1 Douglas Thomson, ‘Does Your Arbitrator Prefer Puppies or Kittens?’ (GAR News, 14 April 2016) reports of an English QC who ‘thought the use of tribunal secretaries is inappropriate’; cf also Niuscha Bassiri and others, Young ICCA Guide on Arbitral Secretaries (ICCA 2014) 55 reproducing the Young ICCA Survey 2012, according to which 5 per cent of survey participants do not ‘approve of the use/appointment of secretaries’; Andrea Meier, ‘Assistance to the Tribunal: An Overview’ in Bernhard Berger and Michael E Schneider (eds), Inside the Black Box: How Arbitral Tribunals Operate and Reach Their Decisions (Juris 2014) 81: ‘[S]ome practitioners seem to deeply mistrust this form of assistance.’ What role specifically they may play is a matter of much controversy. We will turn to that question in Chapter 5.
2 Queen Mary University and White & Case, ‘2012 International Arbitration Survey: Current and Preferred Practices in the Arbitral Process’ 11 (‘Some are firmly against tribunal secretaries, believing that all duties should rest with the tribunal members alone’). On the personal nature of the arbitrator’s mandate, see paras 5.05ff.
3 Clemmie Spalton, ‘Are Tribunal Secretaries Writing Awards?’ (GAR News, 9 November 2012) citing ‘a continental practitioner [who] asked whether it is time “to face reality” [. . .] rather than pretending the practice does not exist or will go away’.
4 Klaus Peter Berger, Private Dispute Resolution in International Business: Negotiation, Mediation, Arbitration (3rd edn, Kluwer 2015) para 27–9 (Berger, PDR); cf Gary B Born, International Commercial Arbitration (2nd edn, Kluwer 2014) 2043; Constantine Partasides and others, ‘The Use of Arbitral Secretaries under the New UNCITRAL Rules and Otherwise: Opportunities and Pitfalls’ in Albert Jan van den Berg (ed), International Arbitration: The Coming of a New Age? (Kluwer 2013) 327.
5 cf Jan Paulsson, The Idea of Arbitration (OUP 2013) 155 considering that such approaches ‘may [be] realism, but reality is sometimes unacceptable’.
7 Pierre Lalive, ‘Secrétaire de tribunaux arbitraux: le bon sens l’emporte’ (1989) 7 ASA Bull 1, 5; Gerald Aksen and others, ‘The Art of Arbitrating: Act IV. The Hearing on the Merits’ (2007) 23 Arb Intl 229, 244; Elisabeth Leimbacher, ‘Efficiency Under the New ICC Rules of Arbitration of 2012: First Glimpse at the New Practice’ (2013) 31 ASA Bull 298, 302; Doug Jones, ‘Ethical Implications of Using Paralegals and Tribunal Secretaries’ (2014) Special Volume 17 Comparative LJ of the Pacific 251, 253; Berger, PDR (n 4) para 27-9.
8 Nigel Blackaby and others, Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration (6th edn, OUP 2015) para 4.197. cf Michael Schneider, ‘The Paper Tsunami in International Arbitration: Problems, Risks for the Arbitrators’ Decision Making and Possible Solutions’ in Teresa Giovannini and Alexis Mourre (eds), Written Evidence and Discovery in International Arbitration: New Issues and Tendencies (ICC 2009) 371: ‘Requiring that all activities must be performed exclusively by the arbitrators leads to an inefficient use of the arbitrator’s skills.’
10 Thomas Schultz and Robert Kovacs, ‘The Rise of a Third Generation of Arbitrators? Fifteen Years after Dezalay and Garth’ (2012) 28 Arb Intl 161, 170; Alan Redfern, ‘The Changing World of Arbitration’ in David D Caron and others (eds), Practising Virtue: Inside International Arbitration (OUP 2015) 45.
11 Charles N Brower, ‘Introduction’ in Richard B Lillich and Charles N Brower (eds), International Arbitration in the 21st Century: Towards ‘Judicialization’ and Uniformity? (Transnational Publishers 1994) ix; cf Catherine A Rogers, ‘Fit and Function in Legal Ethics: Developing a Code of Conduct for International Arbitration’ (2001) 23 Mich J Intl L 341, 350–54; Eric Bergsten, ‘The Americanization of International Arbitration: An Address at the International Law Students Association Conference at Pace Law School—October 27–29, 2005’ (2006) 18 Pace Intl L Rev 289, 301; Charles N Brower, ‘W(h)Ither International Commercial Arbitration?: The Goff Lecture 2007’ (2008) 24 Arb Intl 181, 183; Klaus Peter Berger, ‘The International Arbitrator’s Dilemma: Transnational Procedure versus Home Jurisdiction—A German Perspective’ (2009) 25 Arb Intl 217, 219; William W Park, ‘Arbitrators and Accuracy’ (2010) 1 J Intl Disp Sett 25, 29; Berger, PDR (n 4) para 16-29; Redfern (n 10) 46.
12 Pierre Tercier, ‘The Role of the Secretary to the Arbitral Tribunal’ in Lawrence W Newman and Richard D Hill (eds), Leading Arbitrators’ Guide to International Arbitration (3rd edn, Juris 2014) 543; cf Berger, PDR (n 4) para 16-29.
13 Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler and Antonio Rigozzi, International Arbitration: Law and Practice in Switzerland (OUP 2015) para 7.156: ‘[As] arbitration has changed [. . .] it is only natural that the means to handle arbitration also evolve.’
14 Queen Mary University and PriceWaterhouseCoopers, ‘2006 International Arbitration Study: Corporate Attitudes and Practices’ 6–7; Queen Mary University and PriceWaterhouseCoopers, ‘2008 International Arbitration Study: Corporate Attitudes and Practices: Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Awards’ 5; Queen Mary University and White & Case, ‘2010 International Arbitration Survey: Choices in International Arbitration’ 32; Queen Mary University and White & Case, ‘2012 Survey’ (n 2) 13; Queen Mary University and White & Case, ‘2013 International Arbitration Survey: Corporate Choices in International Arbitration: Industry Perspectives’ 9; Queen Mary University and White & Case, ‘2015 International Arbitration Survey: Improvements and Innovations in International Arbitration’ 7.
15 Michael McIlwrath and Roland Schroeder, ‘The View from an International Arbitration Customer: In Dire Need of Early Resolution’ (2008) 74 Arb 3, 6–7; Paul Hobeck, Volker Mahnken and Max Koebke, ‘Time for Woolf Reforms in International Construction Arbitration’ (2008) 11 Intl ALR 84, 85–86; Park (n 11) 28–32; Ema Vidak-Gojkovic, Lucy Greenwood, and Michael McIlwrath, ‘Puppies or Kittens? How To Better Match Arbitrators to Party Expectations’ in Christian Klausegger and others (eds), Austrian Yearbook on International Arbitration 2016 (Manz 2016) 61.
16 Michael McIlwrath, ‘Foreword’ in Michael Leathes, Negotiation: Things Corporate Counsel Need to Know but Were Not Taught (Kluwer 2017) xii. cf also the seasonal warnings by William W Park, ‘Arbitration in Autumn’ (2011) 2 J Intl Disp Sett 287; and Neil Kaplan, ‘Winter of Discontent’ (2017) 34 J Intl Arb 373.
17 cf Irene Welser, ‘Efficiency—Today’s Challenge in Arbitration Proceedings’ in Christian Klausegger and others (eds), Austrian Yearbook on International Arbitration 2014 (Manz 2014) 151–52; Klaus Peter Berger and J Ole Jensen, ‘It Takes Pressure to Form Diamonds: The Changing Landscape of Dispute Resolution and Its Implications for International Arbitration’ (Kluwer Arbitration Blog, 23 May 2016).
18 cf Ulrike Gantenberg, ‘Methods of Reducing Costs in International Commercial Arbitration’  SchiedsVZ 17, 17.
19 Park (n 11) 33; Welser (n 17) 152–53; Jennifer Kirby, ‘Efficiency in International Arbitration: Whose Duty Is It?’ (2015) 32 J Intl Arb 689, 689.
20 On the question of which tasks belong to which category, see paras 5.49ff.
21 Karl-Heinz Böckstiegel, ‘The Role of the Arbitrators in Investment Treaty Arbitration’ in Albert Jan van den Berg (ed), International Commercial Arbitration: Important Contemporary Questions (Kluwer 2003) 371; Pierre Lalive, ‘Un post-scriptum et quelques citations’ (1996) 14 ASA Bull 35, 40; cf Clyde C Pearce and Jack Coe Jr, ‘Arbitration Under NAFTA Chapter Eleven: Some Pragmatic Reflections Upon the First Case Filed Against Mexico’ (1999) 23 Hastings Intl & Comp L Rev 311, 321.
22 Lalive, ‘Un post-scriptum’ (n 21) 40 quoting an ‘English judge, member of the House of Lords’.
24 cf Lalive, ‘Un post-scriptum’ (n 21) 42–43.
25 How specifically the secretary may be employed to save time in the administrative aspects of the case is discussed at paras 5.137ff.
26 ICC Commission on Arbitration and ADR, Techniques for Controlling Time and Costs in Arbitration (2nd edn, ICC 2012) 9.
27 New York City Bar Association, ‘Secretaries to International Arbitration Tribunals: Joint Report of the International Commercial Disputes Committee and the Committee on Arbitration of the New York City Bar Association’ (2006) 17 Am Rev Intl Arb 575, 590 on the previous edition of the Report.
28 Schneider, ‘Paper Tsunami’ (n 8) 367.
29 cf Aksen and others (n 7) 244; Schneider, ‘Paper Tsunami’ (n 8) 366; Leimbacher (n 7) 303; Zachary Douglas, ‘The Secretary of the Arbitral Tribunal’ in Bernhard Berger and Michael E Schneider (eds), Inside the Black Box: How Arbitral Tribunals Operate and Reach Their Decisions (Juris 2014) 88.
30 Karl-Heinz Böckstiegel, ‘Zur Vertragsgestaltung und Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit bei Infrastrukturprojekten’ in Klaus Peter Berger and others (eds), Festschrift für Otto Sandrock zum 70. Geburtstag (Recht und Wirtschaft 2000) 109 (‘many thousands of pages’); Lucy Reed, ‘The 2013 Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre Kaplan Lecture: Arbitral Decision-Making: Art, Science or Sport?’ (2013) 30 J Intl Arb 85, 97 (‘records with 500-page memorials, scores of witness statements and expert reports, and thousands of exhibits’); James Menz, ‘The Fourth Arbitrator? Die Rolle des Administrative Secretary im Schiedsverfahren’  SchiedsVZ 210, 212 (‘thousands of pages’).
31 Albert Jan van den Berg, ‘Organizing an International Arbitration: Practice Pointers’ in Lawrence W Newman and Richard D Hill (eds), Leading Arbitrators’ Guide to International Arbitration (3rd edn, Juris 2014) 426; cf Menz (n 30) 212 (‘several gigabytes’).
32 cf Douglas (n 29) 88 who offers as an example one of his current cases, in which it would take 292 days to read all documents, assuming three minutes per page and a twelve-hour working day; and Dimitar Ganev, ‘Problematics of Tribunal Secretaries’ (CDR Magazine, 16 August 2017) quoting J Walker with a similar example.
33 Tercier (n 12) 544; cf Olivia Staines, ‘A Comment on the Use of Administrative Secretaries in Arbitration: The Fourth Arbitrator No More?’  In Touch (August 2013) 7, 7; Johannes Stürner, ‘Hilfspersonen im Schiedsverfahren nach deutschem Recht’  SchiedsVZ 322, 322.
34 Michael E Schneider, ‘Assistance to the Tribunal: Options, Advantages and Dangers’ in Bernhard Berger and Michael E Schneider (eds), Inside the Black Box: How Arbitral Tribunals Operate and Reach Their Decisions (Juris 2014) 74; cf Neil Kaplan, ‘ “Let’s Not Get Hung up on Time Limits”: A View from the Other Side of the Arbitral Table’ (GAR News, 7 March 2016): ‘In light of all this is it not just a bit rich, or a bit of a chutzpah, to expect a tribunal of three arbitrators without access to an army of helpers to sort this all out in three months?’
35 cf also Murray L Smith, ‘Reliance Document Management’ in Albert Jan van den Berg (ed), Legitimacy: Myths, Realities, Challenges (Kluwer 2015) 201:
Another device that may assist in document-heavy cases is the use of a secretary to the tribunal. The extra cost is immediately ameliorated by the time saved by a three member tribunal attempting to coordinate or organize massive volumes. Even with a sole arbitrator, who may not be very expert in managing the flow of electronic filings, there can be significant costs savings by the arbitrator employing a skilled assistant.
36 For the circumstances under which these tasks may be carried out, see paras 5.154ff and 5.178ff.
38 The origin of this maxim is unclear. Versions of it date back as far as the Jewish Mishnah of 217 ce. It is often referred to in the context of international arbitration to indicate the parties’ interest in a quick decision of their dispute, cf Klaus Peter Berger, International Economic Arbitration (Kluwer 1993) 399; McIlwrath and Schroeder (n 15) 6; Franz T Schwarz and Christian W Konrad, The Vienna Rules: A Commentary on International Arbitration in Austria (Kluwer 2009) para 7-059; Douglas (n 29) 89.
39 A survey by Berwin Leighton Paisner, ‘Research Based Report on Perceived Delay in the Arbitration Process’ (2012) Intl Arb Survey 4, 14 has found that most international commercial arbitrations take 12–18 months to get to the closing of the proceedings and that it takes almost the same amount of time for the final award to be rendered; Geoffrey Senogles, ‘The United Nations Compensation Commission’s Utilisation of Experts’ in Bernhard Berger and Michael E Schneider (eds), Inside the Black Box: How Arbitral Tribunals Operate and Reach Their Decisions (Juris 2014) 106 quoting D Hacking who notes that in investment arbitration, it takes fifteen months on average for the award to be rendered; Douglas Thomson, ‘Rivkin’s “Clarion Call” for Arbitration’ (2015) 10 GAR 23, 23 quotes D Rivkin who is waiting for several awards eighteen months after the final hearing has ended.
40 Pierre A Karrer, Introduction to International Arbitration Practice: 1001 Questions and Answers (Kluwer 2014) para 767.
41 cf ICC Note to Parties and Arbitral Tribunals on the Conduct of the Arbitration under the ICC Rules of Arbitration of 30 October 2017 ss 91–95 (ICC Note 2017). According to those provisions, tripartite tribunals must usually render their awards within three months after the last substantive hearing. The arbitrators’ fees may be reduced by 20 per cent or more, depending on the amount of delay in issuing the award.
42 Arthur W Rovine, ‘Cost Concerns in the Drafting of Arbitral Awards—An Issue of Ethics’ in Arthur W Rovine (ed), Contemporary Issues in International Arbitration and Mediation: The Fordham Papers 2009 (Martinus Nijhoff 2010) 139; cf Aksen and others (n 7) 244; Günther J Horvath, ‘The Angelic Arbitrator Versus the Rogue Arbitrator: What Should an Arbitrator Strive to Be?’ in Patricia Shaughnessy and Sherlin Tung (eds), The Powers and Duties of an Arbitrator: Liber Amicorum Pierre A. Karrer (Kluwer 2017) 149.
45 ICC Commission on Arbitration and ADR, Techniques for Controlling Time and Costs in Arbitration (ICC 2007) 6; ICC Commission on Arbitration and ADR, ‘Decisions on Costs in International Arbitration’  ICC Disp Res Bull 1, 3.
46 ICC Commission on Arbitration and ADR, ‘Decisions on Costs’ (n 45) 3; with similar observations Pierre A Karrer, ‘Naives Sparen birgt Gefahren—Kostenfragen aus Sicht der Parteien und des Schiedsgerichts—’  SchiedsVZ 113, 115; Rovine (n 42) 134.
47 This method has, for example, been adopted by the ICC and the DIS. The ICC, however, takes into account more factors than merely the amount in dispute, cf Rules of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce 2017, Appendix III art 2(2) (ICC Rules 2017).
48 This method is used for example in LCIA, ICSID, ICDR, and UNCITRAL arbitrations.
49 For alternative remuneration models, see paras 6.44ff.
50 But see para 6.53 for a suggestion as to how institutions could take this into account when assessing fees for the tribunal.
52 A simple example by Constantine Partasides, ‘The Fourth Arbitrator? The Role of Secretaries to Tribunals in International Arbitration’ (2002) 18 Arb Intl 147, 161 illustrates this point:
Arbitrator A does not appoint a secretary and spends 100 hours at an hourly rate [of] £250, thereby costing the parties £25,000. Arbitrator B has the same hourly rate as Arbitrator A, but chooses to appoint a secretary whose hourly rate is significantly lower at £125. Arbitrator B spends only 70 hours while his secretary spends 40 hours. As a consequence of appointing a secretary, the total cost to the parties is lower at £23,750 (even though more hours have been spent on the file). Taking the costs of the use of a secretary out of the arbitrator’s fees in these circumstances would hardly be reasonable. Why should Arbitrator B be penalized for having achieved a saving for the parties?
53 See para 2.12. cf also Partasides and others (n 4) 335.
54 Karrer (n 40) para 624.
55 Senogles (n 39) 102 quoting E Schäfer.
56 Park (n 16) 310; cf Park (n 11) 27; Jennifer Kirby, ‘What Is an Award, Anyway?’ (2014) 31 J Intl Arb 475, 483; Kirby (n 19) 692; Veit Öhlberger and Jarred Pinkston, ‘Iura Novit Curia and the Non-Passive Arbitrator: A Question of Efficiency, Cultural Blinders and Misplaced Concerns About Impartiality’ in Christian Klausegger and others (eds), Austrian Yearbook on International Arbitration 2016 (Manz 2016) 117.
57 Kyriaki Karadelis, ‘The Role of the Tribunal Secretary’ (GAR News, 21 December 2011) quoting a conference attendee who stated that ‘[t]he use of tribunal secretaries can lead to awards that are “part Enid Blyton, part Tolstoy” ’; Khaled Moyeed, ‘London: Out of the Shadows’ (2015) 10 GAR 44, 45 quoting J Feris who ‘stated that another time the ICC encounters problems is at the review stage of draft final awards, when it may appear that an arbitral secretary was too heavily involved in the drafting of the award. This can result in a draft award that is not of the necessary quality to be approved by the ICC and cause delay to the issuance of the final award.’; cf Samuel V Goekjian, ‘ICC Arbitration from a Practitioner’s Perspective’ (1980) 14 J Intl L & Econ 407, 428.
59 Alfonso Gómez-Acebo, Party-Appointed Arbitrators in International Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer 2016) para 5-26.
60 Leimbacher (n 7) 303 (‘It is possible, even for highly experienced arbitrators to overlook various points in light of the deluge of documents with which they are faced.’); Menz (n 30) 213.
61 On the requirements for that task to be carried out by tribunal secretaries, see para 5.235ff.
63 Goekjian (n 57) 432–33; Jan Paulsson, ‘Vicarious Hypochondria and Institutional Arbitration’ (1990) 6 Arb Intl 226, 230–31; W Laurence Craig, William W Park, and Jan Paulsson, International Chamber of Commerce Arbitration (3rd edn, Oceana 2000) 179; Karrer (n 40) para 38; Kirby (n 56) 180–81; Hamid G Gharavi, ‘The Advantages of the ICC Over ICSID Investment Arbitrations’ in Andrea Carlevaris and others (eds), International Arbitration Under Review: Essays in Honour of John Beechey (ICC 2015) 147; Berger, PDR (n 4) para 17-14; Blackaby and others (n 8) para 1.152; Jan Heiner Nedden and Johanna Büstgens, ‘Die Beratung des Schiedsgerichts—Konfliktpotential und Lösungswege’  SchiedsVZ 169, 177. cf also Queen Mary University and White & Case, ‘2015 Survey’ (n 14) 19 finding that the scrutiny of the award is the ‘fourth most important reasons why certain institutions are preferred’.
65 On the importance of the reasoning of an arbitral award, see paras 5.85ff.
66 MPJ Smakman, ‘De rol van de secretaris van het scheidsgerecht belicht’  TvA 2, 3 (author’s translation).
68 Andreas Reiner, Handbuch der ICC-Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit (Manz 1989) 139.
69 Stürner (n 33) 322 (author’s translation).
70 Pierre Lalive, ‘Mission et démission des arbitres internationaux’ in Marcelo Kohen, Robert Kolb, and Djacoba Liva Tehindrazanarivelo (eds), Perspectives of International Law in the 21st Century: Liber Amicorum Professor Christian Dominicé (Martinus Nijhoff 2012) 269–70; Julie A Maupin, ‘Transparency in International Investment Law: The Good, the Bad and the Murky’ in Andrea Bianchi and Anne Peters (eds), Transparency in International Law (CUP 2013) 163; Toby Landau, ‘Dysfunctional Deliberations and Effective Advocacy’ in Andrea Menaker (ed), International Arbitration and the Rule of Law: Contribution and Conformity (Kluwer 2017) 296; cf Karrer (n 40) para 960.
71 Michael E Schneider, ‘President’s Message: A Taxonomy of Arbitrators and the New Species of Arbiter Compositus’ (2013) 31 ASA Bull 237, 239.
72 cf P v Q  EWHC 194 (Comm), para 47.
73 Yves Derains and Eric A Schwartz, A Guide to the ICC Rules of Arbitration (2nd edn, Kluwer 2005) 363.
74 Pedro J Saghy Cadenas, ‘El Secretario del Tribunal Arbitral—The Secretary of the Arbitral Tribunal’  VenAmCham Business 14, 16; cf already Eric A Schwartz, ‘The Rights and Duties of ICC Arbitrators’ in ICC (ed), The Status of the Arbitrator (ICC 1995) 77.
75 cf Stephan Wilske, ‘Der kränkelnde Schiedsrichter—Eine subtile Guerilla-Taktik mittels eines absichtslos handelnden Werkzeugs—’ in Christian Cascante, Andreas Spahlinger, and Stephan Wilske (eds), Global Wisdom on Business Transactions, International Law and Dispute Resolution: Festschrift für Gerhard Wegen (CH Beck 2015) 804.
76 cf Stephan Wilske, ‘The Ailing Arbitrator—Identification, Abuse and Prevention of a Potentially Dangerous Delaying and Obstruction Tool’ (2014) 7 Contemp Asia Arb J 279, 283; Wilske (n 75) 793.
77 On these aspects of the secretary’s scope of tasks, see paras 5.138ff.
78 cf Katia Contos, ‘London: Secretary Perspectives’ (2015) 10 GAR 39, 39 quoting S Nappert who ‘pointed out in this regard that the combined age of the arbitrators in the Yukos case [. . .] is about 200 years and that the task of the arbitrator is nothing if not exhausting. Perhaps it is unsurprising then that they required assistance with drafting the award and the parties who agreed to a tribunal of that seniority have little grounds to object.’
79 Nassib G Ziadé, ‘Achieving Efficiency in Arbitration: The Role of the Institutions’ (2008) 25 News from ICSID 3, 4–5.
81 On the personal nature of the arbitrator’s mandate, see paras 5.05ff.
82 Robert D Cooter, ‘The Objectives of Private and Public Judges’ (1983) 41 Public Choice 107, 107; cf Thomas Schultz, ‘Arbitral Decision-Making: Legal Realism and Law & Economics’ (2015) 6 J Intl Disp Sett 231, 241. cf also Karrer (n 40) para 273 on ‘arbitrator marketing’.
84 cf Jens Gal, Die Haftung des Schiedsrichters in der internationalen Handelsschiedsgerichtsbarkeit (Mohr Siebeck 2009) 304.
86 See Giuseppe Di Federico (ed), Recruitment, Professional Evaluation and Career of Judges and Prosecutors in Europe: Austria, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain (Lo Scarabeo 2005) on the requirements for becoming a judge in those jurisdictions.
87 This is, of course, an oversimplification as many factors depend on the parties’ trust that a particular individual will be right to arbitrate their dispute. See in detail paras 5.15ff.
88 On the importance of that right, see paras 5.10ff.
90 Joseph Heller, Catch-22 (Simon & Schuster 1961) 46:
There was only one catch and that was Catch-22, which specified that a concern for one’s own safety in the face of dangers that were real and immediate was the process of a rational mind. Orr was crazy and could be grounded. All he had to do was ask; and as soon as he did, he would no longer be crazy and would have to fly more missions. Orr would be crazy to fly more missions and sane if he didn’t, but if he was sane then he had to fly them. If he flew them he was crazy and didn’t have to; but if he didn’t want to he was sane and had to. Yossarian was moved very deeply by the absolute simplicity of this clause of Catch-22 and let out a respectful whistle.
91 See eg Lalive, ‘Secrétaire de tribunaux arbitraux’ (n 7) 5; Reiner (n 68) 140; Partasides (n 52) 148; Thomas Clay, ‘Le secrétaire arbitral’ (2005) 2005 Rev de l’Arb 931, 956; Emilia Onyema, ‘The Role of the International Arbitral Tribunal Secretary’ (2005) 9 VJ 99, 107; Schwarz and Konrad (n 38) para 7-152; Marcel Fontaine, ‘L’arbitre et ses collaborateurs’ (2013) 2 b-Arbitra 23, 32; Michael Hwang, ‘Musings on International Arbitration’ in Michael Hwang, Eunice Chan, and Elaine Lim (eds), Selected Essays on International Arbitration (Academy Publishing 2013) 18–19; Venus Valentina Wong, ‘Administrative Secretaries to Arbitral Tribunals: A Note from a Practitioner’s Perspective’ (2013) 2 Slovenian Arb Rev 14, 14; van den Berg (n 31) 434; Tercier (n 12) 554; Berger, PDR (n 4) para 27-9; Blackaby and others (n 8) paras 4.68–4.71; Moyeed (n 57) 45 quoting P Runeland, D Caron, and Lacey Yong, ‘HKIAC Offers Training for Tribunal Secretaries’ (GAR News, 10 November 2015) quoting D Jones and Hilary Heilbron, ‘Keynote Address: Positivity, Perseverance and Empowerment—the Road to Equality and Diversity’  Arbitral Women Newsletter (April 2016) 9, 12.
92 Claude Reymond, ‘The President of the Arbitral Tribunal’ (1994) 9 ICSID Rev 1, 3; cf Rachel Bendayan, ‘Interview with a Leading International Arbitrator: L Yves Fortier’ (2013) 18 IBA Arb News 16, 17 quoting LY Fortier.
93 Queen Mary University and White & Case, ‘2015 Survey’ (n 14) 42.
94 Yves Dezalay and Bryant G Garth, Dealing in Virtue: International Commercial Arbitration and the Construction of a Transnational Legal Order (University of Chicago Press 1996) 20–22, 27, 40 refer to famous arbitrators like P Lalive and G Lagergren as well as two unidentified Swiss practitioners; cf also Bendayan (n 92) 17 quoting LY Fortier; Patrik Schöldström, ‘The Arbitrators’ in Ulf Franke and others (eds), International Arbitration in Sweden: A Practitioner’s Guide (Kluwer 2013) para 99; Karrer (n 40) para 261; Michael E Schneider, ‘The Uncertain Future of the Interactive Arbitrator: Proposals, Good Intentions and the Effect of Conflicting Views on the Role of the Arbitrator’ in Stavros L Brekoulakis, Julian DM Lew, and Loukas A Mistelis (eds), The Evolution and Future of International Arbitration (Kluwer 2016) para 25.2.
95 See Joshua Karton, The Culture of International Arbitration and the Evolution of Contract Law (OUP 2013) 50 n 57 reporting on a French practitioner who regularly acts in both capacities: ‘I think sitting as an arbitrator helps me a lot be effective as a lawyer addressing an arbitration tribunal or even a state court. [. . .] Because it helps me realize that only clear, important, convincing arguments are of any use and that all of the little legal discussions you advance in argument [. . .] will not convince anybody.’ cf also Wong (n 91) 18.
99 cf Nina Holvast, ‘The Power of the Judicial Assistant/Law Clerk: Looking Behind the Scenes at Courts in the United States, England and Wales, and the Netherlands’ (2016) 7 Intl J Ct Admin 10, 19.
100 cf Edward Lazarus, Closed Chambers: The First Eyewitness Account of the Epic Struggles Inside the Supreme Court (Times Books 1998) 18: ‘[C]lerkships [. . .] serve as door openers, jobs of sufficient prestige to launch promising careers’; The Law Society Gazette, ‘Courting Appeal—for Budding Lawyers a Spell at the Court of Appeal Is an Unrivalled Way to Learn Court Procedure’ (Law Society Gazette, 25 January 2001): ‘One of the best weapons to have on a CV is a stint as a judicial assistant at the [English] Court of Appeal’; cf Nina Holvast, In the Shadow of the Judge: The Involvement of Judicial Assistants in Dutch District Courts (Eleven 2017) 67. In the United States, the position of a law clerk is so well known that it has entered the realm of pop-culture, serving as the basis for novels (Brad Meltzer, The Tenth Justice (Rob Weisbach Books 1997); David Lat, Supreme Ambitions (ABA Publishing 2015)); and television series (Netflix Originals, ‘Chapter 38’, House of Cards (2015) 00:04:15: Heather Dunbar: ‘Your dissent on Godfrey v Kent was brilliant, by the way.’ Supreme Court Justice Robert Jacobs: ‘My clerks—they wrote it, every word.’).
101 Heilbron (n 91) 12–13.
102 Zain Jinnah, ‘Careers in International Arbitration: Taking the Institutional Route’ (GAR News, 2 November 2017) reporting of S Blanchard’s ‘private international arbitration law clerk[ship]’ with CN Brower; cf also Hwang (n 91) 19 reporting of his ‘MH Alumni’ all of whom have acted as his tribunal secretaries for an extended amount of time.
103 cf Douglas (n 29) 87.
104 On such undisclosed or ‘shadow secretaries’, see paras 4.117ff.
105 Douglas (n 29) 87–88.
106 cf Menz (n 30) 214: ‘Undisclosed secretaries [. . .] will be less known than their officially appointed colleagues’ (author’s translation).
109 Heilbron (n 91) 12–13; John Gaffney, ‘The Equal Representation in Arbitration Pledge: Two Comments on Its Scope of Application’, Columbia FDI Perspectives No 196 (2017) 2.
110 cf Dezalay and Garth (n 94) 47; Wong (n 91) 18.
111 Moyeed (n 57) 45 quoting P Runeland. On the role of reporters at ICAC, see paras 1.74ff.
112 Introduction to Iran–US Claims Tribunal Section (1986) XI Ybk Comm Arb 257, 259.
113 Also cf Partasides (n 52) 149.
114 See paras 5.132ff. The advice by Mark Herrmann, ‘The Retirement Dream: How to Become an Arbitrator’ (Above the Law, 12 April 2017) that aspiring arbitrators should ‘[a]sk the arbitrators if they need ghostwriting help’ certainly goes too far.
116 Lalive, ‘Mission et démission’ (n 70) 274.
117 Karton (n 95) 43; Klaus Peter Berger and J Ole Jensen, ‘Due Process Paranoia and the Procedural Judgment Rule: A Safe Harbour for Procedural Management Decisions by International Arbitrators’ (2016) 32 Arb Intl 415, 418; cf VV Veeder, ‘Whose Arbitration Is It Anyway—The Parties’ or the Arbitration Tribunal’s?’ in Lawrence W Newman and Richard D Hill (eds), Leading Arbitrators’ Guide to International Arbitration (3rd edn, Juris 2014) 87.
118 cf FD von Hombracht-Brinkman, ‘Er zijn secretarissen en secretarissen!’  TvA 53, 54; Bassiri and others (n 1) 47. cf also a counsel’s quote from a 2009 discussion on the Oil-Gas-Energy-Mining-Infrastructure Dispute Management (OGEMID) List Serve, which operates under Chatham House Rule. The discussion is archived at <https://www.transnational-dispute-management.com/members/ogemid/>: ‘Secretaries may go learn how to draft an arbitral award and go playing arbitrator elsewhere, not with my case.’
120 Harry L Arkin, ‘International Ad Hoc Arbitration: A Practical Alternative’ (1987) 15 International Business Lawyer 5, 5; Pierre Lalive, ‘Avantages et inconvénients de l’arbitrage “ad hoc” ’, Etudes offertes à Pierre Bellet (Litec 1991) 211; Pieter Sanders, ‘Has the Moment Come to Revise the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules?’ (2004) 20 Arb Intl 243, 266; Michael McIlwrath and John Savage, International Arbitration and Mediation: A Practical Guide (Kluwer 2010) para 3-079; Roger Enock and Alexandra Melia, ‘Ad Hoc Arbitrations’ in Julian DM Lew and others (eds), Arbitration in England with Chapters on Scotland and Ireland (Kluwer 2013) para 6-7; Anne Véronique Schlaepfer and Angelina M Petti, ‘Institutional versus Ad Hoc Arbitration’ in Elliott Geisinger, Nathalie Voser, and Angelina M Petti (eds), International Arbitration in Switzerland: A Handbook for Practitioners (2nd edn, Kluwer 2013) 16; Smakman (n 66) 4; Bassiri and others (n 1) 12 (Commentary on the Young ICCA Guide on Arbitral Secretaries 2014 art 3(2)(a) (Young ICCA Guide 2014)); Remy Gerbay, The Functions of Arbitral Institutions (Kluwer 2016) 35–36; Sundra Rajoo, Law, Practice, and Procedure of Arbitration (2nd edn, LexisNexis 2017) 398.
121 cf Clay (n 91) 949; Karadelis (n 57); Rajoo (n 120) 398.
122 Blackaby and others (n 8) para 4.196.
123 cf Goekjian (n 57) 410 n 5; Ben Rigby, ‘Assume the Position’ (CDR News, 11 March 2015).
124 Lalive, ‘Secrétaire de tribunaux arbitraux’ (n 7) 4.
125 Saghy Cadenas (n 74) 15.
127 For other purely administrative tasks, see paras 5.137ff.
129 Rules of Arbitration of the Bahrain Chamber for Dispute Resolution 2017 art 13.1(d); HKIAC Guidelines on the Use of a Secretary to the Arbitral Tribunal of 1 June 2014 s 3.3(g) (HKIAC Guidelines 2014); LCIA Notes for Arbitrators of 26 October 2017 s 70(c) (LCIA Notes 2017); New York City Bar Association (n 27) 590; Peter Leaver, ‘Reciprocal Duties of Institutions and Arbitrators’ in Bernard Hanotiau and Alexis Mourre (eds), Players’ Interaction in International Arbitration (ICC 2012) 109; Jacomijn J van Haersolte-van Hof, ‘Challenges and Responsibilities of Arbitral Institutions’ in Andrea Carlevaris and others (eds), International Arbitration Under Review: Essays in Honour of John Beechey (ICC 2015) 180.
132 That is the assumption many institutional schedules of fees take when they determine the arbitrator’s remuneration based on the amount in dispute, see paras 6.21ff.
133 Schwarz and Konrad (n 38) para 14-027; cf Born (n 4) 2127; Wilske (n 75) 793; Rajoo (n 120) 459.
134 cf Jason Fry, Simon Greenberg, and Francesca Mazza, The Secretariat’s Guide to ICC Arbitration (ICC 2012) para 3-1453; Blackaby and others (n 8) para 4.206.
135 Menz (n 30) 212. See also the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators International Arbitration Practice Guideline on Managing Arbitrations and Procedural Orders (CIArb Practice Guideline on Managing Arbitrations and Procedural Orders; Commentary on Article 2.1):
Before deciding whether to appoint an arbitral secretary, arbitrators should take into account (1) the number of parties to the arbitration; (2) the nature and complexity of the case; (3) the likely volume of documentary evidence, submissions, witness statements and expert reports; (4) whether the use of secretary will contribute to the overall efficiency of proceedings; and (5) any other relevant matters.
136 cf Agrimex Ltd v Tradigrain SA  EWHC 1656 (Comm), para 34(i) on the appointment of a ‘draftsman’; cf also Enock and Melia (n 120] para 6-38: ‘[T]he level of administration would likely not justify the costs’; Joaquim T de Paiva Muniz and Ana Tereza Palhares Basílio, Arbitration Law of Brazil: Practice and Procedure (2nd edn, Juris 2016) 81.
138 Menz (n 30) 217; cf Remy Gerbay, ‘How Does a New Arbitrator Get Their First Appointment?’ (LexisPSL, 18 August 2014): ‘[T]he statistics published by the leading arbitral institutions confirm that there are hundreds upon hundreds of relatively small international disputes referred to arbitration each year. Parties and institutions need to have access to a pool of qualified and reliable young arbitrators willing to give to these smaller disputes the time and attention they deserve.’
139 On parties’ and institutions’ expectations of the arbitrators they appoint, see paras 5.11ff.
140 On the importance of transparency in that regard, see paras 4.80ff.
141 cf Rajoo (n 120) 398: ‘The arbitral tribunal has no automatic entitlement to an arbitral secretary’; cf also McIlwrath and Savage (n 120) para 5-106; Mauro Rubino-Sammartano, International Arbitration Law and Practice (3rd edn, Juris 2014) 536; Tercier (n 12) 542–43, 545.
142 Arbitration legislation without reference to tribunal secretaries exists in Austria, Australia, Belgium, China, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Lebanon, Lithuania, Malaysia, New Zealand, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Sweden, Thailand, Ukraine, the UAE, the US, Venezuela, and Vietnam. Arbitral rules without reference to tribunal secretaries are the AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules 2013, AIAC Arbitration Rules 2018, Camera Arbitrale di Milano Arbitration Rules 2010, CEPANI Arbitration Rules 2013, DIFC-LCIA Arbitration Rules 2016, DIAC Arbitration Rules 2007, DIS-Arbitration Rules 2018 (DIS Rules 2018), ICC Rules 2017, ICDR Dispute Resolution Rules 2014, JAMS International Arbitration Rules & Procedures 2016, LCIA Arbitration Rules 2014, and Vienna International Arbitral Centre Rules of Arbitration 2018 (Vienna Rules 2018).
143 Argentine National Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure (Law No 17,454 of 19 September 1967) art 749(1): ‘The arbitral proceedings shall be held in the presence of a secretary who shall be qualified for the position and have full legal capacity and exercise of his civil rights.’ This provision means that ‘the appointment of a secretary of the arbitral tribunal is mandatory in any arbitration case’, cf Horacio A Grigera Naón, ‘Observations—Cour suprême de justice de la République argentine 11 November 1997—Yacimientos Carboniferos Fiscales y Otros v. Constitucion des Tribunal Arbitral’  Rev de l’Arb 655, 656 (author’s translation).
144 Brazilian Arbitration Law 2015 (Law No 13.129 of 26 May 2015, amending Law 9.307 of 23 September 1996) art 13(5): ‘The sole arbitrator or the President of the arbitral tribunal, if he deems it necessary, may designate a secretary, who could also be one of the other arbitrators.’ For details, see de Paiva Muniz and Palhares Basílio (n 136) 81.
145 Colombian Arbitration Law 2012 (Law No 1563 of 12 July 2012) art 9: ‘The arbitrators shall appoint a secretary [. . .]’. Several other provisions in the Law also address the tribunal secretary, inter alia, in regard to her scope of duties (arts 10(3), 27(2)), the scope of required disclosure (arts 15, 55), grounds for challenge of the secretary (arts 16, 55), her maximum amount of remuneration (art 26(3)) as well as post-award involvement (art 40). Arbitral institutions are required to maintain lists of tribunal secretaries (art 51). For details, see Eduardo Zuleta Jaramillo, ‘National Report for Colombia (2018)’ in Jan Paulsson and Lise Bosman (eds), ICCA International Handbook on Commercial Arbitration (Supplement No 98, March 2018, Kluwer 1984) ch 3 s 2.a.
146 The Ecuadorian Arbitration Law 2006 (Law No 14 of 14 December 2006 (Arbitration and Mediation Law)) addresses tribunal secretaries in several regards. Article 17 foresees that both in institutional arbitrations (art 17(2) and (3)) and in ad hoc arbitrations (art 17(4)) a tribunal secretary takes part. This makes the appointment of a secretary mandatory: see Javier Robalino Orellana and others, ‘Arbitration Guide of the IBA Arbitration Committee: Ecuador (January 2018)’ (IBA 2018) 15. Arbitral institutions are required to train tribunal secretaries (art 39(3)), maintain lists of them (art 40(a)), determine their fees (art 40(b)), and provide a code of ethics for their use (art 40(e)).
147 El Salvadorian Arbitration Act 2002 (Ley de Mediación, Conciliación y Arbitraje of 11 July 2002) art 44(3) (Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration Act) provides that the arbitral tribunal may appoint a tribunal secretary, if it considers it appropriate.
148 Indian Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 art 6: ‘In order to facilitate the conduct of the arbitral proceedings, the parties, or the arbitral tribunal with the consent of the parties, may arrange for administrative assistance by a suitable institution or person.’ This provision is not affected by the far-reaching amendments to the 1996 Act through the Indian Arbitration and Conciliation Ordinance of 23 October 2015, cf Sumeet Kachwaha, ‘Arbitration Guide of the IBA Arbitration Committee: India (January 2017)’ (IBA 2017) 18.
149 Scottish Arbitration Rules (Arbitration (Scotland) Act 2010, Schedule 1) r 32(1) provides that ‘[t]he tribunal may appoint a clerk (and such other agents, employees or other persons it thinks fit) to assist it in conducting the arbitration.’ This rule refers to tribunal secretaries. See Hew R Dundas, ‘Arbitration in Scotland’ in Julian DM Lew and others (eds), Arbitration in England with Chapters on Scotland and Ireland (Kluwer 2013) para 27-74; Brandon J Malone, ‘Arbitration Guide of the IBA Arbitration Committee: Scotland (January 2018)’ (IBA 2018) 15.
150 Uruguayan Law on Arbitration and other Alternative Dispute Resolution Procedures (Law No 15982 of 1988) art 481(1): ‘Once the arbitrators have been appointed, the parties may appoint a secretary, leave the appointment to the Arbitral Tribunal or order them to act without a secretary.’
151 See nn 143, 145, and 146. For an ‘opt out’ model regarding the mandatory participation of a secretary, see n 149.
152 Jan Kleinheisterkamp, International Commercial Arbitration in Latin America (Oceana 2005) 208.
154 Horacio A Grigera Naón, ‘Arbitration and Latin America: Progress and Setbacks—2004 Freshfields Lecture’ (2005) 21 Arb Intl 127, 131; cf Kleinheisterkamp (n 152) 1; Born (n 4) 60–61.
156 cf Queen Mary University and White & Case, ‘2012 Survey’ (n 2) 11.
157 See Kleinheisterkamp (n 152) 208 with further references.
158 For Switzerland, see Swiss Code of Civil Procedure art 365(1): ‘The arbitral tribunal may appoint a secretary.’ cf also its predecessor, Swiss Inter-Cantonal Concordat on Arbitration of 27 March 1969 art 15: ‘The arbitral tribunal, with the agreement of the parties, may designate a secretary.’ For Chile, see Chilean Code of Civil Procedure (Law No 1552, as amended up to Law No 20.217 of November 12, 2007) art 632(1) (Chilean CCP) which requires the arbitrator to appoint a ‘certifying authority’, who must be present and certify all procedural actions by the arbitral tribunal. If such a ‘certifying authority’ is challenged or not available at the place of arbitration, the tribunal may appoint a tribunal secretary. Chilean CCP art 632(2) provides that there may be a different ‘certifying authority’ or secretary, if certain acts are conducted at a different place than the seat of the arbitration. In case the arbitrator is tasked to decide as amiable compositeur it is up to her discretion whether she appoints a ‘certifying authority’ or tribunal secretary, Chilean CCP art 639(1). If the parties want to question witnesses they must do so through the arbitrator, though in practice the tribunal secretary often takes over this task.
160 SFT, Judgment of 21 May 2015 (2015) 33(4) ASA Bull 879, 885 (author’s translation) on ch 12 of the Swiss Federal Statute on Private International Law (Bundesgesetz über das Internationale Privatrecht; PILS).
161 On Swiss law, see Eugen Bucher, ‘Die Schweiz als Sitzort internationaler Schiedsgerichte’ in Karl-Heinz Böckstiegel and Eugen Bucher (eds), Die internationale Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit in der Schweiz (II) (Heymanns 1989) 139; Thomas Rüede and Reimer Hadenfeldt, Schweizerisches Schiedsgerichtsrecht: nach Konkordat und IPRG (2nd edn, Schulthess 1993) 192; Nathalie Voser, ‘New Rules on Domestic Arbitration in Switzerland: Overview of Most Important Changes to the Concordat and Comparison with Chapter 12 PILA’ (2010) 28 ASA Bull 753, 762; Philipp Habegger, ‘Art. 365 ZPO’ in Karl Spühler and Luca Tenchio (eds), Basler Kommentar: Schweizerische Zivilprozessordnung (2nd edn, Helbing Lichtenhahn 2013) para 1; Tarkan Göksu, Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit (Dike 2014) para 883 (using the domestic arbitration law as a ‘gap filler’ in the PILS); Bernhard Berger and Franz Kellerhals, International and Domestic Arbitration in Switzerland (3rd edn, Stämpfli 2015) para 1008; Kaufmann-Kohler and Rigozzi (n 13) para 4.189; Matthias Scherer, ‘Arbitration Guide of the IBA Arbitration Committee: Switzerland (January 2018)’ (IBA 2018) 16. On Chilean law, see Andrés Jana, ‘Arbitration Guide of the IBA Arbitration Committee: Chile (April 2012)’ (IBA 2012) 18.
162 CAS Code of Sports-related Arbitration 2017 arts R40.3 and R54.4: ‘An ad hoc clerk independent of the parties may be appointed to assist the Panel.’ While the CAS Court Office may spark the appointment process, the decision to appoint ultimately rests with the arbitral tribunal. See paras 1.67ff.
163 The previous (2011) version of the Arbitration Rules of the European Court of Arbitration provided in art 15(3) that ‘[i]n the absence of a secretary having been appointed, as necessary, the Chairman of the Arbitral Tribunal shall designate, at the commencement of the hearing, the person responsible for this function for the remaining proceedings.’ This made it mandatory to appoint a tribunal secretary in every arbitration, cf Rubino-Sammartano (n 141) 536–37. The new version of Arbitration Rules of the European Court of Arbitration 2015 art 15.3 (CEA Rules 2015) does not explicitly refer to tribunal secretaries: ‘A written record of proceedings will be taken at the hearings. The Chairperson of the Arbitral Tribunal shall designate, at the commencement of the hearing, the person responsible for this function for the remaining proceedings.’ However, CEA Rules 2015 art 23.4 indicates that such a ‘person responsible for this function’ can still be a tribunal secretary as it recognizes CEA Rules 2015 art 15.3 as the legal basis for the appointment of a tribunal secretary by referring to ‘any secretary appointed under Art. 15(3)’. Still, the appointment of a secretary has ceased to be mandatory, as the function under CEA Rules 2015 art 15.3 could also be carried out by one of the arbitrators. Accordingly, several provisions only refer to the ‘Secretary of the Arbitral Tribunal, if appointed’ (CEA Rules 2015 arts 15.2, 17.6; emphasis added).
164 Arbitration Rules of the Finland Chamber of Commerce 2013 art 25.5 sentence 1 (FAI Rules 2013): ‘The arbitral tribunal may, after consulting with the parties, appoint a secretary when deemed appropriate.’
165 HKIAC Administered Arbitration Rules 2013 art 13.4: ‘The arbitral tribunal may, after consulting with the parties, appoint a secretary.’
166 Rules of the Nordic Arbitration Centre of the Iceland Chamber of Commerce 2013 arts 21(3): ‘The arbitral tribunal may, after consulting with the parties, appoint a secretary.’
167 Arbitration Rules of the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce 2017 art 24(1) (SCC Rules 2017): ‘The Arbitral Tribunal may submit to the SCC a proposal for the appointment of an administrative secretary at any time during the arbitration. The appointment is subject to the approval of the parties.’
168 Swiss Rules 2012 arts 15(5) sentence 1: ‘The arbitral tribunal may, after consulting with the parties, appoint a secretary.’
171 Such soft law instruments are also referred to as ‘para-regulatory texts’ and include institutional ‘Guidelines’, ‘Notes’, ‘Best Practices’, etc.
172 See eg the IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration of 23 October 2014 (IBA Conflicts Guidelines 2014); IBA Guidelines on Party Representation in International Arbitration of 25 May 2013.
173 See eg Chartered Institute of Arbitrators Practice Guideline 10: Guidelines on the Use of Tribunal-Appointed Experts, Legal Advisers and Assessors.
174 See eg the IBA Guidelines on Drafting International Arbitration Clauses of 7 October 2010.
175 A famous example are the IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International Arbitration of 29 May 2010 (IBA Rules of Evidence 2010); see also the UNCITRAL Notes on Organizing Arbitral Proceedings 2016 (UNCITRAL Notes 2016).
176 Berger, PDR (n 4) para 16-38.
177 This non-binding character of soft law is easily forgotten in light of its pre-formulated and rule-like appearance. This is criticized by Michael E Schneider, ‘The Essential Guidelines for the Preparation of Guidelines, Directives, Notes, Protocols and Other Methods Intended to Help International Arbitration Practitioners to Avoid the Need for Independent Thinking and to Promote the Transformation of Errors into “Best Practices” ’ in Laurent Lévy and Yves Derains (eds), Liber Amicorum en l’honneur de Serge Lazareff (Éditions Pedone 2011) 563–67; Ugo Draetta, ‘The Transnational Procedural Rules for Arbitration and the Risks of Overregulation and Bureaucratization’ (2015) 33 ASA Bull 327, 333–41; and Tom Jones, ‘ “Killing Me Softly”: Is International Arbitration Being Stifled by Soft Law?’ (GAR News, 1 March 2016).
178 The IBA Rules of Evidence 2010 are an example for such texts as they are widely considered ‘an internationally applicable standard’, Reto Marghitola, Document Production in International Arbitration (Kluwer 2015) 33; cf Railroad Development Corp v Guatemala, ICSID ARB/07/23, Decision on Provisional Measures of 15 October 2008, para 32; Born (n 4) 2212; Kaufmann-Kohler and Rigozzi (n 13) para 1.78.
179 Some institutional guidelines envisage that the parties adopt them as a party agreement, cf HKIAC Guidelines 2014 s 1.1. Others, like ICC Note 2017 s 147, require that both the tribunal secretary and the arbitral tribunal sign an undertaking to comply with the Note (on the legal significance of such an undertaking, see paras 3.19ff).
180 On party autonomy as a legal basis for the appointment of tribunal secretaries, see para 2.93.
181 Bassiri and others (n 1) 18; See Michael Feit and Chloé Terrapon Chassot, ‘The Swiss Federal Supreme Court Provides Guidance on the Proper Use of Arbitral Secretaries and Arbitrator Consultants under the Swiss Lex Arbitri: Case Note on DFC 4A_709/2014 Dated 21 May 2015’ (2015) 33 ASA Bull 897, 913 with the observation that this approach is regularly followed in practice.
182 On the tribunal’s procedural discretion as a legal basis for the appointment of tribunal secretaries, see paras 2.88ff.
183 FAI Rules 2013 art 25.5 sentence 3: ‘The Institute may separately issue further instructions on the appointment, duties and remuneration of a tribunal-appointed secretary.’
184 ICC Rules 2017 Appendix II art 5(2): ‘The Secretariat may, with the approval of the Court, issue notes and other documents for the information of the parties and the arbitrators, or as necessary for the proper conduct of the arbitral proceedings.’ Strictly speaking, appendices are themselves not part of arbitral rules. Nevertheless, some state that this Appendix ‘explicitly authorizes’ the Secretariat to promulgate notes and guidelines, see Derains and Schwartz (n 73) 14 n 4.
185 cf ICC Rules 2017 art 30, making this understanding explicit in terms of the ‘Expedited Procedure Provisions’ appended to the ICC Rules 2017. But see Feit and Terrapon Chassot (n 181) 912 for the opposite opinion that the guidelines do not form part of the parties’ agreement.
186 Or if they are substantially changed after the parties’ agreement on a specific set of procedural rules.
187 cf Feit and Terrapon Chassot (n 181) 912–13.
188 cf Simon Greenberg and Flavia Mange, ‘Institutional and Ad Hoc Perspectives on the Temporal Conflict of Arbitral Rules’ (2010) 27 J Intl Arb 199, 199.
189 See eg ICC Case No 5622, Final Award of 1992 (1997) 8(1) ICC Ct Bull 52–53; SFT, Judgment of 14 June 1990 (1994) 12(2) ASA Bull 226, 228–29; Craig, Park and Paulsson (n 63) 145; Greenberg and Mange (n 188) 207. Institutional rules often contain explicit rules to that effect, cf DIS Rules 2018 art 1.2; ICC Rules 2017 art 6(1); Preamble of LCIA Arbitration Rules 2014; UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 2010 art 1(2); Vienna Rules 2018 art 1(2).
190 As a matter of course, the parties can always opt out of such guidelines if they are unhappy with their content. An exception may be the ICC’s rule that tribunal secretaries may not be remunerated by the parties, see paras 5.115ff and 6.40ff.
192 Habegger (n 161) para 1b; cf Lalive, ‘Secrétaire de tribunaux arbitraux’ (n 7) 41.
193 Habegger (n 161) para 1b. On the tribunal’s procedural discretion as a basis for the appointment of tribunal secretaries, see paras 2.88ff.
194 On the arbitrator’s contract with the arbitral institution, see Julian DM Lew, Loukas A Mistelis, and Stefan M Kröll, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer 2003) paras 12-7–12-9.
195 cf Georg von Segesser and James Menz, ‘Internationale Schweizerische Schiedsordnung’ in Rolf A Schütze (ed), Institutionelle Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit: Kommentar (3rd edn, Heymanns 2018) art 15 para 5. But see Schwartz (n 74) 86 (‘It is, in practice, very difficult for the ICC Court to verify or otherwise ensure that the limitations laid down in its Note are strictly observed.’); Thomas J Stipanowich, ‘Soft Law in the Organization and General Conduct of Commercial Arbitration Proceedings’ in Lawrence W Newman and Michael J Radine (eds), Soft Law in International Arbitration (Juris 2014) 95 (‘not technically a part of the ICC Rules’).
197 cf Tercier (n 12) 554.
198 cf Erik Schäfer, Herman Verbist, and Christophe Imhoos, ICC Arbitration in Practice (2nd edn, Kluwer 2015) 151.
199 ACICA Guideline on the Use of Tribunal Secretaries of 1 January 2017.
200 FAI Note on the Use of a Secretary of 1 June 2013.
201 HKIAC Guidelines 2014.
202 SCC Arbitrator’s Guidelines of January 2017 s 4.
203 SIAC Practice Note for Administered Cases of 2 February 2015—On the Appointment of Administrative Secretaries.
204 Arbitration Court of the Swiss Chambers’ Arbitration Institution Guidelines for Arbitrators of 1 August 2014 s A.2.
206 cf Sonatrach v Statoil  EWHC 875 (Comm), para 48, acknowledging that ‘it is standard practice in ICC arbitrations for administrative secretaries to be used’.
207 JAMS Guidelines for Use of Clerks and Tribunal Secretaries in Arbitrations of 2012 (JAMS Guidelines 2012): ‘JAMS International arbitrators may use Clerks or Secretaries’.
208 LCIA Notes 2017 s 68: ‘Subject to any applicable law [. . .], an Arbitral Tribunal may obtain assistance from a tribunal secretary in relation to an arbitration.’
209 See paras 2.60ff. On party autonomy as a legal basis for the appointment of tribunal secretaries, see para 2.93.
210 IBA Conflicts Guidelines 2014 GSt 5(b): ‘Arbitral or administrative secretaries and assistants, to an individual arbitrator or the Arbitral Tribunal, are bound by the same duty of independence and impartiality as arbitrators.’
211 UNCITRAL Notes 2016 ss 35–38; UNCITRAL Notes on Organizing Arbitral Proceedings 1996 ss 26–27.
212 CIArb Practice Guideline on Managing Arbitrations and Procedural Orders (Commentary on Article 2.1).
214 Bassiri and others (n 1) 1.
215 See paras 2.58ff. On the tribunal’s procedural discretion and party autonomy as legal bases for the appointment of tribunal secretaries, see paras 2.88ff.
216 Most provincial arbitration laws in Canada do not address tribunal secretaries. An exception is British Columbia Commercial Arbitration Act, RSBC 1996, c 55, as amended on 1 May 2011 s 26(1) (British Columbia Commercial Arbitration Act 1996) which states that the fees of ‘a clerk, secretary or reporter assisting in the arbitration must not exceed the fair value of services performed together with necessary and reasonable expenses incurred’. This serves as an implicit legal basis for the appointment of tribunal secretaries in domestic arbitrations in British Columbia. In ‘arbitrations by advocates’ under the Québec Code of Civil Procedure of 11 November 1986, as amended on 1 August 2004 (Québec CCP) there is an explicit basis for the appointment of a ‘clerk’ (Québec CCP s 384: ‘The arbitrators may appoint someone to act as their clerk.’).
217 While the Greek International Arbitration Law 1999 (Law No 2735 of 18 August 1999) is silent on tribunal secretaries, the domestic arbitration law, located in the Greek Code of Civil Procedure (Κώδικας Πολιτικής ∆ικονομίας; Greek CCP), addresses them in a limited regard. Greek CCP art 882(3) provides that the ‘fee and costs of the arbitration’ include the tribunal secretary’s fee. This reference is understood to imply that tribunal secretaries may be appointed in Greek domestic arbitrations, cf Antonias Dimolitsa and Niki K Kerameus, ‘Arbitration Guide of the IBA Arbitration Committee: Greece (May 2016)’ (IBA 2016) 12; cf also Stelios Koussoulis, ‘Die internationale Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit in Griechenland’ in Peter Gottwald (ed), Internationale Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit—Arbitrage international—International Arbitration (Gieseking 1997) 405.
218 Tribunal secretaries are mentioned twice in the Indonesian Arbitration Law 1999 (Law of the Republic of Indonesia No 30 of 1999 regarding Arbitration and Alternative Dispute Resolution). Article 51 requires that ‘[m]inutes of the hearings, and examination of witnesses, shall be drawn up by a secretary’, making the participation of a tribunal secretary mandatory in arbitrations seated in Indonesia. Accordingly, Article 9(3)(e) provides that a submission agreement to arbitrate after the dispute has arisen must contain the ‘full name of the secretary’. These provisions indicate that a tribunal secretary must participate in every arbitration and therefore serve as a legal basis for their appointment, cf Jan K Schäfer, ‘La nouvelle loi indonésienne sur l’arbitrage’  Rev de l’Arb 625, 629.
219 The Peruvian Arbitration Law 2008 (Law No. 26572, amended by Arbitration Act Legislative Decree 1071 of 2008) includes references to tribunal secretaries in respect to their confidentiality obligation (art 51(1)), the costs of the arbitration (art 70(b)), and the tribunal secretary’s fees (art 71).
220 Romanian Code of Civil Procedure, enacted by Law 134/2010 of 15 July 2010 art 603(1)(g) provides that the arbitral award must contain ‘[t]he signatures of all arbitrators [. . .] and, where applicable, the signature of the secretary of the tribunal.’ On that rule, see para 5.270.
221 The Dutch arbitration law makes direct reference to tribunal secretaries in Dutch Code of Civil Procedure (Wetboek van Burgerlijke Rechtsvordering; Dutch CCP) art 1035a regarding the challenge of secretaries and in Dutch CCP art 1061(5) on additional awards.
222 According to Abu Dhabi Commercial Conciliation & Arbitration Center Procedural Regulations of Arbitration 2013 art 17(1), ‘secretary charges’ are considered fees of the arbitral tribunal (cf also art 17(4)(3)). This reference is understood as an implicit legal basis for the appointment of tribunal secretaries in ADCCAC arbitrations, see Karim Nassif, ‘ADCCAC: New Rules … A Year Later!’ (2015) 7 Intl J Arab Arb 9, 17.
223 BVI IAC Arbitration Rules 2016 art 1(5)(l) states that the Secretariat provides ‘assistance in the appointment of administrative secretaries’.
224 CRCICA Arbitration Rules 2011 art 40(1) provides that the ‘secretary of the arbitral tribunal’ is subject to confidentiality.
225 Arbitration Rules of the Singapore International Arbitration Centre 2016 art 38.1 (SIAC Rules 2016) extends the exclusion of liability to ‘any administrative secretary’. SIAC Rules 2016 art 38.2 provides that tribunal secretaries are not under the obligation ‘to make any statement in connection with any arbitration administered by SIAC’. SIAC Rules 2016 art 39.1 and 39.2 provides for the confidentiality obligation to include tribunal secretaries.
226 TRAC Rules of Arbitration of 2005 art 4 sentence 2 provides that also ‘the Arbitral Tribunal’s appointed experts and secretaries’ are subject to a confidentiality obligation.
227 CETA differentiates between the resolution of disputes between investors and states by a ‘Tribunal’ (art 8.18ff) and the resolution of inter-state disputes by an ‘arbitration panel’ (art 29.6ff). Both the CETA Rules of Procedure for Arbitration (Annex 29-A to CETA) and the CETA Code of Conduct for Arbitrators and Mediators (Annex 29-B to CETA) contain rules on assistants to members of the arbitration panel. Similar provisions are found in other EU investment protection agreements which are currently being negotiated, such as the Investment Protection Agreement Between the European Union and Its Member States, of the One Part, and the Republic of Singapore, of the Other Part (Annexes 9 and 11).
229 cf Laura Carlson, Fundamentals of Swedish Law (Studentlitteratur 2009) 42–43.
230 Spanish Arbitration Law 1988 (Law No 36/1988 of 5 December 1988) art 20(1): ‘With the consent of the parties the arbitrators may appoint a Secretary’ (author’s translation).
231 See Bernardo M Cremades (ed), Arbitration in Spain (Butterworths 1991) 57 who notes that prior Spanish arbitration laws had provided for the participation of an escribano, a court officer, whose participation was later abolished.
232 Law No. 60/2003 of 23 December 2003. cf Clay (n 91) 933.
233 Fernando Mantilla-Serrano, Ley de arbitraje: Una perspectiva internacional (Justel 2005) 109; Jóse María Alonso Puig, ‘Artículo 35’ in Carlos González-Bueno (ed), Comentarios a la Ley de arbitraje (Consejo General del Notariado 2014) 715; cf Clay (n 91) 933; Laura Lozano Correa, ‘Art. 34–39’ in Carlos González-Bueno (ed), The Spanish Arbitration Act: A Commentary (Dykinson 2016) 218.
235 Jan Paulsson and Georgios Petrochilos, ‘Revision of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules’ (UNCITRAL 2006) para 138; cf Sanders (n 120) 265–66.
236 The travaux préparatoires do not address the issue of an express legal basis for the appointment of tribunal secretaries. It was considered whether tribunal secretaries should be expressly excluded from liability (UN Doc A/CN.9/646, para 41) or included in the costs of the arbitral tribunal (UN Doc A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.143/Add.1, para 36). However, these proposals were eventually rejected (UN Doc A/CN.9/646, para 131).
237 Blackaby and others (n 8) para 4.193 n 215.
238 Constantine Partasides, ‘Secretaries to Arbitral Tribunals’ in Bernard Hanotiau and Alexis Mourre (eds), Players’ Interaction in International Arbitration (ICC 2012) 86; Partasides and others (n 4) 327; Anna Kombikova and Iryna Glushchenko, ‘The Role of Arbitral Secretaries: Overregulate the Underregulated?’ (arbitration-blog.com, 23 May 2014).
239 Partasides (n 238) 86; Partasides and others (n 4) 327; cf Kombikova and Glushchenko (n 238).
240 The statement by Partasides (n 238) 85; and Partasides and others (n 4) 327 that ‘[a]s the travaux préparatoires confirm, these rules were intended to apply to arbitral secretaries’ cannot be confirmed in terms of Art. 5 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 2010. cf Pierre Pic and Irène Léger, ‘Le nouveau règlement d’arbitrage de la CNUDCI (2010)’  Rev de l’Arb 99, 106.
241 cf Nicole Conrad, Ömer Cilingir, and Barbara Baumann, ‘UNCITRAL Rules’ in Nicole Conrad, Peter Münch, and Jonathan Black-Branch (eds), International Commercial Arbitration: Standard Clauses and Forms (Helbing Lichtenhahn 2013) para 3.180: ‘The Rules do not contain provisions regarding the appointment of a secretary for the Arbitral Tribunal’; Peter Ashford, Handbook on International Commercial Arbitration (2nd edn, Juris 2014) 143:‘The UNCITRAL Rules are [. . .] silent [on tribunal secretaries]’.
242 cf ICC Rules 2017 art 41.
243 cf Clyde Croft, Christopher Kee, and Jeff Waincymer, A Guide to the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (CUP 2013) 166; Partasides and others (n 4) 327; Bassiri and others (n 1) 10 (Commentary on Young ICCA Guide 2014 art 2(7)); Axel Benjamin Herzberg, ‘Vor Art. 11 ff. ICC-SchO’ in Jan Heiner Nedden and Axel Benjamin Herzberg (eds), ICC-SchO, DIS-SchO: Praxiskommentar zu den Schiedsgerichtsordnungen (Otto Schmidt 2014) para 14.
244 cf Blackaby and others (n 8) para 4.193 n 215; Tilman Niedermaier and Paolo Michele Patocchi, ‘UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (UncitralO)’ in Rolf A Schütze (ed), Institutionelle Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit: Kommentar (3rd edn, Heymanns 2018) Art. 16 para 6.
246 Turkish International Arbitration Law 2001 (Law No 4686 of 21 June 2001) art 16(B)(3): ‘The term costs refers to [. . .] the fees paid to the experts, and to the other persons whose assistance is sought and who are, collectively, appointed by the arbitral tribunal’ (emphasis added); Mexican Commercial Code art 1416(IV) (Código de Comercio) defines the costs of an arbitration as, inter alia, ‘the costs of expert advice and other assistance required by the arbitral tribunal’ (emphasis added; cf also art 1456(1)); Swiss Rules 2012 art 38(c); Arbitration Rules of the Mumbai Centre for International Arbitration 2017 art 32.6(c) refers to ‘expert advice and of other assistance reasonably required by the Tribunal’; the 2013 edition of the SIAC Rules similarly refers to ‘expert advice and other assistance required by the arbitral tribunal’ in art 31.2(c).
250 English Arbitration Act 1996 s 29(2) (‘Subsection (1) [on the immunity of arbitrators] applies to an employee or agent of an arbitrator as it applies to the arbitrator himself’); Irish Arbitration Act 2010 (Law No 1 of 8 June 2010) s 22(2) provides that ‘an employee, agent or advisor of an arbitrator’ is exempt from liability; Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance 2013 (Cap 609) s 104(1)(b) provides that an arbitral tribunal is liable for any act or omission by ‘an employee or agent of the tribunal’; Lagos State Arbitration Law of 18 May 2009 art 18(2) is a verbatim adoption of English Arbitration Act 1996 s 29(2).
251 On the English Arbitration Act 1996, see Patrik Schöldström, The Arbitrator’s Mandate (Jure 1998) 331; Partasides (n 52) 148 n 10; Onyema (n 91) 104 n 26. On the Irish Arbitration Act 2010, see Klaus Reichert, ‘Arbitration in Ireland’ in Julian DM Lew and others (eds), Arbitration in England with Chapters on Scotland and Ireland (Kluwer 2013) para 28-28 n 20. On the Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance, see Clay (n 91) 933–34; Neil Kaplan and Robert Morgan, ‘National Report for Hong Kong (2018)’ in Jan Paulsson and Lise Bosman (eds), ICCA International Handbook on Commercial Arbitration (Supplement No 98, March 2018, Kluwer 1984) 39.
252 Clement C Ebokan v Ekwenibe & Sons Trading Company  2 NWLR (Pt.696)32.
254 DAC, ‘DAC Report on Arbitration Bill 1996’.
258 But, of course, tribunal secretaries may nevertheless be appointed in arbitrations seated in England, Ireland, Hong Kong, and Lagos (see paras 2.88ff) and they enjoy immunity under these provisions (see para 3.66).
259 Hans Jakob Maier, Handbuch der Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit (Neue Wirtschafts-Briefe 1979) para 380; Göksu (n 161) para 878; Tercier (n 12) 538–39; Contos (n 78) 39–40 quoting L Martinez; cf Jean-François Poudret and Sebastian Besson, Comparative Law of International Arbitration (2nd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2007) para 594; Gal (n 84) 303; Felix Dasser, ‘Art. 365 ZPO’ in Paul Oberhammer, Tanja Domej, and Ulrich Haas (eds), Kurzkommentar ZPO: Schweizerische Zivilprozessordnung (2nd edn, Helbing Lichtenhahn 2014) para 1; Blackaby and others (n 8) para 4.195; Tracey Timlin, ‘The Swiss Supreme Court on the Use of Secretaries and Consultants in the Arbitral Process’ (2016) 8 YB Arb & Mediation 268, 271; Simon Maynard, ‘Laying the Fourth Arbitrator to Rest: Re-Evaluating the Regulation of Arbitral Secretaries’ (2018) 34 Arb Intl 173, 181.
260 Law Clerks at the ICJ are part of the Registry and are assigned to assist each of the fifteen sitting judges in the growing number of fact intensive cases. They are appointed under the Statute of the International Court of Justice art 21(2). cf Hugh Thirlway, ‘The Drafting of ICJ Decisions: Some Personal Recollections and Observations’ (2006) 5 Chinese J Intl L 15, 15–26; UN General Assembly, ‘Report of the International Court of Justice: 1 August 2016–31 July 2017’ (UN 2017) para 63.
261 Each judge at the International Criminal Court is assigned one associate legal officer and each Chamber has an additional senior legal officer. While senior legal officers overtake substantive tasks like conducting depositions, associate legal officers will help with research, drafting of decisions, etc. They are all appointed under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (UN Doc A/CONF.183/9) art 44(1) and are formally part of the Registry. cf Daryl A Mundis, ‘Practicing International Criminal Law’, Careers in International Law: A Guide to Career Paths in International Law (2007–2008 Edition) (ASIL 2008) 28–29.
262 Judges and Advocates General at the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) are assisted by référendaires (legal secretaries, Rechtsreferenten). Their appointment is based on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union art 12. They are intended to facilitate the work of the CJEU and take over tasks at each stage of the decision-making process. cf Gerhard Grill, ‘Die Tätigkeit eines Rechtsreferenten am EuGH’  Europa-Blätter 47, 47–50; Sally J Kenney, ‘Beyond Principals and Agents Seeing Courts as Organizations by Comparing Référendaires at the European Court of Justice and Law Clerks at the U.S. Supreme Court’ (2000) 33 Comp Pol Stud 593, 605–12; Partasides (n 52) 154–55; Bertrand Wägenbaur, Court of Justice of the EU—Commentary on Statue and Rules of Procedure (CH Beck 2013) art 12 para 1.
263 Judges at the ECtHR are assisted by rapporteurs, explicitly envisaged by the European Convention on Human Rights art 24(2), effective 3 September 1953 (ECHR). cf Jens Meyer-Ladewig and Hugo Fuentes, ‘Art. 24’ in Jens Meyer-Ladewig, Martin Nettesheim, and Stefan von Raumer (eds), Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention: Handkommentar (4th edn, Nomos 2017) para 5.
264 At the UNCC each panel of commissioners was assisted by a team of staff, made up of lawyers and valuation personnel. They were appointed under Provisional Rules of Claims Procedure (UN Doc S/AC.26/1992/10) art 34(1). They worked closely together with the commissioners and assisted them in any way the panel required. cf John P Gaffney, ‘The United Nations Compensation Commission: A Structural and Procedural Overview’ (1999) 65 Arb 212, 213–14; Senogles (n 39) 94–96.
265 The WTO Secretariat employs legal officers who have many substantive responsibilities in regard to supporting panels. For instance, they prepare a paper at the beginning of the dispute, setting out the factual and legal issues the Panel should address and detailing case law. WTO legal officers are appointed under Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes at the WTO, Annex 2 of the WTO Agreement (Dispute Settlement Understanding) art 27(1). cf New York City Bar Association (n 27) 582–83; Giorgio Sacerdoti, ‘From Law Professor to International Adjudicator: The WTO Appellate Body and ICSID Arbitration Compared, a Personal Account’ in David D Caron and others (eds), Practising Virtue: Inside International Arbitration (OUP 2015) 207; Gerbay (n 120) 171; François Dessemontet, ‘Dispute Resolution Proceedings in World Trade Organization and International Commercial Arbitration: A Comparison’ (2017) 6 Indian J Arb L 174, 189.
266 US federal justices have been assisted by clerks since the nineteenth century (see paras 1.35, 1.37, and 2.33). Their appointment is provided for in 28 USC § 752 (Title 28 of the United States Code (Judiciary and Judicial Procedure)). They continue to play an important role at all levels of the federal judiciary and perform a broad range of functions to assist their judge. cf Fredonia Broadcasting Corp v RCA Corp, 569 F.2d 251, 255–57 (5th Cir 1978); Lazarus (n 100); Partasides (n 52) 152–53; Richard A Posner, How Judges Think (Harvard University Press 2008) 221: ‘[T]oday most judicial opinions are written by law clerks, which was not true a century ago, when very few judges even had law clerks’ (emphasis in original).
267 In the 1990s, the English Court of Appeal has responded to the increasing number of appeals with the use of judicial assistants. Their appointment is based on the ‘Judicial Assistant Scheme’ set up by Justice Otton. The model was subsequently extended to the English Supreme Court. The judicial assistants’ tasks are to prepare bench memoranda and carry out research for the judge. cf Partasides (n 52) 155–56; Holvast (n 99) 18–20.
268 The German Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG), Bundesgerichtshof (BGH), and all other German federal courts employ Wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiter (research fellows) under Statute organizing the German Federal Constitutional Court (Geschäftsordnung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts) s 13 and German Courts Constitution Act (Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz; GVG) s 193(1). These research fellows are lower-court judges or state attorneys who second federal courts for a certain period of time. They are mainly concerned with researching points of law and drafting judgments. They have been referred to as the BVerfG’s ‘third senate’ and the BGH’s ‘shadow senate’. For an in-depth analysis of these actors in the German judicial process, see Jürgen Bichelmeir, Der juristische Hilfsarbeiter an den obersten Deutschen Gerichten (Heymanns 1971). cf also Christoph Herz, Hans-Peter Freymann, and Stefan Vatter (eds), HIWI 2000: Die ‘einzig wahre Festschrift’ oder: Was Sie schon immer über den BGH wissen wollten. . . (Alma Mater 2000); Constantin Körner, ‘Jobprofil Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter am BVerfG: Der “Dritte Senat” ’ (Legal Tribune Online, 30 October 2012); Karin Graßhof, ‘§ 93b’ in Theodor Maunz and others (eds), Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz: Kommentar (53rd edn, CH Beck 2018) paras 11–13. In addition, German lower court judges are assisted by Rechtsreferendaren (trainee lawyers) who draft judgments and assist the judge in oral hearings as part of their legal training, see GVG ss 10, 193(1).
269 On greffiers or Gerichtsschreiber at the Swiss Federal Tribunal, see paras 1.34 and 5.246. They are appointed under BGG art 24 (Bundesgesetz über das Bundesgericht; Federal statute organizing the Swiss Federal Tribunal). They provide far-reaching support to judges in their adjudicative function and are endowed with an advisory vote. cf Peter Uebersax, ‘Die Stellung der Gerichtschreiberinnen und Gerichtsschreiber in der Gerichtsverfassung’ in Benjamin Schindler and Patrick Sutter (eds), Akteure der Gerichtsbarkeit (Dike 2007) 82–110; Peter Bieri, ‘Law Clerks in Switzerland—A Solution to Cope with the Caseload?’ (2016) 7 Intl J Ct Admin 29, 29–36; J Ole Jensen, ‘The Swiss Federal Tribunal Addresses the Role of Secretaries and “Legal Consultants” to Arbitral Tribunals’ (2016) 21 IBA Arb News 66, 67–68; James Menz and Anya George, ‘How Much Assistance Is Permissible? A Note on the Swiss Supreme Court’s Decision on Arbitral Secretaries and Consultants’ (2016) 33 J Intl Arb 311, 323.
270 On Rechtspraktikanten in Austria, see Schwarz and Konrad (n 38) para 7-156. On the griffier in the Netherlands, see Holvast (n 99) 15–17; Holvast (n 100). On Law Clerks at the Singapore Court of Appeal, see Hwang (n 91) 18.
272 cf also P v Q  EWHC 194 (Comm), para 67; SFT, Judgment of 21 May 2015 (2015) 33(4) ASA Bull 879, 885; Pierre Lalive, Jean-François Poudret, and Claude Reymond (eds), Le droit de l’arbitrage interne et international en Suisse (Payot 1989) 95; Rüede and Hadenfeldt (n 161) 194; Schwarz and Konrad (n 38) para 7-156; Schwartz (n 74) 86 n 70; Partasides (n 52) 152–56; Leimbacher (n 7) 303; Partasides and others (n 4) 334; Hwang (n 91) 18; Stürner (n 33) 324; Dasser (n 259) para 1; Kombikova and Glushchenko (n 238); Gary B Born, International Arbitration: Cases and Materials (2nd edn, Kluwer 2015) 1068; Moyeed (n 57) 46.
273 cf Lazarus (n 100) 29 describing the tasks of a clerk at the US Supreme Court: ‘drafting majority opinions, drafting dissents, drafting concurrences [. . .], writing “bench memos” (which help a Justice prepare for a case the Court is about to hear), writing post-oral argument memos [. . .], commenting on draft opinions, dissents, and concurrences circulated by other Chambers, recommending which new petitions for certiorari the Court should grant, and advising on emergency applications, often including last-minute requests for stays of execution’; Uebersax (n 269) 87–96; Jong-Lin Yu and Masood Ahmed, ‘Keeping the Invisible Hand Under Control?—Arbitrator’s Mandate and Assisting Third Parties’ (2015) 19 VJ 213, 233–39; Holvast (n 100) 133–59.
278 See paras 5.10ff. cf also Partasides (n 52) 156; Lalive, ‘Mission et démission’ (n 70) 272–73; Menz and George (n 269) 216 n 88.
280 Ulrike Gantenberg and Ulrich Kopetzki, ‘The Vienna Predictability Propositions: Secretaries’ in Christian Klausegger and others (eds), Austrian Yearbook on International Arbitration 2017 (Manz 2017) 152.
281 cf also Swedish Arbitration Act 1999 s 21: ‘The arbitrators shall handle the dispute in an impartial, practical, and speedy manner’; English Arbitration Act 1996 s 33(1)(b).
282 cf Berger and Jensen (n 117) 419–20.
283 Agrimex Ltd v Tradigrain SA  EWHC 1656 (Comm), para 34 iii).
285 See paras 2.03ff. But see also paras 10.18ff on how ‘paper tsunamis’ may be prevented by the use of strict page limits for party submissions.
287 cf UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 1985, with amendments as adopted in 2006 art 19(2) (Model Law); Dutch CCP art 1036(1); English Arbitration Act 1996 s 34(1); French Code of Civil Procedure (Code de procédure civile) art 1509; German Code of Civil Procedure (Zivilprozessordnung; German CCP) s 1042(4); PILS art 182(2).
288 Born (n 4) 2145; cf Berger and Jensen (n 117) 419.
289 On the hybrid nature of the arbitrator’s mandate, see paras 5.06ff.
290 On the parties’ consent as a legal basis, see paras 2.93ff.
292 Albert Jan van den Berg, R van Delden, and Henricus Joseph Snijders, Netherlands Arbitration Law (Kluwer 1993) 173.
293 Habegger (n 161) para 1b; Herzberg (n 243) para 11; Petronela Proteasa, ‘Invisible Arbitrator—Real Problem or Artificial One?’ (LinkedIn Pulse, 15 October 2015); Nassim Eslami, Die Nichtöffentlichkeit des Schiedsverfahrens (Mohr Siebeck 2016) 218; Jan Paulsson and Georgios Petrochilos, UNCITRAL Arbitration (Kluwer 2017) art 17 para 7; Monica Mitrea, ‘Notion de secrétaire et de consultant du tribunal arbitral en droit suisse de l’arbitrage (arbitrage ad hoc)’ (2018) 46 Revista Română de Arbitraj 1, 7; Bianca Vogt and Lucas Wedl, ‘Repositioning Tribunals’ Secretaries’ in Christian Klausegger and others (eds), Austrian Yearbook on International Arbitration 2018 (Manz 2018) 228; cf Born (n 4) 2045: ‘[I]t is very likely that an arbitral tribunal would have the inherent power to appoint a secretary over one party’s objection.’ cf also P v Q  EWHC 194 (Comm), para 50.
294 Paulsson and Petrochilos (n 235) paras 137–38; Herzberg (n 243) para 11; cf also the Note on Administrative Secretaries to Arbitral Tribunals of 1988 (ICC Note 1988) which based the appointment of a tribunal secretary on International Chamber of Commerce, Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration, in force from 1 January 1988 until 31 December 1997 art 11 (ICC Rules 1988) providing for the tribunal’s discretion to conduct the proceedings. On a joint agreement against the use of tribunal secretaries, see paras 4.78ff.
295 Compagnie Honeywell Bull SA v Computacion Bull de Venezuela CA, Cour d’appel de Paris, 21 June 1990 (1991) Rev de l’Arb 96, 100 (author’s translation).
296 cf Philippe Fouchard and others, Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman on International Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer 1999) para 1250; Thomas Clay, L’arbitre (Dalloz 2001) para 420 n 1; Clay (n 91) 933.
297 Agrimex Ltd v Tradigrain SA  EWHC 1656 (Comm), para 34; RG, Judgment of 1 February 1901 (1901) RGZ 47, 424, 426; RG, Judgment of 3 November 1916  JW 46, 47; RG, Judgment of 1 April 1921  JW 1248; BGH, Judgment of 22 May 1957 (1958) 71 ZZP 427, 435–36; SFT, Judgment of 21 May 2015 (2015) 33(4) ASA Bull 879, 885–86; H Teßmer, Das Schiedsverfahren nach deutschem Recht (Veit & Comp 1915) 181; Wilhelm Kisch, ‘Anmerkung zum Urteil des RG vom 1. April 1921’  JW 1248, 1248; Wolfgang Hiepe, Der Schiedsrichtervertrag und die Rechte und Pflichten des Schiedsrichters (Pöppinghaus 1930) 34; Karl Sieg, ‘Hilfsstellung Dritter im schiedsrichterlichen Verfahren’  JZ 719, 722; Joachim Kessler, Schiedsgerichtsvertrag und Schiedsverfahren (Goldmann 1970) 46; Stürner (n 33) 322.
298 OLG Hamburg, Judgment of 11 March 1933  HRR No 140. At the time of the judgment, German CCP s 1034 belonged to Part 2 of the 10th book of the German CCP: ‘Procedure before the Arbitral Tribunal’ (‘Verfahren vor dem Schiedsgericht’).
299 OLG Hamburg, Judgment of 11 March 1933  HRR No 140.
300 ibid; Franz Prager, Schiedsrecht: Recht des privaten Schiedsverfahrens (Schweitzer 1931) 20 n 18.
302 On the parties’ right to object, see paras 4.82ff.
303 Virtually all arbitration laws allow the parties to tailor the proceedings in any way they see fit, see the provisions cited in n 287. There is nothing to prevent them from providing for additional players to take part in the proceedings, such as any experts or tribunal secretaries. cf Paulsson (n 5) 23: ‘[T]he presumption in a free society should be that citizens may devise ways to resolve their disputes by means which they find attractive and particularly suited to their activity and temperament.’ cf also Saghy Cadenas (n 74) 15; Herzberg (n 243) para 11.
304 With that proposition, see Johannes Stürner, ‘Hilfspersonen im Schiedsverfahren nach deutschem Recht’  SchiedsVZ 322, 326; Timlin (n 259) 294–95. But see Vogt and Wedl (n 293) 228 who warn against regulating secretaries in the arbitration agreement, citing the risk of the clause becoming inoperable. For a famous exception, see the arbitration agreement in the Lena Goldfields Arbitration, discussed at para 1.32.
cf also Geoffrey Senogles, ‘The United Nations Compensation Commission’s Utilisation of Experts’ in Bernhard Berger and Michael E Schneider (eds), Inside the Black Box: How Arbitral Tribunals Operate and Reach Their Decisions (Juris 2014) 105 quoting W Bassler who reports of ‘a very large arbitration in which the parties’ counsel themselves offered to each of the three arbitrators a legal assistant’.
305 See paras 4.80ff. cf Continental Materials Corp v Gaddis Mining 306 F.2d 952, 954 (10th Cir 1962) in which the arbitrators had been contractually allowed to appoint a particular tribunal expert to calculate damages.
306 Gino Lörcher, Heike Lörcher, and Torsten Lörcher, Das Schiedsverfahren—national/international—nach deutschem Recht (2nd edn, CF Müller 2001) para 133.
308 Grigera Naón (n 143) 657; YRRR de Mul, ‘De rol van de secretaris in de bouwarbitrage’  BR 192 on tribunal secretaries in RvA arbitrations.
309 Bernhard F Meyer and Jonatan Baier, ‘Arbitrator Consultants—Another Way to Deal with Technical or Commercial Challenges of Arbitrations’ (2015) 33 ASA Bull 37, 41.
310 Swiss Rules of International Arbitration 2012 art 38(a) (Swiss Rules 2012) (emphasis added).
311 Onyema (n 91) 102; Richard M Mosk, ‘Deliberations of Arbitrators’ in David D Caron and others (eds), Practising Virtue: Inside International Arbitration (OUP 2015) 495.
312 Maarten Draye, ‘Commentary on Part VI of the Belgian Judicial Code, Chapter III: Articles 1684–1689’ in Niuscha Bassiri and Maarten Draye (eds), Arbitration in Belgium (Kluwer 2016) art 1684 para 17.
313 Berger, PDR (n 4) para 27-11; cf Pierre Jolidon, Commentaire du Concordat suisse sur l’arbitrage (Stæmpfli 1984) 242; McIlwrath and Savage (n 120) para 5-103; Philipp Peters, ‘Presiding Arbitrator, Deciding Arbitrator: Decision-Making in Arbitral Tribunals’ in Christian Klausegger and others (eds), Austrian Yearbook on International Arbitration 2011 (Manz 2011) 151; Born (n 4) 2043; Herzberg (n 243) para 13; Rajoo (n 120) 402.
314 Bommel van der Bend, Marnix Leijten, and Marc Ynzonides (eds), A Guide to the NAI Arbitration Rules: Including a Commentary on Dutch Arbitration Law (Kluwer 2009) 175.
315 cf Paul Rolf Meurs-Gerken, ‘Secrétaire des arbitres’ (1985) 5 AIJA—Intl Arb Gazette 224, 225; David D Caron and Lee Caplan, The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules: A Commentary (2nd edn, OUP 2013) 201 n 118. On the question of whether a secretary can de facto assume the role of an arbitrator, see paras 8.08ff.
316 That result only changes where the parties explicitly agree that the secretary becomes a member of the tribunal, see Rechtbank Utrecht, Judgment of 8 August 2007 (2007) NJF 501, para 2.6.
318 Herzberg (n 243) para 13.
319 Göksu (n 161) para 884.