1 Jurisdictional principles normally applied by a court to decide whether it is the appropriate forum to adjudicate the dispute brought before it will not be covered in this work: the subject is well covered by standard textbooks in the field, so there is not much to add here. This Part is therefore mainly concerned with the determination of the law applicable to alleged non-complying performance of obligations arising out of letters of credit.
2 The required standard of proof is a ‘good arguable case’, as opposed to the lower standard of a mere prima facie case: the leading authority is Seaconsar Far East Ltd v Bank Markazi Jomhouri Islami Iran  1 AC 438, expressly adopted in Singapore in Bradley Lomas Electrolok Ltd v Colt Ventilation East Asia Pte Ltd  SGCA 89,  1 SLR 673. Reference may also be made to NML Capital Ltd v Republic of Argentine  EWCA Civ 41,  WLR 28.
3 Para 3.1 (6) (c) of Practice Direction B supplementing Rule 6.36, Part 6—replacing 2008 CPR r 6.20—Civil Procedure Rules (January 2014 incorporating 68th Update). The ground derives from the provision of the old O 11, r 1 (d) (iii), Rules of the Supreme Court (UK), re-enacted as part of the Rules of Court in probably each of the Commonwealth countries and other former British colonies: see e.g. Rules of Court, Chapter 322, R 5, 2004 edition, Singapore; The Rules of the High Court, Chapter 4A, Laws of Hong Kong.
4 I.e. on the basis of the principles enunciated by the House of Lords in Spiliada Maritime Corp v Cansulex Ltd  3 WLR 972, 3 All ER 843,  AC 460.
5 Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters; published in the Official Journal of the European Union, OJ 2001 L/1, the instrument came into force on 1 March 2002 and applies directly to all EU Member States, including Denmark, with effect from 1 July 2007. Where the defendant issuing bank is domiciled in Iceland, Norway, or Switzerland, the analogous provision of Art 5 (1) (a), Lugano Convention (Convention of 16 September 1988 on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters) applies.
6 Unlike the courts in jurisdictions such as Singapore, England, and the United States, which are famed for their no-injunction policy, the relief is frequently granted in the blink of an eye in some countries; notable examples include China, Indonesia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and many other countries in the Middle East and Africa, probably without the particular judges in question having an inkling of the harmful effects such judicial interference with the issuing bank’s obligation ultimately have on the utility and reliability of letters of credit issued by their banks as a payment instrument.
7 Under a credit subject to s 5-115, Revised Article 5, the limitation period is one year from the date the cause of action accrues; if it is governed by English or Singapore law, the period is six years: Limitation Act 1980, s 5.
8 In Singapore, it has been held that an issuing or confirming bank is relieved of its obligation to honour a complying presentation by a beneficiary if it has knowledge that the tender contains a document that is a nullity; innocence of the beneficiary is entirely irrelevant: Beam Technology (Mfg) Pte Ltd v Standard Chartered Bank  SGCA 53,  1 SLR. This exception to the bank’s payment undertaking forms no part of the UK law on letters of credit: Montrod Ltd v Grundkotter Fleischvertriebs GmbH  EWCA Civ 1954,  1 WLR 1975, resolving the question left open in United City Merchants (Investments) Ltd v Royal Bank of Scotland, The American Accord  1 AC 168, 187–188, per Lord Diplock. In the US, the Singapore position is shared by s 5-109 (1) (a) of the Revised Article 5, albeit it has yet to be tested in the courts.
9 Such an assignee of the beneficiary’s rights is protected in the US under s 5-109 (a) (1) (iv), Revised Article 5, unlike in Singapore and the UK where, under the common law, he takes subject to equities existing against the assignor/beneficiary in favour of the issuing or confirming bank at the time of the assignment: see Banco Santander SA v Bayfern Ltd  1 All ER (Comm) 776,  1 Lloyd’s Rep Bank 165.
10 For such different approaches, see notes 3–6.
11 In the United States, a federal court exercising jurisdiction in a case involving natural or corporate citizens of different states applies the choice of law rules of the forum state to determine the applicable law: Kaxon Co v Stentor Electric Mfg Co, 313 US 487, 497 (1941); Alderman v Pan American World Airways, 169 F 3d 99, 103 (2nd Cir 1999); Fieger v Pitney Bowes Credit Corp, 251 F 3d 386 at 393 (2nd Cir 2001), and even if the jurisdiction is founded on the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act (FSIA): Barkanic v General Admin. of Civil Aviation of the Peoples Republic of China, 923 F 2d 957, 959–961 (2nd Cir 1991), but see Chuidian v Philippine National Bank, 976 F 2d 561, 564 (9th Cir 1992), stating in the context mentioned the court looks to the ‘federal common law choice of law rules as articulated in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws and not the choice of law rules of the forum’.
13 See e.g. EP Ellinger, ‘The UCP-500: Considering a New Revision’  LMCLQ 30, 43–44.
14 Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v Bankers Trust Co  1 QB 728, 747; Attock Cement Co Ltd v Romanian Bank for Foreign Trade  1 Lloyd’s Rep 572, 580–581 (CA).
15 Cases to be examined on this topic, so far as it concerns English law, are mainly the decisions of Cooke J. in Trafigura Beheer BV v Kookmin Bank Co  EWHC 2350 (Comm), 2005 WL 3157676, and in cases of the same name decided by Aikens J. reported  EWHC 1450 (Comm),  2 Lloyd’s Rep 455, and by Field J. reported  EWHC 1921 (Comm),  1 Lloyd’s Rep 669; noted by Adrian Briggs, (2007) 123 LQR 18. For a helpful introductory coverage of the subject, see Ali Malek and David Quest, Jack: Documentary Credits, 4th edn (Haywards Heath, West Sussex, England: Tottel, 2009), paras 13-37–13-45.
16 In mid-2008 the Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations 1980 (the Convention which had as its principal objective the harmonization of the choice of law rules for contractual obligations for the then Member States of the European Union and implemented into UK law by the Contracts (Applicable Law) Act 1990, effective 1 April 1991) was converted into a regulation and published in the Official Journal of the European Union, OJ 2008 L 177/6, with the title Regulation (EC) No. 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I), hereinafter ‘Rome I Regulation’, and under Art 29 applies to contracts made after 17 December 2009. Arts 3 and 4 of the Rome I Regulation, so far as it relates to the identification of the governing law of contracts covered by it, are substantially the same as Articles 3 and 4 of the Rome Convention, though a remarkably more felicitous phrasing and structure are now employed, not least the conversion of certain presumptions into fixed rules. However, for an interesting commentary on the question whether the new regime introduces any real change or is simply more of the same, see Zheng Tang, ‘Law Applicable in the Absence of Choice—The New Article 4 of the Rome I Regulation’  MLR 785. See generally Adrian Briggs, The Conflict of Laws, 2nd edn (Oxford: OUP, 2008) 181; JJ Fawcett and JM Carruthers, Cheshire, North and Fawcett Private International Law, 14th edn (Oxford: OUP, 2008), Ch 18.
17 Adopted and promulgated by the American Law Institute in Washington, D.C. on 23 May 1969.