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9 Conduct of the Arbitration (Articles 13–22, 25–26, 31–32)

Michael Moser, Chiann Bao

From: A Guide to the HKIAC Arbitration Rules (2nd Edition)

Michael J Moser, Chiann Bao

From: Oxford Legal Research Library (http://olrl.ouplaw.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2023. All Rights Reserved. Subscriber: null; date: 06 June 2023

Subject(s):
Jurisdiction — Waiver

(p. 211) Conduct of the Arbitration (Articles 13–22, 25–26, 31–32)

9.01  This chapter addresses a number of key procedural steps and principles in an HKIAC arbitration. It begins with a discussion of the general principles governing the conduct of proceedings (Section A), followed by rules concerning the seat and venue of the arbitration (Section B) and the language of the arbitration (Section C). The next two sections analyse the filing of and amendment to the parties’ written submissions (Section D), and explain the arbitral tribunal’s authority to rule on its own jurisdiction as well as HKIAC’s prima facie power to proceed with an arbitration (Section E). The remaining sections cover evidentiary matters and hearings (Section F); experts appointed by the arbitral tribunal (Section G); non-participation of a party in the arbitral proceedings (Section H); closure of the proceedings (Section I); and the waiver of a party’s right to object (Section J).

A.  Article 13—General Provisions

9.02  Article 13 outlines the general provisions to govern the conduct of an HKIAC arbitration. The key features of these provisions are summarized as follows:

  1. (1)  The arbitral tribunal enjoys broad discretion to manage the proceedings in a manner that avoids unnecessary delay or expense, provided that the procedures adopted ensure equal treatment of the parties and afford the parties a reasonable opportunity to be heard (Article 13.1);

  2. (2)  The arbitral tribunal shall consult with the parties and prepare a procedural timetable at the earliest opportunity (Article 13.2);

  3. (3)  Any documents provided to the arbitral tribunal must be provided to each other party and to HKIAC (Article 13.3);

  4. (p. 212) (4)  The arbitral tribunal may appoint a secretary after consulting with the parties (Article 13.4). HKIAC has developed separate guidelines on the use of tribunal secretaries;1

  5. (5)  The arbitral tribunal and the parties are required to do everything necessary to ensure the fair and efficient conduct of the arbitration (Article 13.5);

  6. (6)  The parties are free to choose their legal representatives (Article 13.6);

  7. (7)  A party is required to promptly communicate changes and/or additions to its legal representatives to all other parties, the arbitral tribunal, and HKIAC (Article 13.7);

  8. (8)  If the parties agree, after the arbitration commences, to resolve their dispute by other means, HKIAC, the arbitral tribunal, or emergency arbitrator may suspend the arbitration or emergency arbitration proceedings until a party requests that they be resumed (Article 13.8);

  9. (9)  Where the HKIAC Rules are silent on any issue, the arbitral tribunal and the parties must act in the spirit of the Rules (Article 13.9); and

  10. (10)  The arbitral tribunal is required to make every reasonable effort to ensure that an award is valid (Article 13.10).

1.  Article 13.1—arbitral tribunal’s power to adopt suitable procedures

Subject to these Rules, the arbitral tribunal shall adopt suitable procedures for the conduct of the arbitration in order to avoid unnecessary delay or expense, having regard to the complexity of the issues, the amount in dispute and the effective use of technology, and provided that such procedures ensure equal treatment of the parties and afford the parties a reasonable opportunity to present their case.

(a)  The arbitral tribunal’s power to determine the procedures

9.03  The HKIAC Rules give parties considerable scope to agree on how the arbitration is to be conducted. This approach is consistent with the central importance of party autonomy in international arbitration.2 Article 13.1 makes clear, however, that the arbitral tribunal is ultimately responsible for determining the procedures for the conduct of the arbitration, subject to the requirement of due process.

9.04  An arbitral tribunal’s power to manage the arbitral procedure was upheld by the CA in Grand Pacific Holdings Ltd v Pacific China Holdings Ltd (in liq) (No 1).3 In that case, Hon Tang VP confirmed that the Hong Kong courts are not ‘entitled to interfere with a case management decision, which was fully within the discretion of the Tribunal to make’.4

9.05  In practice, arbitral tribunals will invariably seek the parties’ views on the procedures and will generally adopt the procedures agreed between the parties. Indeed, Article 13.2 (discussed in paragraphs 9.23–9.25 below) expressly contemplates that the arbitral tribunal will (p. 213) consult with the parties when preparing the procedural timetable for the arbitration. Where the parties have proposed a procedure that is unworkable or inconsistent with the terms of Article 135 or any mandatory requirements of the applicable law,6 the arbitral tribunal may vary the parties’ proposed procedure or substitute its own. In Brunswick Bowling Billiards Corp v Shanghai Zhonglu Industrial Co Ltd,7 Lam J said that:

After hearing submissions from the parties, if the arbitrators were of the view that the procedure agreed by the parties would result in a breach of Article 18 [equal treatment of the parties and a party’s full opportunity to present its case], they should take steps to conduct the arbitration in such a manner that could redress the problem instead of being constrained by an unworkable agreement of the parties.8

9.06  Article 13.1 enumerates factors for the arbitral tribunal to take into account when fixing the procedures, namely: (a) the relevant provisions of the HKIAC Rules; (b) the need to avoid unnecessary delay or expense, having regard to the complexity of the issues and the amount in dispute; and (c) the need to treat the parties equally and afford the parties a reasonable opportunity to present their case. These factors are considered below.

(b)  Subject to the HKIAC Rules

9.07  The opening words of Article 13.1—‘[s]ubject to these Rules’—require the arbitral tribunal to have regard to other provisions of the Rules before adopting a procedure for the conduct of the arbitration. These provisions include but are not limited to: Article 13.2 (provisional timetable), Article 16 (Statement of Claim), Article 17 (Statement of Defence), Article 18 (amendments to the claim or defence), Article 20 (further written statements), Article 21 (time limits), Article 22 (evidence and hearings), and, where applicable, Article 42 (expedited procedure).

(c)  Avoiding unnecessary delay or expense

9.08  The arbitral tribunal must adopt procedures to avoid unnecessary delay or expense. Section 46(3)(c) of the Arbitration Ordinance specifically requires the arbitral tribunal to ‘use procedures that are appropriate to the particular case, avoiding unnecessary delay or expense, so as to provide a fair means for resolving the dispute to which the arbitral proceedings relate’.

9.09  The requirement for the arbitral tribunal to adopt efficient and cost-effective procedures is a response to the growing concern about the speed and cost of international arbitration.9 While the onus is on both the arbitral tribunal and the parties to ‘do everything to ensure the fair and efficient conduct of the arbitration’ as stipulated in Article 13.5, Article 13.1 emphasizes the arbitral tribunal’s role in managing the process. The HKIAC Rules (2018) provide (p. 214) several mechanisms to assist arbitral tribunals in enhancing efficiency and reducing costs, for example, the expedited procedure,10 joinder of additional parties,11 consolidation of arbitrations,12 the appointment of tribunal secretaries,13 and the early determination procedure.14 In choosing which procedures or mechanisms to adopt, the arbitral tribunal must carefully consider the circumstances of the case, including the complexity of the dispute and the disputed amount.

(d)  Having regard to the complexity of the issues, the amount in dispute, and the effective use of technology

9.10  When determining suitable procedures for the conduct of an arbitration, the arbitral tribunal shall factor in the complexity of the issues and the amount in dispute. The complexity of the dispute is perhaps the most appropriate indicator as to the kind of process required to effectively resolve the dispute. Certain factors such as number of parties involved, the issues in dispute, the factual matrix of the dispute, provide a helpful metric for the arbitrator to establish a suitable procedure. The arbitral tribunal should also factor in the amount in dispute, which establishes a gauge for a process that is proportionate in cost.

9.11  The HKIAC Rules (2018) now also expressly require the arbitral tribunal to have regard to effective use of technology. This additional provision is intended to encourage the arbitral tribunal to consider available technology including, but not limited to, the HKIAC’s secured online document repository. Other technologies include use of audio and videoconferencing facilities, and translation and interpretation services.

Increasingly, technology provides tools for arbitrators and parties to maximize the efficiency of the proceedings, which in turn reduces cost and delay.

9.12  For example, use of electronic document bundles can significantly improve the document production exercise and, in certain circumstances, reduce cost. Likewise, case management conferences give the tribunal an opportunity to discuss with the parties and their representatives the size and nature of the case, including issues on which the parties cannot agree, and to establish a procedure that will be most appropriate to the circumstances of that case.

9.13  Moreover, increased use of virtual platforms means that tribunals can hold case management conferences (or indeed full hearings) remotely, saving the significant costs involved in travelling to an in-person hearing, and making the hearing considerably easier to schedule.

(e)  Ensuring equal treatment of the parties and a reasonable opportunity to present their case

9.14  ‘Equal treatment of parties’ and ‘reasonable opportunity to present a case’ are two bedrock principles of arbitration.15 The arbitral tribunal cannot derogate from these principles when fixing the procedures for the arbitration.

(p. 215) 9.15  The same principles are reflected in section 46 of the Arbitration Ordinance, which provides in relevant part:

  1. (2)  The parties must be treated with equality.

  2. (3)  When conducting arbitral proceedings or exercising any of the powers conferred on an arbitral tribunal by this Ordinance or by the parties to any of those arbitral proceedings, the arbitral tribunal is required— …

    1. (b)  to act fairly and impartially as between the parties, giving them a reasonable opportunity to present their cases and to deal with the cases of their opponents.

9.16  Both Article 13.1 of the HKIAC Rules (2018) and section 46 of the Arbitration Ordinance are extensions of the principles in Article 18 of the UNCITRAL Model Law (2006),16 which has been described as a key element of the ‘Magna Carta of Arbitral Procedure’.17

9.17  The arbitral tribunal has discretion to determine what ‘equal treatment’ or ‘reasonable opportunity’ to present one’s case means in a particular case.

9.18  The meaning of ‘equal treatment’ must be assessed having regard to the circumstances of the case and does not necessarily equate, literally, to ‘the same treatment’ in relation to every aspect of the arbitration.18 For example, it may be appropriate to order one party to produce certain documents but not require any document production from the other party. Likewise, in scheduling a hearing, the arbitral tribunal may allot more time to one party on the basis that it is required to cross-examine more witnesses than the other party. On the other hand, it would be wrong to permit one party to present witnesses or address the arbitral tribunal orally but deny the other party an equivalent right.19

9.19  As to a party’s opportunity to present its case, there is a distinction between ‘full’ and ‘reasonable’ opportunity in this context.20 As pointed out by a leading treaties on international arbitration, the word ‘full’ conjures up ‘visions of a party demanding the opportunity to present duplicative testimony for days or even weeks’.21 The word ‘reasonable’ allows the arbitral tribunal to take a proportionate and pragmatic approach to limiting the scope of the evidence which a party wishes to present.

9.20  The Arbitration Ordinance deviates from the use of ‘full’ opportunity as provided under Article 18 of the UNCITRAL Model Law (2006), instead requiring that parties be given a ‘reasonable’ opportunity to be heard. The drafting history of the Arbitration Ordinance records a concern that the ‘full’ opportunity might make it difficult for an arbitrator to prevent (p. 216) a party from calling unnecessary factual witnesses or an excessive number of expert witnesses, or from making repetitive submissions, without risking challenge to the award.22

9.21  Similarly, the HKIAC Rules (2018) adopt the ‘reasonable’ test as regards a party’s right to be heard. Such a right is not without limits—it must be balanced with the need for procedural efficiency and fairness, as required under Article 13. Accordingly, the arbitral tribunal can (and should) actively manage the extent of the parties’ pleadings and evidence with a properly defined scope and appropriate time limits.

9.22  Where an arbitral tribunal fails to ensure the equal treatment of the parties or a reasonable opportunity for a party to present its case, the tribunal’s award may be vulnerable to challenge under the law of the seat, or to non-enforcement under Article V(1)(b) of the New York Convention. Nonetheless, in most jurisdictions, the threshold for challenging an award on procedural violation grounds is set appropriately high.23 Arbitral tribunals generally have broad case management powers and considerable discretion to determine the arbitral procedures and national courts tend to defer to the procedural decisions made by arbitral tribunals, unless there has been a ‘serious or egregious’ breach of natural justice.24

2.  Article 13.2—provisional timetable

At an early stage of the arbitration and in consultation with the parties, the arbitral tribunal shall prepare a provisional timetable for the arbitration, which shall be provided to the parties and HKIAC.

9.23  Shortly after it is constituted, the arbitral tribunal must prepare a provisional timetable setting out the key procedural steps in the arbitral process. The timetable normally covers the timing of filing pleadings, witness statements, expert reports, document production requests, as well as the dates of the case management conference and the substantive hearing. In practice, the procedural timetable is commonly included in a ‘Procedural Order No 1’.25

9.24  The arbitral tribunal is required to consult with the parties when preparing the provisional timetable. Often, this is done by way of a preliminary procedural conference, which can be convened in person, by telephone, or by videoconference. Alternatively, the arbitral tribunal may consult with the parties in writing by way of an exchange of proposed timetables.

9.25  The timetable is provisional, so the arbitral tribunal may vary timelines upon a party’s request (and comments from all other parties). After preparing this timetable, the arbitral tribunal shall provide it to the parties and to HKIAC. HKIAC will use this timetable as a reference to monitor the pace of the arbitral process. To the extent significant delays are caused by the arbitral tribunal, and particularly when prompted by the parties, HKIAC will consult (p. 217) the arbitral tribunal as to reasoning for the delay and work with the arbitral tribunal to keep delays it has caused to a minimum.

3.  Article 13.3—communication of documents or information

Subject to Article 11.5, all written communications between any party and the arbitral tribunal shall be communicated to all other parties and HKIAC.

9.26  Article 13.3 is intended to prevent parties from passing any written communications to the arbitral tribunal without providing the same to the other party or parties and HKIAC.26 If the parties and tribunal agree to communicate by email, all parties and HKIAC must be copied on its emails to the arbitral tribunal. The requirement to supply communication to all parties is consistent with the arbitral tribunal’s duty to act independently and to ensure equal treatment of the parties,27 as well as the parties’ duty not to engage in ex parte communications with the arbitral tribunal.28

9.27  In limited circumstances, however, ex parte communications from the parties to an arbitrator may be permitted. As stipulated under Article 11.5, these circumstances include where a party advises an arbitrator candidate on the general nature of the dispute, discusses the candidate’s qualifications, availability, impartiality, or independence, or the suitability of candidates to act as the presiding arbitrator (where the parties or their designated arbitrators are to designate that arbitrator).29 In any event, no parties shall have any ex parte communications relating to the arbitration with any candidate for the presiding arbitrator.30

9.28  Article 13.3 seeks to meet the standard of due process under Hong Kong law. As a matter of Hong Kong’s public policy, an arbitrator must ensure that he or she is ‘not influenced, or seen to be influenced, by private communications’.31 This was confirmed in Gao Haiyan v Keeneye Holdings Ltd, in which the Court of First Instance (CFI) held that ‘basic notions of morality and justice in Hong Kong would not permit ex parte communication between a member of a tribunal and a party once an arbitration process has commenced’.32 However, this principle does not prevent unilateral contact between a party and an arbitrator candidate concerning the selection of arbitrators.33

9.29  Article 13.3 also requires the parties to keep HKIAC informed of communications between them and the arbitral tribunal in order to enable HKIAC to monitor the arbitration process. Accordingly, HKIAC should receive copies of all written communications exchanged during the arbitration. Unilateral communications with HKIAC will generally be responded to with (p. 218) HKIAC supplying its response and the original correspondence to all parties and the arbitral tribunal. In circumstances whereby a party may be seeking information not specific to the arbitration at hand, HKIAC may respond to the requesting party only.

4.  Article 13.4—appointment of a tribunal secretary

The arbitral tribunal may, after consulting with the parties, appoint a secretary. The secretary shall remain at all times impartial and independent of the parties and shall disclose any circumstances likely to give rise to justifiable doubts as to his or her impartiality or independence prior to his or her appointment. A secretary, once appointed and throughout the arbitration, shall disclose without delay any such circumstances to the parties unless they have already been informed by him or her of these circumstances.

(a)  Need for tribunal secretaries

9.30  The use of tribunal secretaries in international arbitration is widely accepted and has become commonplace in the market. A survey conducted as part of the 2012 International Council for Commercial Arbitration (ICCA) Congress in Singapore reports that 95 per cent of respondents approve of the use of tribunal secretaries.34 The 2015 International Arbitration Survey by Queen Mary University of London and White & Case reports that 82 per cent of respondents have directly been involved in cases involving a tribunal secretary and 71 per cent of them consider tribunal secretaries to be useful in arbitration.35 The 2018 International Arbitration Survey by Queen Mary University of London and White & Case reveals that 70 per cent of respondents believe that arbitration rules (whether institutional or ad hoc) should include provisions dealing with the use of arbitral secretaries.36

9.31  The prevalence of tribunal secretaries is largely due to the recognition of the value which secretaries can bring to arbitration. For example, tribunal secretaries can increase the efficiency of arbitral proceedings and allow the tribunal to focus on deciding the merits and to render awards faster.37 Using a tribunal secretary for administrative and organizational tasks can also be more cost-effective, as the hourly rate of the secretary is generally much lower than that of the arbitral tribunal.38

9.32  There are, however, concerns about the use of tribunal secretaries in arbitration. Some argue that the appointment of arbitrators is intuiti personae and therefore no work should be delegated.39 Some take the view that the tribunal secretary’s work will necessarily bear his or her perspective and therefore might improperly influence the tribunal’s own decision-making.40 (p. 219) It has also been argued that the use of tribunal secretaries allows eminent and busy arbitrators to take even more cases which will result in fewer appointments for the next generation of arbitrators.

9.33  In view of market demand and concerns, HKIAC has taken systematic and innovative measures to regulate and increase transparency to the practice of tribunal secretaries. These measures include the introduction of the tribunal secretary service,41 the issuance of the Guidelines on the Use of a Secretary to the Arbitral Tribunal (the Tribunal Secretary Guidelines),42 and the launch of the Tribunal Secretary Accreditation Programme.43

(b)  Appointment of a tribunal secretary

9.34  HKIAC was the first major commercial arbitral institution to provide in its rules that an arbitral tribunal may appoint a tribunal secretary.44 The power to appoint a tribunal secretary rests with the arbitral tribunal and is subject to consultation with the parties.

9.35  Article 13.4 does not expressly require the parties’ consent to the appointment of a tribunal secretary. It only requires the arbitral tribunal to seek the parties’ comments before making the appointment. This provision is not intended to encourage the arbitral tribunal to unilaterally introduce a tribunal secretary against the clear and reasonable wishes of the parties. Rather, Article 13.4 deals with the situation where a party unreasonably objects to the proposal of a tribunal secretary or does not participate in the arbitration. In these situations, the tribunal shall have discretion and flexibility, after having given due regard to the parties’ comments, to decide whether to appoint a tribunal secretary to increase the efficiency and save costs of the arbitral proceedings.45

9.36  HKIAC has issued the Tribunal Secretary Guidelines to further standardize the appointment, removal, remuneration, and duties of tribunal secretaries.46 The Tribunal Secretary Guidelines, which came into force on 1 June 2014, can be adopted by parties for cases administered by HKIAC or otherwise.

9.37  The appointment process in the Tribunal Secretary Guidelines comprises the following steps:

  1. (1)  The arbitral tribunal selects an appropriate candidate to act as its secretary;

  2. (2)  The candidate signs a declaration form confirming his or her availability, impartiality, and independence, and makes any appropriate disclosures;

  3. (3)  The arbitral tribunal informs the parties of its proposal to appoint the candidate as tribunal secretary and circulates the candidate’s CV, declaration, and the Tribunal Secretary Guidelines to the parties for their comments;

  4. (p. 220) (4)  After receiving and considering the parties’ comments, the arbitral tribunal decides whether to appoint the candidate; and

  5. (5)  If the tribunal decides to appoint the candidate, the appointment becomes effective at the time the notice of the appointment is received by the parties.

(c)  Appointment of an HKIAC Secretariat member as tribunal secretary

9.38  HKIAC provides a tribunal secretary service, which allows the arbitral tribunal to appoint a member of the HKIAC Secretariat as its secretary in arbitrations involving the HKIAC or ad hoc arbitrations. The Secretariat member, once appointed, can assist the tribunal to run the proceedings efficiently, save time and costs for the parties, and provide useful insights on HKIAC procedures at competitive rates.

9.39  An arbitral tribunal that intends to appoint an HKIAC Secretariat member as secretary should send a written request to HKIAC. The request should include, to the extent possible, the following information:

  1. (1)  The identity and contact details of all parties and the arbitral tribunal;

  2. (2)  A copy of the arbitration agreement(s);

  3. (3)  A summary of the case (including the current stage of the arbitration) and an indication of the amount in dispute; and

  4. (4)  The applicable method of determining the fees and expenses of the arbitral tribunal.

9.40  Upon receipt of the request, HKIAC will endeavour to designate a Secretariat member to assist the tribunal as soon as practicable.47

9.41  The appointment of an HKIAC Secretariat member as tribunal secretary in an HKIAC administered arbitration will be governed by the Tribunal Secretary Guidelines, unless the parties agree otherwise. Accordingly, the appointment process discussed in Chapter 7 applies also to an HKIAC Secretariat member’s appointment. It should be noted that the appointment of a Secretariat member requires confirmation by HKIAC.48 Such Secretariat member must not act as a tribunal secretary and case manager in the same case.49

9.42  The appointment of a member of the HKIAC’s Secretariat has a number of benefits. Firstly, an HKIAC Secretariat member is usually conflict free and is unlikely to attract challenges. Second, the Secretariat member is familiar with the HKIAC Rules and can provide valuable insights into HKIAC’s procedures. Third, the Secretariat member is employed by HKIAC and will work independently of the arbitral tribunal, thereby maintaining an arm’s-length relationship with the tribunal.

(d)  Impartiality and independence of a tribunal secretary

9.43  A tribunal secretary must be, and at all times remain, impartial and independent of the parties. Any matters which may give rise to justifiable doubts as to the impartiality or independence of a proposed or serving tribunal secretary must be disclosed (1) prior to his or her appointment; or (2) without delay if those circumstances arise after his or her appointment.50 (p. 221) In this regard, the obligations of impartiality and independence imposed on tribunal secretaries mirror those imposed on the arbitral tribunal under Article 11.51 Under the Tribunal Secretary Guidelines, prior to his or her appointment, the tribunal secretary should sign a declaration of independence and impartiality, and disclose any circumstances which may give rise to justifiable doubts as to his or her impartiality or independence.52

9.44  The Tribunal Secretary Guidelines include a procedure for a party to object to a tribunal secretary’s impartiality or independence. The party must send a notice of objection within fifteen days after the appointment of the secretary has been notified to that party, or within fifteen days after that party becomes aware or ought reasonably to have become aware of the relevant circumstances.53 Subsequently, the arbitral tribunal must, after consulting with all the parties, promptly rule on the objection.54 If the objection is upheld, the tribunal secretary will be released from appointment. The arbitral tribunal may continue the arbitration pending the determination of the objection. The tribunal secretary must not undertake any work in relation to the determination of the objection.55

(e)  Role of a tribunal secretary

9.45  The role of a tribunal secretary is an ‘enormously grey area’ that has been a regular topic of discussion within the international arbitration community.56 As a result, there has been a call for greater transparency and regulation of the role and function of tribunal secretaries.57 In response, the Tribunal Secretary Guidelines codify existing best practices to define the proper duties of tribunal secretaries.

9.46  The Tribunal Secretary Guidelines permit a tribunal secretary to perform two types of tasks and contain a non-exhaustive list of examples.

9.47  The first type is ‘organizational and administrative tasks’, which includes transmitting documents and communication on behalf of the arbitral tribunal, organizing and maintaining the tribunal’s files, coordinating logistics for hearings and meetings, proofreading the tribunal’s decisions, and preparing invoices.58

9.48  The second type legitimately goes beyond purely administrative tasks. Unless the parties agree or the arbitral tribunal directs otherwise, it allows a tribunal secretary to, for example: (a) conduct legal research; (b) research discrete questions relating to factual evidence and witness testimony; (c) draft memoranda summarizing the parties’ submissions (p. 222) and evidence; (d) attend the tribunal deliberations; and (e) prepare drafts of non-substantive parts of the tribunal’s orders, decisions, and awards (such as procedural histories and chronologies of events).59

9.49  It is important to note that under the Tribunal Secretary Guidelines the arbitral tribunal cannot delegate any decision-making functions to a tribunal secretary, or rely on a tribunal secretary to perform any essential duties of the arbitral tribunal.60 A tribunal secretary shall act upon the arbitral tribunal’s instructions and under its strict supervision. The tribunal shall, at all times, be responsible for the secretary’s conduct in connection with the arbitration.61

(f)  Remuneration of a tribunal secretary

9.50  A tribunal secretary’s fees and expenses will be determined by the arbitral tribunal after consulting with the parties.62 The method of paying a tribunal secretary depends on the method by which the arbitral tribunal is remunerated. Where the fees of the arbitral tribunal are determined on an hourly rate basis, a tribunal secretary should be remunerated by his or her hours spent, which are charged separately from the arbitral tribunal’s fees. Where the arbitral tribunal’s fees are determined based on the amount in dispute, fees of a tribunal secretary should form part of the arbitral tribunal’s fees. Where the arbitral tribunal is composed of three arbitrators, the fees of a tribunal secretary should in principle be shared equally among the members of the arbitral tribunal, unless the arbitral tribunal decides otherwise.63

9.51  Where a tribunal secretary is paid an hourly rate, such rate must not exceed HK$2,500 per hour unless the parties agree otherwise.64 HKIAC Secretariat members’ hourly rates for acting as tribunal secretary are published on HKIAC’s website.65

9.52  Under the Tribunal Secretary Guidelines, a tribunal secretary’s reasonable expenses will be borne by the parties and reimbursed in accordance with paragraphs 4.6 to 4.9 of the Tribunal Secretary Guidelines.

5.  Article 13.5—ensuring the fair and efficient conduct of the arbitration

The arbitral tribunal and the parties shall do everything necessary to ensure the fair and efficient conduct of the arbitration.

9.53  Article 13.5 of the HKIAC Rules imposes an overarching obligation on both the parties and the arbitral tribunal to ensure that the arbitral proceedings be conducted fairly and expeditiously.66 The provision requires the parties and the arbitral tribunal to ‘do everything (p. 223) necessary’ to achieve these objectives. This reflects a key objective of the HKIAC Rules (2018) to require all participants of an arbitration (including the parties, the arbitral tribunal, and HKIAC) to safeguard and enhance procedural efficiency and fairness. Such a principle can also be found in the Arbitration Ordinance which requires the ‘fair and speedy resolution of disputes by arbitration without unnecessary expense’.67

9.54  The obligation under Article 13.5 sets a high ethical standard on the conduct of the parties (and their counsel). This standard will not be met if a party (or its counsel) deliberately adopts any tactics to delay or obstruct the arbitral proceedings, for example repeated requests for an extension of time to file a document; the use of a ‘fishing expedition’ during the discovery process; the introduction of new evidence or authorities at a very late stage of the proceedings; unreasonable objections to every request by the other party; and the non-compliance with the tribunal’s procedural orders without legitimate reasons.68

9.55  The tribunal may impose a range of sanctions against the party who adopts these tactics. The tribunal can impose cost sanctions on the party or draw negative interferences from the conduct. It may also make references in its award to this effect.69 Furthermore, counsel who engages in these tactics might face the risk of disciplinary or criminal sanctions.70

9.56  Similarly the arbitral tribunal must act fairly and efficiently and adopt procedures in compliance with the requirements under Article 13.1 of the HKIAC Rules (2018).71 The expectation set for the arbitral tribunal will not be met if, for example, the tribunal is excessively slow in responding to the parties’ requests; the tribunal takes a very long time to render an award without legitimate justification; or the tribunal adopts an unrealistic hearing schedule that provides the parties with insufficient time for oral submissions and cross-examination.

6.  Article 13.6—party representation

The parties may be represented by persons of their choice, subject to Article 13.5. The names, addresses, facsimile numbers and/or email addresses of party representatives shall be communicated to all other parties, HKIAC, any emergency arbitrator, and the arbitral tribunal once constituted. The arbitral tribunal, emergency arbitrator or HKIAC may require proof of authority of any party representatives.

(a)  Free choice of legal representation

9.57  Under the HKIAC Rules (2018), parties are generally free to choose legal representatives from anywhere in the world. There are no restrictions as to when a party may engage legal representation and how many legal representatives it may have. The Rules also do not require (p. 224) a party to be legally represented at all. While there have been a handful of cases in which parties represent themselves, in most cases, parties are represented by counsel.

9.58  Similarly, the Arbitration Ordinance gives parties considerable flexibility to appoint their legal representatives.72 Parties to arbitrations in Hong Kong may instruct any lawyers to (a) represent them in the arbitral proceedings; (b) give advice and prepare documents for the purposes of the proceedings; and (c) undertake any other work in relation to the arbitration except court proceedings arising in relation to the arbitration agreement or proceedings.73 There is no requirement to instruct a Hong Kong-qualified lawyer in a Hong Kong seated arbitration.

(b)  Subject to Article 13.5

9.59  The only condition on a party’s choice of legal representation is that it must not appoint a counsel who may compromise the party’s obligation to facilitate the fair and efficient conduct of the arbitration. In this regard, a party’s right to legal representation does not necessarily equate to a right to switch legal representatives repeatedly, or at a late stage, in a manner as to unreasonably delay the proceedings or create a conflict of interest issue to disqualify an arbitrator.

9.60  The HKIAC Rules (2018) do not contain an express provision to regulate the conduct of parties’ legal representatives. The question of whether such a provision should be included in the Rules was raised and discussed within the HKIAC Rules Committee during the rule revision process. The HKIAC Rules Committee ultimately decided not to include the provision, given the concern that such a provision may undermine parties’ fundamental right to choose legal representatives and the controversial issue of who should have the authority to regulate and impose sanctions on counsel in international arbitration. In light of the ongoing debate on this subject and the diverse and potentially conflicting rules and norms issued by different institutions, the HKIAC Rules Committee felt that it was not an opportune time to introduce provisions to deal expressly with counsel conduct in HKIAC arbitration.74

(c)  Communication of the details of the party representatives

9.61  Where a party has appointed a representative, it must inform the other parties, HKIAC, any emergency arbitrator where applicable, and the arbitral tribunal once constituted, of the representative’s identity and contact details.75 Where a party has appointed a counsel, the counsel’s name and contact details must be provided in the Notice76 or Answer.77

(p. 225) (d)  Proof of authority

9.62  Under the HKIAC Rules (2018), a party representative is not required to furnish proof of his or her authority unless the arbitral tribunal, the emergency arbitrator, or HKIAC directs him or her to do so. In practice, an arbitral tribunal and HKIAC rarely ask a party’s counsel to provide proof of authority. However, such proof may be required if a party changes counsel or the authority of a party’s counsel is challenged by the other party. The HKIAC Rules do not prescribe any requirement on the form of proof of authority. The common form is a power of attorney.

9.63  Any issue in relation to the authority of a party’s representatives is a matter to be determined by the arbitral tribunal. If such an issue arises before the tribunal is constituted, HKIAC may require the representative to provide proof of authority. If any issue of authority remains, HKIAC will normally proceed to constitute the arbitral tribunal and leave the issue to be decided by the tribunal.

7.  Article 13.7—changes or additions to a party’s legal representatives

After the arbitral tribunal is constituted, any change or addition by a party to its legal representatives shall be communicated promptly to all other parties, the arbitral tribunal and HKIAC.

9.64  It is not uncommon for a party to add to its legal representatives or to change them during an arbitration. If this occurs, that party is now expressly required to communicate any such addition or change to all other parties, the arbitral tribunal, and HKIAC. This is important not only to guarantee the smooth progress of the arbitral proceedings but also to allow all the other parties to challenge any new legal representative on the basis of potential conflicts of interest and/or lack of independence and impartiality.

8.  Article 13.8—parties’ agreement to pursue other means of settling their dispute

Where the parties agree to pursue other means of settling their dispute after the arbitration commences, HKIAC, the arbitral tribunal or emergency arbitrator may, at the request of any party, suspend the arbitration or Emergency Arbitrator Procedure, as applicable, on such terms as it considers appropriate. The arbitration or Emergency Arbitrator Procedure shall resume at the request of any party to HKIAC, the arbitral tribunal or emergency arbitrator.

9.65  This new article acknowledges the growing trend in arbitration for parties to consider alternative dispute resolution mechanisms to settle their dispute during the course of an arbitration. Parties seek the most efficient mechanism for resolving their dispute and may in fact pursue different mechanisms in tandem. When appropriate, parties may wish to suspend their arbitration to pursue another means of resolving their dispute. In such instances, at the request of any party, the arbitral tribunal may suspend the arbitration or Emergency Arbitration Procedure, as applicable, and decide the terms of such suspension. However, the article is drafted to prevent a party from relying on this article to frustrate the arbitral (p. 226) proceedings. The arbitration or Emergency Arbitration Procedure, as applicable, will thus resume when any party makes a request to HKIAC, the arbitral tribunal, or emergency arbitrator.

9.  Article 13.9—matters not expressly provided for in the Rules

In all matters not expressly provided for in these Rules, HKIAC, the arbitral tribunal, emergency arbitrator and the parties shall act in the spirit of these Rules.

9.66  The HKIAC Rules (2018) do not (and cannot possibly) cover all procedural matters of an arbitration. As a result, where there is a matter that is not expressly covered by the Rules, Article 13.9 requires HKIAC, the arbitral tribunal, emergency arbitrator, and the parties to act in line with the ‘spirit’ of the Rules.

9.67  The ‘spirit’ of the HKIAC Rules can be identified from the general objectives and principles set out in the Rules, in particular Article 13. These objectives and principles include the arbitral tribunal’s power to manage the arbitral procedure,78 the need to avoid unnecessary delay or expense,79 the requirement to ensure equal treatment of the parties and the parties’ reasonable opportunity to present their case,80 the parties’ and tribunal’s duty to ensure the fair and efficient conduct of the arbitration,81 and the objective of the tribunal to make a valid award.82

10.  Article 13.10—ensuring that an award is valid

The arbitral tribunal or emergency arbitrator shall make every reasonable effort to ensure that an award is valid.

9.68  An arbitral tribunal or emergency arbitrator must make every reasonable effort to make sure that its award is valid. This provision was first introduced in the 2013 Rules83 to ensure the validity and quality of HKIAC awards. This is critical because HKIAC does not scrutinize arbitral awards and it is the tribunal’s sole responsibility to make sure that its award complies with the applicable requirements and will be recognized by the applicable law.

9.69  Article 13.10 represents a different approach to the equivalent provision in many other major arbitration rules. For example, the ICC Rules and the SIAC Rules require the arbitral tribunal to endeavour to make an enforceable award.84 The 2013 HKIAC Rules Committee made a conscious decision to change the word ‘enforceable’ to ‘valid’ to require the tribunal to consider only the law applicable to the validity of the arbitral award. In this regard, an award is generally accepted to be valid if it conforms to the requirements of the law of the seat.85 The (p. 227) HKIAC Rules Committee recognized that it would be difficult for the tribunal to identify all places of enforcement and it would be onerous to ensure the enforceability of the award in all these places.86 This article has not changed in the HKIAC Rules (2018).

B.  Article 14—Seat and Venue of the Arbitration

9.70  Article 14 provides default rules for determining the seat and venue of the arbitration, which can be summarized as follows:

  1. (1)  The default seat of the arbitration is Hong Kong, unless the arbitral tribunal determines that another seat is more appropriate;87 and

  2. (2)  Meetings and hearings may occur at any location in or outside of the seat.88

1.  Article 14.1—seat of the arbitration

The parties may agree on the seat of arbitration. Where there is no agreement as to the seat, the seat of arbitration shall be Hong Kong, unless the arbitral tribunal determines, having regard to the circumstances of the case, that another seat is more appropriate.

(a)  Parties are free to agree on any seat of arbitration

9.71  Article 14.1 allows the parties to agree on the seat of an HKIAC arbitration, which can be Hong Kong or any other place in the world.89 The HKIAC Rules are modelled on the UNCITRAL Rules and broadly compatible with arbitration laws of most Model Law jurisdictions. As the case with many institutions with a natural seat, Hong Kong is the natural and most commonly selected seat for HKIAC arbitrations. However, in some cases, other seats have been selected such as Singapore, Macau, Russia, the USA, and England.

9.72  The choice of seat is a critical decision to be made by parties for both legal and practical reasons. From a legal perspective, the seat of the arbitration determines the nationality of an arbitral award, the procedural law applicable to the arbitration, and the supervisory jurisdiction of a court to support the arbitral proceedings (eg issuing interim measures or assisting in taking evidence) and determine any challenge to an award.90

9.73  There are also practical reasons why the seat of arbitration is important. The seat is the legal place where the parties’ dispute will be resolved. Therefore, the parties often prefer a place in a neutral jurisdiction (ie one in which none of the parties is resident or domiciled). The convenience of the seat is also important because, although hearings can take place anywhere in the world, the parties and tribunal often have hearings at the seat by default. As a result, ease (p. 228) and cost of travel, as well as the availability of adequate hearing facilities and support services, are also relevant factors when choosing a seat.

9.74  As a result of the Covid pandemic that began in 2020, many arbitral hearings are now conducted via online platforms. This is known as a ‘remote’ or ‘virtual’ hearing. It is now widely accepted that it is possible to hold full hearings without any requirement to travel to the physical location of the seat. HKIAC was an early adopter of virtual hearing technology and offers sophisticated facilities and support at its Hong Kong premises. It remains to be seen whether this practice will continue once the pandemic has abated, but it is the authors’ expectation that technology will play a greater and greater role in arbitration hearings, including by enabling hearings to go ahead more cheaply and without the need for international travel. HKIAC will continue to offer sophisticated virtual hearing services and support.

9.75  Holding a hearing remotely does not affect the legal seat of the arbitration. The legal seat is the jurisdiction selected by the parties in their arbitration agreement, or ordered by the tribunal in the absence of express choice.

9.76  Therefore, regardless of how and where hearings might be held, in order to avoid disputes regarding the validity or effectiveness of the arbitration agreement, parties should always strive to designate a clear and certain seat.91 If the arbitration agreement does not specify the seat, the parties should endeavour to reach an agreement on this issue at the outset of the arbitration, unless the applicable rules provide for a mechanism to determine the seat.92 In the absence of a clear indication of the seat or means for selecting the seat, it may be necessary to ask the arbitral tribunal to determine the seat. Where the clause does not include a method of constituting a tribunal, a national court with jurisdiction over the parties can make the determination.93

9.77  With respect to the choice of seat, the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators has published a set of benchmarks for assessing an effective, efficient, and ‘safe’ seat of arbitration (the London Centenary Principles):94

  1. (1)  A clear, effective, and modern international arbitration law;

  2. (2)  An independent, competent, and efficient judiciary;

  3. (3)  An independent and competent legal profession with expertise in international arbitration;

  4. (4)  An implemented commitment to the education of international arbitration;

  5. (5)  A clear right for parties to be represented in arbitration by representatives of their choice;

  6. (6)  Easy accessibility and safety;

  7. (7)  Functional facilities for the provision of services to arbitral proceedings;

  8. (8)  Professional and other norms which embrace a diversity of legal and cultural traditions;

  9. (p. 229) (9)  Adherence to international treaties on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitration agreements, orders, and awards; and

  10. (10)  A clear right to arbitrator immunity from civil liability.

9.78  Parties should seek to choose a seat that satisfies all the criteria listed above.

(b)  Hong Kong as the default seat

9.79  The HKIAC Rules designate Hong Kong as the seat of arbitration absent the parties’ agreement, which is consistent with other rules that also provide for a default seat of arbitration.95 However, the arbitral tribunal may change the seat to another place if it considers that that place is more appropriate than Hong Kong, having regard to the circumstances of the case.

9.80  Fixing a default seat avoids a potential procedural skirmish at the outset of the arbitration to determine the seat and consequently the law of the arbitral procedure. In the absence of a default seat, parties who have not previously agreed on the seat will need to seek a decision from the arbitral tribunal, institution, or competent court (depending on the applicable rules), which will result in additional time and costs in the proceedings.96 While the HKIAC Rules have designated a default seat, the Rules allow the arbitral tribunal to ultimately determine the appropriate seat of the arbitration, thereby striking a balance between certainty and flexibility.

9.81  Hong Kong is the natural choice for the default seat of arbitration under the HKIAC Rules. The territory enjoys a strong reputation as one of the world’s leading seats of arbitration. In the 2018 International Arbitration Survey by Queen Mary University of London and White & Case, Hong Kong was ranked among the world’s top four seats, alongside London, Paris, and Singapore.97 Furthermore, Hong Kong appears to best reflect parties’ expectations on the seat when they agree to adopt the HKIAC Rules to resolve their disputes, but fail to specify the seat of the arbitration.

9.82  The key advantages and benefits of choosing Hong Kong as the seat of arbitration are discussed in Chapters 1 and 2.

(c)  The arbitral tribunal’s discretion to choose another seat

9.83  Unless the parties have agreed on the seat, the arbitral tribunal has discretion to choose a seat other than Hong Kong if it considers that another seat is more appropriate, having regard to the circumstances of the case.98 In practice, the tribunal will hear the views of the parties before choosing another seat.

9.84  In determining whether another seat is more appropriate than Hong Kong, the arbitral tribunal will typically take into account the legal and practical factors as well as the London Centenary Principles as discussed in paragraph 9.77 above. Regard may also be had to paragraph 29 of the UNCITRAL Notes on Organizing Arbitral Proceedings (2016), which set out factors that may influence a tribunal’s choice of a seat:99

(p. 230)

  1. (1)  Suitability of the law on arbitral procedure of the seat of arbitration;

  2. (2)  Whether there is a multilateral or bilateral treaty on enforcement of arbitral awards between the state where the arbitration takes place and the state or states where the award may have to be enforced;

  3. (3)  Convenience of the parties and the arbitrators including the travel distances;

  4. (4)  Availability and cost of support services needed; and

  5. (5)  Location of the subject matter in dispute and proximity of evidence.

2.  Article 14.2—venue of hearings and meetings

Unless the parties have agreed otherwise, the arbitral tribunal may meet at any location outside of the seat of arbitration which it considers appropriate for consultation among its members, hearing witnesses, experts or the parties, or the inspection of goods, other property or documents. The arbitration shall nonetheless be treated for all purposes as an arbitration conducted at the seat.

9.85  Article 14.2 allows parties to agree to hold meetings or hearings at any location outside the legal seat. The arbitral tribunal (in consultation with the parties) may decide to hold hearings or meetings at any appropriate location outside of the seat of arbitration. It is worth noting that aside from its Hong Kong office, HKIAC has branch offices in Seoul at the Seoul International Dispute Resolution Centre (opened in May 2013) and in Shanghai (opened in November 2015). All three offices can assist in arranging HKIAC hearings in Hong Kong, South Korea, or mainland China.

9.86  In determining whether a location is appropriate for a meeting or hearing, the arbitral tribunal may consider various factors. A principal consideration is the convenience of the location. In this regard, the arbitral tribunal should consider the location of the potential attendees of the meeting or hearing as well as the ease of obtaining entry visas for them. The location of evidence may also be a relevant factor. In addition, the arbitral tribunal should take into account the neutrality of the location in relation to the parties, as well as the availability of hearing facilities and support services in the location.

9.87  Much will depend on the purpose of the meeting or hearing. Where the meeting is for the purpose of tribunal deliberations, the dominant consideration will be the location of the arbitral tribunal members. There is no requirement under the HKIAC Rules for the arbitral tribunal to inform the parties when and where it will meet for deliberations. However, where the meeting or hearing is to be held between the parties and the arbitral tribunal, the tribunal will usually consult with the parties on the venue. The arbitral tribunal must also give the parties adequate advance notice of the relevant date, time, and place of any oral hearings for the presentation of evidence and/or oral arguments pursuant to Article 22.4 of the HKIAC Rules. Where the arbitral tribunal is to inspect goods, property, or documents, the site of these goods, property, or documents is usually the location of the meeting.

9.88  As noted above, the arbitral tribunal may also hold meetings or hearings by electronic means such as by telephone, online platform, or videoconference. In practice, case management conferences and procedural hearings are often held in one of these ways. Substantive or evidential hearings are more commonly held in person at a physical location, although that has changed as a result of the 2020 Covid pandemic. It remains to be seen to what extent parties (p. 231) and tribunals will resume in-person hearings once travel restrictions are limited, but the authors anticipate that there will be continued use of virtual hearings.

9.89  Article 14.2 confirms that the arbitral proceedings are deemed to have been conducted at the seat of the arbitration even if any hearings or meetings are held outside of the seat, and if the award is signed outside of the seat. In cases where a hearing is held outside of the seat, some parties may argue that the seat has been changed to the location of the hearing and seek interference from the local courts. Article 14.2 is introduced to prevent such attempt or argument.

C.  Article 15—Language of the Arbitration

9.90  Article 15 sets out the rules regarding the language(s) of the arbitration, which can be summarized as follows:

  1. (1)  Where the parties have not previously agreed on the language of the arbitration, they are required to communicate in English or Chinese until the arbitral tribunal determines such language;

  2. (2)  Unless the parties have agreed upon the language of the arbitration, the tribunal must determine the language which will apply to all written communications, and will be used in any hearing;100 and

  3. (3)  The arbitral tribunal is empowered to order translation of any supporting materials.101

1.  Article 15.1—communications in English or Chinese prior to determining the language of the arbitration

The arbitration shall be conducted in the language of the arbitration. Where the parties have not previously agreed on such language, any party shall communicate in English or Chinese prior to any determination by the arbitral tribunal under Article 15.2.

9.91  Until this provision was added to the 2018 HKIAC Rules, parties that had not agreed on the language of the arbitration found uncertainty in relation to the appropriate language by which to communicate with the HKIAC and the arbitral tribunal before any such language was determined. This would sometimes lead to extensive communications between the parties on this issue. The 2018 HKIAC Rules now make clear that parties that have not agreed on the language of the arbitration must communicate either in English or Chinese before the tribunal has decided on the language of the arbitration pursuant to Article 15.2. In such circumstances, the HKIAC Secretariat will communicate in both English and Chinese until the tribunal determines the language of the arbitration. This provision gives the parties the flexibility to choose either English or Chinese as valid languages for communication until the determination by the arbitral tribunal on the issue. At the same time, the provision provides enough certainty in the use of one of the two languages stipulated to allow parties to (p. 232) proceed with the arbitral proceedings efficiently until the issue regarding the language of the arbitration is resolved.

2.  Article 15.2—arbitral tribunal’s power to determine the language of the arbitration

Subject to agreement by the parties, the arbitral tribunal shall, promptly after its constitution, determine the language of the arbitration. This determination shall apply to all written communications and the language to be used in any hearing.

(a)  Parties are free to agree on any language of arbitration

9.92  Article 15.1 allows the parties to agree on any language for an HKIAC arbitration.102 The parties may also agree on more than one language of the arbitration, although this will generally result in increased time and costs, and may reduce the pool of suitably qualified arbitrators.

9.93  The language of the arbitration is a matter of considerable practical importance. It may affect the choice of counsel, arbitrators, factual, and expert witnesses, as well as the costs and efficiency of the arbitral proceedings. As a result, parties will usually designate the language(s) of the arbitration in their arbitration agreement. Even where the arbitration agreement does not specify a language, the parties will usually try to agree upon the language(s) at the beginning of the arbitral proceedings.

(b)  Languages used by HKIAC

9.94.  HKIAC maintains a multilingual team to administer cases in multiple languages, including English, Mandarin, and Cantonese.

9.95  HKIAC will communicate in the language(s) agreed by the parties or determined by the arbitral tribunal.

9.96  As noted above, if the parties have not agreed on the language of the arbitration, the Notice and Answer can be submitted in either English or Chinese. There are cases where one party communicates in English and the other party uses Chinese pursuant to Article 15.1. In such cases, HKIAC will use both languages to communicate with the parties for the sake of fairness and equal treatment, until the issue of language is resolved by party agreement or the tribunal’s decision.

9.97  If a party files a pleading prior to the constitution of the arbitral tribunal and that pleading is not in the language agreed by the parties, HKIAC will ask for the pleading to be submitted in the agreed language. If the parties have agreed to more than one language of the arbitration and a party submits a pleading in one of these languages (prior to the constitution of the arbitral tribunal), HKIAC will ask for the pleading to be submitted in all the agreed languages. If a party communicates in a language other than English or Chinese, and there is no agreed language in the clause, HKIAC will generally request it to translate its communications into either English or Chinese. In all of these scenarios, if the party does not comply (p. 233) with HKIAC’s directions, HKIAC will normally proceed to constitute the arbitral tribunal and refer the issue of language to the tribunal for its determination.

(c)  The arbitral tribunal must determine the language(s) of the arbitration absent party agreement

9.98  Article 15.1 requires the arbitral tribunal to determine the language of the arbitration promptly after its constitution. In this regard, the tribunal will usually seek the parties’ input and may take into account the following factors:

  1. (1)  The language(s) of the relevant contract(s) and documentary evidence;

  2. (2)  The language(s) spoken by the parties and their counsel;

  3. (3)  The language(s) spoken by any potential factual or expert witnesses;

  4. (4)  The language(s) spoken by the tribunal members; and

  5. (5)  The language(s) of the applicable rules, regulations, and legislation.

9.99  The language determined by the arbitral tribunal must be used for all parties’ written communications and hearings.

3.  Article 15.3—translation of supporting materials

The arbitral tribunal may order that any supporting materials submitted in their original language shall be accompanied by a translation, in whole or in part, into the language of the arbitration as agreed by the parties or determined by the arbitral tribunal.

9.100  Where supporting materials (including exhibits or legal authorities) are not submitted in the language of the arbitration, the arbitral tribunal may order the material to be translated, in whole or in part, into that language. The tribunal’s power to order translation is discretionary.

9.101  Where a party submits a large volume of documents or documents of excessive length, the arbitral tribunal may order the party to provide translation of the parts that are relied upon by the party or relevant to the case, rather than the entirety of the documents. In this regard, the ICCA Drafting Sourcebook for Logistical Matters in Procedural Orders provides that:

A partial or excerpt translation may be submitted where, due to length or otherwise, the submitting party considers that the burden of translating outweighs the relevance and materiality of the excluded portions.103

9.102  During an evidential hearing, if a witness or expert is not able to give evidence in the language(s) of the arbitration, the arbitral tribunal may order the party who introduced the witness or expert to arrange a translator.

9.103.  There is no requirement under Article 15.3 that the translation be prepared by a certified translator. However, the arbitral tribunal may impose such a requirement if it considers it appropriate.

(p. 234) 9.104  If the parties have a dispute over the accuracy of a translation, the parties are expected to confer and try to come to an agreement on the translation. If the parties cannot agree, the arbitral tribunal should decide how to handle the disagreement.104

D.  Article 19—Jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal

9.105  Article 19 reflects the widely accepted principles of competence–competence and separability of the arbitration agreement from the main contract. Both principles are enshrined in Article 16(1) of the UNCITRAL Model Law (2006), given effect by section 34 of the Arbitration Ordinance and have been upheld by the Hong Kong courts.105 The UNCITRAL Explanatory Note 2008 defines the two principles as follows:

[Competence-competence] means that the arbitral tribunal may independently rule on the question of whether it has jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement, without having to resort to a court. Separability means that an arbitration clause shall be treated as an agreement independent of the other terms of the contract.106

9.106  In addition to affirming these principles, Article 19 regulates the manner in which jurisdictional challenges may be raised. It also introduces a mechanism that allows HKIAC to move the arbitral proceedings forward if it is satisfied, prima facie, that an arbitration agreement under the Rules may exist.

1.  Article 19.1—arbitral tribunal’s power to rule on its own jurisdiction

The arbitral tribunal may rule on its own jurisdiction under these Rules, including any objections with respect to the existence, validity or scope of the arbitration agreement.

9.107  Article 19.1 empowers the arbitral tribunal to decide on any issues in relation to its jurisdiction. Common issues that fall to be determined under Article 19.1 include the following:107

  1. (1)  Whether there is a valid arbitration agreement under the applicable law.108 This issue may involve allegations that the arbitration agreement does not meet the mandatory requirements of the applicable law,109 the agreement is inoperative,110 or was procured by fraud or corruption.

  2. (p. 235) (2)  Whether a party lacks legal authority or legal capacity to enter into the arbitration agreement. This often gives rise to the question of whether an individual or entity has the authority to sign the arbitration agreement on behalf of a party to the arbitral proceedings. In some cases, the respondent raised this issue to argue that it was not bound by the arbitration agreement.

  3. (3)  Whether the subject matter of a dispute is capable of settlement by arbitration. The range of disputes that can be referred to arbitration is very broad under Hong Kong law. Although the Arbitration Ordinance does not define arbitrable disputes, generally most types of commercial or contractual claims can be submitted to arbitration.111

  4. (4)  Whether a condition precedent to arbitration has been fulfilled. For example, there may be a question of whether the parties should negotiate or mediate their dispute before commencing arbitration.

  5. (5)  Whether the subject matter submitted to arbitration falls within the scope of the arbitration agreement112 This issue requires the examination of the terms of the arbitration agreement. Parties sometimes argue that the scope of a particular arbitration agreement does not cover, for example, tortious claims or claims that arise in relation to a separate agreement.

  6. (6)  Whether the arbitral tribunal has been properly constituted.113 This may involve questions of whether an arbitrator was appointed in accordance with the arbitration agreement or whether there are any issues of due process in relation to the appointment procedure.

9.108  The arbitral tribunal may rule on jurisdictional issues on its own motion or upon a party’s request. In practice, it is relatively rare for a tribunal to exercise its power under Article 19.1 unless a party raises a jurisdictional objection.

9.109  The arbitral tribunal may bifurcate issues of jurisdiction and merits and rule on the jurisdictional issue as a preliminary question. The tribunal may also determine its jurisdiction and the merits together in the final award. If the tribunal decides that it has jurisdiction as a preliminary question, such a decision is not final under Hong Kong law. Within thirty days after receipt of the decision, any party may request the CFI to decide the matter, which decision will not be subject to appeal. While such a request is pending, the tribunal may continue the arbitration and proceed to make an award.114

9.110  If the tribunal decides that it does not have jurisdiction over a dispute, such a decision is not subject to appeal under Hong Kong law.115 In the circumstances, the Hong Kong court must decide the dispute (assuming it is competent to do so).116

(p. 236) 2.  Article 19.2—separability of the arbitration agreement

The arbitral tribunal shall have the power to determine the existence or the validity of any contract of which an arbitration agreement forms a part. For the purposes of Article 19, an arbitration agreement which forms part of a contract, and which provides for arbitration under these Rules, shall be treated as an agreement independent of the other terms of the contract. A decision by the arbitral tribunal that the contract is null and void shall not necessarily entail the invalidity of the arbitration agreement.

9.111  Article 19.2 affirms the doctrine of separability, whereby an arbitration agreement is considered to be separate and divisible from the contract in which it is contained. This means, for example, where a party alleges that the contract is null or void, such an allegation does not affect the arbitral tribunal’s authority to determine the validity of the contract. Even when the arbitral tribunal decides that the contract is null and void, it does not necessarily follow that the arbitration clause itself is invalid.117

9.112  The doctrine of separability has also been incorporated into the Arbitration Ordinance118 and many other arbitration rules.119 It has also been given effect to by the Hong Kong courts.120

3.  Article 19.3—plea of lack of jurisdiction

A plea that the arbitral tribunal does not have jurisdiction shall be raised if possible in the Answer to the Notice of Arbitration, and shall be raised no later than in the Statement of Defence, or, with respect to a counterclaim, in the Defence to the Counterclaim. A party is not precluded from raising such a plea by the fact that it has designated or appointed, or participated in the designation or appointment of, an arbitrator. A plea that the arbitral tribunal is exceeding the scope of its authority shall be raised as soon as the matter alleged to be beyond the scope of its authority is raised during the arbitration. The arbitral tribunal may, in either case, admit a later plea if it considers the delay justified.

9.113  Article 19.3 deals with the timing of raising a jurisdictional objection. The provision is largely incorporated from Article 16(2) of the UNCITRAL Model Law (2006), given effect by section 34(1) of the Arbitration Ordinance.

9.114  There are two sets of time limits for raising an objection:

  1. (1)  Where the objection relates to the tribunal’s lack of jurisdiction, the objection must be raised in the Answer if possible and must be raised no later than in the Statement of Defence. In the case of an objection to the tribunal’s jurisdiction to decide a counterclaim, the applicable deadline is the due date of the reply to the counterclaim.

  2. (p. 237) (2)  Where the objection relates to the tribunal exceeding the scope of its authority, the objection should be raised as soon as the matter alleged to have exceeded the scope emerges during the arbitral proceedings.

9.115  Article 19.3 contains a sensible qualification to the effect that a party’s designation or appointment of an arbitrator, or its participation in the designation or appointment of an arbitrator, does not by itself preclude a party from raising a jurisdictional objection. This clarifies that a party will not lose its fundamental right to appoint an arbitrator simply because it intends to object to the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal, once constituted.121

9.116  While a party should make a jurisdictional objection as soon as practicable, Article 19.3 recognizes that the arbitral tribunal may accept and consider a late objection if it considers that the delay is justified, for example where new facts are discovered.122 This applies to both time limits in paragraph 9.114 above.

9.117  There is an ongoing debate as to whether the failure to raise a jurisdictional objection during the arbitration should preclude its use in setting aside or enforcement proceedings. Hong Kong and Singapore courts grappled with this issue in relation to the enforcement of five SIAC awards in Astro v Lippo.123 For different reasons, both courts found that parties have a choice as to remedies, thereby allowing a party to reserve its right to raise a jurisdictional objection until the enforcement proceeding.124 And it appears that the Hong Kong courts have a diverging view from the Singapore courts, whereby the CFI enforced the awards despite the Singapore Court of Appeal’s decision to refuse enforcement. A key area of difference between the two courts was whether a party could raise a jurisdictional objection at the enforcement stage if it failed to do so in the arbitration. The Singapore court found that a party was entitled to object to the tribunal’s jurisdiction at an enforcement court under the UNCITRAL Model Law, while the Hong Kong court took issue with a party keeping a jurisdictional objection in reserve to be deployed in the enforcement proceedings, depending on the outcome of the arbitration.125 The approach adopted by the Hong Kong courts is that of English courts, which tend to reject challenges to an award on the basis of jurisdictional objections that were raised late during the arbitration.126

4.  Article 19.4—jurisdictional questions raised prior to the constitution of the arbitral tribunal

Subject to Article 19.5, if a question arises as to:

  1. (a)  the existence, validity or scope of the arbitration agreement; or

  2. (b)  whether all of the claims have been properly made in a single arbitration pursuant to Article 29; or

  3. (p. 238) (c)  the competence of HKIAC to administer an arbitration;

    before the constitution of the arbitral tribunal, the arbitration shall proceed and any such question shall be decided by the arbitral tribunal once constituted.

9.118  Article 19.4 of the HKIAC Rules (2013) has been split into Articles 19.4 and 19.5 of the HKIAC Rules (2018). Together, these articles give HKIAC the power to proceed with an arbitration, even where there are questions about the tribunal’s jurisdiction, as long as HKIAC is satisfied on a prima facie basis that there may be a valid HKIAC arbitration agreement.

9.119  The jurisdictional questions contemplated by Article 19.4 are those in relation to the existence, validity, or scope of the arbitration agreement(s) or those concerning the authority of HKIAC to administer the arbitration. A new question has been included as a result of the addition of Article 29 in relation to one single arbitration under multiple contracts. These questions cover the common objections raised by the respondent in practice, which include allegations that, for example:

  1. (1)  the person or entity who signed the arbitration agreement did not have the authority to represent the respondent;

  2. (2)  the respondent is not a party to the arbitration agreement;

  3. (3)  the arbitration agreement is invalid under the law of the place of the respondent;

  4. (4)  the claimant’s claim falls outside the scope of the arbitration agreement; or

  5. (5)  the arbitration agreement should not be construed to include a reference to the HKIAC Rules or HKIAC as the administering body.

9.120  Such a question may be raised by a party or identified by HKIAC. In practice, HKIAC will usually exercise its power pursuant to Article 19.5 only upon a party’s request and will make a decision after hearing the views from all the parties.

5.  Article 19.5—HKIAC’s decision concerning jurisdictional questions

The arbitration shall proceed only if and to the extent that HKIAC is satisfied, prima facie, that an arbitration agreement under the Rules may exist or the arbitration has been properly commenced under Article 29. Any question as to the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal shall be decided by the arbitral tribunal once constituted, pursuant to Article 19.1.

9.121  Article 19.5, one of the most notable provisions introduced in the HKIAC Rules (2013), allows HKIAC to deal with jurisdictional issues at an early stage in the arbitration and prior to the constitution of the arbitral tribunal.

9.122  In practice, the respondent sometimes takes issue with the arbitration agreement or challenges the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal or institution, and relies on these grounds to seek suspension or termination of the arbitral proceedings even before the arbitral tribunal is put in place. The parties are often stuck in these situations, as the respondent may not wish to proceed any further and may create difficulty in the process for constituting the tribunal. Article 19.4 addresses this problem directly by authorizing HKIAC to step in and to decide whether and to what extent the arbitration shall proceed.

(p. 239) 9.123  The test adopted by HKIAC to deal with these jurisdictional objections is whether, prima facie, ‘an arbitration agreement under the Rules may exist’.127 The test will be met if there is some (even tenuous) evidence that the parties may have an agreement to arbitrate under the HKIAC Rules.

9.124  The prima facie test in Article 19.5 sets a relatively low threshold. Its objective is to allow HKIAC to proceed with any arbitration commenced under a clause that meets the test in Article 1.1, which applies the Rules to ‘arbitrations where an arbitration agreement either (a) provides for these Rules to apply; or (b) … provides for arbitration “administered by HKIAC” or words to similar effect’. Article 19.5 does not allow HKIAC to determine whether the tribunal has jurisdiction to decide the dispute; that is the job of the arbitral tribunal itself. It does, however, give HKIAC power to reject arbitrations that are commenced under obviously invalid clauses, or clauses that do not provide for arbitration under the HKIAC Rules.

9.125  For example, in the past HKIAC has decided to proceed with the arbitration in the following situations:

  1. (1)  The claimant commenced an arbitration under the terms and conditions of 100 purchase orders. The terms and conditions contained an HKIAC arbitration clause. The claimant was not able to provide copies of the purchase orders, but was able to provide a copy of the terms and conditions as well as purchase management records showing the relevant transactions between the parties. The respondent raised a jurisdictional objection on the basis that there was no arbitration agreement between the parties.

  2. (2)  One of the respondents requested HKIAC to terminate the arbitration against it because that respondent was a non-signatory to the underlying contract. The claimant explained that a provision of the contract allowed the claimant to claim any of its right against that particular respondent, and, in the circumstances, that respondent must act as a direct party under the contract.

  3. (3)  The respondent requested HKIAC not to proceed with an arbitration because the relief pleaded by the claimant was a matter within the exclusive jurisdiction of an accounting expert. The claimant argued that its claim related to the respondent’s breach of a share purchase agreement which was covered by the arbitration clause contained in the agreement.

  4. (4)  The claimant commenced an arbitration under the HKIAC Rules pursuant to a charterparty with a clause providing ‘arbitration in Hong Kong (Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre)’. The respondent raised an objection under Article 19.4 on the basis that the clause refers to ad hoc arbitration with HKIAC as the appointing authority or a provider of administrative services. The claimant asserted that the reference to HKIAC in the clause should be construed as being words to similar effect as ‘administered by HKIAC’ and therefore HKIAC should administer the arbitration.

9.126  In practice, HKIAC is slow to discontinue an arbitration under Article 19.5 and will generally proceed, leaving the jurisdictional issue to be decided by the arbitral tribunal once (p. 240) constituted. However, HKIAC is unlikely to proceed if it is obvious that no arbitration agreement exists between the parties.

9.127  It should be noted that Article 19.5 does not empower HKIAC to decide on the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal or the substantive aspect of the jurisdictional question raised. Instead, HKIAC’s decision is limited to whether and to what extent the arbitration shall proceed. Such decisions are made by the Proceedings Committee.128

6.  Article 19.6—effect of the HKIAC’s decision regarding jurisdictional questions

HKIAC’s decision pursuant to Article 19.5 is without prejudice to the admissibility or merits of any party’s claim or defence.

9.128  Article 19.6 serves to clarify that HKIAC’s decision under Article 19.5 as to whether an arbitration shall proceed has no bearing on the substance of any party’s claim or defence. The HKIAC Rules (2018) add ‘defence’ to the language in this section to set out that such decision made under Article 19.5 shall be made without prejudice to the admissibility or merits of any party’s defence as well as claims. If HKIAC decides to proceed, such decision does not affect the arbitral tribunal’s ability to rule on the admissibility or merits of the claim. Similarly, if HKIAC decides not to proceed, such decision must not be regarded as a determination of the admissibility or merits of the claim.

E.  Articles 16–18 and 20–21—Written Submissions

9.129  These articles underwent minor changes in the HKIAC Rules (2018) revision process. The majority of the changes are linguistic, and do not affect the substantive requirements for written submissions, which remain largely unchanged from those in the HKIAC Rules (2013). The requirement to provide the parties’ contact details has been removed from Article 16.1 because Article 4.1 requires the same details to be provided in the Notice of Arbitration.

In addition, the HKIAC Rules (2018) now expressly provide that respondents may include cross-claims in the Statement of Defence (in addition to defences and counterclaims).

9.130  The filing of written submissions is a key procedural step for the parties to present their case and respond to their opposing party’s position. The HKIAC Rules offer considerable flexibility in the form and style of written submissions, with guidance on the content to be included in these submissions.

9.131  The arbitral tribunal retains the power to determine the appropriate form and contents of the parties’ written submissions and the manner in which these submissions should be exchanged. In most HKIAC cases, pleadings are exchanged sequentially. However, the arbitral tribunal may order simultaneous exchange in appropriate cases.

(p. 241) 9.132  It has been suggested that the ideal system of pleadings would include the following features:129

  1. (1)  Each issue must be clearly identified in a simple, concise but comprehensive manner. No intentional vagueness or obfuscation of issues should be allowed;

  2. (2)  The issues should be identified early in the reference, but the system of identification should also cater for any (legitimate) need of the parties to amend their cases as the case evolves; and

  3. (3)  The system should be strict enough to ensure that each party appreciates the case it has to meet and yet to be sufficiently flexible so that there is no need to devote inordinate time and resources to technical amendments and arguments on the pleadings.

These features are reflected by Articles 16 to 18, 20, and 21 of the HKIAC Rules (2018). Each of these provisions will be discussed in turn below.

1.  Article 16.1—filing a Statement of Claim

Unless the Statement of Claim was contained in the Notice of Arbitration (or the Claimant elects to treat the Notice of Arbitration as the Statement of Claim), the Claimant shall communicate its Statement of Claim to all other parties and to the arbitral tribunal within a time limit to be determined by the arbitral tribunal.

(a)  Form of the Statement of Claim

9.133.  Article 16.1 does not impose any requirement regarding the form or style of the Statement of Claim, except that it has to be in writing. The claimant can determine the appropriate format or structure for its pleadings.

9.134  The claimant also has discretion to decide whether to file the Statement of Claim together with the Notice (or to treat the Notice as the Statement of Claim), or to file it separately.

(b)  The time limit for filing the Statement of Claim

9.135  Article 16.1 does not set a time limit for the claimant to submit the Statement of Claim, and instead leaves it to be determined by the arbitral tribunal. In this regard, Article 21 provides that time limits for the communication of written statements (including the Statement of Claim) should not exceed forty-five days, unless the arbitral tribunal considers otherwise, and subject to the arbitral tribunal’s power to extend this time limit.130

9.136  Subject to the terms of the arbitral tribunal’s procedural order, the claimant may seek an extension of time for filing the Statement of Claim. The tribunal will decide whether to grant such a request.

(c)  Delivery of the Statement of Claim

9.137  The claimant must serve a copy of the Statement of Claim on all other parties and each member of the arbitral tribunal by one or more means of delivery under Article 2.16 of the (p. 242) HKIAC Rules (2018). A copy must also be provided to HKIAC in accordance with Article 13.3.

2.  Article 16.2—contents of the Statement of Claim

The Statement of Claim shall include the following particulars:

  1. (a)  a statement of the facts supporting the claim;

  2. (b)  the points at issue;

  3. (c)  the legal arguments supporting the claim; and

  4. (d)  the relief or remedy sought.

9.138  Article 16.2 provides a list of contents to be included in the Statement of Claim. In principle, the claimant is required to include summaries of relevant facts, points of law, the issues for determination and the relief sought. The claimant is free to include more particulars. As discussed in paragraph 9.106 below, the arbitral tribunal may vary this content requirement as it considers appropriate.

9.139  In contrast with the HKIAC Rules (2013),131 the claimant is no longer expressly required to include parties’ contact details in its Statement of Claim. The claimant is required to include this information in the Notice of Arbitration. In practice, the Statement of Claim is usually a more comprehensive and extensive document than the Notice and sets out the claimant’s case in substantial detail.

3.  Article 16.3—supporting materials annexed to the Statement of Claim

The Claimant shall annex to its Statement of Claim all supporting materials on which it relies.

9.140  Article 16.3 requires the claimant to annex to the Statement of Claim all supporting materials on which it relies. Whereas the HKIAC Rules (2013) referenced ‘supporting documents’, these new rules refer to ‘supporting materials’ which allows for a broader range of material to support the Statement of Claim. Supporting materials typically include any contemporaneous documents produced in support of a party’s case (documentary evidence) and any legal authorities on which the claimant wishes to rely. In practice, if the claimant wishes to introduce further evidence or authorities into the arbitration, it will need to seek leave from the arbitral tribunal.

9.141  The HKIAC Rules (2018) leave it open to the parties and the arbitral tribunal to determine whether witness evidence and/or expert reports should be filed together with the Statement of Claim. The arbitral tribunal will usually determine this issue in the procedural timetable referred to in Article 13.2 of the HKIAC Rules (2018).

(p. 243) 4.  Article 16.4—varying the Statement of Claim’s requirements

The arbitral tribunal may vary any of the requirements in Article 16 as it deems appropriate.

9.142  To provide flexibility, Article 16.4 empowers the arbitral tribunal to amend the requirements set out in Article 16, such as the requirement on the contents, time limits, and supporting materials filed in support of the Statement of Claim.

5.  Article 17.1—filing a Statement of Defence

Unless the Statement of Defence was contained in the Answer to the Notice of Arbitration (or the Respondent elects to treat the Answer to the Notice of Arbitration as the Statement of Defence), the Respondent shall communicate its Statement of Defence to all other parties and to the arbitral tribunal within a time limit to be determined by the arbitral tribunal.

9.143  Paragraphs 9.97–9.101 regarding the form, time limit, and delivery of the Statement of Claim apply mutatis mutandis in respect of the Statement of Defence.

6.  Article 17.2—contents of the Statement of Defence

The Statement of Defence shall reply to the particulars of the Statement of Claim (set out in Article 16.2(a) to (c)). If the Respondent has raised an objection to the jurisdiction or to the proper constitution of the arbitral tribunal, the Statement of Defence shall contain the factual and legal basis of such objection.

(a)  Basic contents of the Statement of Defence

9.144  In its Statement of Defence, the respondent must outline its response to the claimant’s position in the Statement of Claim, in particular the claimant’s summary of the facts, legal arguments, and points at issue. The respondent is free to include more particulars, such as any objection to the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal. As discussed in paragraph 9.114 below, the arbitral tribunal may vary this content requirement as it considers appropriate.

9.145  In practice, the Statement of Defence is usually a more comprehensive and extensive document than the Answer and sets out the respondent’s case in substantial detail.

(b)  Objection to the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction or the proper constitution of the tribunal

9.146  If the respondent intends to object to the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal (eg the existence, validity, or scope of the arbitration agreement) or the manner in which the tribunal was constituted, it must raise such objection no later than in the Statement of Defence.132 If the respondent does so in the Statement of Defence, it must include the factual and legal basis of the objection.

(p. 244) 9.147  After the filing of the Statement of Defence, the respondent may not be permitted to raise a jurisdictional objection unless the arbitral tribunal considers the delay to be justified.133

7.  Article 17.3—counterclaims, set-off defences, and cross-claims

Where there is a counterclaim, set-off defence or cross-claim, the Statement of Defence shall also include the following particulars:

  1. (a)  a statement of the facts supporting the counterclaim, set-off defence or cross-claim;

  2. (b)  the points at issue;

  3. (c)  the legal arguments supporting the counterclaim, set-off defence or cross-claim; and

  4. (d)  the relief or remedy sought.

9.148  If the respondent intends to raise a counterclaim, a set-off defence, or cross-claim, it must plead the counterclaim, set-off defence, or cross-claim in the Statement of Defence with the particulars required by Article 17.3. The content requirements of a counterclaim, set-off defence, or cross-claim are very similar to those for a Statement of Claim under Article 16.2. Paragraph 9.102 regarding the contents of the Statement of Claim applies mutatis mutandis in respect of the counterclaim, set-off defence, or cross-claim.

8.  Article 17.4—supporting materials annexed to the Statement of Defence

The Respondent shall annex to its Statement of Defence all supporting materials on which it relies.

9.149  Article 17.4 requires the respondent to annex to the Statement of Defence all supporting materials on which it relies. Paragraph 9.104 regarding the exhibits to the Statement of Claim applies mutatis mutandis in respect of the Statement of Defence. It bears noting that the respondent is normally not required to annex materials which have already been submitted by another party, but may refer to them in the Statement of Defence.

9.  Article 17.5—varying the Statement of Defence’s requirements

The arbitral tribunal may vary any of the requirements in Article 17 as it deems appropriate.

9.150  Article 17.5 empowers the arbitral tribunal to amend the requirements for the submission of the Statement of Defence as set out in Article 17. Paragraph 9.106 regarding the arbitral tribunal’s power to amend the Statement of Claim requirements applies mutatis mutandis in respect of the Statement of Defence.

(p. 245) 10.  Article 18.1—amendments and supplements to claims or defences

During the course of the arbitration, a party may amend or supplement its claim or defence, unless the arbitral tribunal considers it inappropriate to allow such amendment having regard to the circumstances of the case. However, a claim or defence may not be amended in such a manner that the amended claim or defence falls outside the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal.

9.151  Article 18.1 permits a party’s claim or defence to be amended or supplemented during the arbitral proceedings. The party can introduce the amendment if (a) the amended claim or defence falls within the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal; and (b) the tribunal does not consider it inappropriate to permit such amendment. In practice, a party often needs to seek permission from the tribunal before it amends its written submissions.

9.152  In deciding whether to permit a party to amend its case, an arbitral tribunal will also look at the circumstances of the case, which may include the delay in making the amendment and any prejudice to the other party as a result. The tribunal will also normally consider the scope of the arbitration agreement and the primary pleadings to determine whether the amended claim or defence is within the tribunal’s jurisdiction.

9.153  While Article 18.1 contemplates formal amendments to the parties’ pleadings, in practice parties’ cases sometimes evolve during the course of the arbitration without any formal modifications being made to the initial pleadings (such as the Notice, Answer, Statement of Claim, and Statement of Defence). In deciding whether to allow a party to amend the substance of its case in this context, the tribunal is likely to ‘balance the inconvenience and prejudice involved, ensuring that each party retains a reasonable opportunity to present its case and deal with that of its opponent’.134

9.154  Arbitral tribunals are sometimes faced with applications to introduce new claims or arguments at a very late stage of the proceedings. This issue was considered by the Hong Kong Court of Appeal (CA) in Grand Pacific Holdings Ltd v Pacific China Holdings Ltd.135 In that case, the respondent applied to amend its Statement of Defence one month prior to the hearing to, inter alia, introduce a new argument that the arbitration agreement was void and unenforceable under Taiwanese law. Although it recognized that the respondent’s new argument was tenuous and allowing such argument would prejudice the claimant, the arbitral tribunal granted the respondent’s amendment application but allowed the claimant to file its expert report in response to the respondent’s new argument two working days before commencement of the hearing. In the tribunal’s opinion, this arrangement would diminish the claimant’s prejudice.

9.155  In an application to set aside the award, the respondent argued that this procedure was unfair as it had had to disclose its best case on the Taiwanese law issue before the claimant did so, such that the latter could tailor its expert evidence and submissions accordingly. In dismissing the application, the CA held that, given the respondent’s late amendment, the arbitral tribunal was perfectly entitled to adopt procedures to give the claimant a reasonable opportunity to respond to the new argument.

(p. 246) 9.156  The Pacific China case is a good illustration of how the arbitral tribunal can deal with the late introduction of a new claim or defence and preserve the integrity of the arbitral process. The case also demonstrates the Hong Kong courts’ general support for the tribunal’s broad case management power to deal with such issues.

11.  Article 18.2—adjustment of HKIAC’s Administrative Fees and the arbitral tribunal’s fees

HKIAC may adjust its Administrative Fees and the arbitral tribunal’s fees (where appropriate) if a party amends its claim or defence.

9.157  A party’s amendment to its claim or defence may affect the total amount in dispute and/or the complexity of the case. Where the dispute value changes, HKIAC will adjust its Administrative Fees and the tribunal’s fees if its fees are calculated based on the sum in dispute. Where the amendment gives rise to many new issues and adds significantly more work to HKIAC and the tribunal, the Administrative Fees and the tribunal’s fees (if based on the sum in dispute) may also be adjusted.

12.  Article 20—further written statements

The arbitral tribunal shall decide which further written statements, if any, in addition to the Statement of Claim and the Statement of Defence, shall be required from the parties and shall set the time limits for communicating such statements.

9.158  The arbitral tribunal may direct the parties to file further written submissions in addition to the Statement of Claim and the Statement of Defence in appropriate cases, and tribunals often do so in practice. These further submissions may include the following:

  1. (1)  Statement of Reply;

  2. (2)  Statement of Rejoinder;

  3. (3)  Statement of Defence to Counterclaim;

  4. (4)  Statement of Reply to Defence to Counterclaim;

  5. (5)  Pre-hearing submissions; and

  6. (6)  Post-hearing submissions.

9.159  The arbitral tribunal may also direct the parties to file submissions on specific issues at different stages in the arbitration. For example, where the proceedings are bifurcated, the parties may be asked to plead issues of jurisdiction, liability, and quantum at different phases. At the end of the proceedings, the arbitral tribunal will often ask the parties to make submissions on costs.

9.160  The arbitral tribunal’s decision on whether and when further written submissions will be required is usually determined at an early stage, for example in the procedural timetable under Article 13.2 of the HKIAC Rules. In some cases, the tribunal may reserve this decision until the Statement of Defence is filed to assess if further submissions are required from the parties.

(p. 247) 13.  Article 21.1—time limits for written statements

The time limits set by the arbitral tribunal for the communication of written statements should not exceed 45 days, unless the arbitral tribunal considers otherwise.

9.161  Under the HKIAC Rules, the arbitral tribunal is empowered to fix appropriate time limits for the parties to file written submissions, which include the pleadings listed in paragraph 9.117 above. Such time limits should not exceed forty-five days.136 Only if the arbitral tribunal considers otherwise may the time limit exceed forty-five days.

14.  Article 21.2—extension of time limits for written statements

The arbitral tribunal may, even in circumstances where the relevant time limit has expired, extend time limits where it concludes that an extension is justified.

9.162  Article 21.2 adds flexibility to the time limits for filing written submissions by allowing the arbitral tribunal to extend such time limits if it considers an extension to be justified. The tribunal may extend the time limit at the request of a party or on its own initiative. However, in practice, the tribunal will often act only upon a party’s application.

9.163  A unique feature of Article 21 is that the tribunal may extend a time limit even after the relevant period has expired. This is particularly useful where a party applies for an extension of time on the eve of the last day of the time period and the tribunal does not have time to respond before the time period expires. However, it is good practice to apply for a time extension as soon as it is foreseen that the deadline cannot be made. It is undesirable to make an application that could have been made earlier but deferred to the last minute.

9.164  Under Article 2.4 of the HKIAC Rules, only the arbitral tribunal can amend the time limits it has set. HKIAC does not have the power to amend such time limits unless the tribunal so directs.137

F.  Article 22—Evidence and Hearings

9.165  Article 22 of the HKIAC Rules provides a framework for handling evidentiary issues arising out of the arbitral process. Consistent with other provisions of the HKIAC Rules on the conduct of proceedings, Article 22 provides a high degree of flexibility for the parties and the arbitral tribunal to deal with evidentiary matters and to run hearings, whilst establishing minimum requirements to safeguard due process. In summary, Article 22 covers the following rules:

  1. (1)  A party has the burden of proving the facts relied upon to support its claim or defence;138

  2. (p. 248) (2)  The arbitral tribunal determines the admissibility, relevance, materiality, and weight of evidence;139

  3. (3)  The arbitral tribunal has broad discretion with respect to document production;140

  4. (4)  The arbitral tribunal decides whether and when to hold hearings;141

  5. (5)  The arbitral tribunal may determine how to examine experts and witnesses;142

  6. (6)  The arbitral tribunal may order transcription and translation of oral statements at a hearing;143 and

  7. (7)  Hearings will generally be held in private and the arbitral tribunal may require any witness or expert to leave the hearing room at any time.144

1.  Article 22.1—burden of proof

Each party shall have the burden of proving the facts relied on to support its claim or defence.

9.166  Under Article 22.1, each party bears the burden of adducing relevant evidence to prove the facts of its case. While this is not expressly provided in the Arbitration Ordinance, some arbitration rules also contain express provisions in this regard.145

9.167  The HKIAC Rules do not prescribe the standard of proof for a party to prove its case. However, it is widely accepted that an arbitral tribunal should apply the normal standard of proof in civil cases, that is the ‘balance of probability’,146 without strictly following the rules of evidence adopted by any court system. In some cases, the arbitral tribunal may require a higher standard of proof for more startling propositions.147 Such a heightened standard of proof may apply, for example, where allegations of fraud or corruption are raised.

2.  Article 22.2—assessment of evidence

The arbitral tribunal shall determine the admissibility, relevance, materiality and weight of the evidence, including whether to apply strict rules of evidence.

9.168  The arbitral tribunal is not bound by any strict rules of evidence and enjoys broad discretion to determine the admissibility, relevance, materiality, and weight of any evidence.148 This provision is in line with Article 19(2) of the UNCITRAL Model Law (2006),149 section 47(3) (p. 249) of the Arbitration Ordinance,150 and Article 9(1) of the IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International Arbitration (2020) (IBA Rules of Evidence).151

9.169  While the arbitral tribunal is not required to apply any established rules of evidence, commentators have suggested that the tribunal should always have regard to such rules for the following reasons:

  1. (1)  The rules themselves have evolved based on years of judicial and legislative experience and expertise. They are, by and large, rational and designed to achieve fairness;

  2. (2)  The rules are comprehensive and should cover most situations. They will therefore be a source of persuasive guidance to the tribunal;

  3. (3)  If the tribunal were to make decisions on evidential issues based on its own whims and without any rational basis, the parties may have legitimate grounds to feel aggrieved, and possibly recourse.152

9.170  In this respect, the IBA Rules of Evidence are commonly adopted or referred to in HKIAC arbitration. The IBA Rules of Evidence merge procedures in use in different legal systems and provide a useful framework for the arbitral tribunal to follow in assessing evidence.

3.  Article 22.3—production of documents

At any time during the arbitration, the arbitral tribunal may allow or require a party to produce documents, exhibits or other evidence that the arbitral tribunal determines to be relevant to the case and material to its outcome. The arbitral tribunal shall have the power to admit or exclude any documents, exhibits or other evidence.

(a)  Document production process

9.171  Production of documents (sometimes called ‘discovery’ or ‘disclosure’) is a regular feature of HKIAC arbitration. Under Article 22.3, the arbitral tribunal has wide discretion to allow or order production of documents that are ‘relevant to the case and material to its outcome’. The specific procedure for document production is usually fixed by the arbitral tribunal, in consultation with the parties, at an early stage in the proceedings.153 Arbitral tribunals commonly refer to Article 3 of the IBA Rules of Evidence when conducting the document production process. The adoption of these Rules has been seen as a prudent way for dealing with document production requests made by parties from different backgrounds and legal traditions.154

9.172  Under the IBA Rules of Evidence, a party may request another party to produce a narrow and specific category of documents that are relevant to the case and material to its outcome. The requesting party must explain that the requested documents are not in its possession, (p. 250) custody, or control or why it would be unreasonably burdensome for it to produce such documents. The requesting party must also provide reasons why it assumes another party has the documents.155

9.173  As a matter of general practice, a request for documents is often submitted in the form of a ‘Redfern Schedule’ with four columns, completed as briefly as possibly by the parties, as follows:156

  1. (1)  In the first column, the requesting party sets out a brief description of a narrow and specific category of documents that are reasonably believed to exist in sufficient detail.157

  2. (2)  In the second column, the requesting party states why the requested documents are both relevant to the case and material to its outcome and why another party should produce these documents.158

  3. (3)  In the third column, the opposing party states the extent to which, if at all, it is prepared to accede to the request, and if it objects, the grounds on which it does so.159

  4. (4)  The fourth column is reserved for the arbitral tribunal’s decision.160

9.174  An alternative form is the ‘Armesto Schedule’. The Armesto Schedule offers a procedural order on document production that annexes a document request chart. This schedule itself is organized in portrait orientation with one request per page. Each row is organized by the requirements and objections set out in the IBA Rules. The procedural order sets out a framework for the document production phase which includes provisions that prevent ‘fishing expeditions’, offer word limits for the request, and suggest the possibility of limiting the number of document requests.161

9.175  It bears noting that, for arbitrations seated in Hong Kong, a party is not required to produce any document or other evidence that the party could not be required to produce in civil proceedings before a court.162 In practice, this provision has a limited effect because document production in HKIAC arbitration is generally more limited in scope than that in Hong Kong court proceedings.

(b)  Documents that are relevant to the case and material to its outcome

9.176  Article 22.3 does not contemplate the production of every document which the requesting party considers to be helpful to it case. It only allows the arbitral tribunal to order a party to produce documents that are ‘relevant to the case and material to its outcome’, so that the process does not amount to a fishing expedition. This test is adopted from Article 3(7) of the IBA Rules of Evidence and reflects international best practice in favour of limited document production.

9.177  The terms ‘relevance’ and ‘materiality’ are similar, but there are nuances in meaning. According to a commentator, the terms have the following meanings:

(p. 251)

Relevance suggests that the document must be useful for the line of evidence by the requesting party in order to establish the truth of its factual allegations, on which its legal conclusions are based. In addition, the term materiality means that the arbitral tribunal must deem it necessary that the document is needed as an element to allow complete consideration as to whether a factual allegation is true or not.163

(c)  Admission and exclusion of evidence

9.178  As a general rule, all relevant evidence that is material to the outcome of the arbitration is admissible. However, the arbitral tribunal retains the power under Article 22.3 to exclude evidence (even if it may otherwise be admissible) or admit evidence (even if it would otherwise be inadmissible).

9.179  A commentator has suggested examples of situations where the arbitral tribunal may exclude or limit evidence adduced by a party even though it is relevant and admissible:

  1. (1)  where the evidence is adduced to establish a fact which the tribunal considers has already been established by other evidence;

  2. (2)  where the amount of evidence adduced is excessive in view of the amount at stake or the importance of the issue, the tribunal may exclude additional evidence to avoid unnecessary expense. In principle, a tribunal should be slow to exclude any admissible and relevant evidence on this basis unless it is going to decide the case in favour of the party whose evidence the tribunal is excluding;

  3. (3)  in cases where the dispute concerns numerous but similar factual issues, for example where the claim relates to a large number of allegedly defective goods, the tribunal may suggest the decision be based only on a sample of those goods.164

9.180  The arbitral tribunal generally has the power to order cost sanctions against a party whose evidence turns out to be unnecessary.165

4.  Article 22.4—hearings

The arbitral tribunal shall decide whether to hold hearings for presenting evidence or for oral arguments, or whether the arbitration shall be conducted solely on the basis of documents and other materials. The arbitral tribunal shall hold such hearings at an appropriate stage of the arbitration, if so requested by a party or if it considers fit. In the event of a hearing, the arbitral tribunal shall give the parties adequate advance notice of the relevant date, time and place.

9.181  Article 22.4 is based largely on Article 24(1) of the UNCITRAL Model Law (2006), given effect by section 52 of the Arbitration Ordinance. It authorizes the arbitral tribunal to decide whether, when, and where to hold hearings and sets out the requirements for proper notice of hearing to be given to the parties. Article 22.4 allows tribunals to order that a hearing shall take place either fully or partially via videoconference or online platform (‘remote’ or ‘virtual’ hearings).

(p. 252) (a)  The arbitral tribunal’s power to hold oral hearings

9.182  The arbitral tribunal is empowered to decide whether to hold hearings (in person or virtual) or to conduct the arbitral proceedings on the basis of documents only. If a party requests a hearing, the arbitral tribunal must hold one at an appropriate stage of the arbitration (regardless of whether the tribunal itself considers a hearing to be necessary). In the absence of any party request, the tribunal may decide to hold a hearing if it considers it appropriate to do so. When considering whether to hold a hearing, the arbitral tribunal should bear in mind that the right to a hearing is sometimes described as a fundamental aspect of the right to be heard and therefore carries great importance.166 In practice, the arbitral tribunal will normally consult with the parties at an early stage of the proceedings to ascertain whether they require a hearing, the anticipated length of the hearing, and the parties’ availability. The tribunal will normally insert tentative hearing dates into its first procedural order, although these dates may be varied upon a party’s application or if the tribunal becomes unavailable.

9.183  The HKIAC Rules permit hearings to take place in various forms, including physical hearings at any locations, teleconferences, online, and videoconferences. In practice, substantive hearings have traditionally taken place at HKIAC’s premises, which offer first-class facilities for in-person and virtual proceedings. Procedural hearings are generally conducted by way of teleconference, videoconference, or online.

9.184  The types of hearings which the arbitral tribunal may decide to hold under Article 22.4 are those for the presentation of evidence or oral arguments. The provision does not expressly state whether the tribunal’s obligation to hold hearings applies also to hearings in respect of procedural or jurisdictional issues. In this regard, guidance may be sought from the commentary to Article 24(1) of the UNCITRAL Model Law (2006) (in similar terms to Article 22.4 of the HKIAC Rules), which suggests that ‘the party’s right to a hearing should not be considered limited to substantive issues’.167

9.185  A substantive hearing usually comprises the following steps:168

  1. (1)  The claimant’s opening;

  2. (2)  The claimant’s evidence;

  3. (3)  The respondent’s opening;

  4. (4)  The respondent’s evidence;

  5. (5)  The respondent’s closing; and

  6. (6)  The claimant’s closing.

9.186  The tribunal may dispense with a hearing in appropriate circumstances, unless any party requests a hearing. For example, under the HKIAC expedited procedure, the proceedings are generally conducted by a sole arbitrator on a document-only basis, unless it decides that it is appropriate to hold a hearing.169

(b)  Notice of hearing

9.187  The arbitral tribunal will fix the date, time, and place of any hearing. Proper notice of this information must be given to the parties in advance, in order to allow the parties to plan their (p. 253) schedules, and to arrange hearing facilities and other support services. In practice, the tribunal will usually ask the claimant to make such arrangement. The tribunal must notify the parties of the hearing in accordance with Article 2.1 of the HKIAC Rules.

9.188  Adequate notice of hearings is important to ensure due process of the arbitral proceedings. Such notice affords the parties a reasonable opportunity of presenting their cases under Article 13.1 of the HKIAC Rules. It also enables the arbitral tribunal to proceed with the arbitration where a party fails to participate in a hearing under Article 26 of the Rules.

5.  Article 22.5—witnesses and experts

The arbitral tribunal may determine the manner in which a witness or expert is examined.

9.189  The arbitral tribunal can determine the manner in which cross-examination should be conducted. In general, the cross-examination of a party’s factual witnesses will be conducted in the following order:170

  1. (1)  Examination-in-chief by the party leading the evidence;

  2. (2)  Cross-examination by the other side; and

  3. (3)  Re-examination by the party leading the evidence.

The arbitral tribunal may intervene during the examination process, for example by asking questions during any of these steps.171

9.190  Normally experts are called after factual witnesses in a hearing. The examination of expert witnesses may follow the same order in paragraph 9.189 above.

9.191  Some arbitral tribunals prefer to examine experts by way of witness conferencing (or sometimes called ‘hot-tubbing’). Both parties’ expert witnesses will participate in the conference and the arbitral tribunal will take a more proactive role in asking questions. The tribunal may request the two experts, one after another, to answer the same question and to clarify or test the opinion of an expert using the answer given by the other expert. The parties will also be given the opportunity to ask questions.172

9.192  Article 22.5 of the HKIAC Rules (2018) stated expressly that ‘any person may be a witness or an expert’. Although this language has been removed from the HKIAC Rules (2018), there is no change in practice. The parties are free to call any person to give evidence in support of their cases, and to instruct an expert or experts of their choice.

6.  Article 22.6—translation and transcript

The arbitral tribunal may make directions for the translation of oral statements made at a hearing and for a record of the hearing if it deems that either is necessary in the circumstances of the case.

(p. 254) (a)  Translation of oral statements

9.193  Article 22.6 empowers the arbitral tribunal to order the translation of oral statements made at a hearing. This may be necessary where, for example, a witness or expert has difficulties in giving his or her evidence in the language(s) determined for the arbitration.173 The ICCA Drafting Sourcebook contains helpful guidance on protocols for the parties and the arbitral tribunal to adopt in relation to the translation of oral testimony.

9.194  HKIAC does not provide a translation service in this regard. Parties in need of such service should make the necessary arrangement and bear the associated costs. Such costs are not covered by HKIAC Administrative Fees.

(b)  Record of the hearing

9.195  The arbitral tribunal may direct the parties to arrange transcription services to record a hearing. In practice, the tribunal will usually make such directions for all substantive hearings, including hearings on issues of interim measures, liability, and quantum. Transcripts are less commonly required for procedural hearings or case management conferences.

9.196  Two modes of transcription are often used in HKIAC hearings: (a) real-time transcription which can deliver computer text screens within a few seconds of the words being spoken; and (b) transcription of an audio file taped from a hearing. Parties are usually expected to arrange the appropriate transcription services and bear the associated costs. HKIAC can recommend transcription service providers but does not provide such service.

7.  Article 22.7—privacy of hearings and cross-examination

Hearings shall be held in private unless the parties agree otherwise. The arbitral tribunal may require any witness or expert to leave the hearing room at any time during the hearing.

(a)  Privacy of hearings

9.197  HKIAC hearings are held in private by default. This is consistent with the overall confidentiality requirement under Article 42 of the HKIAC Rules that both arbitral proceedings and awards are confidential.174 In practice, a procedural hearing or case management conference is usually attended by the arbitral tribunal (sometimes by the sole or presiding arbitrator only) and the parties or their legal representatives. Substantive hearings are often attended by the arbitral tribunal, the parties, their legal representatives, witnesses, and experts. If the tribunal has appointed a secretary, such secretary may participate in the hearing. Translators and transcribers may also be present at a hearing if the parties have made relevant arrangements. Third parties can only attend by agreement of the parties and the arbitral tribunal.

9.198  The parties may also agree to hold their hearings in public, for example hearings of investment disputes involving a state or disputes concerning public interest.

(p. 255) (b)  Sequestration of witnesses or experts

9.199  The arbitral tribunal may require any witness or expert to leave the hearing room during the hearing. In other words, the tribunal may direct the presence of a witness at a hearing to be limited to the time when he or she is testifying. This practice is commonly referred to as ‘sequestration’.

9.200  The purpose of sequestration is to prevent a witness from being influenced by what is said in the hearing room.175 The arbitral tribunal will often remind witnesses that they must not discuss anything in relation to the case or the evidence given.176 In practice witnesses are generally permitted to remain in the hearing room after they have testified.177 It is less common for an expert to be sequestered.

G.  Article 25—Tribunal-Appointed Experts

9.201  The HKIAC Rules allow an arbitral tribunal to appoint an independent expert to report on specific issues and provide for such expert to participate in a hearing. The rules in this regard can be summarized as follows:

  1. (1)  The arbitral tribunal has the power to appoint an expert to prepare a written report on specific issues, as determined by the tribunal;178

  2. (2)  In appointing an expert, the arbitral tribunal must first consult with the parties and must provide the expert’s terms of reference to the parties and to HKIAC;179

  3. (3)  The parties must provide the expert with relevant information;180

  4. (4)  The parties must have the opportunity to comment on the expert report;181

  5. (5)  The parties are entitled to examine the expert at a hearing. The parties may present their own experts at the hearing;182 and

  6. (6)  The provisions of Article 11 on the qualifications and challenge of the arbitral tribunal apply by analogy with respect to the expert.183

9.202  These rules are broadly in line with Article 6 of the IBA Rules of Evidence, which provides a detailed procedure for the use of tribunal-appointed experts. The parties and arbitral tribunal can adopt this procedure where an expert is appointed by the tribunal in an HKIAC arbitration.

1.  Article 25.1—appointment of an expert by the arbitral tribunal

To assist it in the assessment of evidence, the arbitral tribunal, after consulting with the parties, may appoint one or more experts. Such expert shall report to the arbitral tribunal, in writing, on specific issues to be determined by the (p. 256) arbitral tribunal. After consulting with the parties, the arbitral tribunal shall establish terms of reference for the expert, and shall communicate a copy of the expert’s terms of reference to the parties and HKIAC.

(a)  Arbitral tribunal’s powers to appoint experts

9.203  The arbitral tribunal has the discretion to appoint its own expert(s) to assist in assessing evidence (as distinct from experts appointed by the parties). The tribunal may appoint any types of experts in this regard, which may include experts on technical issues, financial issues, or foreign laws. However, the tribunal is required to seek views from the parties before deciding whether to appoint an expert. In practice, if the parties object to such appointment, the tribunal is unlikely to insist on a tribunal-appointed expert.184

9.204  The arbitral tribunal may appoint experts in place of, or in addition to, party-appointed experts. The former is more often seen in small cases, whereas the latter is more likely to be considered in complex cases.185 In practice, many arbitrators prefer the parties to appoint experts who will meet and report to the tribunal on the areas of agreement and disagreement, and then give evidence in a hearing by witness conferencing.186 Tribunal-appointed experts are not often seen in HKIAC arbitrations.

9.205  The HKIAC Rules (2018) removed the 2013 provision that allowed tribunals to meet privately with tribunal-appointed experts. This change was prompted by a desire to increase transparency, and to ensure that parties had fair opportunity to comment on any work conducted by a tribunal’s expert. However, the authors note that the Arbitration Ordinance does not prohibit tribunals from meeting privately with their experts.187 Indeed, it is suggested that such meetings are required for a tribunal-appointed expert to work effectively with the tribunal. Nevertheless, it is essential that the parties have a reasonable opportunity to see, and comment on, the expert’s report, to ask him or her questions, and to present their own experts to testify on the points at issue. This right is stated expressly at section 54(2) of the Arbitration Ordinance.

9.206  In exercising its power to appoint experts, the arbitral tribunal should bear in mind its obligation to ensure the fair and efficient conduct of the arbitration under Articles 13.1 and 13.5 of the HKIAC Rules. Therefore, the arbitral tribunal should balance the need for such expert against the potential costs and delays involved (and, indeed, the potential cost and time efficiencies that might be saved as a result of using a tribunal-appointed expert). Where the parties have already appointed their own experts, the arbitral tribunal should carefully consider whether the costs of appointing an additional expert are justified.

(b)  Terms of reference

9.207  The arbitral tribunal must establish, after consulting with the parties, terms of reference for a tribunal-appointed expert. Such terms will normally define the scope of the expert’s role and the specific issues upon which the expert should opine. The form of the terms can be determined by the arbitral tribunal. Once the terms are finalized, the tribunal must provide a copy to the parties and HKIAC.

(p. 257) (c)  Expert to produce a written report

9.208  Once an expert is appointed by the arbitral tribunal, he or she must prepare a written report addressing the issues specified in the terms of reference. The HKIAC Rules do not prescribe any requirement on the content of an expert report. In this regard, the parties and arbitral tribunal may be guided by Article 6.4 of the IBA Rules of Evidence, which contains a list of contents to be included in an expert report.

9.209  Any such report will be sent to the parties for their comments. The parties will also be given the opportunity to examine any supporting documents for the report.188

9.210  It may be relevant to note that, in Hebei Import & Export Corp v Polytek Engineering Co Ltd,189 the Court of Final Appeal (CFA) enforced a CIETAC award arising from an arbitration in which a tribunal-appointed expert examined the relevant equipment and consulted with the end user in the presence of the presiding arbitrator but in the absence of the parties. The court decision largely relied on the fact that this procedure did not violate the procedures under the CIETAC Rules or Chinese law.

9.211  The expert’s report is not binding on the arbitral tribunal and should be assessed in a similar way as other expert evidence. The arbitral tribunal retains the power to determine the relevance, materiality, and weight of the report. However, in practice, such a report is often given significant weight because of the additional element of independence associated with the appointment of such an expert. It should be noted that, a tribunal-appointed expert report, like any other expert evidence, does not discharge the arbitral tribunal from its duty to render an award on its own.190

2.  Article 25.2—provision of information to tribunal-appointed expert

The parties shall give the expert any relevant information or produce for his or her inspection any relevant documents or goods that he or she may require of them. Any dispute between a party and such expert as to the relevance of the required information or production shall be referred to the arbitral tribunal for decision.

9.212  To assist a tribunal-appointed expert in producing a relevant and useful report, the parties must provide the expert with all relevant information and access to any documents, goods, samples, property, machinery, systems, process, or site for inspection, to the extent relevant to the case.

9.213  If a party refuses to provide such information or access, the arbitral tribunal may intervene and issue an appropriate order. Any disagreement between a party and a tribunal-appointed expert as to the relevance of the requested information will be decided by the arbitral tribunal. Article 6.3 of the IBA Rules of Evidence provides that the tribunal-appointed expert (p. 258) must record in his or her report any non-compliance by a party with an appropriate request or decision of the tribunal and must state its effects on the determination of the relevant issue.

3.  Article 25.3—communication of tribunal-appointed expert report to the parties

Upon receipt of the expert’s report, the arbitral tribunal shall send a copy of the report to the parties who shall be given the opportunity to express their opinions on the report. The parties shall be entitled to examine any document on which the expert has relied in his or her report.

9.214  After a tribunal-appointed expert has produced a report, the arbitral tribunal must provide a copy of the report to the parties for comments. The parties will be given the opportunity to comment on the report. While the HKIAC Rules (2013) stipulated that the comments should be in writing, the HKIAC Rules (2018) no longer express this requirement. Usually, parties will express their comments through their own experts, which are expressly permitted pursuant to Article 25.4.

9.215  Where a tribunal-appointed expert has relied on or referred to a document in an expert report, parties have the right to request and review such a document.

9.216  Article 25.3 is intended to prevent the tribunal from relying on its own expert’s opinion without the parties’ input and to safeguard due process for the use of tribunal-appointed experts. The provision ensures that each party must be treated fairly and has a reasonable opportunity to be heard.191

4.  Article 25.4—examination of tribunal-appointed expert by the parties

At the request of either party, the expert, after delivering the report, shall attend a hearing at which the parties shall have the opportunity to be present and to examine the expert. At this hearing either party may present experts in order to testify on the points at issue. The provisions of Articles 22.2 to 22.7 shall be applicable to such proceedings.

9.217  The parties not only have the opportunity to comment on a tribunal-appointed expert’s report in writing, they may also insist on examining the expert through a hearing. After delivery of the report, either party may request a hearing to examine the expert and the expert must attend such hearing.

9.218  At the hearing, the parties may present their own experts to testify on the points at issue and refer to these experts’ opinions to question or clarify the views of the tribunal-appointed expert. As mentioned above, a tribunal-appointed expert’s report should be assessed in the same way as any other expert report. This is reflected by the provision that Articles 22.2 to 22.7 of the HKIAC Rules (ie how the arbitral tribunal should deal with evidential issues and hearings) apply equally to a tribunal-appointed expert’s evidence.

(p. 259) 9.219  Like Article 25.3, Article 25.4 is intended to ensure due process and the parties’ right to be heard on any evidence given by a tribunal-appointed expert. Similar provisions can also be found in Article 26(2) of the UNCITRAL Model Law (2006), given effect by section 54(1) of the Arbitration Ordinance. Failure to allow the parties to be heard in this regard may have serious consequences. In Paklito Investment Ltd v Klockner East Asia Ltd,192 the Hong Kong High Court refused to enforce a CIETAC award on the basis that the defendant had not been given the opportunity to comment on the report produced by the tribunal-appointed expert.

5.  Article 25.5—impartiality and independence of tribunal-appointed expert

The provisions of Article 11 shall apply by analogy to any expert appointed by the arbitral tribunal.

9.220  As a tribunal-appointed expert is tasked to produce independent and professional opinions to assist the arbitral tribunal in deciding on specific issues, such an expert must assume the same level of impartiality and independence as the arbitral tribunal. For this reasons, Article 11 (qualifications and challenge of the arbitral tribunal) applies to tribunal-appointed experts by analogy.

9.221  Chapter 6 regarding qualification and challenge of the arbitral tribunal applies mutatis mutandis in respect of tribunal-appointed experts.

H.  Article 26—Default

9.222  Article 26 deals with the arbitral tribunal’s power in the event of a party’s failure to participate in the arbitral proceedings. It empowers the tribunal to terminate the proceedings if the claimant fails to submit its written statement and allows the tribunal to proceed with the proceedings if the respondent fails to submit its written statement or if any party fails to present its case. This provision is largely modelled on Article 25 of the UNCITRAL Model Law (2006), given effect by section 53(1) of the Arbitration Ordinance.

9.223.  The text of Article 26 was amended in 2018, primarily to streamline its language and to reflect amended terminology in the latest Rules. The amendment also expands the scope of the article, by providing that tribunals can treat a party as being in default if it fails to submit any written statement. The 2013 version was limited to circumstances where a party failed to file its Statement of Claim or Statement of Defence. The broader language thus gives tribunals additional flexibility to terminate proceedings where the claimant stops participating, or to proceed with a case where (as is increasingly the case) the respondent fails to participate, even if this is later in the arbitration. Parties to Hong Kong seated arbitrations may also be in default if they fall within the provisions of section 53 of the Arbitration Ordinance.

(p. 260) 9.224  Relevant rules under Article 26 can be summarized as follows:

  1. (1)  In the event of default by the claimant in filing a written statement without showing sufficient cause for the default, the arbitral tribunal may terminate the proceedings or proceed with the arbitration in respect of any counterclaim;193

  2. (2)  In the event of default by the respondent in filing a written statement without showing sufficient cause for the default, the arbitral tribunal may proceed with the arbitration notwithstanding the non-participation of the respondent;194 and

  3. (3)  In the event of any other form of non-participation by any party without showing sufficient cause for the non-participation, the arbitral tribunal may nonetheless proceed with the arbitration and render an award based on the evidence available.195

1.  Article 26.1—claimant’s failure to submit its written statement

If, within the time limit set by the arbitral tribunal, the Claimant has failed to communicate its written statement without showing sufficient cause for such failure, the arbitral tribunal may terminate the arbitration unless another party has brought a claim and wishes the arbitration to continue, in which case the tribunal may proceed with the arbitration in respect of the other party’s claim.

9.225  Article 26.1 allows the arbitral tribunal to terminate the arbitral proceedings under two conditions: (1) the claimant has failed to submit its written statement within the time limit directed by the tribunal; and (2) the claimant has not provided sufficient reasons for such failure. In the circumstances, the tribunal must terminate the proceedings by issuing a termination order.196

While the HKIAC Rules define the term ‘claim’ to mean ‘any claim or claims by any party against any other party’,197 Article 26.1 does not require the arbitral tribunal to terminate the proceedings if there is a failure to produce a counterclaim.

9.226  Where the claimant fails to submit its written statement but there is a counterclaim on foot, Article 26.1 permits the arbitral tribunal to proceed with the arbitration in respect of the counterclaim only. When proceeding without the participation of the claimant, the arbitral tribunal should ensure that the circumstances of the claimant’s non-participation are clear on the face of the award and that the claimant remains fully informed of all submissions, correspondence, and hearings.

9.227  Termination of arbitral proceedings is a severe step and must be handled with caution. The arbitral tribunal would ordinarily give the claimant every opportunity to explain its position before terminating the arbitration, or proceeding only in relation to any counterclaim, as the case may be.

9.228  Under Article 25(a) of the UNCITRAL Model Law (2006), given effect by section 53(1) of the Arbitration Ordinance, the termination of an arbitration by the arbitral tribunal does not prevent the claimant from commencing fresh arbitral proceedings, provided that it is (p. 261) not precluded from doing so by contractual or statutory limitation periods. However, under section 59(2) of the Arbitration Ordinance, the arbitral tribunal may make an order prohibiting a party from commencing further arbitral proceedings if it is satisfied that the party has unreasonably delayed in pursuing the claim.

2.  Article 26.2—respondent’s failure to submit its written statement

If, within the time limit set by the arbitral tribunal, the Respondent has failed to communicate its written statement without showing sufficient cause for such failure, the arbitral tribunal may proceed with the arbitration.

9.229  The respondent is not permitted to stymie an arbitration simply by refusing to participate. Accordingly, where the respondent fails to file its written statement without good reason, the arbitral tribunal may proceed with the arbitration. In exercising this discretion, the tribunal must have regard to its obligations under Article 13.1 of the HKIAC Rules to provide each party with a reasonable opportunity to present its case.

9.230  The arbitral tribunal should act cautiously when proceeding in the absence of a defence. It should make sure that the respondent remains fully informed of all submissions, correspondence, and hearings. The arbitral award should record the full procedural history, including the respondent’s absence and the attempts to notify the respondent of the proceedings, and should set out the tribunal’s reasons for its decision. The tribunal may also record in the award that it has jurisdiction pursuant to the arbitration agreement, even where there is no jurisdictional challenge.198

9.231  The default procedure under Article 26 allows the tribunal to continue the arbitration even where the respondent is not participating, in which case the claimant must still prove its case and the tribunal must consider the merits fully as well as the submissions advanced by the participating party. In practice the tribunal may also draw adverse inferences from the respondent’s failure to submit a defence.199

3.  Article 26.3—failure to present case

If one of the parties, duly notified under these Rules, fails to present its case in accordance with these Rules including as directed by the arbitral tribunal, without showing sufficient cause for such failure, the arbitral tribunal may proceed with the arbitration and make an award on the basis of the evidence before it.

9.232  Article 26.3 applies in respect of any failure by a party to properly participate in the arbitration rather than a specific failure to file a Statement of Claim or Statement of Defence on time. In the circumstances, the arbitral tribunal has the discretion to proceed and make an award based on the evidence available.

9.233  There are two preconditions to the arbitral tribunal’s exercise of its discretion under Article 26.3: (1) a party has been duly notified of its obligation and time frame to present its case under the HKIAC Rules, but still fails to participate in the arbitration; and (2) the defaulting (p. 262) party fails to give sufficient reasons for its failure to present its case. As the tribunal’s power under Article 26.3 is discretionary, it may proceed with the arbitration or decide to postpone the hearing and give the defaulting party a further opportunity to present its case.

9.234  It should be noted that a party’s failure to file its written submissions or participate in a hearing does not necessarily amount to an admission. However, the arbitral tribunal may draw adverse inferences from the party’s failure to participate or comply with orders.200

I.  Article 31—Closure of Proceedings

9.235  Article 31 provides an endpoint for the arbitral tribunal to receive the parties’ submissions and evidence. After this point, the arbitral tribunal will proceed to make an award unless it decides to reopen the proceedings.

Relevant rules under Article 31 can be summarized as follows:

  1. (1)  The arbitral tribunal declares closed the entire proceedings or a discrete phase of the proceedings when it is satisfied that the parties have had a reasonable opportunity to present their case;201

  2. (2)  Once the entire proceedings or a discrete phase of the proceedings are declared closed, the arbitral tribunal shall inform HKIAC and the parties of the anticipated date for the communication of the award;202

  3. (3)  The date for rendering the award should not exceed three months from the date the proceedings were declared closed unless this time limit was extended by the parties or HKIAC;203

  4. (4)  The provision on the time limit for rendering the award does not apply to the Expedited Procedure under Article 42;204

  5. (5)  The arbitral tribunal can decide to reopen the proceedings at any time before rendering the award.205

1.  Article 31.1—closing the proceedings

When it is satisfied that the parties have had a reasonable opportunity to present their case, whether in relation to the entire proceedings or a discrete phase of the proceedings, the arbitral tribunal shall declare the proceedings or the relevant phase of the proceedings closed. Thereafter, no further submissions or arguments may be made, or evidence produced in respect of the entire proceedings or the discrete phase, as applicable, unless the tribunal reopens the proceedings or the relevant phase of the proceedings in accordance with Article 31.4.

(p. 263) 9.236  Where the arbitral tribunal is satisfied that each party has had a reasonable opportunity to present its case either in relation to the entire proceedings or a discrete phase of the proceedings, it is required to formally close the entire proceedings or a discrete phase of the proceedings as applicable. Thereafter, no further submissions, arguments, or evidence should be submitted by the parties in respect of the entire proceedings or the discrete phase, as applicable, unless the arbitral tribunal reopens the proceedings under Article 31.4.

9.237  The text of this article was expanded in 2018 to allow tribunals to close discrete phases of an arbitration, rather than waiting until the end of the entire proceedings. This change is aimed at cases where, for example, arguments on jurisdiction and liability (or liability and quantum) are bifurcated, with one phase is pleaded in its entirety before the other commences. In such circumstances, HKIAC tribunals can close the first phase and must issue their award in respect of that phase within the three month time limit prescribed by Article 31.2.

9.238  In practice, the arbitral tribunal often closes the proceedings at the end of the substantive hearing (whether on a discrete phase or the case as a whole). This is particularly so where the parties deliver closing oral submissions at the end of the hearing. However, it is increasingly common for arbitral tribunals to request post-hearing briefs from the parties, summarizing their case in the light of any new arguments or evidence presented at the hearing. In such circumstances, it may be appropriate for the arbitral tribunal to close the proceedings after the receipt of post-hearing briefs.

9.239  Closure of the proceedings draws a line between the submission and evidence-gathering stage and the final stage where the arbitral tribunal makes its award. This also helps to prevent parties from introducing new issues or evidence at the final stage of the proceedings, to which the other parties must be given a chance to respond. Such late-stage submissions delay the proceedings and increase cost.

2.  Article 31.2—anticipated date for rendering an award

Once the proceedings are declared closed, the arbitral tribunal shall inform HKIAC and the parties of the anticipated date by which an award will be communicated to the parties. The date of rendering the award shall be no later than three months from the date when the arbitral tribunal declares the entire proceedings or the relevant phase of the proceedings closed, as applicable. This time limit may be extended by agreement of the parties or, in appropriate circumstances, by HKIAC.

9.240  This provision was included to encourage the arbitral tribunal to render an award efficiently and to be held accountable for its own deadline for rendering an award. Once the arbitral tribunal declares the proceedings closed pursuant to Article 31.1, it is required to inform both HKIAC and the parties in writing of the anticipated date by which it will communicate an award to the parties. The outer limit of three months is similar to that which is found in the ICC Rules. However, the parties can agree to extend this time. Moreover, in appropriate circumstances, HKIAC can extend this time limit as well. While no sanctions are expressly imposed if the arbitral tribunal is not able to deliver an award by the anticipated date by which the award will be communicated to the parties or three months, HKIAC does monitor such deadlines closely.

(p. 264) 3.  Article 31.3—anticipated date for rendering an award inapplicable to the Expedited Procedure

Article 31.2 shall not apply to any arbitration conducted pursuant to the Expedited Procedure under Article 42.

9.241  Given the six-month timeframe for arbitrations under the Expedited Procedure, Article 31.3 expressly carves out the requirement set out in Article 31.2 from the Expedited Procedures. In such situations, time limits are shortened and an allowance of a three-month time limit for the rendering of an award pursuant to Article 31.2 will not suitable.

4.  Article 31.4—reopening the proceedings

The arbitral tribunal may, if it considers it necessary, decide, on its own initiative or upon application of a party, to reopen the proceedings at any time before the award is made.

9.242  After the arbitral tribunal declares the proceedings closed, it may reopen the proceedings at any time before the award is made. Very occasionally new points of issues or evidence will emerge and justify the reopening of the proceedings. While the HKIAC Rules (2018) no longer require that there exist ‘exceptional circumstances’ in order to reopen the proceedings, the arbitral tribunal is generally reluctant to reopen the proceedings without good cause. Arbitral tribunals rarely reopen proceedings in HKIAC cases, but have done so in the past, upon a party’s request, to consider the issue of costs which was not raised or heard before the proceedings were closed.

9.243  The arbitral tribunal may reopen the proceedings on its own initiative or upon the application of a party. The applying party should identify the circumstances which necessitate the reopening of the proceedings.

J.  Article 32—Waiver

9.244  Article 32 deals with the situations in which a party may waive its right to object. Relevant rules under Article 32 can be summarized as follows:

  1. (1)  A party that knows or ought reasonably to know that any provision of the Rules or any requirement under the Rules has not been complied with, waives its right to object where it proceeds with the arbitration without promptly objecting;206

  2. (2)  The parties waive any objection to the validity and/or enforcement of any of the arbitral tribunal’s awards on the basis of the following procedures: consolidation of arbitrations, single arbitration under multiple contracts, concurrent proceedings, and early determination procedure.207

(p. 265) 1.  Article 32.1—waiver of the right to object

A party that knows, or ought reasonably to know, that any provision of, or requirement arising under, these Rules (including the arbitration agreement) has not been complied with and yet proceeds with the arbitration without promptly stating its objection to such non-compliance, shall be deemed to have waived its right to object.

9.245  Under Article 32.1, if a party knows or ought to know of non-compliance with any provisions of the HKIAC Rules or in the arbitration agreement, it should raise any objection without delay. If that party fails to raise such objection, it shall be deemed to have waived its right to object.

9.246  Article 32.1 is largely modelled on Article 4 of the UNCITRAL Model Law (2006), given effect by section 11 of the Arbitration Ordinance. The provision requires a party to raise any procedural objection promptly so that it can be dealt with by the arbitral tribunal as soon as possible during the arbitration. This prevents parties from withholding objections to use at a later stage, including to challenge or oppose enforcement of the award. Any party who wishes to rely on a ground of procedural irregularity to set aside or resist enforcement of the award bears the risks of being debarred by the waiver provision under Article 32.1.

9.247  Three requirements must be satisfied in order for Article 32.1 to apply:

  1. (1)  The party deemed to have waived its right to object must have actual or imputed knowledge of the non-compliance;

  2. (2)  That party must have proceeded with the arbitration; and

  3. (3)  That party must have failed to raise an objection to the non-compliance promptly.

9.248  While both Article 32.1 of the HKIAC Rules and section 11 of the Arbitration Ordinance are silent on the effect of the waiver to object, the UNCITRAL Report 1985 points out that ‘as regards the effect of a waiver under article 4, the Commission [was] agreed that it was not limited to the arbitral proceedings but extended to subsequent court proceedings in the context of articles 34 and 36’.208 In light of this, where a party is deemed to waive its right to object under Article 32.1, it is precluded from raising any objection at the later stage of the arbitral proceedings and after the award is made.

9.249  In practice, courts can come to their own conclusions as to whether a party has indeed waived its right to object under Article 32.1 or the applicable law. For example, the Hong Kong courts will not entertain an objection based on procedural irregularity if it is found that the objection was not raised during the arbitral proceedings, but kept in reserve to be deployed in the enforcement court depending on the outcome of the arbitration.209

(p. 266) 2.  Article 32.2—waiver of the objection to the validity and/or enforcement of an award

The parties waive any objection, on the basis of the use of any procedure under Articles 27, 28, 29, 30 or 43 and any decision made in respect of such procedure, to the validity and/or enforcement of any award made by the arbitral tribunal in the arbitration(s), in so far as such waiver can validly be made.

9.250  By agreeing to arbitration under the HKIAC Rules (2018), the parties also waive any objection to the validity and/or enforcement of any award in any arbitration where procedures found in these HKIAC Rules, including consolidation of arbitrations (Article 28), a single arbitration for claims arising out of or in connection with several contracts (Article 29), concurrent proceedings (Article 30), or early determination procedure (Article 43), are used.

9.251  Article 32.2 is not, in general, new in substance. Similar waivers appeared in the HKIAC Rules (2013), at Articles 27.13, 28.8, 29.2, and 31. The 2018 Rules have moved them into a single article, and added similar waivers in respect of new Articles 30 and 43.

9.252  As with the waivers in the HKIAC Rules (2013), such waivers are expressed to be valid only in so far as is permitted under the relevant law (eg the law of the court where enforcement is sought).

Footnotes:

1  See Chapter 3 for a detailed discussion of HKIAC’s Guidelines on Use of Secretary to Arbitral Tribunal.

2  UNCITRAL Model Law (2006), art 19(1), given effect by s 47 of the Arbitration Ordinance, provides that ‘[s]ubject to the provisions of this Law, the parties are free to agree on the procedure to be followed by the arbitral tribunal in conducting the proceedings’.

3  [2012] 4 HKLRD 1.

4  Ibid at 68.

5  In particular, the obligation to avoid unnecessary delay or expense (art 13.1), the obligation to provide the parties with equal treatment and a reasonable opportunity to present their respective cases (art 13.1), the obligation to do everything necessary to ensure the fair and efficient conduct of the arbitration (art 13.5), the obligation to make every reasonable effort to ensure the validity of the award (art 13.10), as well as the general principle of conducting the arbitration in accordance with the spirit of the HKIAC Rules (art 13.9).

6  As far as Hong Kong law is concerned, see s 46 of the Arbitration Ordinance.

7  [2011] 1 HKLRD 707.

8  Ibid at 88.

9  See Queen Mary, University of London and White & Case, ‘2015 International Arbitration Survey: Improvements and Innovations in International Arbitration’ <http://www.arbitration.qmul.ac.uk/media/arbitration/docs/2018-International-Arbitration-Survey---The-Evolution-of-International-Arbitration-(2).PDF> (last accessed 1 April 2021) at 8 (67 per cent of respondents said that ‘cost’ was perceived as the worst characteristic of international arbitration, with 34 per cent also citing ‘lack of speed’).

10  See Chapter 12 for a detailed discussion of the expedited procedure under art 42 of the HKIAC Rules (2018).

11  See Chapter 10 for a detailed discussion of consolidation of arbitrations under art 27 of the HKIAC Rules (2018).

12  See Chapter 10 for a detailed discussion of consolidation of arbitrations under art 28 of the HKIAC Rules (2018).

13  See paragraphs 9.26–9.47 below for a detailed discussion of the appointment of tribunal secretaries under art 13.4 of the HKIAC Rules (2018).

14  See Chapter 12 for a detailed discussion of the early determination procedure under art 43 of the HKIAC Rules (2018).

15  Similar principles have also been adopted in eg the ICC Rules, art 22(4) (2021); SIAC Rules, art 19.1 (2016); LCIA Rules, art 14.1(i) (2020); UNCITRAL Rules, art 17(1) (2010).

16  Article 18 of the UNCITRAL Model Law (2006) provides that ‘The parties shall be treated with equality and each party shall be given a full opportunity of presenting his case’.

17  Howard M Holtzmann and Joseph E Neuhaus, A Guide to the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration: Legislative History and Commentary (Kluwer Law International 2015) at 550.

18  Gary Born, International Commercial Arbitration (3rd edn, Kluwer Law International 2020) vol II at 2334–8.

19  Nigel Blackaby, Constantine Partasides QC, Alan Redfern, and Martin Hunter, Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration (6th edn, OUP 2015) at 5.71.

20  John Choong and Romesh Weeramantry, The Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance: Commentary and Annotations (2nd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2015) at 46.19. In particular, the Arbitration Ordinance has specifically deviated from the use of ‘full’ opportunity as provided under art 18 of the Model Law, instead providing parties with a ‘reasonable’ opportunity which has been affirmed by the Report of Committee on Hong Kong Arbitration Law (Hong Kong Institute of Arbitrators 30 April 2003) and the Consultation Paper on the Reform of the Law of Arbitration in Hong Kong and Draft Arbitration Bill (Department of Justice, December 2007, LC Paper No CB(2)2261/08-09(02)).

21  Blackaby et al (n 19) at 6.15.

22  Choong and Weeramantry (n 20) at 46.19.

23  Born (n 18) vol III at 3601.

24  Grand Pacific Holdings Ltd v Pacific China Holdings Ltd [2012] HKCA 200, [2012] 4 HKLRD 1 at 94. See also Dongwoo Mann + Hummel Co Ltd v Mann + Hummell GmbH [2008] 3 SLR(R) 871; Born (n 18) vol II at 2348.

25  In contrast to the ICC Rules (2021) (which mandates the arbitral tribunal under arts 23 and 24 to produce the Terms of Reference, convene a case management conference, and establish a procedural timetable at an early stage in the arbitration), the HKIAC Rules take a light-touch approach by requiring the arbitral tribunal to produce a provisional timetable only. Likewise, art 19.3 of the SIAC Rules (2016) and art 22.2 of the ICDR Rules (2021) simply ask the arbitral tribunal to conduct a preliminary meeting to discuss the procedures.

26  ‘Written communications’ has replaced ‘document and information’ to streamline with the defined term set out in art. 3.

27  See HKIAC Rules, art 13.1.

28  Ibid, art 11.5.

29  The practice referred to in art 11.5 of the HKIAC Rules is sometimes described as pre-appointment interviews. See Queen Mary, University of London and White & Case (n 9) at 6 (up to 86 per cent of respondents consider pre-appointment interviews to be appropriate or sometimes appropriate). More detailed guidance on this issue can be found in Doak Bishop and Lucy Reed, ‘Practical Guidelines for Interviewing, Selecting and Challenging Party-Appointed Arbitrators in International Commercial Arbitration in Arbitration International’ (2008) 14(4) Arbitration International 423.

30  See Chapter 7 for a detailed discussion of art 11.5 of the HKIAC Rules.

31  Hebei Import & Export Corp v Polytek Engineering Co Ltd [1999] 1 HKLRD 665 at 692.

32  [2010] HKEC 1694 at 16.

33  Pacific China Holdings Ltd v Grand Pacific Holdings Ltd [2007] 3 HKLRD 741 at 15(6).

34  See Young ICCA Guide on Arbitral Secretaries, International Council for Commercial Arbitration, the ICCA Report No 1, Annex B <http://www.arbitration-icca.org/media/3/14235574857310/aa_arbitral_sec_guide_composite_10_feb_2015.pdf> (last accessed 14 May 2021).

35  See Queen Mary, University of London and White & Case (n 9) at 42.

36  Queen Mary, University of London and White & Case, ‘2018 International Arbitration Survey: The Evolution of International Arbitration’ (2018) <https://www.whitecase.com/sites/whitecase/files/files/download/publications/qmul-international-arbitration-survey-2018-19.pdf> (last accessed 8 December 2019) at 34.

37  See Young ICCA Guide on Arbitral Secretaries (n 34) art 3(e)–(h) and at 5, 13, 14.

38  See Pierre Tercier, ‘The Role of the Secretary to the Arbitral Tribunal’ in Lawrence Newman and Richard Hill (eds), The Leading Arbitrators’ Guide to International Arbitration (3rd edn, Juris 2014) at 531, 544.

39  See eg Constantine Partasides, ‘The Fourth Arbitrator? The Role of Secretaries to Tribunals in International Arbitration’ (2002) 18(2) Arbitration International 147. See also Tercier (n 38) at 531, 537.

40  See Partasides (n 39) 156.

41  See paras 9.30–9.31 below.

42  See para 9.32 below.

43  HKIAC launched its Tribunal Secretary Accreditation Programme in December 2015, aiming to train the next generation of qualified tribunal secretaries. The goal is to establish a panel of qualified tribunal secretaries suitable for appointment in arbitrations seated in any jurisdictions and governed by any arbitration rules.

44  The SCC Arbitration Rules (2017) now expressly allow the arbitral tribunal to appoint an arbitral secretary (see art 24). At the time of writing, HKIAC has provided tribunal secretary services in 59 cases, with numbers steadily increasing each year.

45  The Finland Arbitration Institute has also adopted the approach that the tribunal has to take into account the parties’ comments when appointing a tribunal secretary. The parties’ explicit consent is not required; see Finland Arbitration Institute Note on the Use of a Secretary <http://arbitration.fi/files/2013/06/note-on-the-use-of-a-secretary.pdf> (last accessed 1 April 2021).

47  See HKIAC Tribunal Secretary Service <http://www.hkiac.org/our-services/tribunal-secretary-service> (last accessed 1 April 2021).

48  HKIAC Guidelines on the Use of a Secretary to the Arbitral Tribunal (n 46), para 2.6.

49  Ibid, para 2.5.

50  HKIAC Rules, art 13.4. See also the HKIAC Guidelines on the Use of a Secretary to the Arbitral Tribunal (n 46), para 2.10.

51  HKIAC Guidelines on the Use of a Secretary to the Arbitral Tribunal (n 46), para 2.10.

52  Ibid, para 2.2.

53  Ibid, para 2.7.

54  Ibid, para 2.9.

55  Ibid.

56  Michael Polkinghorne and Charles Rosenberg, ‘The Role of the Tribunal Secretary in International Arbitration: A Call for a Uniform Standard’ (October 2014) 8(2) Dispute Resolution International 107.

57  See Queen Mary, University of London and White & Case (n 36) at 34 (70 per cent of respondents believe that arbitration rules (whether institutional or ad hoc) should include provisions dealing with the use of arbitral secretaries); Queen Mary, University of London and White & Case (n 9) at 44 (68 per cent of respondents said that the use and function of tribunal secretaries ought to be regulated and 70 per cent thought that the most effective way to regulate this area would be through arbitral institutions). See also Young ICCA Task Force survey on tribunal secretaries 2012, at 2 (57.4 per cent of respondents favoured greater regulation of the role and function of tribunal secretaries and 78.5 per cent were in favour of guidelines of best practice as the preferred form of regulation).

58  HKIAC Guidelines on the Use of a Secretary to the Arbitral Tribunal (n 46), para 3.3. These tasks are largely endorsed by the relevant results of Queen Mary, University of London and White & Case 2015 (n 9) at 43 (93 per cent of respondents considered ‘organizational tasks’ to be appropriate for tribunal secretaries to undertake; 81 per cent considered ‘communications with the parties’ appropriate).

59  HKIAC Guidelines on the Use of a Secretary to the Arbitral Tribunal (n 46), para 3.4. Some of these tasks are largely endorsed by the relevant results of Queen Mary, University of London and White & Case 2015 (n 9) at 43 (75 per cent of respondents considered drafting ‘procedural orders and non-substantive parts of awards’ to be appropriate for tribunal secretaries to undertake; 55 per cent considered ‘legal research’ appropriate).

60  HKIAC Guidelines on the Use of a Secretary to the Arbitral Tribunal (n 46), para 3.2.

61  Ibid, para 3.1.

62  Ibid, para 4.1.

63  Ibid, paras 4.2 and 4.3.

64  HKIAC 2018 Schedule of Fees <https://www.hkiac.org/content/2018-schedule-fees> (last accessed 14 May 2021).

65  HKIAC Tribunal Secretary Service (n 47).

66  HKIAC Rules (2008), art 14.7 imposes the obligation on the parties only.

67  See Arbitration Ordinance, s 3(1).

68  For a more detailed discussion of these tactics, see Stephan Wilske and Günther J Horvath, Guerrilla Tactics in International Arbitration (Kluwer Law International 2013).

69  Günther J Horvath, ‘Guerrilla Tactics in Arbitration, an Ethical Battle: Is There Need for a Universal Code of Ethics?’ in Christian Klausegger, Peter Klein, Florian Kremslehner, Alexander Petsche, Nikolaus Pitkowitz, Jenny Power, Irene Welser, and Gerold Zeiler (eds), Austrian Yearbook on International Arbitration 2011 305–11; Lucy Reed, ‘Sanctions Available for Arbitrators to Curtail Guerrilla Tactics’ in Wilske and Horvath (n 68) at 100–1; see also ICC Rules, art 38(5) (2021).

70  Stephan Wilske, ‘Arbitration Guerrillas at the Gate: Preserving the Civility of Arbitral Proceedings When the Going Gets (Extremely) Tough’ in Klausegger et al (n 69) at 330–1.

71  See paras 9.03–9.06 above for the commentary of art 13.1 of the HKIAC Rules.

72  Arbitration Ordinance, s 63.

73  Ibid.

74  See LCIA Rules (2020), art 18.3 which stipulates that an arbitral tribunal must approve an intended change or addition of legal representatives before it takes effect. Further, an arbitral tribunal may withhold such approval pursuant to art 18.4 if the proposed change or addition could ‘compromise the composition of the Arbitral Tribunal or finality of any award (on the grounds of possible conflict or other like impediment)’. Legal representatives under the LCIA Rules are also required to agree to comply with the general guidelines contained in the Annex to the LCIA Rules (art 18.5), failing which would allow an arbitral tribunal to order any or all of the sanctions contained under art 18.6 (eg a written reprimand or a written caution as to future conduct in the arbitration).

75  Although art 13.6 does not expressly require parties to communicate the telephone numbers of their representatives, it is advisable to do so.

76  HKIAC Rules, art 4.3(b).

77  Ibid, art 5.1(a).

78  Ibid, art 13.1.

79  Ibid.

80  Ibid.

81  Ibid, art 13.5.

82  Ibid, art 13.10.

83  HKIAC Rules (2013), art 13.8.

84  ICC Rules, art 42 (2021); SIAC Rules, art 41.2 (2016).

85  See eg Born (n 18) vol III at 2918–38; Simon Greenberg, Christopher Kee, and Romesh Weeramantry, International Commercial Arbitration: An Asia-Pacific Perspective (CUP 2011) at 9.99; Günther J Horvath, ‘The Duty of the Tribunal to Render an Enforceable Award’ (2001) 18(2) Journal of International Arbitration 142.

86  This would be an issue particularly in the circumstances where different places have different and potentially conflicting laws on the enforcement of arbitral awards.

87  HKIAC Rules, art 14.1. See para 9.63 below.

88  Ibid, art 14.2. See para 9.75 below.

89  Art 14.1 of the HKIAC Rules (2018) is consistent with UNCITRAL Model Law (2006), art 20(1), given effect by Arbitration Ordinance, s 48. Art 20(1) of the UNCITRAL Model Law (2006) provides that the parties are free to agree on the place of arbitration.

90  See A v R [2009] HKCFI 342. See also A v B [2007] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 237.

91  Greenberg et al (n 85) at 4.164.

92  For example, in an HKIAC arbitration, art 14.1 of the HKIAC Rules (2018) stipulates that Hong Kong shall be the default seat if there is no agreement by the parties as to the seat. Art 7.2 of the CIETAC Rules, on the other hand, provides for the domicile of CIETAC or its subcommission/arbitration centre administering the case as the seat. Other institutional rules, such as the ICDR Rules (2021), may provide for the administering body to make a first instance determination on the seat.

93  Born (n 18) vol I at 827–9.

94  CIArb, ‘The London Centenary Principles 2015’ <https://www.ciarb.org/media/1263/london-centenary-principles.pdf> (last accessed 14 May 2021).

95  See eg LCIA Rules, art 16(2) (2020); SIAC Rules, art 21(1) (2016).

96  Note eg the UNCITRAL Rules, the ICC Rules, and the Arbitration Ordinance do not include a default seat of arbitration.

97  Queen Mary, University of London and White & Case (n 36) at 9–10.

98  HKIAC Rules (2018), art 14.1 is consistent with UNCITRAL Model Law (2006), art 20(1), given effect by Arbitration Ordinance, s 48. UNCITRAL Model Law (2006), art 20(1) provides that, absent the parties’ agreement, the place of arbitration shall be determined by the arbitral tribunal having regard to the circumstances of the case, including the convenience of the parties.

99  UNCITRAL Notes on Organizing Arbitral Proceedings (UNCITRAL 2016) at 29.

100  HKIAC Rules, art 15.2.

101  Ibid, art 15.3.

102  HKIAC Rules, art 15.1 is consistent with UNCITRAL Model Law (2006), art 22(1), given effect by Arbitration Ordinance, s 50. UNCITRAL Model Law (2006), art 22(1) provides that the parties are free to agree on the language or languages to be used in the arbitral proceedings.

103  ICCA, ‘ICCA Drafting Sourcebook for Logistical Matters in Procedural Orders’ the ICCA Reports No 2, para 13.5.

104  Ibid, para 13.4.

105  See eg The Incorporated Owners of Sincere House v Sincere Company Ltd [2005] HKLT 18; PCCW Global Ltd v Interactive Communications Service Ltd [2007] 1 HKLRD 309.

106  UNCITRAL Explanatory Note 2008, para 25.

107  See generally Choong and Weeramantry (n 20) at 34.08; Ma and Brock (n 107) at 14.016.

108  Generally, the applicable law is the law of the arbitration agreement. See Chapter 4 for a detailed discussion of this subject.

109  For example, a party may allege that a PRC law governed arbitration agreement is void because it does not designate an arbitral institution.

110  For example, a party may argue that an agreement providing for arbitration administered by HKIAC under the ICC Rules is not operative or capable of being performed.

111  In June 2017, the Hong Kong government amended the Arbitration Ordinance to expressly allow disputes over the subsistence, scope, validity, ownership infringement, or any other aspect of an IP right to be submitted to arbitration in Hong Kong.

112  Arbitration Ordinance, s 34(2)(b) expressly empowers the arbitral tribunal to decide on ‘what matters have been submitted to arbitration in accordance with the arbitration agreement’.

113  Arbitration Ordinance, s 34(2)(a) expressly empowers the arbitral tribunal to decide on ‘whether the tribunal is properly constituted’.

114  See UNCITRAL Model Law (2006), art 16(3), given effect by Arbitration Ordinance, s 34(1).

115  See Arbitration Ordinance, s 34(4) enacting UNCITRAL Model Law, s 16.

116  See Arbitration Ordinance, s 34(4) and (5).

117  See eg Chee Cheung Hing & Co Ltd v Zhong Rong International (Group) Ltd (HCA 1454/2015); Lin Ming v Chen Shu Quan [2012] 2 HKLRD 547.

118  UNCITRAL Model Law (2006), art 16(1), given effect by Arbitration Ordinance, s 34(1).

119  See eg ICC Rules (2021), art 6(9); LCIA Rules (2020), art 23.2; SIAC Rules (2016), art 28.2; UNCITRAL Rules, art 23.1.

120  See eg Fung Sang Trading Ltd v Kai Sun Sea Products and Food Co Ltd [1991] HKCFI 190; H Smal Ltd v Goldroyce Garment Ltd [1994] 2 HKC 526.

121  See Choong and Weeramantry (n 20) at 34.22, on a discussion of similar provisions in UNCITRAL Model Law (2006), art 16(2), given effect by Arbitration Ordinance, s 34(1).

122  Choong and Weeramantry (n 20) at 34.23.

123  Astro Nusantara International BV v PT First Media TBK [2018] HKCFA 12; PT First Media TBK v Astro Nusantara International BV et al [2013] SGCA 57, 31 October 2013.

124  PT First Media TBK v Astro Nusantara International BV et al [2013] SGCA 57, 31 October 2013; Astro Nusantara International BV v PT First Media TBK, CACV 272/2015, 5 December 2016 (CA).

125  Astro Nusantara International BV (n 127) [91] and [99] respectively; see also Johan Billiet, International Investment Arbitration: A Practical Handbook (Maklu Publishers 2016) at 311–14.

126  For a recent example, see Exportadora de Sal SA de CV v Corretaje Maritimo Sud-Americano Inc [2018] EWHC 224 (Comm).

127  HKIAC Rules (2018), art. 19.5.

128  Information on HKIAC’s Proceedings Committee can be found here <https://www.hkiac.org/ about-us/council-members-and-committees/proceedings-committee> (last accessed 14 May 2021).

129  Geoffrey Ma and Denis Brock, Arbitration in Hong Kong: A Practical Guide (4th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2014) at 15.074.

130  See paras 9.125–9.128 below for a detailed discussion of art 21 of the HKIAC Rules.

131  HKIAC Rules (2013), art 16.2.

132  See HKIAC Rules (2018), art 19.3.

133  Ibid.

134  Choong and Weeramantry (n 20) at 51.13.

135  [2012] 4 HKLRD 1.

136  UNCITRAL Rules (2013), art 25 has the same requirement that a time limit for written statements should not exceed forty-five days.

137  See Chapter 5 for a detailed discussion of art 2.4 of the HKIAC Rules.

138  HKIAC Rules (2018), art 22.1.

139  Ibid, art 22.2.

140  Ibid, art 22.3.

141  Ibid, art 22.4.

142  Ibid, art 22.5.

143  Ibid, art 22.6.

144  Ibid, art 22.7.

145  See eg Swiss Rules, art 24.1; UNCITRAL Rules, art 27.1.

146  Ma and Brock (n 107) at 15.092.

147  Blackaby et al (n 19) at 6.87; Born (n 18) vol II at 2488.

148  See Ma and Brock (n 107) at 15.081–15.109, for a detailed discussion on how arbitral tribunals should deal with evidence in Hong Kong arbitration.

149  UNCITRAL Model Law (2006), art 19(2) provides that ‘[t]he power conferred upon the arbitral tribunal includes the power to determine the admissibility, relevance, materiality and weight of any evidence’.

150  Arbitration Ordinance, s 47(3) provides that, ‘[w]hen conducting arbitral proceedings, an arbitral tribunal is not bound by the rules of evidence and may receive any evidence that it considers relevant to the arbitral proceedings, but it must give the weight that it considers appropriate to the evidence adduced in the arbitral proceedings’.

151  IBA Rules of Evidence, art 9(1) provides that ‘[t]he Arbitral Tribunal shall determine the admissibility, relevance, materiality and weight of evidence’.

152  Ma and Brock (n 107) at 15.084.

153  This is consistent with the requirement to prepare a provisional timetable under art 13.2 of the HKIAC Rules.

154  Born (n 18) vol II at 2372; Jeffrey Waincymer, Procedure and Evidence in International Arbitration (Kluwer Law International 2012) at 841–42.

155  IBA Rules of Evidence, art 3(3).

156  Blackaby et al (n 19) at 6.102.

157  See IBA Rules of Evidence, art 3(3)(a).

158  Ibid, art 3(3)(b) and (c).

159  Ibid, art 3(4) and (5).

160  Ibid, art 3(7).

162  See Arbitration Ordinance, s 56(9).

163  Hilmar Raeschke-Kessler, ‘The Production of Documents in International Arbitration—A Commentary on Article 3 of the New IBA Rules of Evidence’ (2002) 18(4) Arbitration International 427.

164  See Ma and Brock (n 107)</BIT> at 15.086.

165  Ibid at 15.087.

166  Julian D M Lew, Loukas A Mistelis, and Stefan M Kröll, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer Law International 2003) at 21.42.

167  Holtzmann and Neuhaus (n 17) at 673–4.

168  See Ma and Brock (n 107) at 15.197.

169  See Chapter 12 for a detailed discussion of the expedited procedure.

170  Ma and Brock (n 107) at 15.202.

171  Jeffrey Waincymer, Procedure and Evidence in International Arbitration (Kluwer Law International 2012) at 926–7.

172  Ma and Brock (n 107) at 15.213.

173  The language(s) of the arbitration will be determined by the arbitral tribunal absent the parties’ agreement. See para 9.85 above.

174  See Chapter 12 for a detailed discussion of art 42 of the HKIAC Rules.

175  See Ma and Brock (n 107) at 15.117.

176  Ibid at 15.209.

177  Ibid at 15.117.

178  HKIAC Rules, art 25.1.

179  Ibid, art 25.1.

180  Ibid, art 25.2.

181  Ibid, art 25.3.

182  Ibid, art 25.4.

183  Ibid, art 25.5.

184  See Choong and Weeramantry (n 20) at 54.07.

185  Ibid at 54.13.

186  Ibid.

187  See Arbitration Ordinance, s 54(1)(a).

188  HKIAC Rules, art 25.3.

189  [1999] 1 HKLRD 665.

190  See Margaret L Moses, The Principles and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration (2nd edn, CUP 2012) at 186; Alan Redfern and Martin Hunter, Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration (6th edn, OUP 2015) at 6.136.

191  See HKIAC Rules, arts 13.1 and 13.5; Arbitration Ordinance, s 46.

192  [1993] 2 HKLR 39.

193  HKIAC Rules, art 26.1.

194  Ibid, art 26.2.

195  Ibid, art 26.3.

196  See paras 9.227 and 9.228 for a detailed discussion of termination orders.

197  HKIAC Rules, art 2.10.

198  See Choong and Weeramantry (n 20) at 53.17.

199  Ibid at 53.16.

200  Ibid at 53.18.

201  HKIAC Rules, art 31.1.

202  Ibid, art 31.2.

203  Ibid, art 31.2.

204  Ibid, art 31.3.

205  Ibid, art 31.4.

206  Ibid, art 32.1.

207  Ibid, art 32.2.

208  Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on the work of its 18th session, 21 August 1985, A/40/17, para 57.

209  See eg China Nanhai Oil Joint Service Corporation Shenzhen Branch v Gee Tai Holdings Co Ltd [1995] 2 HKLR 215. See also Astro Nusantara International BV v PT First Media TBK, HCCT 45/2010, 17 February 2015 [2018] HKCFA, and cf PT First Media TBK v Astro Nusantara International BV [2014] 1 SLR 372, where the Singapore Court of Appeal reached the opposite conclusion.