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Oxford Law Citator
Contents
Expand All
Collapse All
Preliminary Material
Preface
Table of Contents
Editors
Contributors
Table of Cases
European Court of Justice/Court of Justice of the European Union
Court of First Instance/General Court of the European Union
Permanent Court of International Justice
Domestic Cases
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
France
Germany
Ireland
Italy
Netherlands
New Zealand
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdon
United States
Table of Legislation
International Treaties and Conventions
European Union
Treaties
Regulations
Directives
Domestic Legislation
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Brazil
Canada
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Japan
Mexico
Netherlands
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Taiwan
United Kingdom
Statutes
Statutory Instruments
United States
Statutes
Rules
Sec Rules
Main Text
Part I Collective Redress Mechanisms in a Comparative Perspective
1 Class Actions and Collective Actions
Preliminary Material
I Introduction
1.01
1.02
1.03
1.04
1.05
1.06
1.07
1.08
II The United States Model and Its Influence on Other Regimes
1.09
1.10
1.11
1.12
1.13
1.14
1.15
1.16
1.17
1.18
1.19
1.20
1.21
1.22
1.23
1.24
1.25
1.26
1.27
1.28
1.29
1.30
1.31
1.32
1.33
1.34
1.35
III Developments Within the United States Model
1.36
1.37
1.38
1.39
IV Conclusion
1.40
1.41
1.42
1.43
1.44
1.45
2 Collective Redress Procedures:
Preliminary Material
I Introduction
2.01
2.02
2.03
2.04
2.05
2.06
2.07
2.08
2.09
2.10
2.11
2.12
II Developments at a National Level
Scandinavian Countries
2.13
(a) Sweden
2.14
2.15
2.16
2.17
2.18
(b) Denmark
2.19
2.20
(c) Norway
2.21
2.22
2.23
Portugal
2.24
2.25
2.26
2.27
The Netherlands
2.28
France
2.29
(a) Current Procedural Backdrop
2.30
2.31
(b) A Brief History of the Recent Proposals
2.32
(c) Legislative Initiatives
2.33
2.34
2.35
2.36
Italy
2.37
2.38
Germany
2.39
2.40
2.41
2.42
2.43
England and Wales
2.44
2.45
2.46
2.47
2.48
2.49
2.50
2.51
2.52
2.53
Spain
2.54
2.55
2.56
2.57
2.58
Comparative Conclusions
2.59
2.60
2.61
2.62
2.63
2.64
2.65
III The EU Response
2.66
2.67
2.68
2.69
2.70
2.71
2.72
Critique of the European Union Approach to Collective Redress
2.73
2.74
2.75
2.76
2.77
2.78
2.79
2.80
IV Conclusion
2.81
2.82
3 Collective Action Reform in England and Wales
Preliminary Material
I Introduction
3.01
II 1987–2004: The Long Road to Reform
3.02
3.03
3.04
3.05
3.06
3.07
3.08
3.09
3.10
3.11
3.12
3.13
3.14
3.15
3.16
3.17
3.18
3.19
3.20
3.21
III 2004–10: Flattering to Deceive, Reform’s False Dawn
3.22
3.23
3.24
3.25
3.26
3.27
3.28
3.29
3.30
3.31
3.32
3.33
3.34
3.35
3.36
3.37
3.38
3.39
3.40
3.41
3.42
3.43
3.44
IV Conclusion
3.45
3.46
3.47
3.48
3.49
3.50
3.51
3.52
3.53
4 Class Actions and Class Settlements Going Global:
Preliminary Material
I Introduction
4.01
4.02
II The Dutch System of Collective Redress
General
4.03
4.04
4.05
4.06
The Collective Action
4.07
4.08
4.09
4.10
4.11
4.12
4.13
4.14
4.15
4.16
The Collective Settlement under the WCAM
4.17
4.18
4.19
4.20
4.21
4.22
4.23
4.24
Interaction between the WCAM and the Collective Action
4.25
4.26
4.27
4.28
4.29
4.30
Post WCAM Initiatives
4.31
4.32
4.33
4.34
Trends and Dynamics in Dutch Civil Procedure
4.35
4.36
III Cross-border Mass Disputes—The WCAM Going Global
4.37
The Shell Case
4.38
4.39
4.40
4.41
The Converium Case
4.42
4.43
4.44
4.45
4.46
4.47
IV The Complementary Role of the WCAM
4.48
4.49
4.50
4.51
4.52
V Unanticipated Problems with Going Global
4.53
4.54
4.55
4.56
4.57
4.58
4.59
4.60
4.61
4.62
4.63
4.64
4.65
4.66
4.67
4.68
VI Recognition and Enforcement of United States Judgments
4.69
4.70
4.71
4.72
4.73
4.74
4.75
VII Conclusion
4.76
4.77
4.78
4.79
5 Collective Redress:
Preliminary Material
I Introduction
5.01
II Policy Objectives
5.02
5.03
5.04
5.05
5.06
5.07
5.08
5.09
5.10
5.11
5.12
5.13
5.14
5.15
III Practical Problems
5.16
Collective Claimants
5.17
(a) Assembling a Group
5.18
Representative Bodies.
5.19
5.20
5.21
Existing Groupings.
5.22
Disparate Groups.
5.23
Disclosure by Defendants.
5.24
(b) Coordination between Lawyers
5.25
(c) Coordination by Lawyers
5.26
5.27
5.28
5.29
5.30
Procedures and Case Management
5.31
(a) Representative Proceedings
5.32
5.33
5.34
5.35
(b) Group Actions
5.36
5.37
(c) Case Management
5.38
Costs
5.39
(a) Who Funds It?
5.40
5.41
5.42
5.43
(b) Who Bears the Adverse Costs Risk?
5.44
5.45
(c) Disclosure of Funding Arrangements
5.46
IV Conclusions
5.47
5.48
5.49
Part II Private International Law and Collective Redress
6 A Coherent Approach to European Collective Redress
Preliminary Material
I Introduction
Collective Redress—An Enigmatic Concept of Procedural Law
6.01
6.02
6.03
6.04
6.05
6.06
6.07
6.08
II Different Perspectives and Objectives of Law-making
Private Enforcement of European Union Law
6.09
6.10
6.11
6.12
National Laws of Civil Procedure
6.13
6.14
6.15
Horizontal Coordination: European Union Instruments on Cross-Border Litigation and Collective Redress
6.16
6.17
6.18
6.19
6.20
6.21
6.22
6.23
6.24
6.25
6.26
6.27
6.28
6.29
III Conclusion
The Need for a Coherent Instrument on Cross-Border Collective Redress in the European Union
6.30
6.31
7 The Trouble With Cross-Border Collective Redress:
Preliminary Material
I Introduction
7.01
7.02
7.03
7.04
7.05
7.06
II Sources of Resistance
7.07
7.08
7.09
7.10
7.11
III New Directions?
Collective Redress as a Resource for Change?
7.12
7.13
7.14
7.15
7.16
8 Cross-Border Collective Redress and Jurisdiction Under Brussels I:
Preliminary Material
I Introduction
8.01
8.02
8.03
8.04
8.05
8.06
II One Court for All: Concentration of Jurisdiction under Brussels I
8.07
Domicile of the Defendant
8.08
8.09
8.10
8.11
8.12
8.13
Place Where the Event Giving Rise to the Damage Occurred
8.14
8.15
III Too Many Courts Spoil the Broth: Dispersed Jurisdiction under Brussels I
Habitual Residence of the Consumer
8.16
8.17
8.18
8.19
8.20
8.21
Place of Performance
8.22
8.23
8.24
IV The Magic Trick? Article 6(1) Brussels I Regulation
8.25
8.26
8.27
8.28
8.29
8.30
V Can the Parties Decide?
8.31
8.32
VI Conclusions and Perspectives
8.33
8.34
8.35
8.36
8.37
8.38
9 Parallel Litigation and Cross-Border Collective Actions Under the Brussels I Framework:
Preliminary Material
I Introduction
9.01
9.02
9.03
9.04
II Lis Pendens and Related Actions under the Brussels I Regulation
9.05
9.06
9.07
Article 27: Lis Pendens
9.08
9.09
9.10
Article 28: Related Actions
9.11
9.12
III Collective Actions and Parallel Proceedings
9.13
9.14
First in Time Rule
9.15
9.16
9.17
Concept of ‘Same Parties’
9.18
9.19
9.20
9.21
Consolidation Dependent on National Rules
9.22
IV Proposed Amendments to the Brussels I Regulation
9.23
9.24
9.25
9.26
9.27
9.28
9.29
9.30
V Suggestions for Reform
9.31
Redefining ‘Same Parties’
9.32
9.33
Exclusive Head of Jurisdiction
9.34
Mandatory Stay
9.35
9.36
Methods for Coordination, Centralization, and Consolidation
9.37
9.38
9.39
9.40
9.41
9.42
9.43
9.44
9.45
9.46
9.47
9.48
9.49
9.50
Article 28 and Forum Non Conveniens
9.51
9.52
9.53
9.54
9.55
9.56
9.57
9.58
9.59
9.60
9.61
9.62
9.63
Anti-suit Injunctions
9.64
9.65
9.66
9.67
9.68
9.69
9.70
9.71
VI Conclusion
9.72
9.73
9.74
9.75
10 The Impact of the Brussels I Enforcement and Recognition Rules on Collective Actions
Preliminary Material
I Introduction
10.01
10.02
10.03
II The Scheme of Brussels I
Foreign Judgments
10.04
10.05
10.06
10.07
10.08
Distinction between Judgments and Settlements
10.09
10.10
10.11
10.12
10.13
10.14
10.15
10.16
10.17
III The Notion of Ordre Public under Brussels I, Article 34(1)
10.18
10.19
10.20
10.21
10.22
10.23
10.24
10.25
IV Approach in Individual Member States: Public Policy and Collective Redress
10.26
France
10.27
10.28
10.29
10.30
10.31
10.32
10.33
10.34
Germany
(a) Uncertainty
10.35
10.36
(b) Restrictive Use of the Public Policy Exception
10.37
10.38
(c) Arguments in Favour of a Violation of Public Policy
10.39
10.40
10.41
10.42
10.43
10.44
10.45
(d) Class Action Settlements
10.46
10.47
The Netherlands
10.48
10.49
10.50
Conclusion and the Position under English Law
10.51
10.52
10.53
10.54
V Article 34(2): Procedural Issues
10.55
10.56
10.57
VI Article 34(3): Irreconcilability
10.58
10.59
10.60
10.61
VII Conclusion
Impact of the Recognition of Third State Judgments or Settlements in other EU States
10.62
10.63
10.64
11 Conflicts of Laws in Multinational Collective Actions—A Judicial Nightmare?
Preliminary Material
I Introduction
11.01
11.02
11.03
11.04
11.05
11.06
11.07
11.08
11.09
11.10
II Choice of Law and European Mass Litigation
11.11
Anti-trust Cases
11.12
11.13
11.14
11.15
Unfair Competition
11.16
Capital Market and Securities Cases
11.17
11.18
11.19
11.20
11.21
11.22
Single Event Torts
11.23
11.24
11.25
11.26
Product Liability Cases
11.27
11.28
11.29
Consumer Contracts
11.30
11.31
11.32
11.33
11.34
III Possible Solutions
Reconsidering Cross-border Group Actions?
11.35
‘After the Event’ Choice of Law Agreements
11.36
11.37
11.38
11.39
Specially Designed Choice of Law Rules for Mass Litigation?
11.40
11.41
11.42
11.43
11.44
11.45
11.46
11.47
11.48
11.49
11.50
11.51
Procedural Management of Multinational Group Actions
(a) Court’s Discretion in the Certification Process
11.52
11.53
11.54
(b) Formation of Sub-groups and Aggregate Treatment of Common Issues
11.55
11.56
IV Conclusion
11.57
11.58
11.59
11.60
12 Extraterritoriality of evidence gathering in US class action proceedings
Preliminary Material
I Introduction
12.01
12.02
12.03
12.04
12.05
12.06
12.07
II The Scope of Extraterritoriality of United States Discovery
12.08
Application of US Discovery Rules through the 1970 Hague Convention Mechanism
12.09
12.10
12.11
12.12
12.13
12.14
12.15
The Direct (Unilateral) Application of United States Discovery Rules
12.16
12.17
12.18
12.19
12.20
12.21
12.22
12.23
The International Scope of Application of the United States Discovery Rules
12.24
12.25
12.26
12.27
12.28
12.29
12.30
12.31
12.32
12.33
12.34
12.35
12.36
12.37
III The Conflict between Extraterritorial United States Discovery Rules and Foreign Laws
12.38
12.39
12.40
The Conflict between United States Discovery Rules and Foreign Blocking Statutes
12.41
12.42
12.43
12.44
12.45
12.46
12.47
The Conflict between United States Discovery Rules and Foreign Privileges
12.48
12.49
12.50
12.51
12.52
12.53
12.54
IV Conclusion
12.55
12.56
12.57
12.58
13 The ILA Rio Resolution on Transnational Group Actions
Preliminary Material
I Introduction
13.01
13.02
13.03
II The Resolution of the 2008 ILA Rio de Janeiro Conference
13.04
13.05
13.06
13.07
III Factors Determining the Type of Procedure
Subject Matter
13.08
Nature of Damages
13.09
13.10
Amount of Damages
13.11
Number of Parties Affected
13.12
Number of States Affected
13.13
Risk of Excessive Litigation
13.14
Applicable Law
13.15
Distribution of Compensation
13.16
Financing Ability
13.17
13.18
13.19
IV Analysis of the Resolution
Who Can Bring a Claim?
13.20
Requirements for Bringing a Claim (Certification)
13.21
Jurisdiction
13.22
13.23
13.24
Information—Notification
13.25
13.26
The Applicable Law on the Merits
13.27
13.28
13.29
13.30
Evidence
13.31
Management of Proceedings (Case Management)
13.32
13.33
Transnational Judicial Cooperation
13.34
13.35
13.36
13.37
Costs, Lawyers’ Fees
13.38
13.39
Recognition and Enforcement
13.40
V Conclusion
13.41
14 In Defence of the Requirement for Foreign Class Members to Opt in to an English Class Action
Preliminary Material
I Introduction
14.01
14.02
14.03
II The Draft Statutory Framework
The Relevant Provisions Requiring an Opt-in Foreign Class
14.04
14.05
14.06
The Explanatory Notes
14.07
14.08
14.09
The Problem in Reverse
14.10
14.11
14.12
14.13
14.14
III Requiring Non-domiciled Class Members to Opt In: Key Canadian Precedent
Canadian Statutory Provisions
14.15
14.16
14.17
14.18
Canadian Judicial Commentary on the Opt-in Requirement for Foreign Class Members
14.19
14.20
14.21
14.22
14.23
14.24
14.25
14.26
14.27
14.28
14.29
14.30
14.31
14.32
IV Further Support Derived from Some Key United States Decisions
14.33
Avoidance of any Kern v Siemens -type Problem
14.34
14.35
14.36
14.37
14.38
14.39
14.40
A Superior Method of Ensuring Due Process, and Equivalent Outcomes, for Foreign Class Members
14.41
14.42
14.43
14.44
14.45
14.46
14.47
14.48
14.49
14.50
An Opt-in Requirement for Foreign Class Members Makes Optimal Use of the English Judiciary’s Resources
14.51
14.52
14.53
14.54
V Conclusion
14.55
14.56
14.57
Part III Reception of Foreign Collective Redress and Punitive Damages Decision in National Jurisdictions
15 Foreign Punitive Damages Decisions and Class Actions in Italy
Preliminary Material
I Introduction
15.01
15.02
II Compatibility of US Class Action Procedure with European Jurisprudence
15.03
Opt-out Regime
15.04
15.05
15.06
15.07
15.08
15.09
Extra-compensatory Damages
15.10
15.11
15.12
15.13
15.14
15.15
15.16
15.17
15.18
The Italian Approach to Extra-compensatory Damages
15.19
15.20
15.21
15.22
15.23
15.24
15.25
15.26
15.27
15.28
15.29
15.30
Extra-compensatory Damages: US and European Principles Compared
15.31
15.32
15.33
15.34
15.35
15.36
15.37
15.38
15.39
III Conclusion
15.40
15.41
16 The Perils of Certifying International Class Actions in Canada
Preliminary Material
I Introduction
16.01
16.02
16.03
16.04
16.05
16.06
16.07
16.08
16.09
II Traditional Judgment Recognition Rules Are Inadequate for Enforcing Multi-jurisdictional Class Action Judgments
16.10
16.11
16.12
16.13
16.14
III Why the ‘Real and Substantial Connection’ Test Should Not Be Applied to Absent Foreign Claimants
16.15
16.16
16.17
16.18
16.19
16.20
16.21
16.22
16.23
16.24
16.25
16.26
16.27
IV The ‘Real and Substantial Connection’ Test—Applied Rigorously
16.28
16.29
16.30
16.31
16.32
16.33
16.34
16.35
16.36
16.37
16.38
16.39
16.40
16.41
16.42
16.43
16.44
16.45
16.46
V Canadian Courts Should Not Certify Multi-jurisdictional Opt-out Classes
16.47
McCann v CP Ships Ltd (June 2009)
16.48
16.49
16.50
16.51
Silver v IMAX (December 2009)
16.52
16.53
16.54
16.55
McKenna v Gammon Gold (March 2010)
16.56
16.57
16.58
16.59
16.60
16.61
16.62
16.63
16.64
16.65
Ramdath v George Brown College (April 2010)
16.66
16.67
16.68
16.69
16.70
16.71
16.72
16.73
16.74
VI Conclusion
16.75
16.76
16.77
16.78
17 Collective Redress in Spain:
Preliminary Material
I Introduction
17.01
17.02
17.03
II Collective Redress in Spain
General
17.04
17.05
17.06
The CPA 2000 Regulation
17.07
(a) The Non-existence of Special Court Proceedings for the Protection of Collective Interests
17.08
(b) Interpretation of the Principle of Legal Standing
17.09
17.10
(c) The Rules Relating to the Opt-out Process
17.11
17.12
(d) The Availability of Publicity in Claims for the Protection of Collective and Diffuse Rights and Interests of Consumers and Users
17.13
17.14
(e) Identifying the Individuals Concerned
17.15
(f) Money Judgments
17.16
(g) Res Judicata
17.17
17.18
17.19
(h) Settlements
17.20
17.21
III Recognition and Enforcement in Spain
Introduction
17.22
17.23
17.24
17.25
17.26
17.27
17.28
17.29
17.30
Analysis of Conditions (I): Procedural Requirements
(a) The Review of the Jurisdiction of the Court of Origin
17.31
17.32
17.33
17.34
17.35
17.36
(b) Service of Process
17.37
17.38
(c) Irreconcilable Judgments or Ongoing Proceedings in Spain
17.39
17.40
Procedural Public Policy
(a) The ‘Absent Member’ Defence
17.41
17.42
17.43
17.44
17.45
17.46
17.47
17.48
17.49
Grounds for the Judgment
17.50
Abuse?
17.51
17.52
Other Grounds
17.53
Analysis of Conditions (II): Material Requirements
(a) Punitive Damages
17.54
17.55
17.56
17.57
(b) Identifying Beneficiaries and Criteria for Calculating Compensation
17.58
17.59
Scope of Recognition/ Exequatur
17.60
17.61
17.62
Recognition/ Exequatur Procedure
17.63
17.64
IV Conclusion
17.65
17.66
Part IV Extraterritoriality and US Law
18 Morrison V National Australia Bank :
Preliminary Material
I Introduction
18.01
18.02
18.03
18.04
II The Facts of Morrison
Introduction
18.05
18.06
The Court’s Analysis of the Facts
18.07
18.08
18.09
The Case as Presented by the Parties’ Briefs
(a) The Petitioners’ View of the Facts
18.10
18.11
18.12
18.13
18.14
The Petitioners’ Strategy in the Briefing
18.15
18.16
18.17
18.18
18.19
The Petitioners’ Strategy in Aligning Themselves with the Regulators
18.20
The Respondents’ Briefing before the Court
18.21
18.22
18.23
18.24
18.25
18.26
18.27
18.28
18.29
The Briefing of the United States as Amicus Curiae before the Court
18.30
18.31
18.32
18.33
The Amicus Briefs before the Court
(a) The Commonwealth of Australia Brief
18.34
18.35
18.36
18.37
18.38
18.39
18.40
(b) The United Kingdom Brief
18.41
18.42
18.43
18.44
The Oral Argument before the Court
18.45
18.46
18.47
III The Court’s Opinion and the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality
The Strong Version of the Presumption is Applied
18.48
18.49
18.50
The ‘Conduct’ Test
18.51
18.52
18.53
18.54
18.55
‘Comity’ Analysis
18.56
18.57
The Remedies Section of the Plurality Opinion
18.58
18.59
The ‘Effects’ Test is Effectively Abolished
18.60
18.61
Refutation of the Solicitor General’s Arguments
18.62
18.63
The Attack on Class Actions
18.64
18.65
18.66
18.67
The Concurrences
(a) Justice Breyer
18.68
18.69
(b) Justices Stevens and Ginsburg Concurrence
18.70
18.71
18.72
18.73
18.74
18.75
18.76
18.77
The Risk of Addressing Issues not before the Court
18.78
18.79
18.80
18.81
18.82
The Next Steps
18.83
18.84
The SEC Report
18.85
IV Conclusion
18.86
18.87
19 Morrison V National Australia Bank :
Preliminary Material
I Introduction
19.01
II Background of Morrison
19.02
III The Morrison Decision
19.03
19.04
19.05
19.06
IV The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality in Morrison
19.07
19.08
19.09
19.10
19.11
V The Influence of Comity Concerns in Morrison
19.12
19.13
19.14
19.15
19.16
VI Implications for Global Class Actions Post- Morrison
The ‘Listed Securities’ Language in Morrison
19.17
19.18
19.19
19.20
The Possibility of Bringing Claims under Foreign Law in United States Courts
19.21
19.22
19.23
The Public Law Taboo
19.24
19.25
19.26
Forum Non Conveniens
19.27
19.28
19.29
19.30
19.31
19.32
19.33
19.34
Preclusion
19.35
19.36
19.37
19.38
VII Conclusion
19.39
19.40
20 Morrison V National Australia Bank :
Preliminary Material
I Introduction
20.01
20.02
20.03
20.04
II Choice of Law and Jurisdiction
20.05
III International Jurisdiction
20.06
20.07
20.08
20.09
20.10
20.11
20.12
20.13
IV Extraterritorial Application of United States Law
20.14
20.15
20.16
20.17
20.18
20.19
V International Comity and the Approach in England
20.20
20.21
20.22
20.23
20.24
20.25
20.26
20.27
VI Conclusion
20.28
20.29
20.30
20.31
20.32
20.33
20.34
20.35
20.36
20.37
20.38
21 ‘Bridging the Gap’:
Preliminary Material
I Introduction: Morrison and Empagran
21.01
21.02
21.03
21.04
21.05
21.06
21.07
21.08
21.09
21.10
21.11
21.12
21.13
21.14
21.15
21.16
21.17
21.18
21.19
21.20
II How Might this New Situation Affect Collective Claims in Europe?
21.21
21.22
21.23
21.24
21.25
21.26
21.27
21.28
21.29
21.30
21.31
21.32
III Conclusion: Increasing Collective Claims in Europe?
21.33
21.34
22 Transnational Issuer Liability After the Financial Crisis:
Preliminary Material
I Introduction
22.01
22.02
22.03
22.04
22.05
22.06
22.07
22.08
II International Securities Class Actions
22.09
22.10
22.11
22.12
22.13
22.14
III Classification of Primary Capital Markets Duties
22.15
22.16
22.17
22.18
22.19
22.20
22.21
22.22
IV Current State of the Conflict of Laws Discussion
22.23
22.24
Switzerland
22.25
United States
22.26
22.27
22.28
22.29
22.30
22.31
European Union
22.32
22.33
22.34
22.35
22.36
22.37
22.38
22.39
22.40
22.41
V Suggested Solution: Synchronism between Duties and Liability
22.42
Corporate Governance as the Purpose of Securities Liability
22.43
22.44
22.45
22.46
22.47
Consistent Characterization of Corporate Governance Rules
22.48
(a) Issuer Choice
22.49
22.50
(b) Bundling of Issuer Liability and Applicable Securities Law
22.51
22.52
22.53
22.54
22.55
22.56
Implementation within the Rome II Regulation
22.57
(a) Country Where the Damage Occurs
22.58
22.59
(b) Marketplace
22.60
22.61
22.62
(c) Bundling with Disclosure Duties
22.63
22.64
Characterization in United States Cases
22.65
22.66
22.67
22.68
VI Implications
22.69
22.70
22.71
22.72
22.73
22.74
VII Conclusion
22.75
22.76
Further Material
Index
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Table of Cases
Edited By: Duncan Fairgrieve, Eva Lein
From:
Extraterritoriality and Collective Redress
Edited By: Duncan Fairgrieve, Eva Lein
Content type:
Book content
Product:
Private International Law [PRIL]
Published in print:
01 September 2012
ISBN:
9780199655724
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