* This is a revised version of a paper delivered at the conference on Financial Regulation and Supervision in the New Financial Architecture, Taormina, Sicily, 20–21 May 2010. I am grateful to the participants of that conference, both academics and regulators, for their comments on the paper, and to those regulators and policy makers who have been willing to give their time to discuss various views and ideas in this paper in recent months. The usual responsibilities remain my own.
1 On a visit to the LSE in November 2008 the Queen asked, ‘Why did no one see this coming?’ The British Academy forum of economists convened to answer the Queen’s question wrote to her concluding that ‘the failure to foresee the timing, extent and severity of the crisis and to head it off, while it had many causes, was principally a failure of the collective imagination of many bright people, both in this country and internationally, to understand the risks to the system as a whole’. Letter dated 22 July 2009. See also Financial Services Authority (FSA), The Turner Review: A Regulatory Response to the Global Banking Crisis (London, 2009).
2 IMF, The Fund’s Mandate—An Overview (January 2010), 12.
3 On the issues in defining and identifying financial stability, see eg A. Crockett, The Theory and Practice of Financial Stability (1996) 144 De Economist 4, 531; C. Goodhart and D. Tsomocos, Analysis of Financial Stability (2007) (Special Paper 173, Financial Markets Group, London School of Economics); O. Aspachs, C. Goodhart, M. Segoviano, D. Tsomocos, and L. Zicchino, Searching for a Metric for Financial Stability (2006) (Special Paper 167, Financial Markets Group, London School of Economics); H. Davies and D. Green, Banking on the Future: The Rise and Fall of Central Banking (Princeton University Press, 2010), 54–9.
4 For example the potential for statutory schemes for bank resolution that impose moratoria on payments can conflict with the status of private netting agreements in insolvency law: see P. Paech, Systemic Risk, Regulatory Powers and Insolvency Law: The Need for an International Instrument on the Private Law Framework for Netting (2010) (Working Paper Series no 116, Institute for Law and Finance, Goethe Universitat).
5 eg S. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets (2009–10) Washington University L Rev 8(2) 211.
6 eg G. Teubner, ‘After Legal Instrumentalism: Strategic Models of Post-Regulatory Law’ in G. Teubner (ed), Dilemmas of Law in the Welfare State (De Gruyter, 1986); N. Rose and P. Miller, Political Power Beyond the State: Problematics of Government (1992) 43(2) British Journal of Sociology 173; J. Kooiman (ed), Modern Governance: New Government-Society Interactions (Sage, 1993).
7 See J. Black, Decentring Regulation: Understanding the Role of Regulation and Self Regulation in a ‘Post-Regulatory’ World (2001) 54 Current Legal Problems 103; J. Black, Constructing and Contesting Legitimacy in Polycentric Regulatory Regimes (2008) Regulation and Governance 1.
8 See eg J. Kooiman, Findings, Speculations and Recommendations in J. Kooiman, see n 6, at 253; N. Rose, Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought (Cambridge University Press, 1999); L. Hancher and M. Moran, Organizing Regulatory Space in L. Hancher and M. Moran (eds), Capitalism, Culture and Economic Regulation (Oxford University Press, 1989).
9 J. Black, Enrolling Actors in Regulatory Processes: Examples from UK Financial Services Regulation  Public Law 62.
10 J. March and J. Olsen, The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life (1984) 78 American Political Science Review 734; V. Braithwaite, K. Murphy, and M. Reinhart, Taxation Threat, Motivational Postures, and Responsive Regulation (2007) 29(1) Law & Policy 137.
11 The term ‘regime’ here is used to refer to a set of interrelated units that are engaged in joint problem solving to address a particular goal; its boundaries are defined by the definition of the problem being addressed, and it has some continuity over time: C. Hood, H. Rothstein, and R. Baldwin, The Government of Risk (Oxford University Press, 2001), 9–17.
12 Firms themselves are regulatory actors in that they have internal systems of regulation (eg compliance, risk management, internal audit), though on significantly different scales depending on their size, and in that they are actors whose behaviour contributes to the overall performance of the regulatory regime.
13 By regulators I am referring to those state or non-state actors who have been given a mandate to regulate the behaviour of others (though not necessarily by all those they purport to regulate), ie engage in organized attempts to influence their behaviour.
14 See H. Davies and D. Green, Global Financial Regulation: The Essential Guide (Polity Press, 2008); C. Brummer, Soft Law and the Global Financial System (Cambridge University Press, 2011).
15 According to Davies and Green, the ECB ‘turned up at the first meeting uninvited and has never been shown the door’, ibid, 114. The European Commission, on the other hand, was invited but refused to attend: ibid. Given the Commission’s insistence after the crisis that it be a member of the FSB, its priorities had clearly changed.
17 For example the deep disputes over whether banks should be broken up.
18 The UK Treasury Select Committee has recommended the abandonment of the passporting regime for banks, which would be a significant move contrary to one of the EU’s central principles of freedom of movement: Treasury Select Committee, Banking Crisis: Regulation and Supervision (Fourteenth Report of Session 2008–09, HC 767, HMSO, 2009).
19 M. King, evidence to UK Treasury Select Committee, ibid, response to Q146.
20 Treasury Select CommitteeBank of England, Financial Stability Reports (October 2008) and (June 2009).
21 European Commission, Communication to the European Parliament, 26 May 2010, Council, European Economic and Social Committee and the European Central Bank, Bank Resolution Fund, COM(2010) 254 final.
22 eg FSF, Report of the Financial Stability Forum on Enhancing Market and Institutional Resilience (April 2008); IMF, see n 2; IOSCO, Report on the Subprime Crisis—Final Report, Report of the Technical Committee of IOSCO (2009).
23 FSB and IMF, The Financial Crisis and Information Gaps—Report to the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors (November 2009), 4.
24 eg FSB and IMF, see n 22; H. Hannoun, Information Gaps—What has the Crisis Taught Us?, Speech dated 20 April 2010.
25 Joint FSF-CGFS Working Group, The Role of Valuation and Leverage in Procylclicality (March 2009), 2.
26 FSB, Guidance on Systemic Risk (November 2009).
28 J. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (Yale University Press, 1998).
29 K. Weick, Sense Making in Organizations (Sage Publications, 1995).
30 A. Wildavsky, Searching for Safety (Transaction Books, 1988).
31 C. Perrow, Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies (Basic Books, 1984).
32 C. Goodhart, et al, Financial Regulation: Where, Why, How and What Now? (Routledge, 1998).
33 In the United Kingdom the Tripartite Authorities had conducted a series of ‘war games’ on the possible failures of different banks which had revealed the weaknesses in the UK regulatory structure for managing the failure of a large bank, but the matter had not been pushed up the legislative agenda: Treasury Select Committee, The Run on the Rock (5th Report of Session 2007–08 HC 56–1).
35 Dodd-Frank Act 2010 in the United States; European Commission, Communication on an EU Framework for Cross-Border Crisis Management in the Banking Sector (October 2009); Consultation on technical details of a possible European crisis management framework (January 2011).
36 FSA, Turner Review Conference Discussion Paper (DP09/4, October 2009); BCBS, Report and Recommendations of the Cross Border Bank Resolution Group (Basle, March 2010).
37 Ibid; European Commission, see n 35; FSB, Key Attributes for Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions (November 2011).
38 FSB, Guidance to Assess the Systemic Importance of Financial Institutions, Markets and Instruments: Initial Considerations—Background Paper (November 2009); FSB, Progress in the Implementation of the G20 Recommendations for Strengthening Financial Stability, Report of the Financial Stability Board to G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors (April 2011).
39 For example the discussions as to whether there should be a list of systemically important financial institutions identified in advance or not: eg IMF, Responding to the Financial Crisis and Measuring Systemic Risks (Global Financial Stability Report, IMF, 2009).
41 Risk-adjusted leverage measures failed to capture the multiples of exposure created by pooling and tranching structured credit instruments, or the compounding of that embedded leverage through re-securitisation: Joint FSF-CGFS Working Group, The Role of Valuation and Leverage in Procyclicality (March 2009); CRMPG III, Containing Systemic Risk: The Road to Reform (2008).
42 eg Joint Forum, Credit Risk Transfer—Developments from 2005–07 (April 2008).
44 Ibid; A. Haldane, Why Banks Failed the Stress Test, Speech dated 13 February 2009.
45 Joint Forum, see n 42.
46 Ibid. In particular, the exposure of senior tranches of CDOs to worst-case correlations (eg recession in the macro-economy) as that generates the largest losses on the underlying portfolio.
48 eg J. Danielsson, et al, An Academic Response to Basle II (Special Paper 130, Financial Markets Group, LSE, 2001); C. Goodhart, Financial Regulation, Credit Risk and Financial Stability (2005) 192 National Institute Economic Review 118; C. Goodhart, B. Hofmann, and M. Segoviano, Bank Regulation and Macroeconomic Fluctuations (2005) 20 Oxford Review of Economic Policy 591.
49 FSB, Working Group on Loan Loss Provisioning; FSF-BCBS, Joint Working Group on Capital (March 2009); de Larosiere Report, see n 40; Joint FSF-CGFS Working Group, see n 41.
50 Joint FSF-CGFS Working Group, ibid; Joint Forum, see n 42.
52 A development illustrating this cognitive shift is IOSCO’s recent creation of a research group to investigate systemic risk in the securities markets, previously considered to be an issue confined to banks. Its initial focus is hedge funds, and it has sent out a data collecting template to funds for them to complete: IOSCO/MR/03/2010.
53 eg the ‘Volcker’ rule provisions in the Dodd-Frank Act 2010; the UK’s Independent Commission on Banking, Final Report And Recommendations (London, 2011).
54 D. Gruen, M. Plumb, and A. Stone, How Should Monetary Policy Respond to Asset Price Bubbles? (2005) 1 International Journal of Central Banking 1; J. Dokko, et al, Monetary Policy and the Housing Bubble (Federal Reserve Board, Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2009–49).
55 Davies and Green, see n 3, ch 3.
56 R. Portes, ‘Global Imbalances’ in M. Dewatripint, X. Freixas, and R. Portes (eds), Macro Economic Stability and Financial Regulation: Key Issues for the G20 (London: Centre for Economic and Policy Research, 2009); S. Dunaway, Global Imbalances and the Financial Crisis (Special Report No 44, Council of Foreign Relations, March 2009); H. Davies, The Financial Crisis: Who is to Blame? (Polity Press, 2010).
57 See eg FSF, see n 23; FSA, see n 1.
58 eg Ireland, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
59 eg D. Walker, A Review of Corporate Governance in UK Banks and Other Financial Industry Entities—Final Recommendations (HM Treasury, November 2009).
60 eg Senior Supervisors Group, Observations on Risk Management Practices during the Recent Market Turbulence (March 2008); ibid, Risk Management Lessons from the Global Banking Crisis of 2008 (October 2009); OECD, Corporate Governance and the Financial Crisis: Key Findings and Main Messages (June 2009).
61 However, in other respects, there is still reliance on private market actors to perform significant coordinating roles. A key example is the role of ISDA, not only in developing the standard form contracts on which the derivatives markets are built, but in providing a coordinated mechanism for settlement of contracts at the height of the crisis. Its ‘big bang’ protocol incorporated into its standard documentation the auction settlement of contracts after a default or other credit event on a company referenced in credit default swap transactions: Auction Supplement to the 2003 ISDA Credit Derivatives Definitions (the ‘Big Bang Protocol’); 2009 ISDA Credit Derivatives Determinations Committees, Auction Settlement and Restructuring CDS Protocol (the ‘Small Bang Protocol’). Notably, in an attempt by ISDA to control the interpretation of its contracts and not leave this to the courts in individual jurisdictions, the protocols include provision for the ISDA Determinations Committee to make binding determinations for issues such as whether a credit event has occurred; whether an auction will be held; and whether a particular obligation is deliverable. The auction process provided a crucial and largely successful mechanism for settling transactions at the height of the crisis and to this extent ISDA can be seen has having a significant role in ensuring financial stability; ISDA, however, remains outside the main coordinating body of international regulators, the Financial Stability Board. On the question of who should have the interpretive authority over ISDA contracts, and in particular the role of the courts, see J. Golden, ‘The Future of Financial Regulation: The Role of the Courts’ in I. MacNeil and J. O’Brien (eds), The Future of Financial Regulation (Oxford University Press, 2010).
62 See the US Dodd-Frank Act 2010; in the EU see Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council on credit rating agencies; EU Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Alternative Investment Fund Managers, COM(2009) 207 final.
63 eg FSB, Principles for Sound Compensation Practices (2009); EU Commission, Green Paper on Corporate Governance in Financial Institutions and Remuneration Policies, COM(2010) 284 final (June 2010).
64 eg FSF, see n 23, at 37–8; CESR, Second Report to the European Commission on the Compliance of Credit Rating Agencies with the IOSCO Code and the Role of Credit Rating Agencies in Structured Finance (CESR/08-277, May 2008); ESME, Report to the European Commission on the Role of Credit Rating Agencies (4 June 2008); FSB, Improving Financial Regulation: Report of the Financial Stability Board to G20 Leaders (September 2009).
65 DG Market Services, Tackling the Problem of Over Reliance on Ratings (2009).
66 P. Van Roy, Credit Ratings and the Standardised Approach to Credit Ratings in Basle II (ECB Working Paper Series, No 217, August 2005); FSI, 2008 FSI Survey on the Implementation of the New Capital Adequacy Framework in non-Basel Committee Member Countries (BIS, 2008).
67 eg the European Central Bank only accepted ‘A’ rated products; however, as the Greek crisis has demonstrated, in times of crisis this strict stance may have to be adjusted, and the ECB has had to say it will accept Greek bonds regardless of their rating. Financial Times (5 May 2010).
68 Indeed, the crisis and its aftermath have demonstrated the fundamental reliance of monetary authorities on banks to act as sluice gates to push money out into the economy; when banks refuse to do so, monetary authorities are almost paralysed.
69 BCBS, Enhancements to the Basle II Framework (July 2009); the revised rules now introduce a ban on banks recognising ratings gained through such guarantees.
70 EC, see n 67, on CRAs.
71 Bank of England, Financial Stability Report (December 2009) on the need to reduce reliance on credit ratings in capital adequacy regulation; on collateral see Bank of England, Market Notice—Expanding Eligible Collateral in the Discount Window Facility and Information Transparency for Asset-Backed Securities (July 2010).
73 G20, Declaration Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy (15 November 2008); this also prompted the expansion in the membership of the BCBS to the G20 countries. According to the de Larosiere Report, the G20 initiative originated with the EU Commission, which was keen to ensure it had adequate involvement in the international standard-setting bodies: de Larosiere Report, see n 40, at para 220 (though note the observation above that it had refused such a role in 1999: Davies and Green see n 14.
74 On the role of the FSF in its early years, see Davies and Green, see n 14, at 113–18.
76 It was formed at the proposal of Hans Tietmeyer, then President of the German Bundesbank, after an inquiry instigated by the BIS. H. Tietmeyer, Report on International Cooperation and Coordination in the Area of Financial Market Supervision and Surveillance (BIS, 1999). For a discussion of the FSF’s work and the problems of its institutional position, see Davies and Green, see n 14, at 113–18.
77 Davies and Green, ibid, 117–18.
78 See E. Kapstein, Resolving the Regulator’s Dilemma: International Coordination of Banking Regulations (1989) 43 International Organization 323; Davies and Green, see n 14, at 34–9.
80 de Larosiere Report, see n 40, at paras 208, 256.
82 FSB, see n 63; FSB, Principles for Cross Border Cooperation and Crisis Management (April 2009).
83 FSB, Consultation Document on Principles for Sound Residential Mortgages Underwriting (October 2011).
84 See further J. Black ‘The Rise, Fall and Fate of Principles Based Regulation’ in K. Alexander and N. Moloney (eds), Law Reform and Financial Markets (Edward Elgar, 2011).
85 FSB, Report on the Overview of Progress in the Implementation of the G20 Recommendations for Strengthening Financial Stability (November 2011).
88 For discussion see FSA, Reforming Remuneration Practices in Financial Services (PS 09/15, London, August 2009).
89 The first country peer review was of Mexico: FSB, Country Review of Mexico—Peer Review Report (September 2010). The review assessed Mexico’s implementation of the recommendations made in its 2006 FSAP report.
90 FSB, Framework for Strengthening Adherence to International Standards (January 2010).
92 FSB, Promoting Global Adherence to International Cooperation and Information Exchange Standards, Annex D, Toolbox of possible measures to promote the implementation of international financial standards (FSB, March 2010).
93 I. Ayres and J. Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation (Oxford University Press, 1992).
94 Applicants to become IOSCO members are required to apply to become signatories to the IOSCO MMoU and to sign the IOSCO MMoU as a condition for being accepted as IOSCO members: <http://www.iosco.org>.
95 FSB, A Coordination Framework for Monitoring the Implementation of Agreed G20/FSB Financial Reforms (October 2011).
96 Ibid. The FSB Plenary will determine priority areas where consistent and comprehensive implementation of reforms is particularly important for global financial stability. The CFIM will ensure that these areas are subjected to more intensive monitoring and detailed reporting, including on a country-by-country basis. They include the Basel II, II.5 and III frameworks; OTC derivatives market reforms; compensation practices; resolution frameworks; policy measures for G-SIFIs; and shadow banking.
97 FSB, Report to G20, November 2011.
98 FSB, A Coordination Framework for Monitoring the Implementation of Agreed G20/FSB Financial Reforms (October 2011).
100 This potential for divergence recognizes both the relative autonomy of independent regulators from national governments in policy-making in most G20 countries, and the different membership of the FSB from the G20 both in terms of countries represented and in terms of other international bodies involved.
101 G20 countries which are not considered systemically significant are South Africa, Argentina, India, and Saudi Arabia. Those considered systemic but are not in the G20 (and not EU members) are Singapore, Hong Kong, and Switzerland. The EU as a regional organisation is represented on FSB, but there are also several EU members who are not G20 members who are considered significant: Netherlands, Spain, Ireland, Austria, Luxembourg, and Sweden: IMF, Integrating Stability Assessments Under the Financial Sector Assessment Program into Article IV Surveillance (August 2011).
102 See the discussion in IMF, see n 2.
103 IMF, Public Information Notice (PIN) No 10/135, 27 September 2010 (IMF, 2010).
104 IMF, Integrating Financial Sector Surveillance Issues and FSAP Assessments into Surveillance (IMF, 2009).
107 Ibid; Art VIII, Section 5(b).
108 IMF, Financial Sector and Bilateral Surveillance—Toward Further Integration (IMF, August 2009), 7; see also IMF, The FSAP After 10 Years: Experiences and Reform for the Next Decade (IMF, 2009); Revised Approach to Financial Regulation and Supervision Standards in FSAP Updates (IMF, 2009).
110 de Larosiere Report, see n 40, at 27.
111 European Commission, Communication from the Commission: European Financial Supervision, COM(2009) 252 final (May 2009).
112 CESR, General Methodology for Implementation Reviews Undertaken by CESR, CESR/04-711b (April 2005).
113 Regulation 1093/2010 (establishing EBA); Regulation 1094/2010 (establishing EIOPA); Regulation 1095/2010 (establishing ESMA); and Directive 2010/78/EU (the Omnibus Directive).
114 K. Abbot and D. Snidal, International Regulation without International Government: Improving International Organization Performance through Orchestration (June 2010), available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1487129>.
115 Part of the discussion section comes from a paper drafted jointly with Rob Baldwin, Regulatory Cohabitation (presented at the Regulation conference, Dublin, June 2010); I thank Rob for agreeing to the use of part of that paper here.
116 See B.G. Peters, ‘Managing Horizontal Government: The Politics of Co-ordination’ (1998) 76 Pub Admin 295, 298; B. Marin, ‘Generalised Political Exchange’ in B. Marin (ed), Generalised Political Exchange (Campus Verlag, 1990); R. Fisher and W. Ury, Getting to Yes (Houghton Mifflin, 1981); E. Ostrom, Governing the Commons (Cambridge University Press, 1990).
118 D. Chisholm, Co-ordination without Hierarchy (University of California Press, 1989).
119 See W. Grant, W. Paterson, and C. Whitston, Government and the Chemical Industry (Oxford University Press, 1988). A government motive for creating a network may be the desire to opt out of control over a difficult issue—to ‘offload a headache’—see S. Goldsmith and W. Eggers, Governing By Network (Brookings, 2004), 43.
120 W. Kickert, E-H Klijn, and J. Koppenjan (eds), Managing Complex Networks (Sage, 1997).
121 See Black, see n 9; CRI 2006; K. Jayasuriya, ‘The New Regulatory State and Relational Capacity’ (2004) 32(4) Policy & Politics 487.
122 See Kickert, Klijn, and Koppenjan, see n 120, at 47.
123 See N. Machado and T. Burns, Complex Social Organization: Multiple Organizing Modes, Structural Incongruence and Mechanisms of Integration (1998) 76 Public Administration 355, 370. On trust as the ‘bedrock of collaboration’ see Goldsmith and Eggers, see n 119, at 111.
124 OECD, Policy Framework for Effective and Efficient Financial Regulation: OECD Recommendation and Principles (2009).
125 As noted above, there has been a significant debate between the IASB and the EU Commission on the IASB’s rule IAS 39 Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement, since 2004. The EU initially did not accept this rule (the IAS carve out) only adopting it in 2005. The IASB was pressed to review the provision by the FSB, BCBS, Commission, and others. However, the EU Commissioner, Michel Barnier, initially indicated that that the EU may not adopt the IFRS rule, and indeed that continued EU funding of the IASB will be contingent on it making changes to its governance structure: see eg M. Christodoulou, ‘Europe’s IASB Concerns Voiced at Global Meeting’ (1 April 2010) Accountancy Age 1. Agreement was finally reached and the new standard brought into effect in the EU in 2011: Commission Regulation (EC) No 149/2011 of 18 February 2011. The debate over IAS 39, as well as the creation of the Monitoring Board, illustrates the price the IASB is being required to pay for success, ie for the EU’s adoption of its standards.
126 de Larosiere Report, see n 40, at para 184.
127 L. Barroso, The European Regulatory State (PhD thesis, London School of Economics, 2011).
128 See eg UK Treasury Select Committee, see n 18.
129 A. Turner, The Turner Review: A Regulatory Response to the Global Financial Crisis (Financial Services Authority, 2009).
130 This is not to say that private actors have not been vociferous participants in debates, notably but not uniquely on the formation of Basle II.
132 P. Sheridan, D. Watts, and C. Sabel, ‘Information Exchange and the Robustness of Organizational Networks’ (2003) 100(21) PNAS 12516.
133 IOSCO, Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Consultation and Cooperation and the Exchange of Information (2002); the requirement was for members to sign by 1 January 2010, or to be taking steps to ensure they had the requisite legal powers to enable them to sign.
134 House of Lords, Evidence of the European Banking Federation to House of Lords: The Future of EU Financial Regulation and Supervision (June 2009).
135 FSB, Principles for Cross-border Cooperation on Crisis Management (2009), Preface. The FSB’s recent implementation report, in April 2010, stated that firm-specific cross-border crisis management groups have been established for the major global financial institutions requiring FSB core supervisory colleges; discussions are underway for development of effective contingency planning and resolution plans.
137 BCBS’s Good Practice Principles for Supervisory Colleges (2010). See also IAIS, Guidance on the Use of Supervisory Colleges in Group-Wide Supervision (October 2009); IOSCO, Principles Regarding Cross-Border Supervisory Cooperation Final Report (May 2010).
138 eg Joint Forum, Principles for the Supervision of Financial Conglomerates: Consultation Paper (Joint Forum, November 2011).
139 Under Article 131a of the amended CRD, all EEA cross border banking groups were required to have a college of supervisors in place by the end of 2010.
140 CEBS, Methodology for Peer Review (2009), adopted by EBA.
141 For criticism see eg House of Lords, European Union Committee, Future of EU Regulation and Supervision (Fourteenth Report, Session 2008–09), paras 196–7.
142 eg British Bankers Association Report (June 2008); House of Lords, see n 151.
143 FSB, Overview of Progress in Implementing the London Summit Recommendations for Strengthening Financial Stability, Report of the Financial Stability Board to G20 Leaders (September 2009).
144 CEIOPS, CEBS, and IWCFC, see n 129; CEBS, see n 129; IWCFC 08 32 (January 2009).
145 The IAIS adopted a supervisory guidance paper on the use of supervisory colleges in groupwide supervision in October 2009. In March 2010 the BCBS released a consultative document on good practices on supervisory colleges, outlining expectations in relation to college objectives, governance, communication, and information sharing.
146 EBF, International Colleges of Supervisors and Global European Banks (EBF Ref.: D1239E-2009, September 2009).
147 Scott, see n 28; T. Porter, Trust in Numbers: The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public Life (Princeton University Press, 1995).
148 eg B. Wynne, ‘May the Sheep Safely Graze? A Reflexive View of the Expert-Lay Knowledge Divide in RISK’ in S. Lash, B. Szerszunski, and B. Wynne (eds), Environment and Modernity: Towards a New Ecology (Sage, 1996).
149 A. Klinke and O. Renn, ‘Precautionary Principle and Discursive Strategies: Classifying and Managing Risks’ (2001) 4(2) Journal of Risk Research 159.
150 Sheridan, et al, see n 134.
152 EBF report, see n 150.
153 eg C. Sabel and W. Simon, Minimalism and Experimentalism in the Administrative State (Columbia Public Law Research Paper No. 10–238, 2010), available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1600898>.
154 eg P. Barach and S. Small, ‘Reporting and Preventing Medical Mishaps: Lessons from Non-Medical Near Miss Reporting Systems’ (March 2000) British Medical Journal 320.
155 J. March, L. Sproull, and M. Tamuz, ‘Learning from Samples of One or Fewer’ (1991) 2(1) Organization Science 1.
156 B. Levitt and J. March, ‘Organizational Learning’ (1998) 14 Ann Rev Soc 319. See eg M. Zollo and S. Winter, ‘Deliberate Learning and the Evolution of Dynamic Capabilities’ (2002) 13(3) Organization Science 339.
157 M. Barnett and M. Finnemore, ‘The Power of Liberal International Organizations’ in M. Barnett and R. Duvall, Power in Global Governance (Cambridge University Press, 2005); D. Carpenter, Reputation and Power: Organizational Image and Pharmaceutical Regulation at the FDA (Princeton University Press, 2010).
158 See further Black, see n 7.
159 eg J. Eatwell and L. Taylor, Global Finance at Risk: The Case for International Regulation (Polity Press, 2000).
160 eg N. Pidgeon, D. Blockley, and B. Turner, ‘Design Practice and Snow Loading: Lessons from a Roof Collapse’ (1986) 64A(3) The Structural Engineer 67.
161 Perrow, n 31, at 332.