Footnotes:
1 For a discussion of UK exchange controls and the events leading up to their abolition, see Kynaston, ‘The Long Life and Slow Death of Exchange Controls’ [2000] JIFM 37.
2 The suspension of the exchange control system took effect from midnight on 23 October 1979 and was achieved by means of a general consent given under s 37 of the 1947 Act. The Act itself was finally repealed by the Finance Act 1987 (s 72(7) and Sch 16, Pt XI). It may be added in passing that a system of exchange control should be applied generally and for the purpose of protecting the country’s monetary resources. Viewed in that light the use of the Exchange Control Act 1947 to regulate commerce with Rhodesia in the period following its Unilateral Declaration of Independence may be open to objection—see App (Southern Rhodesia) to Exports from the United Kingdom (Bank of England Notice to Exporters, 8 September 1970). However, this merely formed a small part of a broader set of sanctions against that country and the point is no longer of practical concern. In the view of the present writer, sanctions should not be seen as a form of exchange control—see para 17.02.
3 The provisions of the TFEU dealing with free movement of capital and payments are considered in Ch 25 in the context of economic and monetary union.
4 On these points, see Article VIII(2)(a), IMF Agreement (current payments) and Article VI(2)(b) IMF Agreement (capital controls).
5 Respectively, 15 Chas II, ch 7, ss 12 and 7 and 8 Will III, ch 19.
6 By 59 Geo III, ch 49, ss 10–12; 1 & 2 Geo IV, ch 26, s 4.
7 See in particular the Gold and Silver (Export Control) Act 1920.
8 SR & O 1939, No 950. The Order in Council was made on 25 August 1939, pursuant to powers conferred by the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act 1939, s 1. The Defence (Finance) Regulations Amendment Order 1939 (SR & O 1939, No 1620) was made on 23 November 1939 and formed the basis of UK exchange control for a number of years. For a survey of these regulations, see Mann, ‘Exchange Control in England’ (1939–1940) 3 MLR 202.
9 Notices to Banks did not have legal force, but explained the policy of the authorities from time to time and indicated those types of case in which permission might (or might not) be expected to be forthcoming. Consent might sometimes be given subject to conditions, eg a premium rate of exchange would generally be applied if the applicant wished to purchase foreign securities or make capital investments overseas. The general subject was covered in Exchange Control Notices EC 7 and 18. The so-called ‘dollar premium’ was briefly noted in Shelly v Paddock [1978] 3 All ER 129.
10 On the points made in this paragraph, See Bank of England, A Guide to United Kingdom Exchange Control (February 1977).
11 For a recent and successful attack on South Africa exchange controls imposing an ‘exit charge‘ on the basis of inconsistency with the Constitution, see Shuttleworth v South African Reserve Bank and others [2014] 4 AIISA 693 (Supreme Court of Appeal, South Africa.
12 The official administration of exchange control was in fact delegated by the Treasury to the Bank of England. The Bank, in turn, delegated a number of responsibilities to commercial banks, which were ‘authorized dealers’ for the purpose of the Act. At least in so far as discretions were conferred upon the Treasury of the Bank of England, the exercise of such discretions might be amenable to judicial review if irrelevant factors had been taken into account in reaching a decision. For a New Zealand case which illustrates this point in the context of exchange control, see Rowling v Takaro Properties Ltd [1975] 2 NZLR 62. The case involved a refusal by Mr Rowling (in his capacity as New Zealand Minister for Finance) to grant the approval that was necessary to enable a Japanese company to acquire shares in Takaro, a New Zealand entity. The refusal was based on a desire to ensure continued New Zealand ownership and operation of the Takaro Lodge. Under the legislation giving the Minister power to sanction share acquisitions of this kind, the Minister was required to consider the financial and economic resources of New Zealand, with the result that presentation of New Zealand ownership was a legally irrelevant consideration. The Court of Appeal accordingly declared the Minister’s decision to be invalid. The episode is the subject of later decisions in New Zealand, but these deal with the potential liability of the Minister for an erroneous decision. The Minister was ultimately absolved of such liability by the Privy Council: Rowling v Takano Properties Ltd [1988] AC 473. The Privy Council cast some doubt on the decision in the original exchange control case.
13 Thus, if a loan had been made in contravention of s 1 of the Act, then the lender could not recover the amounts owing to him even though permission were obtained subsequently. The injustices to which these provisions could give rise are plainly illustrated by Boissevain v Weil [1950] AC 327 (CA) and by the County Court decision in Mortarana v Morley (1958) 108 LJ 204. In each case, the debtor was able to avoid his repayment obligations by relying on exchange control regulations, but the objective merits of the defence are by no means obvious.
15 See Pt II, Sch 5, para 1.
16 Ignorance of particular types of directions given by the Bank of England could, in limited cases, constitute a defence under s 37(3) of the Act, but this only marginally detracts from the general statement in the text.
17 Pickett v Fesq [1949] 2 All ER 705. In spite of this view, it should be emphasized that there are relatively few decisions relating to the 1947 Act. Given the scope of the prohibitions created by the 1947 Act, the absence of a significant body of case law is remarkable.
18 A point emphasized in Contract & Trading Co (Southern) Ltd v Barbey [1960] AC 244. This decision was cited by the Court of Appeal of Barbados in Kings Beach Hotels Ltd v Johanna Kesmin Marks (Civil Appeal No 26 of 2006), where the company alleged that the security created by a debenture over its assets was void, on the basis that the foreign borrowing thereby secured had not been approved by the Central Bank of Barbados. The court dismissed this argument, in part because it would have allowed the company to use the exchange control legislation as a means of defrauding the foreign lender.
19 See ss 1 and 2 of the 1947 Act. The list of authorized dealers was published pursuant to s 42 of the Act. Authorized dealers and certain others were required to comply with directions given by the Treasury and were thus charged with an administrative role in ensuring compliance with the provisions of the Act—see s 34.
20 ‘Gold’ referred to gold coin and gold bullion—see s 42 of the 1947 Act. The Act was thus directed to gold which had a monetary value as a currency or means of exchange; it did not apply to gold merely on account of its market value. On this point, see Freed v DPP [1969] 2 QB 115, (DC).
21 For ease of illustration, the discussion will proceed on this basis. However, it should be appreciated that payments could generally be made to residents of other countries within the sterling area—referred to as the ‘scheduled territories’ in the 1947 Act. The sterling area is discussed in Ch 33.
22 1947 Act, s 6(1). Consent was generally given for payments of a current nature, thus securing compliance with this country’s obligations in that respect under the terms of the Articles of Agreement of the International Fund—see paras 22.29–22.41. Where, however, payment was to be made to acquire an overseas investment, approval from the Bank of England was almost invariably required, and the rate of exchange used to acquire the necessary foreign currency would involve an ‘investment premium’—see generally, A Guide to United Kingdom Exchange Control (Bank of England, 1977).
23 These provisions were to some extent supplemented by ss 21 and 22 of the 1947 Act, which prohibited both the import and export of banknotes.
24 Thus, whilst the import of both sterling and foreign currency banknotes was unrestricted, any foreign currency held by a person resident in the UK had to be offered for sale to an authorized dealer. The export of such notes was subject to a requirement for consent under the 1947 Act. In practice, however, a number of exceptions applied—see A Guide to United Kingdom Exchange Control (Bank of England, 1977) 19; Bank of England Notice EC2 to Authorised Banks Import and Export of Notes, Assurance Policies, Bills of Exchange etc (29 November 1972).
25 See Koh Kim Chai v Asia Commercial Bank [1984] 1 WLR 860, considering an equivalent provision in the Malaysian Exchange Control Act 1953.
26 This point is further considered in the context of Art VIII(2)(b) of the IMF Agreement—see Ch 22. It will be apparent that the wide-ranging statutory prohibitions which have just been outlined would, of themselves, render impossible almost any form of international commerce. It is thus necessary to repeat that the provisions were made workable by means of numerous concessions created by means of statutory instruments and Notices to Banks. However, the text is concerned with the broad framework, rather than the detailed exceptions.
27 For the details, see Sch 5 to the 1947 Act.
28 See s 42(5) of the 1947 Act.
29 The concept of ‘residence’ can be an elusive one, but the Treasury had power to determine whether or not a particular person was resident in the UK for these purposes—see s 41(2) of the 1947 Act.
30 See, in particular, ss 1, 2, 7, and 10.
31 See, eg, ss 6, 24, 28, 29, and 30.
33 See, eg, s 5—‘no person shall do any of the following things in the United Kingdom’. The United Kingdom refers to the place in which the act is done, not the place in which the relevant person was to be found at the time.
34 International law would not generally permit the United Kingdom to claim criminal jurisdiction over the actions of foreigners abroad—see Oppenheim para 137, discussing The Lotus Case (1927) PCIJ Series A, No 10 and Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (Oxford University Press, 6th edn, 2003) 299–305.
35 The present discussion again proceeds by reference to the provisions of the 1947 Act. Nevertheless it is suggested that the broad contractual issues which are about to be discussed would apply equally in any country which continues to operate a system of exchange control.
36 For a discussion of this principle under English law, see Chitty, paras 2-153–2-179.
37 On this subject generally, see Ch 4.
38 Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Malaysia Mining Corporation Bhd [1989] 1 All ER 785 (CA). It seems to have been accepted that English law governed the question of material validity.
39 A similar provision remains in effect in several Commonwealth countries, eg see s 36 of the Malaysian Exchange Control Act.
40 See remarks made in Contract and Trading Co (Southern) Ltd v Barbey [1960] AC 244, 245. In accordance with general principles of statutory interpretation, the section could only apply to contracts governed by English law.
41 See the 1947 Act, Sch 4, para 4. The point was confirmed in relation to corresponding Malaysian exchange control legislation in Tow Kong Liang v Nomura Singapore Limited [2004] MYCA 41 (Malaysian Court of Appeal).
42 Windschuegl Ltd v Alexander Pickering Ltd (1950) 84 Ll LR 89.
43 AV Pound & Co Ltd v MW Hardy & Co Inc [1956] AC 588.
44 Brauer & Co (Great Britain) Ltd v James Clark (Brush Materials) Ltd [1952] 2 All ER 497.
45 This is apparent from the proviso to s 33(1), which has been reproduced in para 14.1820.
46 Boissevain v Weil [1950] AC 327, 341. This case illustrates in the clearest terms the injustice which exchange control regulations could cause in certain cases; for criticism, see Mann, Rec 111 (1964, i) 124, and see also the discussion by Jonathan Anderson, ‘Currency Control, Exchange Contracts and War: Boissevain v Weil’ (2018) 3 Jus Gentium, Journal of International Legal History 505. In Swiss Bank Corp v Lloyds Bank Ltd [1982] AC 684, the Court of Appeal noted that actions taken in breach of the 1947 Act were devoid of legal effect as between the parties, and that they merely exposed the wrongdoer to criminal sanctions. The Court was concerned with s 16(2) of the Act (which dealt with the holding of certificates for securities by authorized depositories) and the comment may be justifiable in that specific context. However, it is plainly not acceptable as a statement of general principle.
47 Shelly v Paddock [1980] 2 WLR 647, distinguishing JM Allen (Merchandising) Ltd v Clarke [1963] 2 QB 340.
48 See, eg, Boissevain v Weil [1950] AC 327 (HL); Bigos v Boustead [1951] 1 All ER 92; Re HPC Productions Ltd [1962] Ch 466; and Shaw v Shaw [1965] 638 (CA).
49 Bank für Gemeinwirtschaft v City of London Garages Ltd [1971] 1 All ER 541(CA). The decision in part reflects s 33(2) of the 1947 Act, which preserved the validity of a bill of exchange notwithstanding any requirement for permission under the Act.
50 See the 1947 Act, Sch 4, para 4.
51 Contract and Trading Co (Southern) Ltd v Barbey [1960] AC 244, and see also Credit Lyonnais v PT Barnard & Associates Ltd (1976) 1 Ll LR 557. In Shaw v Shaw [1965] 1 All ER 638, the Court of Appeal had to consider a claim for a refund of a payment made in connection with the purchase of a property in Spain. The Court of Appeal struck out the claim, on the basis that the plaintiff based himself on nothing but the illegal payment. Yet this was not so, for the plaintiff was suing for the return of money paid for a consideration which had wholly failed (see p 639 of the judgment). Regrettably, the Court did not consider the Fourth Schedule provisions (n 46), although it seems unlikely that they would have assisted the plaintiff—they apply only to ‘debts’, and recovery seems precluded by the decision in Boissevain v Weil [1950] AC 327.
52 Koh Kim Chai v Asia Commercial Banking Corp [1984] 1 WLR 850 (PC), applied and followed in American Express Sdn Bhd v Dato Wong Kee Tat [1990] MLJ 91 and Tow Kong Liang v Nomura Singapore Ltd [2004] MYCA 41.
53 This is the effect of the decisions of the Supreme Court of Appeal in Oil Well (Pty) Ltd v Protech International Ltd and others 2011 (A) SA 394 and of the Western Cape High Court in Van Zyl and others v Master of the High Court of South Africa 2013(5) SA 71