit e NYC)

6.313  Under Art V para 1 lit e NYC, a foreign award “may” (para 6.308) not be recognized and declared enforceable if it has not yet become binding on the parties, or has been set aside or suspended by a competent authority of its country of origin. Whether the award has not yet become binding is to be determined autonomously taking into account the law at the place of arbitration.642 The award is binding if it cannot be challenged before an arbitral tribunal of second instance or under the laws of its country of origin.643 It is irrelevant whether the award is already enforceable in its country of origin644 or may already be declared enforceable there.645

6.314  If the foreign arbitral award has been set aside in its country of origin, this constitutes a separate ground for denial of recognition and a declaration of enforceability regardless of the grounds for which the award was set aside.646 An exception applies within the scope of Art IX para 2 European Convention (para 6.335). The setting aside decision in the award’s country of origin does not need to meet the (p. 372) requirements for recognition and enforceability of a foreign judgment under s 328 ZPO.647 The mere fact that the arbitral award cannot be declared enforceable in its country of origin does not constitute a ground under Art V para 1 lit e NYC.648

c)  Public Policy Violation (Art V para 2 lit b NYC)

6.315  German courts will not recognize and declare as enforceable a foreign award if doing so would be contrary to German public policy (Art V para 2 lit b NYC). Similar to the public policy violation in s 1059 para 2 no 2 lit b ZPO (paras 6.225 et seq.), Art V para 2 lit b NYC serves the purpose of providing the member states to the New York Convention with a safety- valve allowing them to prevent the intrusion of awards into their legal system which they consider irreconcilable with it.649

aa)  Standard

6.316  According to the prevailing view, the public policy standard to be applied within Art V para 2 lit b NYC (“international public policy”) is even more lenient for reasons of comity than the public policy standard under s 1059 para 2 no 2 lit b ZPO (“national public policy”).650 Both standards, however, are— and need to be in light of public policy’s safety- valve purpose (para 6.315)— standards under German law rather than internationalized standards.651 Under German law, the differences between both standards will be only a matter of degree.652

bb)  Procedural International Public Policy

6.317  Procedural international public policy takes into consideration the remedies that are available under the arbitration law governing the arbitral proceedings: the easier it is for the affected party to remedy an issue within the arbitration effectively, the more difficult it will be for such issue to meet the threshold of a public policy violation.653

6.318  The Federal Supreme Court has held that the lack of a valid arbitration agreement may constitute a public policy violation if that objection had been timely raised in the arbitral proceedings.654 Public policy may also be violated if the parties have chosen a law (applicable on the merits, on procedure, on the validity of an arbitration clause etc) that has no connection with the dispute and that has been chosen (p. 373) only in order to circumvent otherwise applicable mandatory law.655 It has been held to be a violation of public policy if the executory title is not sufficiently specific to be enforced by the German enforcement agencies656 if the dispositive part cannot be rephrased accordingly (para 6.331).

6.319  An arbitral award issued by a biased arbitrator may violate international public policy if such bias had an effect on the arbitral award657 and if the affected party could not reasonably remedy this issue before the arbitral tribunal or before the state courts at the place of arbitration.658 It was held that a sole arbitrator appointed by one of the parties alone pursuant to English arbitration law after the other party failed to make use of its appointment rights could permissibly render an arbitral award without violating German international public policy.659 Consultation of a legal adviser by an arbitrator is considered to comply with international public policy,660 as is scrutiny of the award under art 33 ICC Rules.661

6.320  A violation of the right to be heard may also constitute a public policy violation.662 However, exclusion of a party from the proceedings due to contempt of court has not been held to violate international public policy.663

6.321  International public policy is violated if a ground for an action for retrial under s 580 nos 1 to 6 ZPO is present (cf para 6.230).664 If an arbitral award does not provide reasons for its decision and was required to do so, international public policy may be violated.665

cc)  Substantive International Public Policy

6.322  Substantive international public policy is a standard that is similar to, but more lenient (para 6.316) than substantive national public policy (paras 6.231 et seq.). Examples include the violation of (p. 374) German mandatory commercial law like competition law or price fixing law,666 the violation of mandatory rules of European Community law,667 an award ordering payment of punitive damages,668 an award of claims based on a contract that is clearly against good morals (cf s 138 BGB),669 or an award that has been obtained by intentionally inflicting damage on the opposing party against good morals (s 826 BGB, para 6.163).670 Substantive international public policy does not allow for reviewing the correctness of the arbitral tribunal’s decision on substance (no révision au fond).671

3.  Exclusion of Grounds for Denial of Recognition and Enforceability

a)  Preclusion due to Inactivity in the Arbitral Proceedings

6.323  As in the case of domestic arbitral proceedings (paras 6.217 et seq. and 6.224), a party to foreign arbitral proceedings may not be able to invoke a ground for denial of recognition and enforceability if the ground arose during the arbitral proceedings and the party did not raise it. If under the arbitration law at the place of arbitration the party is precluded from relying on such defect, if the defect as such is cured or if the party is otherwise barred from relying on the defect, then this effect will also be acknowledged in proceedings under s 1061 ZPO.672

b)  Preclusion due to Inactivity After the Arbitral Proceedings

6.324  The more controversial question is whether an applicant is also precluded from relying on grounds that it could have raised in setting aside or similar proceedings which were subject to a limitation period although no such proceedings were timely initiated. The New York Convention does not stipulate such preclusion, but rather leaves the decision on preclusion to the national law.673 The Federal Supreme Court held in a case in which the opposing party relied on the absence of a valid arbitration agreement that no such preclusion took place.674 The court reasoned that Art VII para 1 NYC references not only the national law regime for the (p. 375) recognition and enforceability of foreign awards (ie s 1061 ZPO), but also the national law regime for the enforceability of domestic awards (ie s 1060 ZPO).675 It further held that s 1059 para 3, s 1060 para 2 cl 3 ZPO— which stipulate such preclusion for domestic awards— were not referenced since the German legislature lacks competence to regulate the setting aside of foreign awards.676

6.325  While it already goes beyond the concept of Art VII para 1 NYC to allow the provision to reference the national law regime for the enforceability of domestic awards (paras 6.311 et seq.), it is inconsistent to exclude a detail of this regime (ie s 1059 para 3, s 1060 para 2 cl 3 ZPO) without further reasoning.677 Since s 1060 para 2 cl 3 ZPO aims to safeguard the deadline under s 1059 para 3 ZPO (para 6.273) and this rationale also applies to foreign arbitral awards, the better grounds speak for applying s 1060 para 2 cl 3 ZPO by way of analogy.678

c)  Waiver of Grounds for Denial of Recognition and Enforceability

6.326  A party cannot rely on a ground for denial of recognition or enforceability if that ground is subject to a valid waiver. In the context of s 1061 ZPO and the New York Convention, such waivers are similarly restricted as for domestic awards (paras 6.165 et seq.).679

4.  Substantive Law Objections Against the Awarded Claim

6.327  Although not expressly permitted in s 1061 ZPO, the prevailing view allows for raising substantive law objections against the awarded claims in these proceedings.680 The same limits and the same concerns that have been discussed for s 1060 ZPO proceedings (paras 6.276 et seq.) also apply here.

IV.  Procedure

1.  General

6.328  The proceedings for recognition and a declaration of enforceability of a foreign award under s 1061 ZPO are governed by the same rules as those for a declaration of enforceability of a domestic award under s 1060 ZPO, namely ss 1062 et seq. ZPO (paras 6.279 et seq.). An oral hearing (para 6.282) will more likely be ordered (p. 376) in s 1061 ZPO proceedings than in s 1060 ZPO proceedings, since the applicability of a foreign lex arbitri tends to complicate the proceedings.681

2.  Documents to Supply (s 1064 ZPO)

6.329  Under Art IV para 1 NYC, the application must be accompanied by the duly authenticated original award or a duly certified copy thereof and by the original arbitration agreement or a duly certified copy thereof. These rules are stricter than s 1064 ZPO, pursuant to which the award or a certified copy of the award suffices (para 6.281). Although s 1064 para 3 ZPO gives preference to international treaties including the New York Convention, the more- favorable- law provision in Art VII para 1 NYC allows for the application of the more recognition- and enforcement- friendly provision of s 1064 ZPO. Therefore, only the award or a certified copy thereof need be supplied with the application under s 1061 ZPO,682 and not a copy of the arbitration agreement.683 Like s 1064 ZPO (para 6.281), Art IV para 1 NYC is not understood as a prerequisite for the application’s admissibility but rather as a provision containing evidentiary rules in the event the content of the arbitral award is disputed.684

6.330  Article IV para 2 NYC, according to which the arbitral award would have to be translated into German and according to which that translation would need to be certified by an official or sworn translator or by a diplomatic or consular agent, is likewise superseded by the general rules of German civil procedure. Under these (p. 377) rules, it remains in the court’s discretion to request a translation (para 6.264), which is the more enforceability- friendly regulation in the sense of Art VII para 1 NYC.685

V.  Effects of an Order on the Declaration of Enforceability

1.  Order Granting a Declaration of Enforceability

6.331  If the declaration of enforceability is granted, the court may not amend the operative part of the arbitral award on substance, but may rephrase it so that it meets the German standards for enforcement (para 6.285).686 For example, reference to a foreign statutory interest rate may be replaced by that rate as a figure.687 Interest awarded from the delivery of the cost award may be substantiated by the specific date on which the cost award was delivered.688 If father and son share the same name and live at the same address, an ambiguous party designation in the award’s dispositive part may be clarified in the declaration of enforceability if the award’s reasoning is unequivocal in this regard.689 The order granting the declaration of enforceability under s 1061 ZPO is to be declared provisionally enforceable (s 1064 para 2 ZPO), thereby allowing for immediate enforcement (para 6.284).

2.  Order Denying a Declaration of Enforceability (s 1061 para 2 ZPO)

6.332  If the declaration of enforceability is to be refused since the court found a ground for denial of recognition and enforcement to apply (paras 6.308 et seq.), the court shall rule that the arbitral award is not to be recognized in Germany (s 1061 para 2 ZPO). This declaration takes the position of setting aside a domestic arbitral award (s 1060 para 2 cl 1 ZPO, para 6.286); such setting aside is outside the jurisdiction of the German courts if foreign awards are concerned (para 6.173). If, however, the declaration of enforceability is refused since the application was inadmissible (paras 6.296 et seq.) or the other party successfully raised substantive law objections against the awarded claim (para 6.327), only the application is dismissed.690 In that case, the application may be filed again once the admissibility issues have been cured.691

(p. 378) VI.  Setting Aside the Declaration of Enforceability (s 1061 para 3 ZPO)

6.333  A foreign arbitral award that has been set aside in its country of origin will not be recognized and declared enforceable in Germany (Art V para 1 lit e NYC). If the setting aside occurs only after the recognition and declaration as enforceable in Germany, the latter remains unaffected. However, setting aside the declaration of enforceability can be requested (s 1061 para 3 ZPO). While this provision requires the arbitral award to be finally692 set aside in its country of origin,693 the grounds for which the award was set aside are irrelevant even if they differ from the respective grounds under German law.694 The request under s 1061 para 3 ZPO is not time- bound.695

VII.  Other Treaties on the Recognition and Enforceability of Foreign Arbitral Awards

6.334  The provisions of treaties on the recognition and enforceability of arbitral awards other than the New York Convention remain applicable (s 1061 para 1 cl 2 ZPO). The relevance of such other regimes for recognition and enforceability, however, remains limited in practice. The Geneva Treaties (Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses of 1923 and the Geneva Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1927) have largely been supplanted by the New York Convention (Art VII para 2 NYC).

6.335  A (slightly) more important alternative regime for the recognition and declaration of enforceability of foreign arbitral awards is the European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration of April 21, 1961 (Annex D). The European Convention, pursuant to its Art X para 7, does not supersede other conventions. The European Convention’s most relevant provision is Art IX para 2, which, in relation between member states to the New York Convention, notably limits Art V para 1 lit e NYC to the grounds set out by Art IX para 1 European Convention. The effect of this restriction is that if the award has been set aside in its country of origin for grounds of a lack of arbitrability or a violation of public policy, such setting aside cannot be raised as a ground for denial of recognition and a declaration of enforceability under Art V para 1 lit e NYC.696 The members to the European Convention are not limited to European states (Art X paras 1 and 2 European Convention), and also include Azerbaijan, Burkina Faso, Cuba, and Kazakhstan.

(p. 379) 6.336  The most favorable law provisions in Art VII para 1 NYC, Art X para 7 European Convention and other conventions allow for applying the regime for recognition and declaration as enforceable that is most favorable to the applicant (see also paras 6.311 et seq.). The courts apply the most favorable law on their own motion without the need of an election by the applicant.697 The prevailing view does, however, allow only for the choice among (entire) regimes, not among (individual) provisions (no “cherry picking”).698

6.337  The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention) has established a self- contained arbitration system for investment disputes. Awards rendered under this convention do not require recognition and a declaration as enforceable under s 1061 ZPO to be enforceable in Germany (Art 54 ICSID Convention). The award may be reviewed only by an annulment committee under Art 52 ICSID Convention. Germany has been a member state to the ICSID Convention since 1969.699(p. 380)

Footnotes:

1  Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1052 para 2; Nedden/Büstgens, SchiedsVZ 2015, 169, 173 et seq.; Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1052 para 1.

2  Dissenting (entire tribunal) Geimer, in: Zöller (ed), s 1052 para 2; Lachmann, para 1680; Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1052 para 2; Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1052 para 1.

3  Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1052 para 1.

4  Concurring Nedden/Büstgens, SchiedsVZ 2015, 169, 174.

5  See Nedden/Büstgens, SchiedsVZ 2015, 169, 174.

6  KG OLGRspr. 27 (1913), 196, 198; Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1052 para 2.

7  BGHZ 23, 138, 140 = NJW 1957, 592; Bartels, SchiedsVZ 2014, 133, 134; Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1052 para 3; Schwab/Walter, ch 19 para 5.

8  BGHZ 98, 32, 35 = NJW 1986, 3077, 3078.

9  Prütting, in: Festschrift Schwab, pp 409, 413 et seq.; Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1035 para 24.

10  BGHZ 23, 138, 141 = NJW 1957, 592; Prütting, in: Festschrift Böckstiegel, pp 629, 632 et seq.

11  Prütting, in: Festschrift Schwab, pp 409, 419; dissenting Lachmann, para 1695; Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1052 para 5; Nedden/Büstgens, SchiedsVZ 2015, 169, 173; Schwab/Walter, ch 19 para 5.

12  Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1052 para 7; Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1052 para 3.

13  BGHZ 23, 138, 141 = NJW 1957, 592 et seq.; Geimer, in: Zöller (ed), s 1052 para 5; Hartmann, in: Baumbach/Lauterbach/Albers/Hartmann (eds), s 1052 para 5; Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1052 para 4; Schwab/Walter, ch 19 para 5; Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1052 para 3.

14  Pro: Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1052 para 3; con: Bartels, SchiedsVZ 2014, 133; Lionnet/Lionnet, pp 395 et seq.; Wagner, in: Weigand (ed), 1st edn, Part 4: Germany, para 331.

15  Dissenting Bartels, SchiedsVZ 2014, 133, 135 et seq. (emphasizing the advantages of dissenting opinions).

16  BGH ZZP 71 (1958), 427, 435; Schwab/Walter, ch 19 para 3; Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1052 para 2.

17  KG JW 1928, 735, 736; OLG Düsseldorf, BB 1976, 251; Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1052 para 5.

18  Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1052 para 5.

19  Nedden/Büstgens, SchiedsVZ 2015, 169, 177; Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1052 para 2; see also Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1052 para 5.

20  BGH ZZP 71 (1958), 427, 435; Geimer, in: Zöller (ed), s 1049 para 3; Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1052 para 6; Schwab/Walter, ch 19 para 3.

21  Schlosser, in: Stein/Jonas (eds), s 1042 para 2.

22  Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1052 para 2.

23  Eg the ICC Note on the Appointment, Duties and Remuneration of Administrative Secretaries of August 1, 2012.

24  Eg the Young ICCA Guide on Arbitral Secretaries of 2014.

25  Cf Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1052 para 5; Stürner, SchiedsVZ 2013, 322, 327.

26  Term tracing back to Partasides, “The Fourth Arbitrator? The Role of Secretaries to Tribunals in International Arbitration,” (2002) 18(2) Arb. Int’l 147.

27  Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1052 para 6.

28  OLG Düsseldorf, BB 1976, 251; Kreindler/Schäfer/Wolff, para 1092; Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1054 para 5; more generous Stürner, SchiedsVZ 2013, 322, 327.

29  Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1052 para 5; Raeschke-Kessler/Berger, para 955; see generally Menz, SchiedsVZ 2015, 210 et seq.

30  Nedden/Büstgens, SchiedsVZ 2015, 169, 176; Schlosser, in: Stein/Jonas (eds), s 1042 para 37; Schwab/Walter, ch 19 para 2; dissenting Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1052 para 1.

31  Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1052 para 5.

32  Government bill, BT-Drucks 13/5274, p 53.

33  Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1052 para 9; Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1052 para 9.

34  Government bill, BT-Drucks 13/5274, p 53; Schwab/Walter, ch 8 para 14; dissenting Prütting, in: Prütting/Gehrlein (eds), s 1052 para 3 (dismissal of claim).

35  Government bill, BT-Drucks 13/5274, p 54.

36  Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1052 para 8; Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1052 para 6.

37  Government bill, BT-Drucks 13/5274, p 54; Geimer, in: Zöller (ed), s 1052 para 6.

38  Government bill, BT-Drucks 13/5274, p 54.

39  OLG Saarbrücken, SchiedsVZ 2003, 92, 93.

40  Cf Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1053 para 4.

41  OLG München, GmbHR 2005, 1568, 1570; Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1053 para 9; Schwab/Walter, ch 23 para 7; Spohnheimer, in: Festschrift Kaissis, pp 933, 935 et seq.

42  Bredow, SchiedsVZ 2010, 295, 297; v Schlabrendorff/Sessler, in: Arbitration in Germany, s 1053 para 9; Schlosser, in: Stein/Jonas (eds), s 1053 para 8; Schroeter, SchiedsVZ 2006, 298, 302 et seq.

43  See Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1053 para 4.

44  v Schlabrendorff/Sessler, in: Arbitration in Germany, s 1053 para 9.

45  Bredow, SchiedsVZ 2010, 295, 297; Holtzmann/Neuhaus, pp 822 et seq.; v Schlabrendorff/Sessler, in: Arbitration in Germany, s 1053 para 9.

46  Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1053 para 11.

47  v Schlabrendorff/Sessler, in: Arbitration in Germany, s 1053 para 11; Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1053 para 5.

48  v Schlabrendorff/Sessler, in: Arbitration in Germany, s 1053 para 11.

49  Mankowski, ZZP 114 (2001), 37, 62 et seq.; Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1053 para 16; v Schlabrendorff/Sessler, in: Arbitration in Germany, s 1053 para 14.

50  Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1053 para 17; Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1053 para 4.

51  Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1053 paras 16, 37; v Schlabrendorff/Sessler, in: Arbitration in Germany, s 1053 para 14.

52  Cf v Schlabrendorff/Sessler, in: Arbitration in Germany, s 1053 para 16.

53  Cf v Schlabrendorff/Sessler, in: Arbitration in Germany, s 1053 para 7.

54  Dissenting Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1053 para 43; v Schlabrendorff/Sessler, in: Arbitration in Germany, s 1053 para 18.

55  Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1053 para 13; v Schlabrendorff/Sessler, in: Arbitration in Germany, s 1053 paras 13, 25 et seq.; F Schmidt, SchiedsVZ 2013, 32, 34.

56  Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1053 para 3; dissenting F Schmidt, SchiedsVZ 2013, 32, 34.

57  Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1053 para 4.

58  Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1053 para 4.

59  Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1053 para 9.

60  Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1053 para 4.

61  Bilda, DB 2004, 171, 175; Mankowski, ZZP 114 (2001), 37, 61 et seq.; v Schlabrendorff/Sessler, in: Arbitration in Germany, s 1053 para 28; see also Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1053 para 1.

62  Cf Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1053 para 1.

63  BGHZ 39, 60, 63 = NJW 1963, 637; Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1053 para 9.

64  BGHZ 88, 364, 366 et seq. = NJW 1984, 312; R Fischer, in: BeckOK BGB, s 779 para 89.

65  Bredow, SchiedsVZ 2010, 295, 297; Geimer, in: Zöller (ed), s 1053 para 3; Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1053 para 23; v Schlabrendorff/Sessler, in: Arbitration in Germany, s 1053 para 35; Schwab/Walter, ch 23 para 13; Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1053 para 10; dissenting Mankowski, ZZP 114 (2001), 37, 70.

66  Cf Busse, SchiedsVZ 2010, 57, 59 et seq.; Gerstenmaier, SchiedsVZ 2010, 281, 284; v Schlabrendorff/Sessler, in: Arbitration in Germany, s 1053 para 16.

67  Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1053 para 24; Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1053 para 10; Waßmuth, pp 53 et seq.

68  Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1053 para 40.

69  Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1053 para 15.

70  Cf Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1053 para 17.

71  Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1053 para 17.

72  Cf Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1056 para 1.

73  Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1053 para 16.

74  Cf Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1053 para 16 (analogous application of s 1059 para 5 ZPO).

75  Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1053 para 16.

76  Government bill, BT-Drucks 13/5274, p 54.

77  v Schlabrendorff/Sessler, in: Arbitration in Germany, s 1053 para 30.

78  Mankowski, ZZP 114 (2001), 37, 70 et seq.; Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1053 para 20; v Schlabrendorff/Sessler, in: Arbitration in Germany, s 1053 para 32; Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1053 para 8.

79  Cf Bredow, SchiedsVZ 2010, 295, 296.

80  Geimer, in: Zöller (ed), s 1053 para 2; v Schlabrendorff/Sessler, in: Arbitration in Germany, s 1053 para 34; Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1053 para 8.

81  Mankowski, ZZP 114 (2001), 37, 73 et seq.; Schütze, in: Festschrift Lorenz, pp 275, 277; Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1053 para 8; dissenting Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1053 para 20 with further references.

82  Bilda, DB 2004, 171, 172; Lachmann, para 1809; Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1053 para 12; v Schlabrendorff/Sessler, in: Arbitration in Germany, s 1053 para 24; requiring only submission to the arbitration agreement: Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1053 para 5.

83  Cf Bredow, SchiedsVZ 2010, 295, 296; Schwab/Walter, ch 23 para 8; see also Schlosser, in: Stein/Jonas (eds), s 1053 para 17.

84  Mankowski, ZZP 114 (2001), 37, 62 et seq.; Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1053 para 17; v Schlabrendorff/Sessler, in: Arbitration in Germany, s 1053 para 27; Schlosser, in: Stein/Jonas (eds), s 1053 para 4; Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1053 para 4.

85  Government bill, BT-Drucks 13/5274, p 55; critical Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1053 para 25.

86  v Schlabrendorff/Sessler, in: Arbitration in Germany, s 1053 para 36; Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1053 para 10; Waßmuth, p 38; see also Government bill, BT-Drucks 13/5274, p 55; dissenting Bilda, DB 2004, 171, 174 et seq.; Mankowski, ZZP 114 (2001), 37, 44 et seq.

87  v Schlabrendorff/Sessler, in: Arbitration in Germany, s 1053 para 22; stricter Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1053 para 31 (parties must not sign).

88  See OLG München, NZBau 2007, 311; Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1053 para 9: no enforcement of a simple protocol.

89  Geimer, in: Zöller (ed), s 1053 para 6; v Schlabrendorff/Sessler, in: Arbitration in Germany, s 1053 para 21; Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1053 para 9.

90  Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1053 para 38.

91  Government bill, BT-Drucks 13/5274, p 54.

92  Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1053 para 38; Spohnheimer, in: Festschrift Kaissis, pp 933, 940.

93  Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1053 para 40.

94  Lachmann, para 1829; Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1053 para 47.

95  Government bill, BT-Drucks 13/5274, p 55.

96  OLG München, GmbHR 2005, 1568, 1570; Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1053 para 13.

97  Government bill, BT-Drucks 13/5274, p 55.

98  Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1053 para 14; dissenting Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1053 paras 53 et seq.

99  Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1053 para 52; v Schlabrendorff/Sessler, in: Arbitration in Germany, s 1053 para 41; Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1053 para 14.

100  Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1053 para 52; Schlosser, in: Stein/Jonas (eds), s 1053 para 32; v Schlabrendorff/Sessler, in: Arbitration in Germany, s 1053 para 42; Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1053 para 14; dissenting Hartmann, in: Baumbach/Lauterbach/Albers/Hartmann (eds), s 1053 para 10.

101  Government bill, BT-Drucks 13/5274, p 57.

102  BGHZ 193, 38, 42 para 9 = SchiedsVZ 2012, 154, 155; 2014, 31, 33 para 10; Government bill, BT-Drucks 13/5274, p 57; Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1057 para 4.

103  v Schlabrendorff/Sessler, in: Arbitration in Germany, s 1057 para 39.

104  Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1057 para 3; Schlosser, in: Stein/Jonas (eds), s 1057 para 1.

105  Reichold, in: Thomas/Putzo (eds), s 1057 para 9; Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1057 para 2.

106  Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1057 para 2.

107  BGHZ 151, 79, 84 = SchiedsVZ 2003, 39, 40; Lachmann, para 1879; Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1057 para 24; Reichold, in: Thomas/Putzo (eds), s 1057 para 9; v Schlabrendorff/Sessler, in: Arbitration in Germany, s 1057 para 36; Schlosser, in: Stein/Jonas (eds), s 1057 para 4; Schwab/Walter, ch 33 para 4.

108  Explicitly KG SchiedsVZ 2011, 110, 111.

109  Kreindler/Schäfer/Wolff, para 1207; Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1057 para 12; v Schlabrendorff/Sessler, in: Arbitration in Germany, s 1057 para 41; Schlosser, in: Stein/Jonas (eds), s 1057 para 1; Schwab/Walter, ch 33 para 2; Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1057 para 5; Wolff, SchiedsVZ 2006, 131, 133 et seq.

110  Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1057 para 8.

111  KG SchiedsVZ 2011, 110, 111.

112  Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1057 para 8.

113  BGHZ 193, 38, 41 para 7 = SchiedsVZ 2012, 154, 155; KG SchiedsVZ 2011, 110, 111; Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1057 para 5.

114  Government bill, BT-Drucks 13/5274, p 57.

115  Government bill, BT-Drucks 13/5274, p 57.

116  Kreindler/Schäfer/Wolff, para 1193; Kühn/Gantenberg, in: DIS- Mat. X, pp 83, 89; Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1057 para 14; v Schlabrendorff/Sessler, in: Arbitration in Germany, s 1057 para 33; see also BGHZ 193, 38, 42 para 9 = SchiedsVZ 2012, 154, 155.

117  Cf KG SchiedsVZ 2011, 110, 111 (s 269 ZPO).

118  OLG Karlsruhe, SchiedsVZ 2012, 101, 106 = XXXVIII Y.B. Com. Arb. 379, 383 (2013); Kühn/Gantenberg, in: DIS- Mat. X, pp 83, 88; Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1057 para 12; Schlosser, in: Stein/Jonas (eds), s 1057 para 6; Schwab/Walter, ch 33 para 1.

119  See Born, p 3090.

120  See Kreindler/Schäfer/Wolff, para 1195.

121  Kreindler/Schäfer/Wolff, para 1195; Schlosser, in: Stein/Jonas (eds), s 1057 para 8.

122  v Schlabrendorff/Sessler, in: Arbitration in Germany, s 1057 para 34.

123  See eg the ICC Commission Report Techniques for Controlling Time and Costs in Arbitration, 2nd edn, 2012, para 82.

124  ICC Commission Report Techniques for Controlling Time and Costs in Arbitration, 2nd edn, 2012, para 82; Kreindler/Schäfer/Wolff, para 1195.

125  Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1057 para 3.

126  Government bill, BT-Drucks 13/5274, p 57.

127  Kreindler/Schäfer/Wolff, paras 1203 et seq.

128  Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1057 para 4.

129  BGH NJW- RR 1998, 234, 235; Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1057 para 28; Schlosser, in: Stein/Jonas (eds), s 1057 para 24; Schwab/Walter, ch 33 para 12; Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1057 para 4.

130  BGHZ 179, 304, 314 para 37 = SchiedsVZ 2009, 176, 179; OLG München, SchiedsVZ 2012, 156, 158 (even a declaration of enforceability would lose its effect [p 159]) = XXXIX Y.B. Com. Arb. 389, 391 (2014); OLG Stuttgart, NJW- RR 2003, 1438, 1439; Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1057 para 28; Reichold, in: Thomas/Putzo (eds), s 1057 para 8; v Schlabrendorff/Sessler, in: Arbitration in Germany, s 1057 para 42; Schlosser, in: Stein/Jonas (eds), s 1057 para 24.

131  BGH NJW- RR 2007, 784 para 3; Lackmann, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 104 para 40.

132  Wolff, SchiedsVZ 2006, 131, 138 et seq.

133  For potential exceptions, see Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1057 para 21; v Schlabrendorff/Sessler, in: Arbitration in Germany, s 1057 para 19.

134  Kreindler/Schäfer/Wolff, para 1244.

135  Kühn/Gantenberg, in: DIS- Mat. X, pp 83, 88; Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1057 para 1.

136  Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1057 para 13; Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1057 para 6.

137  Cf BGHZ 193, 38, 43 para 10 = SchiedsVZ 2012, 154, 155 et seq.; Government bill, BT-Drucks 13/5274, p 58 (“decision has not the quality of an award”); Wolff, SchiedsVZ 2006, 131, 134.

138  Wolff, SchiedsVZ 2006, 131, 136.

139  Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1057 para 5; Wolff, SchiedsVZ 2006, 131, 136.

140  BGHZ 193, 38, 43 para 10 = SchiedsVZ 2012, 154, 156; Wolff, SchiedsVZ 2006, 131, 137.

141  Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1057 para 5; Wolff, SchiedsVZ 2006, 131, 140; dissenting Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1057 para 9 fn 18.

142  BGH WM 1977, 319, 320; similar OLG Hamburg, MDR 1965, 54, 55.

143  BGH WM 1977, 319, 320 et seq.; similar OLG Dresden, SchiedsVZ 2004, 44; OLG Hamburg, MDR 1965, 54, 55; Government bill, BT-Drucks 13/5274, p 58.

144  See BGHZ 193, 38, 40 et seq. para 6 = SchiedsVZ 2012, 154, 155; Wolff, SchiedsVZ 2006, 131, 133.

145  BGHZ 193, 38 = SchiedsVZ 2012, 154; for foreign arbitral awards OLG München, SchiedsVZ 2012, 287, 288.

146  Elsing, in: DIS- Mat. X, pp 3, 5; Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1057 para 9; v Schlabrendorff/Sessler, in: Arbitration in Germany, s 1057 para 15.

147  Cf Schwab/Walter, ch 33 para 18.

148  Kreindler/Schäfer/Wolff, para 1217; see also Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1057 para 19; v Schlabrendorff/Sessler, in: Arbitration in Germany, s 1057 paras 29 et seq.

149  Cf Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1057 para 19; v Schlabrendorff/Sessler, in: Arbitration in Germany, s 1057 para 30.

150  Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1057 para 19; dissenting Geimer, in: Zöller (ed), s 1057 para 8; Sandrock, IDR 2004, 106, 109; v Schlabrendorff/Sessler, in: Arbitration in Germany, s 1057 para 31.

151  Kreindler/Schäfer/Wolff, para 1220; Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1057 para 6; v Schlabrendorff/Sessler, in: Arbitration in Germany, s 1057 para 6.

152  Schlosser, RIW 2005, 81, 83.

153  Lörcher/Lörcher, para 314; even stricter Lachmann, paras 1947 et seq. (refundability limited by ss 91 et seq. ZPO).

154  OLG München, SchiedsVZ 2012, 282, 286; Kühn/Gantenberg, in: DIS- Mat. X, pp 83, 90; Risse/Altenkirch, SchiedsVZ 2012, 5, 10; v Schlabrendorff/Sessler, in: Arbitration in Germany, s 1057 para 28; Schroth, in: DIS- Mat. X, pp 41, 44.

155  BGH NJW- RR 2004, 856, 857; Bork, in: Stein/Jonas (eds), s 91 paras 35 et seq.

156  Risse/Altenkirch, SchiedsVZ 2012, 5, 12; dissenting Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1057 para 5.

157  v Schlabrendorff/Sessler, in: Arbitration in Germany, s 1057 para 20.

158  Bühler/Jarvin, in: Weigand (ed), 2nd edn, para 15.1142; Kreindler/Schäfer/Wolff, para 1224.

159  Kreindler/Schäfer/Wolff, para 1225; v Schlabrendorff/Sessler, in: Arbitration in Germany, s 1057 para 20 fn 40.

160  Kreindler/Schäfer/Wolff, para 1226; Lachmann, paras 1962 et seq.; Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1057 para 7.

161  Gerstenmaier, SchiedsVZ 2012, 1, 2 et seq.; Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1057 para 5.

162  Pro: Gerstenmaier, SchiedsVZ 2012, 1, 3; con: Lachmann, paras 1907 et seq.; Risse/Altenkirch, SchiedsVZ 2012, 5, 14; Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1057 para 5; undecided Saenger/Uphoff, MDR 2014, 192, 196.

163  Government bill, BT-Drucks 13/5274, p 55.

164  Cf BGH NJW- RR 2007, 1008 para 6 = XXXIII Y.B. Com. Arb. 506, 507 (2008).

165  OLG Köln, SchiedsVZ 2004, 269.

166  BGH NJW- RR 2007, 1008 para 6 = XXXIII Y.B. Com. Arb. 506, 507 (2008); Geimer, in: Zöller (ed), s 1054 para 3; Schlosser, in: Stein/Jonas (eds), s 1054 para 3; Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1054 para 2.

167  Buchwitz/Schütt, SchiedsVZ 2015, 1, 6 et seq.

168  Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1054 para 4; Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1054 para 2.

169  BGHZ 151, 79, 80 = SchiedsVZ 2003, 39 et seq.; v Schlabrendorff/Sessler, in: Arbitration in Germany, s 1054 para 4; dissenting OLG Hamburg, NJW- RR 2000, 806; Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1054 para 2.

170  For the notion, see v Schlabrendorff/Sessler, in: Arbitration in Germany, s 1055 para 12; for an apparently simple solution (interlocutory decisions are always awards) F Schmidt, SchiedsVZ 2013, 32, 35, 40.

171  Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1054 para 2.

172  Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1056 para 8.

173  Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1054 para 2.

174  Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1055 para 6; Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1055 para 4.

175  Kremer/Weimann, SchiedsVZ 2007, 238, 242 et seq.; Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1055 para 4; dissenting OLG Frankfurt, SchiedsVZ 2007, 278, 279 (interlocutory decision on liability not capable of becoming res judicata); Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1055 para 6 (interlocutory award not capable of becoming res judicata).

176  Schwab/Walter, ch 18 paras 9 et seq.; Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1054 para 2.

177  Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1054 para 2.

178  Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1054 para 2.

179  OLG Frankfurt, SchiedsVZ 2007, 278, 279; Schwab/Walter, ch 18 para 7; Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1054 para 2.

180  Schlosser, in: Stein/Jonas (eds), s 1054 para 9; Schwab/Walter, ch 18 para 8; Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1054 para 2.

181  Kreindler/Schäfer/Wolff, para 1013.

182  Cf KG SchiedsVZ 2011, 110, 111 (facts dispensable).

183  Lachmann, para 1755; Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1054 paras 6, 25; v Schlabrendorff/Sessler, in: Arbitration in Germany, s 1054 para 6.

184  OLG München, SchiedsVZ 2012, 217, 218 (although not legally necessary); Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1054 para 6; Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1054 para 3.

185  Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1054 para 18; v Schlabrendorff/Sessler, in: Arbitration in Germany, s 1054 para 5.

186  Kreindler/Schäfer/Wolff, para 1014.

187  Government bill, BT-Drucks 13/5274, p 56 (for the requirement of the majority of signatures).

188  Dissenting Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1054 para 5.

189  Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1054 para 5.

190  OLG München, SchiedsVZ 2013, 230, 233 et seq.; Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1054 para 8; v Schlabrendorff/Sessler, in: Arbitration in Germany, s 1054 para 17; Schwab/Walter, ch 12 para 6.

191  OLG München, SchiedsVZ 2013, 230, 233 et seq.; Münch, SchiedsVZ 2013, 235, 236 et seq.; Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1054 para 6; dissenting v Schlabrendorff/Sessler, in: Arbitration in Germany, s 1054 para 17.

192  OLG München, SchiedsVZ 2013, 230, 234 (obiter dictum); Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1054 para 12; Schlosser, in: Stein/Jonas (eds), s 1054 para 12; for general rules on blank signatures see RGZ 78, 28, 29; BGHZ 40, 65, 68 = NJW 1963, 1971; BGHZ 53, 11, 15 = NJW 1970, 324, 326.

193  Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1054 para 13; Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1054 para 6.

194  Cf Kreindler/Schäfer/Wolff, para 1015; Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1054 para 6.

195  Government bill, BT-Drucks 13/5274, p 56.

196  Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1054 para 15; v Schlabrendorff/Sessler, in: Arbitration in Germany, s 1054 para 18.

197  Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1054 para 15; Schlosser, in: Stein/Jonas (eds), s 1054 para 17.

198  Cf Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1054 para 15.

199  Government bill, BT-Drucks 13/5274, p 55.

200  Government bill, BT-Drucks 13/5274, p 56.

201  v Schlabrendorff/Sessler, in: Arbitration in Germany, s 1054 para 22; Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1054 para 10.

202  v Schlabrendorff/Sessler, in: Arbitration in Germany, s 1054 para 22; Schlosser, in: Stein/Jonas (eds), s 1054 para 20; dissenting (majority decision) Geimer, in: Zöller (ed), s 1054 para 7.

203  Lachmann, paras 1780 et seq.; Schlosser, in: Stein/Jonas (eds), s 1054 para 32; Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1054 para 10.

204  In particular lower than that for state court judgments, see BGHZ 30, 89, 92 = NJW 1959, 1438, 1439; BGHZ 96, 40, 47 = NJW 1986, 1436, 1437; OLG München, December 20, 2006, 34 Sch 16/06 (unreported), http://www.disarb.org (last visited December 1, 2015); SchiedsVZ 2011, 159, 167; Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1054 paras 28 et seq.; Schwab/Walter, ch 19 para 11; Schlosser, in: Stein/Jonas (eds), s 1054 para 17.

205  RGZ 23, 432, 436; RG JW 1896, 434 (no 14); LZ 17 (1923), 649, 650; BGHZ 96, 40, 47 = NJW 1986, 1436, 1437; v Schlabrendorff/Sessler, in: Arbitration in Germany, s 1054 para 10; Schwab/Walter, ch 19 paras 11 et seq.

206  BGHZ 96, 40, 47 = NJW 1986, 1436, 1437 et seq.; Schwab/Walter, ch 19 para 12; Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1054 para 4.

207  Schlosser, in: Stein/Jonas (eds), s 1054 para 17.

208  Schwab/Walter, ch 19 para 13; dissenting Hartmann, in: Baumbach/Lauterbach/Albers/Hartmann (eds), s 1054 para 4.

209  Lachmann, para 2281; Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1054 para 18; v Schlabrendorff/Sessler, in: Arbitration in Germany, s 1054 para 9; Schlosser, in: Stein/Jonas (eds), s 1054 para 17; Schwab/Walter, ch 19 para 12.

210  Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1054 para 5.

211  Government bill, BT-Drucks 13/5274, p 56; Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1054 para 34; Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1054 para 8; dissenting Schütze, para 431.

212  Government bill, BT-Drucks 13/5274, p 56.

213  OLG Karlsruhe, SchiedsVZ 2012, 101, 106 = XXXVIII Y.B. Com. Arb. 379, 383 (2013); Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1054 para 8; dissenting (relevance for binding effect on the arbitral tribunal) v Schlabrendorff/Sessler, in: Arbitration in Germany, s 1054 para 16.

214  Government bill, BT-Drucks 13/5274, p 55.

215  OLG München, SchiedsVZ 2011, 167, 168 (at least if the place of arbitration can be identified by way of interpretation); 2013, 230, 233; OLG Stuttgart, NJW- RR 2003, 1438, 1439; Hartmann, in: Baumbach/Lauterbach/Albers/Hartmann (eds), s 1054 para 5; v Schlabrendorff/Sessler, in: Arbitration in Germany, s 1054 para 13; Schwab/Walter, ch 20 para 13; Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1054 para 7; dissenting Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1054 para 35; Münch, SchiedsVZ 2013, 235, 236.

216  Government bill, BT-Drucks 13/5274, p 56.

217  v Schlabrendorff/Sessler, in: Arbitration in Germany, s 1054 para 20.

218  v Schlabrendorff/Sessler, in: Arbitration in Germany, s 1054 para 20.

219  v Schlabrendorff/Sessler, in: Arbitration in Germany, s 1054 para 20.

220  RG JW 1932, 2877 (no 25); Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1054 para 22; Schlosser, in: Stein/Jonas (eds), s 1054 para 20; dissenting Schütze, para 437; Schütze, in: Festschrift Nakamura, pp 525, 535 et seq.; SchiedsVZ 2008, 10, 13 et seq.

221  Fry/Greenberg/Mazza, para 3- 1181.

222  Fry/Greenberg/Mazza, para 3- 1182.

223  Fry/Greenberg/Mazza, para 3- 1209.

224  Fry/Greenberg/Mazza, para 3- 1210.

225  Government bill, BT-Drucks 13/5274, p 56.

226  Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1054 para 45.

227  Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1054 para 40; Schwab/Walter, ch 20 para 11; Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1054 para 9.

228  Hartmann, in: Baumbach/Lauterbach/Albers/Hartmann (eds), s 1054 para 6; v Schlabrendorff/Sessler, in: Arbitration in Germany, s 1054 para 21.

229  Government bill, BT-Drucks 15/4067, p 36; Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1054 para 38.

230  BGH NJW 2015, 3234, 3238 et seq. para 37.

231  OLG München, SchiedsVZ 2012, 217, 218; Hartmann, in: Baumbach/Lauterbach/Albers/Hartmann (eds), s 1054 para 6; v Schlabrendorff/Sessler, in: Arbitration in Germany, s 1054 para 21; Schwab/Walter, ch 20 para 9; dissenting OLG Düsseldorf, SchiedsVZ 2008, 156, 159.

232  Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1054 para 9.

233  Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1054 paras 42 et seq.

234  Critical Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1054 para 40.

235  Government bill, BT-Drucks 13/5274, p 56.

236  Kreindler/Schäfer/Wolff, para 1029; Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1055 para 3; Schlabrendorff/Sessler, in: Arbitration in Germany, s 1055 para 5.

237  Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1055 para 3; dissenting (first party) Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1055 para 4; v Schlabrendorff/Sessler, in: Arbitration in Germany, s 1055 para 3.

238  BGH NJW 2004, 1805, 1806; Vollkommer, in: Zöller (ed), Vor s 322 paras 14 et seq.

239  BGH NJW 1989, 2133, 2134; 1995, 2993; 2003, 3058, 3059; Musielak, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 322 paras 9 et seq.; Vollkommer, in: Zöller (ed), Vor s 322 para 35.

240  BGH NJW 1958, 950; Government bill, BT-Drucks 13/5274, pp 56 et seq.; Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1055 para 12; Schlosser, in: Stein/Jonas (eds), s 1055 para 8; dissenting Schwab/Walter, ch 21 para 6; Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1055 para 5.

241  BayObLG BB 1984, 746; OLG Bremen, NJW 1957, 1035, 1036; Reichold, in: Thomas/Putzo (eds), s 1055 para 2; v Schlabrendorff/Sessler, in: Arbitration in Germany, s 1055 para 24; Schlosser, in: Stein/Jonas (eds), s 1055 para 5; dissenting Schwab/Walter, ch 21 para 7; Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1055 para 6.

242  OLG Naumburg, SchiedsVZ 2011, 228, 230; Kreindler/Schäfer/Wolff, para 1037; Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1055 para 15; v Schlabrendorff/Sessler, in: Arbitration in Germany, s 1055 para 17; Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1055 para 9.

243  BGHZ 123, 137, 139 = NJW 1993, 2684, 2685; NJW 2003, 3058, 3059; Kreindler/Schäfer/Wolff, para 1040.

244  Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1055 para 10.

245  BGH NJW 1995, 967, 968; 1986, 2508, 2509; NJW- RR 2008, 1397, 1398; Musielak, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 322 para 17.

246  Kreindler/Schäfer/Wolff, para 1038.

247  BGHZ 117, 1, 5 = NJW 1992, 1172, 1173; 1993, 333, 334; 1996, 3151, 3152; 1999, 3126, 3127; 2000, 1958; 2001, 157, 158.

248  BGHZ 157, 224, 229 = NJW 2004, 1456, 1458; OLG Saarbrücken, WM 1998, 833, 835; Schaaff, NJW 1986, 1029, 1030.

249  BGHZ 125, 351, 354 = NJW 1994, 2769, 2770; 1984, 128, 129; 1997, 743; 2001, 3616.

250  Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1055 para 21.

251  Schlosser, in: Stein/Jonas (eds), s 1055 paras 30 et seq., 24; Schwab/Walter, ch 21 para 3; Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1055 para 7.

252  Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1055 para 12.

253  BGHZ 99, 143, 145 et seq. = NJW 1987, 651, 652 et seq.; NJW- RR 1996, 508; Geimer, in: Zöller (ed), s 1030 para 17; Schwab/Walter, ch 7 para 15; Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1030 para 7.

254  Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1055 para 27; v Schlabrendorff/Sessler, in: Arbitration in Germany, s 1055 para 28; Schlosser, in: Stein/Jonas (eds), s 1055 para 18; Schwab/Walter, ch 21 para 10.

255  Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1055 para 36.

256  Cf Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1055 para 34.

257  Geimer, in: Zöller (ed), s 1055 para 2; Lachmann, para 1788; Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1060 para 3; Schwab/Walter, ch 28 para 18; Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1060 para 2; dissenting OLG Dresden, BB 2001, Beil. 7, pp 22 et seq.; Schlosser, in: Stein/Jonas (eds), s 1060 para 6.

258  BayObLGZ 1984, 45, 48 = BB 1984, 746; K Schmidt, ZGR 1988, 523, 535 et seq.; AG 1995, 551, 554; dissenting Geimer, in: Zöller (ed), s 1055 para 2; Lachmann, para 1787; v Schlabrendorff/Sessler, in: Arbitration in Germany, s 1055 para 25; Schwab/Walter, ch 21 para 12; Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1055 para 11.

259  Kreindler/Schäfer/Wolff, para 1032.

260  v Schlabrendorff/Sessler, in: Arbitration in Germany, s 1055 para 5; Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1056 para 2.

261  Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1056 para 5; v Schlabrendorff/Sessler, in: Arbitration in Germany, s 1056 para 4.

262  OLG Frankfurt, NJW- RR 2008, 590, 591; Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1056 para 34.

263  Government bill, BT-Drucks 13/5274, p 57; Busse, SchiedsVZ 2010, 57, 58; dissenting Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1056 para 1.

264  Government bill, BT-Drucks 13/5274, p 57.

265  Government bill, BT-Drucks 13/5274, p 57.

266  Gerstenmaier, SchiedsVZ 2010, 281, 282; Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1056 paras 3, 14, 23; Schlosser, in: Stein/Jonas (eds), s 1056 para 2; dissenting Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1056 para 4.

267  v Schlabrendorff/Sessler, in: Arbitration in Germany, s 1056 para 3; dissenting Schlosser, in: Stein/Jonas (eds), s 1056 para 12; Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1056 para 1.

268  Voit, in: Musielak/Voit (eds), s 1056 para 3; see also Münch, in: MünchKommZPO, s 1056 para 24.