Footnotes:
1 Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on markets in financial instruments and amending Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive 2011/61/EU (recast), [2014] OJ 173/349 (MiFID II). Recital (13) of MiFID II observes:
2 Article 4(1)(21) of MiFID II. Title III concerns the authorization and operating requirements for RMs.
3 Article 4(1)(22) of MiFID II. Title II concerns the authorization and operating requirements for investment firms. See the Glossary in Chapter 1, para 1.71 for a definition of ‘investment firm’.
4 Article 4(1)(23) of MiFID II.
5 Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on markets in financial instruments amending Council Directives 85/611/EEC and 93/6/EEC and Directive 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 93/22/EEC, [2004] OJ L145/1 (MiFID I). Recital (8) of Regulation (EU) 600/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on markets in financial instruments and amending Regulation (EU) 648/2012, [2014] OJ L173/84 (MiFIR) notes that to make financial markets ‘more transparent and efficient and to level the playing field between various venues offering multilateral trading services it is necessary to introduce a new trading venue category of organised trading facility (OTF) for bonds, structured finance products, emissions allowances and derivatives’ and to ensure these venues are regulated and permit ‘non-discriminatory’ access. OTFs are defined broadly to ‘capture all types of organised execution and arranging of trading which do not correspond to the functionalities or regulatory specifications of existing venues’.
6 Art 19(5) of MiFID II prohibits investment firms operating an MTF to execute orders against proprietary capital or to engage in matched principal trading, but see Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) guidance in MAR 5.3.1BG, which clarifies that an investment firm (with the appropriate permission) can execute orders against its proprietary capital or engage in matched principal trading outside the MTF it operates.
7 Recital (8) of MiFIR. Article 2(1)(47) of MiFIR defines ‘portfolio compression’ as ‘a risk reduction service in which two or more counterparties wholly or partially terminate some or all of the derivatives submitted by those counterparties for inclusion in the portfolio compression and replace the terminated derivatives with another derivative whose combined notional value is less than the combined notional value of the terminated derivatives.’ Article 31(1) (Portfolio Compression) of MiFIR exempts investment firms and market operators that offer portfolio compression services from the best execution obligation in art 27 of MiFID II and the transparency obligations of arts 8, 10, 18, and 21 of MiFIR. Article 31(2) still insists that investment firms and market operators who provide portfolio compression services publish the volumes of transactions subject to portfolio compression.
8 See Peter Gomber and Ilya Gvozdeskiy, ‘Dark Trading under MiFID II’ in D Busch and G Ferrarini (eds), Regulation of EU Financial Markets—MiFID II and MiFIR (OUP 2017) paras 14.10ff.
9 Article 4(1)(7) of MiFID II.
10 See paras 6.22ff below (on the legal aspects of self-dealing as agent).
11 The absence of the relevant equivalence decisions can cause significant bottleneck issues for investment firms that wish to trade in non-European Economic Area (EEA) shares in their primary listing venues. The European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) has observed in its Q&As regarding the implementation of MiFID II that pending ‘equivalence decisions for the non-EU jurisdictions whose shares are traded systematically and frequently in the EU, the absence of an equivalence decision taken with respect to a particular third country’s trading venues indicates that the Commission has currently no evidence that the EU trading in shares admitted to trading in that third country’s regulated markets can be considered as systematic, regular, and frequent.
12 ESMA has clarified that in the event of a chain of transmission of orders concerning those shares all EU investment firms that are part of the chain (either initiating the orders or acting as brokers) should ensure that the ultimate execution of the orders complies with the requirements under art 23(1) of MiFIR, see ESMA, updated MiFID II Q&A, statement, <www.esma.europa.eu/press-news/esma-news/esma-clarifies-trading-obligation-shares-under-mifid-ii>, accessed 1 September 2018. As an example, where an EU investment firm transmits an order for a share admitted to trading on a regulated market or traded on a trading venue to an EU investment firm that subsequently passes it on to a non-EEA firm, the EU investment firms should ensure the trade is undertaken in accordance with the requirements set out in art 23 of MiFIR, ie on a regulated market, MTF, systematic internalizer or equivalent third-country venue.
13 Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories, [2012] OJ L201/1 (EMIR). See Chapter 3, paras 3.80ff (on EMIR’s clearing obligation’).
14 Article 4(1)(39) of MiFID II defines ‘algorithmic trading’ as
Article 4(1)(39) of MiFID II defines ‘high-frequency algorithmic trading technique’ as
15 Regulation (EU) 596/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on market abuse (market abuse regulation) and repealing Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Directives 2003/124/EC, 2003/125/EC, and 2004/72/C, [2014] OJ L173/1, ‘Market Abuse Regulation’ (MAR).
16 See also Gomber and Gvozdeskiy (n 8) para 14.62. There is an argument that HFT ‘skims’ trades by front-running or magnifies volatility. However, there appears to be no evidence that HFT increases volatility, and the better argument might be that HFT increases liquidity, for which the ‘skimming’ is a justified reward, see: Kenneth L Fisher, Beat the Crowd (Wiley 2015), 70–71.
17 Recital (13) of MiFID II.
18 Recital (14) and art 18(3) of MiFID II. In response to an question about what sort of behaviour or restrictions should be considered as non-objective, or discriminatory under art 18(3), without meaning to give an exhaustive list, ESMA has clarified that it would consider the following types of access restrictions not to be in compliance: (1) a requirement that a participant be a direct clearing member of a central counterparty clearing house (CCP) (without prejudice to the fact that trading venues may require members or participants to enter into, and maintain, an agreement with a clearing member as a condition for access when trading is centrally cleared); (2) for financial instruments that are centrally cleared, trading venues should not allow members or participants to require other members or participants to be enabled before they are allowed to trade with each other (without prejudice to pre-admittance readiness requirements for non-centrally cleared derivatives, eg the need for bilateral master netting agreements to be in place between participants before the trading venue can allow their trading interests to interact), however, in centrally cleared markets, enablement mechanisms whereby existing members or participants of a trading venue can decide whether their trading interests may interact with a new participant’s trading interest are considered discriminatory and an attempt to limit competition; (3) a minimum trading activity requirement; or (4) restrictions on the number of participants that a participant can interact with, see ESMA, Questions and Answers—On MiFID II and MiFIR Market Structures Topics (ESMA70-872942901-38, 2018) 33–34.
19 See the description of ‘trading book’ in the Glossary in Chapter 1, para 1.64.
20 See on the categories of buy-side participant trade motivations generally, Ananth Madhavan, Jack L Treynor, and Wayne H Wagner, ‘Execution of Portfolio decisions’, in John L Maginn, Donald L Tuttle, Dennis W McLeavey, and Jerald E Pinto (eds), Managing Investment Portfolios—A Dynamic Process (3rd edn, Chichester 2007) 664–65, distinguishing between information-motivated trades aimed at capitalizing on information that has not been incorporated in the price, yet, value-motivated trades aimed at buy-and-hold, liquidity-motivated trades aimed at raising cash, and passive investment aimed at tracking an index.
21 See generally on drivers of spreads, Richard C Grinold and Ronald N Kahn, Active Portfolio Management (2nd edn, McGraw-Hill 1999) 447–48.
22 See for a discussion of transparency in relation to the UK bond markets, the Financial Services Authority, Trading Transparency in the UK Secondary Bond Markets (Feedback Statement 06/4, 2006).
23 See Title II (Transparency for trading venues) of MiFIR. The new transparency rules expand the scope of the type of instruments that are within scope of the reporting obligations significantly beyond MiFID I to include non-equity instruments, and increase the number of market actors and venues that are subject to the rules, particularly by introducing OTFs; see Niamh Moloney, ‘EU Financial Governance and Transparency Regulation’ in Danny Busch and Guido Ferrarini (eds), Regulation of the EU Financial Markets—MiFID II and MiFIR (OUP 2017) paras 12.02–12.03. In general, the publication requirements are similar for all trading venues. The data must be provided as close to real-time as technically possible (although delays may be permitted for certain large trades in some circumstances), in a form that permits comparison with pricing data from other trading venues, and they must made be available to the public at reasonable cost.
24 See Chapter 1, paras 1.44ff (creation of agency), Chapter 4, paras 4.50ff (nature and scope of fiduciary duties) and Chapter 5, paras 5.14ff (implied duties of skill and care of the agent).
25 Peter G Watts (ed), Bowstead & Reynolds on Agency (21st edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2017) para 6-037.
26 Bowstead & Reynolds on Agency (n 25) para 6-037. A person who is authorized to carry out an exactly specified act may on the occasion act in no more than a ministerial capacity, even though he affects his principal’s legal position, ibid (citing Volkers v Midland Doherty (1985) 17 DLR (4th), 343). See further Chapter 4, para 4.57 (analysing the scope of a person’s discretion as a decisive factor in determining the scope of a fiduciary duty).
27 Bowstead & Reynolds on Agency (n 25) para 6-038 (citing Arklow Investments Ltd v Maclean [2000] 1 WLR 594 at 599–600 (PC) re commencement, and Prince Jefri Bolkiah v KPMG [1999] 2 AC 222, 235–36 and Walsh v Shanahan [2013] EWCA Civ 411, 38 re termination).
28 See paras 6.08ff above (addressing the MiFID II concept of systematic internalization). See on the concept of systematic internalization and the management of self-dealing conflicts, Danny Busch, ‘Agency and Principal Dealing under MiFID I and MiFID II’ in Danny Busch and Guido Ferrarini (eds), Regulation of EU Financial Markets—MiFID II and MiFIR (OUP 2017) paras 9.09ff.
29 Maguire v Makaronis (1997) 188 CLR 449, 466.
30 Bowstead & Reynolds on Agency (n 25) para 6-062.
31 Bowstead & Reynolds on Agency (n 25) para 6-063.
32 See on the concept of organized trading via an MTF or OTF and management of client–client conflicts, Danny Busch, ‘Agency and Principal Dealing’ in Danny Busch and Guido Ferrarini, (eds), Regulation of EU Financial Markets – MiFID II and MiFIR (OUP 2017) paras 9.15ff.
33 Bowstead & Reynolds on Agency (n 25) para 6-046.
34 There is no reason why persons acting as agent when making a contract for their principal cannot by that contract provide that they themselves shall have rights and liabilities on that contract, either concurrently with, or to the exclusion of, the principal, see Bowstead & Reynolds on Agency (n 25) para 9-005 (citing Montgomerie v UK Mutual SS Assn [1891] 1 QB 370, 372, and ‘The Swan’ [1968] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 5). See Chapter 1, para 1.46.
35 Although not risk-free, matched principal trading is not treated similarly to own account dealing for prudential categorization purposes.
36 Some venues, in addition to broker execution, permit guaranteed cross-trading, so that a single broker who is a member of the trading venue acts as matching principal trading agent and crosses two orders in the order book directly.
37 See Chapter 3, paras 3.74ff (on CCP-based clearing systems).
38 Bowstead & Reynolds on Agency (n 25) para 6-042, observing that it is perfectly possible for an agent to hold property for its principal, especially money, and mix the same with its own assets subject only to a duty to transfer equivalent assets or account for the property to the principal, while it is clear in general that the existence of a relationship of debtor and creditor between the parties does not prevent the existence of a fiduciary relationship.
39 Article 4(1)(6) of MiFID II.
40 Article 4(1)(5) of MiFID II.
41 This definition covers the issue by an investment firm of its own securities. The FCA is of the view that the issue of its own securities by a commercial company, ie not an investment firm, should not be within the MiFID perimeter. Accordingly, art 18 of the Financial Services and Markets Act (Regulated Activities) Order 2001, SI 2001/544 (RAO) excludes the ‘issue by a company of its own shares’ from the regulated activity specified in art 14 (Dealing as principal) of RAO. See art 4(4) of RAO, the exclusion of art 18 of RAO does not apply to investment firms.
42 See Annex I, sub A (investment services and activities), which specifies: ‘(6) Underwriting of financial instruments and/or placing of financial instruments on a firm commitment basis;’ and ‘(7) Placing of financial instruments without a firm commitment basis’. These services would normally be supplied to the issuer.
43 Previously Recital (69) of MiFID I Implementing Directive 2006/73/EC.
44 Previously Recital (33) of MiFID I.
45 See para 6.25 above for the agency analysis. In MiFID II terms, back-to-back/matched principal trading involves both dealing on own account and executing orders on behalf of clients. See Recital (24) of MiFID II: ‘Dealing on own account when executing client orders should include firms executing orders from different clients by matching them on a matched principal basis (back-to-back trading), which should be regarded as acting as principal and should be subject to the provisions of this Directive covering both the execution of orders on behalf of clients and dealing on own account.’
46 See Luca Enriques and Matteo Gargantini, ‘The Overarching Duty to Act in the Best Interest of the Client in MiFID II’ in Danny Busch and Guido Ferrarini (eds), Regulation of EU Financial Markets—MiFID II and MiFIR (OUP 2017) para 4.71 (referencing the European Commission’s opinion on best execution issues under MiFID I, set out in the European Commission’s Working Document ESC-07-2007, Commission’s answers to CESR to CESR scope issues under MiFID and the implementing directive, prepared in response to questions from the Committee Of European Securities Regulators (CESR) and sent to CESR by the Commission by letter dated 17 March 2017. The Commission’s letter and Working Document ESC-07-2007 are published by CESR as an Appendix to CESR, Best Execution under MiFID – Questions & Answers (CESR/07-320, May 2007)).)
47 European Commission (n 46) para 6. The Working Document was produced in response to three questions posed by ESMA’s predecessor CESR to the European Commission in relation to the work it was undertaking on best execution: (1) In what circumstances do the best execution requirements apply to firms who operate by providing quotes and then dealing? (2) What may ‘specific instructions’ from a client cover? (3) In what circumstances do investment managers and order receivers and transmitters ‘execute client orders’?
48 European Commission (n 46) para 7.
49 European Commission (n 46) para 7.
50 See Chapter 5, paras 5.36ff (on the use of exclusion clauses).
51 See Chapter 5, paras 5.01ff (on the interpretation of client agreements).
52 See Chapter 4, paras 4.11ff (on the assumption of responsibility).
53 See Chapter 4, paras 4.42ff (on the nature of the MiFID II client’s best interest rule).
54 Dealing on own account is considered to be an investment activity, not an investment service, see Danny Busch, ‘Conduct of Business Rules under MiFID I and MiFID II’ in Danny Busch and Cees van Dam (eds), A Bank’s Duty of Care (Hart 2017) 13.
55 Notwithstanding, there is an argument to be made based on the reference to firms that ‘distribute financial instruments issued by them without providing any advice’ in Recital (45) of MiFID II, in conjunction with the definition of ‘executing orders on behalf of clients’, that the scope of that regulatory capacity is wider, because ‘issuing financial instruments’ includes the execution of derivative contracts by an investment firm with a client that are listed in Annex I, Section C, of MiFID II; see Busch, ‘Conduct of business rules under MiFID I and MiFID II’ (n 54) 16 and Busch, ‘Agency and Principal Dealing’ (n 32) para 9.47.
56 G Adams, ‘Schrödinger’s Cat—A Study in Best Execution’ in Best Execution—Executing Transactions in Securities Markets on behalf of Investors, a collection of essays (European Asset Management Association 2002) 2.
57 ‘Execution venue’ includes ‘a regulated market, an MTF, an OTF, a systematic internaliser, or a market maker or other liquidity provider or an entity that performs a similar function in a third country to the functions performed by any of the foregoing’, see art 64(1) of MiFID II Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/565.
58 Article 27(1) (Best execution) of MiFID II and art 64 (Best execution criteria) of MiFID II Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/565. See also Recital (99) of MiFID II Delegated Regulation 2017/565, observing that when
59 Article 64(1) of MiFID II Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/565.
60 Article 27(4) and (5) of MiFID II.
61 An investment firm also satisfies its best execution obligations ‘to the extent that it executes an order or a specific aspect of an order following specific instructions from the client relating to the order or the specific aspect of the order’; see art 64(2) of MiFID II Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/565.
62 See Article 27(4) and (5) of MiFID II.
63 Article 27(7) of MiFID II and art 66 of MiFID II Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/565.
64 See Recital (5) of MiFID I, observing that it ‘is necessary to establish a comprehensive regulatory regime governing the execution of transactions in financial instrument irrespective of the trading methods used to conclude those transactions so as to ensure a high quality of execution of investor transactions and to uphold the integrity and overall efficiency of the financial system’, and Recital (91) of MiFID II, observing that it ‘is necessary to impose an effective ‘best execution’ obligation to ensure that investment firms execute client orders on terms that are most favourable to the client. That obligation should apply where a firm owes contractual or agency obligations to the client’. See also, the Financial Services Authority, Best Execution (Consultation Paper 154, 2002) 3, noting that best-execution requirements are seen as key components of securities market regulation, for two reasons: ‘First, best execution provides assurance to consumers that firms will act in their best interest when dealing for them in the markets. And second, by requiring firms to seek out the best deals for their customers it facilitates the price formation process and market efficiency.’
65 See Chapter 5, paras 5.25ff (on the meaning of regulatory standard in determining the scope of the duty of skill and care of a professional service provider).
66 See paras 6.36ff above (on the fact patterns that will lead to an obligation to achieve best execution for a firm who is dealing on own account).
67 Recital (103) of MiFID II Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/565, previously Recital (69) of MiFID I Implementing Directive 2006/73/EC:
68 Article 30(1) of MiFID II.
69 Article 65 of MiFID II Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/565. See also ESMA’s predecessor, the Commission of European Securities Regulators (CESR), Technical Advice, Possible MiFID Implementing Measures, 1st and 2nd Set of Mandates (CESR/05–290b, 2005) 38–37, noting, in the context of MiFID I, that an investment manager selects, as part of that service, one or more firms to provide the service of executing orders on behalf of their clients and also may instruct them on how or where to execute. A firm might select an entity to execute its client orders that is not subject to the best execution requirements of art 21 MiFID I, eg an entity in a third country. An investment firm should not be permitted to select another entity to execute its client orders unless it takes all reasonable steps to ensure that the entity has taken all reasonable steps to achieve the best possible execution result on a consistent basis.
70 Article 27 (8) of MiFID II Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/565.
71 Article 28 of MiFID II and arts 67–70 of MiFID II Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/565.
72 Such as an International Securities Identification Number (ISIN).
73 See Staughton J in Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v Bankers Trust Co [1998] QB 728, 764, noting that ‘in my view, every obligation in monetary terms is to be fulfilled, either by the delivery of cash or by some other operation which the creditor demands and which the debtor is either obliged to, or is content to perform’. See further, Charles Proctor, Mann on the Legal Aspects of Money (6th edn, OUP 2005) para 7.09.
74 See also the Glossary in Chapter 1, para 1.73 (on terms of reference in relation to cash accounts).
75 ‘The Moorcock’ (1889) 14 PD 64. Further, it requires little evidence that the settlement custom in the securities market is certain, well known, and reasonable. See Cunliffe-Owen v Teather & Greenwood [1967] 1 WLR 1421, holding that the usages of the London Stock Exchange were binding on members as well as third parties. See for an analysis, Gerard McMeel, The Construction of Contracts—Interpretation, Implication and Rectification (OUP 2011) paras 12.14–12.16.
76 This position is further supported by the cases on charterparties, which suggest in relation to large-value payment obligations that, even where the contract provides for payment in ‘cash’, the word ‘cash’ should be construed to include any commercially recognized method of transferring funds that gives the transferee immediate and unconditional use of the funds transferred so as to be the equivalent of cash; see Ewan McKendrick (ed), Goode on Commercial Law (5th edn, Penguin Random House 2016) para 17.07, citing the cases on charterparties: ‘The Brimnes’ [1973] 1 All ER 769, affirmed [1975] QB 929; ‘The Laconia’ [1976] QB 835, reversed on other grounds [1977] AC 850; ‘The Chikuma’ [1981] 1 WLR 314. See also Proctor (n 73), paras 7.10–7.19.
77 A report from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures (BIS Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems, Technical Committee of IOSCO 2012) para 1.12, defines ‘securities settlement systems’ as a system that ‘enables securities to be transferred and settled by book entry according to a set of predetermined multilateral rules. Such systems allow transfers of securities either free of payment or against payment. When transfer is against payment, many systems provide delivery versus payment (DvP), where delivery of the security occurs if and only if payment occurs’.
78 Settlement finality is discussed separately in paras 6.93ff below.
79 See Michael Simmons, Securities Operations—A Guide to Trade and Position Management (Wiley 2002) para 16.3.1. On occasion, a settlement may occur on a ‘free of payment’ (FOP) basis, where the movement of cash and securities is disassociated: see ibid para 16.3.2.
80 DVP is a generic concept, and not a reference to a single settlement method. The Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems of the Central Banks of the Group of Ten Countries (CPSS) of BIS, distinguishes three DVP models: (1) real-time gross settlement, ie trade-by-trade gross simultaneous processing of funds and securities transfers, (2) gross settlement of securities transfers followed by net settlement of funds, and (3) simultaneous net settlement of securities and funds transfers: see CPSS, Delivery Versus Payment in Securities Settlement Systems (BIS 1992). Model (1) can eliminate settlement risk substantially, provided that the originator’s transfer order cannot be revoked or avoided but could impose significant intra-day liquidity constraints on the participants in the system. Model (2) exposes the transferor of securities to principal risk until completion of the net funds transfer, although the cycle is typically secured by a guarantee from the payer’s bank. Model (3) resembles Model (1) given the simultaneous completion of the fund and securities transfers but exposes the system to participant failure intra-day; see Richard S. Dale, ‘Clearing and Settlement Risks in Global Securities Markets: The Case of Cedel’ [1998] Journal of International Banking Law 349. See generally on DVP models, Madeleine Yates and Gerald Montagu, The Law of Global Custody (4th edn, Bloomsbury 2013) paras 8.31–8.34, Mervyn King, Back Office and Beyond—A Guide to Procedures, Settlements and Risk in Financial Markets (Harriman House Publishing 2003, reprinted 2005) 154–55, and Joanna Benjamin, Interests in Securities—A Proprietary Law Analysis of the International Securities Markets (OUP 2000) para 9.08.
85 See Chapter 3, paras 3.92ff (on the need to establish common intention between principal and agent to keep the client assets separate to constitute a trust).
86 Bowstead & Reynolds on Agency (n 25) para 6-042, observing that it is perfectly possible for an agent to hold property for a principal, especially money, as its own and mix the same with its own assets subject only to a duty to transfer equivalent assets or account for the property to the principal; while it is clear, in general, that the existence of a relationship of debtor and creditor between the parties does not prevent the existence of a fiduciary relationship.
87 See Winn LJ, in Hare v Nicoll [1966] 1 All ER 285, 294, saying,
[i]n my judgement, where there is a provision for the purchase of shares on payment by a stated date, it is to be presumed, in the absence of any contrary indication, that the parties to such a contract have impliedly stipulated and mutually intend that the time of payment shall be of the essence of the contract. It is not, I think, irrelevant to recall that, when a rights issue is made to existing shareholders of a company, it is virtually universal practice to provide that, on failure to pay any of the fixed instalments by due date, the right to take up the new shares shall wholly lapse.
See further Parker J in Re Schwabacher (1908) 98 LT 127, 129, saying that,
[w]ith regard to contracts for the sale of shares, I think that time is of the essence of the contract both at law and in equity. Shares continually vary in price from day to day, and that is precisely why courts of equity have considered such a contract to be one in which time is of the essence of the contract, and not like a contract for the sale and purchase of real estate, in which time is not of the essence of the contract. It is in effect analogous to another class of cases in which equity views time always as being of the essence of the contract—namely, where [there] is a purchase of a business and its goodwill as a going concern. There is a variation from day to day in the value of such goodwill and in many other matters which go to make up what is being sold; and it would be in the highest degree inconvenient if equity considered that time was not of the essence of the contract, but that at some time indefinitely afterwards any party could by notice fix a time for completion long after the time fixed by the party to the contract, and then for the first time make time of the essence.
88 For the avoidance of doubt, the analysis in this section refers to ‘banks’ and ‘bank accounts’, which should be taken to include references to a custodian who operates a cash account for an investor as banker pursuant to the terms and conditions of a custody agreement.
89 Article 4A of the US Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) uses the term ‘funds transfer’: see UCC §4A-103 (1989). The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law on International Funds Transfers uses the term ‘credit transfer’ rather than ‘funds transfer’: see art 2(a), defining ‘funds transfer’ as the ‘series of operations, beginning with the originator’s payment order, made for the purpose of placing funds at the disposal of a beneficiary’. See on use of terminology in connection with funds transfers, Goode on Commercial Law (n 76) para 17.38, observing that discussions of ‘the subject of interbank funds transfers has been complicated by the lack of any consistent use of terminology. However, this is now changing under the influence of Article 4A of the [US] Uniform Commercial Code and the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Funds transfers, which use broadly the same terminology to describe the key players in a funds transfer operation’.
90 See Royal Products Ltd v Midland Bank Ltd [1981] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 194, 198 and, for an analysis of this case, Peter Ellinger, Eva Lomnicka, and Christopher Hare, Ellinger’s Modern Banking Law (5th edn, OUP 2011) 610–17.. See for a generic analysis of a bank’s duty to carry out a payment instruction by means of a funds transfer, Benjamin Geva, Bank Collections and Payment Transactions (OUP 2001) 291ff.
91 This is also the position under the UNCITRAL Model Law on Funds Transfers. Article 7(2)(a) provides that the bank is deemed to have accepted the payment order upon receipt, provided that this is agreed in the banking terms, unless it gives notice of rejection, subject to several exceptions: see art 7(3). Similarly, UCC §4A-209 (1989): see official Comment 3. See further Recital (77) to Directive (EU) 2015/2366 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 on payment services in the internal market, amending Directives 2002/65/EC, 2009/110/EC and 2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, and repealing Directive 2007/64/EC, OJ 2015 L 337, 35, ‘Payment Services Directive II’, observing that ‘users should be able to rely on the proper execution of a complete and valid payment order if the custodian has no contractual or statutory reason for refusal’.
92 See in this context, Recital 77 of the Payment Services DirectiveII.
93 Goode on Commercial Law (n 76) para 17.51. The UNCITRAL Model Law provides for a similar arrangement in art 12. The rule laid down in art 80 of the Payment Services Directive II appears stricter (the payer’s payment order cannot be revoked after it has been received and validated by the executing bank, except where that bank agrees otherwise).
94 See generally on the principle of abstraction, David Fox, Property Rights in Money (Oxford University Press 2008) 3.48–3.75 and 5.78.
96 See Ellinger et al (n 90) 270–73 for a further analysis.
97 See Lord Selbourne in Barnes v Abby [1874] LR 9 Ch App (considering that to ensure that ‘the transactions of mankind’ may be conducted with safety, it is necessary that ‘persons dealing honestly as agents [be] at liberty to rely on the legal powers of the trustees, and are not to have the character of trustees constructively imposed upon them’). See for further analysis, Ellinger et al (n 90) 271–72.
98 Not subjective, but objective dishonesty, see Brunei Airlines v Tan [1995] 2 AC 378.
99 This is explicitly provided for in art 5(6) of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Funds Transfers and UCC §4A-402(c) (1989). Under English law, this position follows from the rule that a bank’s duty to carry out payment instructions depends on the availability of funds on which the account holder is entitled to draw, including overdrafts. See for a general analysis of the bank’s duty to pay cheques, Ellinger et al (n 90) 454–59.
100 See Chapter 3, paras 3.12ff (on netting in current account).
101 The Payment Services Directive II (n 91) provides in art 83 that the paying bank should ensure that the receiving bank’s account should be credited at the latest by the end of the business day that follows the business day at which the paying bank has received the valid payment order. This corresponds to art 11(1) UNCITRAL Model Law on Funds Transfers, which provides that a payment order must be executed promptly, but at the latest by the next banking day.
102 See eg Ellinger et al (n 90) 119, 126, 171 (suggesting, at 171, that the bank’s mandate under the account agreement ‘comprises elements of an agency relationship’).
103 See Chapter 1, paras 1.44ff (on the creation of agency relationships).
104 It is quite common for a bank that operates through a branch rather than a subsidiary in a foreign jurisdiction to maintain nostro accounts with a correspondent bank in that foreign jurisdiction to facilitate local currency payments. For instance, an American or Swiss bank that provides accounts through a UK branch will access the UK interbank payment system through a local correspondent-clearing bank. For a more detailed description of available domestic and international payment systems, see, inter alia, Ross Cranston, Principles of Banking Law (2nd edn, OUP 2002) Ch 8, and Ellinger et al (n 90) Ch 13.
105 Payment order processing may be based on some form of netting, or may take place case by case. If the former, payment instructions are netted at the end of a processing cycle which may differ from once to several times a day and only the balance is transferred between clearing banks’ accounts. If the latter, each individual transfer order is processed and executed separately. This is also referred to as real time gross settlement (RTGS). Netting reduces the number of payments that need to be made and consequently reduces the funding needs a bank may have during the day, ie reduces liquidity requirements that a bank needs to observe. However, netting also increases the risk of default, as payment will be delayed to the end of a processing cycle. RTGS systems usually require immediate payment, and will often include daytime overdraft facilities to finance temporary liquidity needs. Although the credit risk may thus be reduced, there is a risk of payment gridlock if a liquidity squeeze leads to delayed performance. See in general Razeen Sappideen, ‘Cross-Border Electronic Funds Transfers through Large Value Transfer Systems, and the Persistence of Risk’ [2003] Journal of Business Law 594–96.
106 See paras 6.98ff (on the common law tracing rules).
109 See Millett J, Macmillan Inc (n 108) 1014. See for a thorough analysis of the ‘knowing receipt’ cases, Ellinger et al (n 90) 291ff.
110 Lord Browne-Wilkinson in Westdeutsche Landesbank [1996] 1 AC 669 (for a constructive trust to arise in relation to the receipt, the receiving bank would have to know that its actions in relation to that receipt are unconscionable). The case is generally perceived to be the leading case on the nature of constructive trusts based on equitable tracing claims: see Geraint Thomas and Alastair Hudson, The Law of Trusts (2nd edn, OUP 2010) paras 33.73. Even if it could be argued that the bank can be brought within the beneficial receipt category based on certain special circumstances, the claimant would still have to satisfy the tracing requirements. The receipt is a substitute asset.
111 By way of an equitable tracing claim.
112 On the basis that such a payment, following notification of the equitable interest, would constitute unconscionable behaviour. The point is argued by Thomas and Hudson (n 110) para 33.77ff, citing Diplock’s Estate [1948] Ch 465; Foskett v McKeown [2001] 1 AC 102; and Allen v Rea Brothers Trustees Ltd (2002) 4 ITELR 627, and noting that there is a tension in the nature of constructive trusts between those imposed in the event of knowing unconscionable behaviour and those imposed in relation to equitable tracing claims, where the recipient of the assets is innocent.
113 See eg Fox (n 94) paras 5.11–5.13, and Ellinger et al (n 90) 220ff.
114 Although this may be different in the context of a ‘delivery-versus-payment’ settlement, but even then, it is the custodian’s independent decision to accept or reject the payment, not the payee’s: see paras 6.50ff above (on settlement).
115 The potential of operational delay is recognized by art 87(1) of the Payment Services Directive II, providing that the ‘value date’ for credit to the payee account, ie the time at which the account is credited so that the payee becomes entitled to the funds as against the receiving bank, must be the business day on which the corresponding funds are received by that bank, while that bank must ensure that the funds are ‘at the payee’s disposal immediately after that amount is credited to the payee’s … account’. Article 4(26) defines a ‘value date’ as the ‘reference time used by a custodian for the calculation of interest for the funds debited or credited to a payment account’.
117 This is also the position under UCC §4A-404(a) (1989) (if a beneficiary’s bank accepts the derivative payment order, the bank is ‘obliged to pay the amount of the order to the beneficiary of the order’).
118 See also Royal Products [1981] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 194. See for a discussion, Ellinger et al (n 90) 633ff.
119 The bank must verify certain matters before it can give credit in relation to a receipt. The payment order from the paying bank must, for instance, identify the payee adequately. The receiving bank must also continue to be authorized to accept the receipt and give credit to the payee’s account. Legal restrictions may apply, eg trade embargo rules. See Goode on Commercial Law (n 76) para .
120 Royal Products (n 118).
121 Agip (n 107), affirmed [1991] Ch 547, and Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale [1991] 2 AC 548. See also the liability provisions in arts 88–93 of the Payment Services Directive II.
123 Ellinger et al (n 90) 645.
124 See, particularly, Momm (n 116).
125 See the charterparty cases (n 76). The leading case is ‘The Brimnes’ [1973] 1 All ER 769, affirmed [1975] QB 929 in which the Court of Appeal considered that ‘payment is not achieved until the process has reached a stage at which the creditor has … a credit available on which, in the normal course of banking practice, he can draw, if he wishes, in the form of cash’. See also Ellinger et al (n 90) 631.
126 Ellinger et al (n 90) 632.
127 But see Goode on Commercial Law (n 76) para 470, noting the decisions in ‘The Brimnes’ and ‘The Chikuma’ [1981] 1 WLR 314 and concluding that the rule applies generally to all funds transfers; Proctor (n 73) paras 7.09, 7.17–7.18, suggesting at 7.18, based on the decisions in the charterparty cases, that nothing short of a credit entry is sufficient to achieve payment in case of a funds transfer); and Fox (n 94) paras 5.65–5.66, noting the charterparty cases and observing that it has been argued that payment should be regarded as complete as soon as the receiving bank has received a message from the paying bank that it has honoured the payment instruction and that funds have been transferred, because at this stage, the payer and his bank have done all they can to complete the transaction, but that ‘whatever the advantages of this possible alternative test, the authorities are against it as an indication of the point when payment is completed’.
128 Indeed, this is the position under art 19 of the UNCITRAL Model Law. See also Rhys Bollen, ‘Harmonisation of International Payment Law: A Survey of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Credit Transfers’ [2008] Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation 48, 56, suggesting that the UNCITRAL position basically codifies the common law position. However, in light of the charterparty cases, at least, that conclusion may not be straightforward.
129 See Chapter 3, paras 3.46ff (on the proprietary effect of the account agreement).
130 (1841) 4 Beav 115, affirmed Cr & Ph 240. The rule cannot apply where the beneficiary does not have an absolute interest, eg because the interest is a contingent, a limited, or a future interest.
131 AO Austen-Peters, Custody of Investments (Oxford 2000), , appears to argue, at paras 2.37–2.42, that transfers out of the pool held by the account provider are based on a power to alienate the beneficial interest conferred on the account provider by the account holders at the outset. It is not clear what the basis for this power would be: a transfer in trust of the beneficial interest, or agency?
132 See Thomas and Hudson (n 110) paras 7.05–7.07. For criticism of the application of the rule in the context of a unit trust, see Kam Fan Sin, The Legal Nature of the Unit Trust (OUP 1997) 114–20, arguing, at 120, that Saunders v Vautier cannot apply to contractual situations where the mutual rights operate. To the extent this means to argue that the beneficiaries are subject to the contractual terms of the trust, ie that Saunders v Vautier should not override a binding contract, that must be correct. However, in the absence of express contrary agreement, the rule should apply regardless of the fact that the trust is embedded in a contractual relationship. The trustee acts as a mere steward to the trust property, both in a custody relationship and in a unit trust relationship. Subject to the trustee’s rights, the beneficiaries should be entitled to direct the trustee to return their share of the property.
133 See the reasoning in relation to original payment orders in para 6.66 above (on the payer challenging the original payment order).
134 See para 6.67 above (on a third party challenging the original payment order).
135 Brunei Airlines (n 98).
136 See s 1(1) Trustee Act 2000. See also Re Waterman’s Will Trusts [1952] 2 All ER 1054. See generally Thomas and Hudson (n 110) paras 10.33–10.44, and Yates and Montagu (n 80) paras 6.25–6.30.
139 See Yates and Montagu (n 80) para 3.54, noting that contractual settlement amounts to lending of securities.
140 See the charterparty cases: ‘The Brimnes’ [1973] 1 All ER 769, affirmed [1975] QB 929, ‘The Laconia’ [1976] QB 835, reversed on other grounds [1977] AC 850, and ‘The Chikuma’ [1981] 1 WLR 314.
141 See para 6.53 above (on discharge of the debt of the payer).
142 The concept of finality therefore may also be referred to as security of transfer or security of receipt: see, eg Benjamin (n 80) paras 3.42ff, referring to the matter in the context of the transfer of electronic securities.
143 See Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v Banker’s Trust Co [1988] QB 728, rejecting the assignment theory.
144 The payment order is not a transfer instrument but an instruction that results in a transaction between the payer and its bank. This is well recognized by the definition of ‘transfer order’ used in the Settlement Finality Directive (n 2): art 2(i) provides that ‘transfer order’ means ‘any instruction by a participant to place at the disposal of a recipient an amount of money by means of a book entry on the accounts of a credit institution, a central bank, or a settlement agent’. Article 4A of the US UCC uses the term ‘payment order’ rather than ‘transfer order’: see UCC §4A-102 (1989) (which defines ‘payment order’ as ‘an instruction of a sender to a receiving bank, transmitted orally, electronically, or in writing, to pay, or cause another bank to pay, a fixed or determinable amount of money to a beneficiary …’), and Official Comment 3 to UCC § 4A-402 (noting that a ‘payment order is not like a negotiable instrument on which the drawer or maker has liability. Acceptance of the order by the receiving bank creates an obligation of the sender to pay the receiving bank the amount of the order. That is the extent of the sender’s liability to the receiving bank and no other person has any rights against the sender with respect to the sender’s order’). See further arts 2(b) and 5(1) of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Funds Transfers, and the definition of ‘payment order’ in art 4 of the Payment Services Directive II, defining ‘payment order’ as ‘any instruction by a payer or payee to his custodian requesting the execution of a payment transaction’. Modern legislation clearly recognizes that a payment instruction equates to a mandate obliging the payment service provider to carry the instruction out and the payer to reimburse the provider. See in this context, Bollen (n 128).
145 See R v Preddy [1996] AC 815 in which the House of Lords considered whether the beneficiaries of certain funds transfers had obtained ‘property belonging to another’ within the meaning of s 15(1) of the Theft Act 1968. It was expressly noted that the credit to the payee’s account created a new chose in action against the payee’s bank distinct from the payer’s chose in action against its bank. See for a general analysis, Ellinger et al (n 90) 600. See further, Geva, (n 90) paras 266ff.
146 Also, the transactions are not linked through agency: see para 6.70 above (on the absence of agency authority of the paying bank), and 6.75 (on the absence of agency authority of the receiving bank).
147 [2001] 1 AC 102, 128.
148 This is demonstrated in figure 6.3 in para 6.64 above, showing that each following step depends on the acceptance of a payment order in the previous step, not on the receipt of payment.
149 See Benjamin (n 80) paras 3.04ff, and Austen-Peters (n 131) paras 2.37–2.42.
150 This is recognized in the definition of ‘transfer order’ used in art 2(i) Settlement Finality Directive, see para 6.116ff below (defining ‘transfer order’ as ‘any instruction by a participant to place at the disposal of a recipient an amount of money by means of a book entry on the accounts of a credit institution, a central bank or a settlement agent, or any instruction which results in the assumption or discharge of a payment obligation as defined by the rules of the system, or an instruction by a participant to transfer the title to, or interest in, a security or securities by means of a book entry on a register, or otherwise’). Revised Article 8 UCC uses the term ‘entitlement order’ rather than ‘transfer order’: see UCC §8–102(8), defining ‘entitlement order’ as ‘a notification communicated to a securities intermediary directing transfer or redemption of a financial asset to which the entitlement holder has a securities entitlement’.
151 See in connection with ultra vires acts of an investor acting through an agent, Chapter 1, paras 1.52ff (on apparent authority).
152 See on fundamental mistake, Fox (n 94) paras 4.116–4.146.
153 Craig Rotherham, Proprietary Remedies in Context (Bloomsbury 2002) 127–28 (observing that ‘the cases have tended to turn on artificial and elusive distinctions as to whether sellers intended to deal with a third party whom a rogue impersonated. The state of the authorities that has resulted does the law no credit.’)
154 Following is what under classic Roman law would be referred to as an actio revindicatio, an actio in rem, which permitted the recovery of a specific asset by the absolute owner. That terminology is still very much used in civil law systems to describe the return of an asset to the legal owner, and would be a convenient term here, too, as the concept of a ‘following claim’ denotes a process whereby property in specie is followed and identified by its original common law owner and returned to that owner; see Lionel Smith, The Law of Tracing (Clarendon Press 1997) para 1.14.
155 See Lord Browne-Wilkinson in Westdeutsche Landesbanken (n 110). See further Thomas and Hudson (n 110) para 33.72, and para 6.74 above.
157 [1996] 1 AC 669 (the case concerned payment made under a mistake of law, as the transaction was entered into ultra vires by the payee).
158 See for a critique of the reasoning that a constructive trust arises only when the conscience of the recipient is affected, Rotherham (n 153) 138–40; Thomas and Hudson (n 110) para 26.07.
159 Rotherham (n 153) 132.
160 Rotherham (n 153), 129.
162 Fox (n 94) paras 6.17.
163 Fox (n 94) para 6.28, using the term ‘inchoate equitable interest’ to denote that the right to rescind has not been exercised, yet. See also Rotherham (n 153) 129.
164 See Fox (n 94) paras 6.40–6.42, arguing that a resulting trust is the better instrument as it permits a variable delineation in time between different interests of the transferee and transferor. A constructive trust arises ab initio and absolutely. But see also Rotherham (n 153) 142, observing that ‘why a resulting trust should arise in these circumstances is not really explained’.
165 See Millett LJ in Bristol and West Building Society v Mothew [1998] Ch 1, 23, applying Westdeutsche Landesbanken (n 110). See on the exact time at which the trust arises, Fox (n 94) paras 6.63–6.64.
167 Agip [1991] Ch 547, and Lipkin Gorman [1991] 2 AC 548. See Thomas and Hudson (n 110) para 33.21.
168 See the Court of Appeal’s decision in FC Jones & Sons (a firm) v Jones [1996] 3 WLR 703 (the amount originally held and the profits generated ultimately had been held in a single bank account and had not been mixed).
169 Westdeutsche Landesbanken (n 110), and Bishopsgate Investment Management v Hofman [1995] Ch 211.
171 Re Diplock’s Estate (n 112). See also Thomas and Hudson (n 110) para 33.36.
172 It has been argued that the holder of a legal estate necessarily also holds the equitable interest in it and should therefore be allowed to trace in equity as well. This was explicitly rejected by Lord Browne-Wilkinson in Westdeutsche Landesbanken (n 110), saying ‘I think this argument is fallacious. A person solely entitled to the full beneficial ownership of money or property, both at law and in equity, does not enjoy an equitable interest in that property. The legal title carries with it all rights. Unless and until there is a separation of the legal and the equitable estates, there is no separate title.’ It is not clear, however, why a holder with the better title might not avail itself of the rights that the holder of the same property with a lesser title would be able to assert.
173 But see Chase Manhattan [1980] Ch 105 in which the payee was allowed to trace in equity based on the facts that the payment was made in error and that the defendant could not have retained the money in good faith, as a result of which a constructive trust arose as soon as the money was received. Nevertheless, this authority has been met with criticism: see Rotherham (n 153) 133.
174 See Lord Millett in Dollar Land [1993] 3 All ER 717, permitting a proprietary remedy in circumstances where the plaintiff invested in a rogue project via a fraudulent agent, and thus, could claim breach of fiduciary duty. Other investors invested directly, and therefore, as legal owners, would not have had a remedy, prompting Lord Millett to observe, obiter, that it ‘would of course be an intolerable reproach to our system of jurisprudence if the plaintiff were the only victim who could trace and recover the money’. See further, Lord Browne-Wilkinson in Westdeutsche Landesbanken (n 110), permitting the payer under a contract that was void ab initio—a swap entered into ultra vires by the payee—to bring an equitable claim.
175 Bishopsgate Investment Management(n 169). See also Westdeutsche Landesbanken (n 110).
176 Agip (n 167); Dollar Land (n 174).
177 See Fox (n 94) para 7.61 (citing Re Hallett’s Estate (1880) 13 Ch D 696, and Re Oatway [1903] 2 Ch 356).
179 Westdeutsche Landesbanken (n 110).
180 A recipient may defeat the claim if, on the faith of that receipt, it has changed its position so that it would suffer an injustice if called upon to repay, but this is not a general defence that can be relied upon in the normal course of commercial business, see Lord Goff in Lipkin Gorman [1991] 2 AC 548, 580 (noting ‘I wish to stress however that the mere fact that the defendant has spent the money, in whole or in part, does not itself render it inequitable that he should be called upon to repay, because the expenditure might in any event have been incurred by him in the ordinary course of things’).
181 (1820) 4 B & Ald 1, 106 ER 839.
182 The defence was first established in Miller v Race (1758) 1 Burr 452.
183 Millet J, in Macmillan Inc (n 108).
184 Joseph H Sommer, ‘A Law of Financial Accounts: Modern Payment and Securities Transfer Law’ (1998) 53 The Business Lawyer 1194.
186 See eg the Financial Markets Law Committee, Property Interests in Investment Securities (Financial Markets Law Committee 2004) 13, and JS Rogers, ‘Negotiability, Property and Identity’ (1990) 12 Cardozo Law Review 471, giving, at 508, the following objection to negotiability for book-entry securities:
What negotiability does is enable us to use physical objects as tokens of abstract rights without applying the legal concepts that ordinarily govern rights in physical objects. Saying that one takes the token free from prior adverse claims to ‘it’, really means that one takes the abstract right, and that what may once have happened to the physical token is irrelevant. It would, then, be ironic to attempt to preserve the concept of negotiability once we dispense with the physical tokens.
But see also Eva Micheler, ‘Farewell Quasi-Negotiability? Legal Title and Transfer of Shares in a Paperless World’ (2002) Journal of Business Law 358.
187 The winding-up procedure permits the orderly liquidation and dissolution of an insolvent company. The terms “winding-up” and “liquidation” are generally used interchangeably. Two separate modes of winding-up procedure exist: voluntary or compulsory winding-up, known technically as “winding-up by the court”: see Ian F Fletcher, The Law of Insolvency (5th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2017) para 17-001 and 17-002.
188 Section 129 Insolvency Act 1986.
189 Under s 239(2) and (3) Insolvency Act 1986, where the company has given a ‘preference’ to any person, on application the competent court may make an order restoring the position to what it would have been if the company had not given that preference. Section 239(4) provides that a company gives a preference to a person if (a) that person is one of the company’s creditors, or a surety or guarantor for any of the company’s debts or other liabilities, and (b) the company does anything or suffers anything to be done which (in either case) has the effect of putting that person into a position which, in the event of the company going into insolvent liquidation, will be better than the position he would have been in if that thing had not been done. The act must be voluntarily and purposive. Section 239(5) provides that the court shall not make the restoration order unless the company was influenced in deciding to give the preference by an intention to put the recipient in the better position. Where a receiving bank gives credit to an insolvent payee who owes a debit balance, the giving of credit might be regarded as a payment by the bank to itself. Does that credit constitute a ‘preference’ within the meaning of s 239 Insolvency Act 1986? Ellinger et al (n 90) 266 note that under s 239(6) an order restoring the original position is available only insofar as the debtor is influenced at the time it gives the preference by a desire to confer a benefit on the creditor. Therefore, unless the payee somehow arranged for the payment to be made with the sole purpose of benefiting the receiving bank, the credit should not be set aside.
190 Section 238(2) and (3) Insolvency Act 1986 provides that, where the company has at a relevant time entered into a transaction with any person at an undervalue, on application the court may make such order as it thinks fit for restoring the position to what it would have been if the company had not entered into that transaction. A company enters into such a transaction if it makes a gift to that person or otherwise enters into a transaction with that person on terms that provide for the company to receive no consideration, or it enters into a transaction with that person for a consideration the value of which, in money or money’s worth, is significantly less than the value, in money or money’s worth, of the consideration provided by the company: see s 238(4).
191 See Fletcher (n 187) para 26-012, noting that the word ‘disposition’ in s 127 is not defined in the Insolvency Act 1986. When a company transfers money from a bank account that is in credit then for the purpose of s 127 that is a disposition to the payee to the extent of the existing credit balance, for the value of the claim against the bank is correspondingly reduced, ibid.
192 Fletcher (n 187) paras 26-012.
193 Fletcher (n 187) para 26-012. See Re Gray’s Inn Construction Co Ltd [1980] 1 All ER 814. After a petition for winding-up was made certain sums were credited to the company’s overdrawn account. Buckley LJ observed that when a
customer’s account with his banker is overdrawn he is debtor to his banker for the amount of the overdraft. When he pays a sum of money into the account, whether in cash or by payment in of a third party’s cheque, he discharges his indebtedness to the bank pro tanto. There is clearly in these circumstances, in my judgment, a disposition by the company to the bank of the amount of the cash or of the cheque. It may well be the case, as counsel for the bank has submitted, that in clearing a third party’s cheque and collecting the amount due on it, the bank acts as the customer’s agent, but as soon as it credits the amount collected in reduction of the customer’s overdraft, as in the ordinary course of banking business it has authority to do in the absence of any contrary instruction from the customer, it makes a disposition on the customer’s behalf in its own favour discharging pro tanto the customer’s liability on the overdraft.
The decision was adopted, obiter, by Harman J in Re McGuinness Bros (UK) Ltd (1987) 3 BCC 571.
194 Fletcher (n 187) para 26-012.
195 See Oliver J in R J Leslie Engineers Co Ltd [1976] 1 WLR 292, 298.
196 Fletcher (n 187) para 26-014.
197 See Chapter 3, para 3.12ff (on the nature of netting in current account).
198 See s 323 of the Insolvency Act 1986 and Rule 14.25 of the Insolvency (England and Wales) Rules 2016, SI 2016, No 1024 (a re-enactment of Rule 4.90 of the Insolvency Rules 1986, SI 1986, No 1925). The Insolvency Rules apply to the liquidation of companies incorporated under English law.
199 Section 178(3) of the Insolvency Act 1986.
200 Section 178(4) of the Insolvency Act 1986.
201 Section 178(5) of the Insolvency Act 1986.
202 See generally on the effect of disclaiming onerous property under s 178, Fletcher (n 187) paras 26-023ff.
203 Directive 98/26/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 1998 on settlement finality in payment and securities settlement systems, the ‘Settlement Finality Directive’, is implemented in the UK through the Financial Markets and Insolvency (Settlement Finality) Regulations 1999, SI 1999/2979. See on the implementation in the UK, generally, Dermot Turing, ‘Implementation of the Settlement Finality Directive in England’ in M Vereecken and A Nijenhuis (eds), Settlement Finality in the European Union (Kluwer Legal Publishers 2003).
204 The account holder of a participant is not a participant, but can qualify as an indirect participant: see the definition of ‘transfer order’ and ‘indirect participant’ in art 1 of the Settlement Finality Directive.
205 Such as payment systems operated by central banks.
206 Such as (I)CSD-operated securities-settlement systems.
207 Such as CCP-operated clearing and settlement systems.
208 See arts 2(a) and 10 of the Settlement Finality Directive.
209 The definition of ‘transfer orders’ covers both electronic funds transfers and electronic securities transfers: see art 2(i) of the Settlement Finality Directive.
210 See art 2(a) of the Settlement Finality Directive. Normally, the system would have to service at least three ‘user’ participants, but the Directive allows for bilateral payment and settlement arrangements to be designated as a system, ie formal arrangements between two user-participants, ie not counting a possible settlement agent, a possible clearing house, or a possible indirect participant: see art 2(a) of the Settlement Finality Directive.
211 Article 2(b) of the Settlement Finality Directive.
212 Sections 238 and 239 of the Insolvency Act 1986 concern preferential payments. Section 178 Insolvency Act 1986 concerns the ability of the liquidator to terminate executory contracts on grounds that these are unprofitable. See paras 6.111ff above.