1 James Crawford, The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, Text and Commentaries (Cambridge University Press 2002) 134 (Crawford, ILC’s Articles on State Responsibility): ‘[t]he principle of the intertemporal law [does not] mean that facts occurring prior to the entry into force of a particular obligation may not be taken into account where these are otherwise relevant’.
2 See eg Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed SA v United Mexican States, ICSID Case No ARB (AF)/00/2, Award (29 May 2003)  (Tecmed v Mexico); Mondev International Ltd v United States of America, ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/99/2, Award (11 October 2002) ; Ioannis Kardassopoulos and Ron Fuchs v Republic of Georgia, ICSID Case No ARB/05/18 and ARB/07/15, Award (3 March 2010); MCI Power Group LC and New Turbine Inc v Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No ARB/03/6 (31 July 2007)  (MCI Power Group v Ecuador); Walter Bau v Thailand, UNCITRAL (5 October 2007) [9.85] (Walter Bau v Thailand); Victor Pey Casado and the President Allende Foundation v Chile, ICSID Case No ARB/98/2, Award (8 May 2008) ; Judge Fitzmaurice’s separate opinion in Case concerning the Northern Cameroons (Cameroon v United Kingdom) (Separate Opinion of Judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice)  ICJ Rep 15, 130.
3 Harutyunan v Armenia, App no 36549/03 (28 June 2007) .
4 Malawi Africa Association and Others v Mauritania, African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Comm No 54/91 (11 May 2000).
6 Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, Hassan Ngeze v The Prosecutor (Judgment in Appeals Chamber) ICTY-99-52-A (28 November 2007)  (Nahimana v The Prosecutor). Nahimana was relied on in the decision of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia in The Prosecutor v Chea Nuon and Samphan Khieu (Trial Judgment) ECCC-2007-002/01 (7 August 2014) [fn 195] (The Prosecutor v Chea Nuon and Samphan Khieu): ‘The evidence discussed in this section is for the purpose of establishing the historical and factual context of events within the temporal jurisdiction of the ECCC. Such may include: clarifying a given context, establishing by inference the elements of criminal conduct within the temporal jurisdiction of the ECCC, or demonstrating a deliberate pattern of conduct’.
7 The Prosecutor v Chea Nuon and Samphan Khieu (n 6) : ‘The events during the Democratic Kampuchea era must be understood within the context of events that preceded it and in particular the development of the Communist Party of Kampuchea …’.
8 The Prosecutor v Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (Trial Judgment) ECCC-2007-001 (18 August 2007) , . See also decisions of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in Moiwana Village v Suriname (Judgment), IACtHR (Series C) No 124 (15 June 2005) ; Manuel Cepeda Vargas v Colombia (Judgment), IACtHR (Series C) No 213 (26 May 2010) –.
9 Prosecutor v Jean-Baptiste Gatete (Decision on Defence Motion on Admissibility of Allegations Outside the Temporal Jurisdiction of the Tribunal) ICTR-2000-61-T (3 November 2009) . See also Nahimana v The Prosecutor (n 6) ; Aloys Simba v The Prosecutor (Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Regarding Temporal Jurisdiction) ICTR-01-76-AR72.2 (29 July 2004) 3; The Prosecutor v Bagosora, Kabiligi, Ntabakuze and Nsengiyum va (Decision on Admissibility of Proposed Testimony of Witness DBY) ICTR-98-41-T (18 September 2003)  (The Prosecutor v Bagosora); and Crawford, ILC’s Articles on State Responsibility (n 1) 144.
10 The Prosecutor v Bagosora (n 9) .
11 Ibid , –. See also The Prosecutor v Akayesu (Judgment) ICTR-96-4-T (2 September 1998); Carsten Stahn, Mohamed El Zeidy, and Hector Olásolo, ‘The International Criminal Court’s Ad Hoc Jurisdiction Revisited’ (2005) 99 Am J Int’l L 421, 431.
12 The Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Judgment)  ICC-01/04-01/06.
13 Ibid . See also The Prosecutor v Chea Nuon and Samphan Khieu (n 6) ; ST-AD GmbH v Republic of Bulgaria, UNCITRAL PCA Case No 2011-06, Award on Jurisdiction (18 July 2013) ; and Société Générale In respect of DR Energy Holdings Limited and Empresa Distribuidora de Electricidad del Este SA v The Dominican Republic, UNCITRAL, LCIA Case No UN 7927, Award on Preliminary Objections to Jurisdiction (19 September 2008) .
14 The Prosecutor v Augustin Ngirabatware (Decision on Defence Motion to Exclude Evidence Falling Outside the Temporal Jurisdiction of the Tribunal) ICTR-99-54-T (3 February 2011) .
16 Apotex Inc v United States of America, UNCITRAL, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (14 June 2013) .
17 William Ralph Clayton, William Richard Clayton, Douglas Clayton, Daniel Clayton and Bilcon of Delaware, Inc v Canada, UNCITRAL, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability (17 March 2015) . See also Marvin Roy Feldman Karpa v United Mexican States, ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/99/1, Interim Decision on Preliminary Jurisdictional Issues (6 December 2000) ; and Rusoro Mining Limited v The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/12/5, Award (22 August 2016) .
18 Robert E. Brown (United States) v Great Britain, VII UNRIAA 120, 219. The tribunal went on to conclude that Great Britain was not responsible for these actions of the South African Republic.
19 Compania de Aguas del Aconquija SA and Vivendi Universal SA v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/97/3, Award (20 August 2007) [7.4.46] (Vivendi v Argentina): ‘[w]e are in no doubt that Respondent’s many acts and omissions cumulatively … infringed the “minimum standard of treatment …’; and [7.5.33]: ‘[t]he Province’s actions—from the very opening months of the concession, continuing through its wrongful regulatory action and culminating in the unilateral amendments to the 8 April Agreement—had the necessary consequence of forcing CAA to terminate the Concession Agreement’. See also El Paso Energy International Company v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/03/15, Award (31 October 2011) : ‘The Tribunal, taking an all-encompassing view of consequences of the measures complained of by El Paso … concludes that, by their cumulative effect, they amount to a breach of the fair and equitable treatment standard’.
20 Vivendi v Argentina (n 19) [7.5.31].
21 Rosiński v Poland, App no 17373/02 (17 July 2007) .
24 Rosiński v Poland (Concurring Opinion of Judge Mularoni) App no 17373/02 (17 July 2007) .
25 Sovtransavto Holding v Ukraine, App no 48553/99 (25 July 2002) .
28 Papamichalopoulos and Others v Greece, App no 14556/89 (24 June 1993) –. See also the decisions of the European Commission and ECtHR in Phocas v France, App no 17869/91 (4 July 1994 and 23 April 1996), and in particular the dissenting opinion of Judges Foighel and Palm; the decision in Pakshayev v Russia, App no 1377/04 (13 March 2014), where the Court found a breach of art 6(3)(c) of the ECHR, even though the period in which the applicant was denied a lawyer was before the Convention entered into force for Russia. Article 6(3)(c) states: ‘Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: … (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require’.
29 Mitev v Bulgaria, App no 40063/98 (22 December 2004) : ‘The Court will proceed on the basis that the relevant period was at least three years and eight months (26 October 1993–8 April 1994 and 5 August 1994–23 October 1997)’. Other decisions of the Court also followed this approach; see eg Kemmache v France (No 1 and No 2), App nos 12325/86 and 14992/89 (27 November 1991) . But it was rejected in subsequent decisions and ultimately by the Grand Chamber in Idalov v Russia, App no 5826/03 (22 May 2012) –.
30 Tecmed v Mexico (n 2) .
34 MCI Power Group v Ecuador (n 2) .
36 Note that in its commentary to the article the ILC focused on obligations that can only be breached through a series of measures (such as genocide and apartheid). See also Scott Vesel, ‘A “Creeping” Violation of the Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard?’ (2014) 30(3) Arbitration International 553, where he partly drew from this commentary to conclude that: ‘[t]he term “composite act” refers to obligations which can only be breached through a series of measures rather than through an individual act’ (emphasis in original). See also ILC, ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its twenty-eighth session’ (3 May–23 July 1976) UN Doc A/31/10, 93 (ILC, ‘Report of 28th session’): ‘The distinctive characteristic of such an [composite] act is thus the systematic repetition of actions having the same purpose, content and effect, but relating to specific cases which are independent of one another’. Nonetheless, some tribunals have interpreted art 15 and the concept of ‘composite acts’ as referring to all acts that can breach an obligation through their cumulative effect. See eg Sergei Paushok, CJSC Golden East Company and CJSC Vostokneftegaz Company v Mongolia, UNCITRAL, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability (28 April 2011); and Pac Rim Cayman LLC v Republic of El Salvador, ICSID Case No ARB/09/12, Decision on the Respondent’s Jurisdictional Objections (1 June 2012) [2.70]–[2.74]: ‘[a] composite act is not the same, single act extending over a period of time, but is composed of a series of different acts that extend over that period; or, in other words, a composite acts results from an aggregation of other acts that acquires a different legal characterization from those other acts …’.
37 ILC, ‘Report of 28th session’ (n 36) 94 (emphasis added).
38 Ibid 87. See also Joost Pauwelyn, ‘The Concept of a “Continuing Violation” of an International Obligation: Selected Problems’ (1995) 66 British Yearbook International Law 415, 446–7 (Pauwelyn, ‘The Concept of a “Continuing” Violation’): ‘[o]nly those individual cases or acts which occurred after the obligation came into force can be taken into account to determine whether the obligation in question has at all been breached … Indeed, once it has been determined that the ‘composite act’ breaches the obligation, the breach will necessarily operate retroactively and start from the date of the first act of the series of acts taken into account … Therefore if the court took into account acts prior to the date of entry into force of the obligation and found that a practice has been established, it would automatically act contrary to the principle of non-retroactivity since the breach would then start on a date at which the obligation was not yet in force’. See also Eric Wyler, ‘Quelques réflexions sur la realisation dans le temps’ (1991) 95 RGDIP 881, 896 (Wyler, ‘Quelques réflexions sur la realisation dans le temps’: ‘[s]eules doivent entrer en ligne de compte les decisions rendues pendant que l’obligation international était en vigueur’.
39 The effect of continuing acts on temporal jurisdiction was addressed in Chapter 5.
40 Yağci and Sargin v Turkey, App nos 16419/90 and 16426/90 (8 June 1995) .
42 Guber v Russia, App no 34171/04 (23 October 2008).
46 Bennich-Zalewski v Poland, App no 59857/00 (22 April 2008) .
47 Igariené and Petrauskiené v Lithuania, App no 26892/05 (21 July 2009) . See also Barantseva v Russia, App no 22721/04 (4 March 2010) , relying partly on: ‘[t]he failure to notify the applicant of the hearing of 18 March 1998 …’ when finding a breach of art 6(1), even though the Convention entered into force for Russia in May 1998.
48 João Canuto De Oliveira v Brazil, Report, IACHR No 24/98 (7 April 1998).
49 Ibid . See also Ovelário Tames v Brazil, Report, IACHR No 19/98 (13 April 1999) –, where the Commission held that a delay of eight years before investigating a death in custody was unreasonable and inconsistent with Brazil’s obligations under the American Convention on Human Rights.
50 Paraga v Croatia, CCPR, Comm No 727/1996 (4 April 2001).
51 Ibid [9.7]. See also the decision of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights in Haregewoin Gabre-Selassie and IHRDA v Ethiopia, African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Comm No 301/05 (12 October 2013) , finding that the length of the detention of the complainants from 1991 breached Ethiopia’s obligations in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, even though the Charter entered into force for Ethiopia in 1998 (but note that Ethiopia did not appear to have raised the issue of retroactivity); the decision of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights in Wilfred Onyango Nganyi and Others v United Republic of Tanzania, African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, App no 006/2013 (18 March 2016) , , finding that the length of time after detention in 2006 was unreasonable and in breach of Tanzania’s obligations in the same charter, even though Tanzania did not accept the Court’s jurisdiction until 2010 (but note again that Tanzania does not appear to have raised the issue of retroactivity).
52 Chevron Corporation (USA) and Texaco Petroleum Company (USA) v Republic of Ecuador, UNCITRAL PCA Case No 34877, Partial Award on Merits (30 March 2010) –.
53 Walter Bau v Thailand (n 2) [13.2].
54 Mõtsnik v Estonia, App no 50533/99 (29 April 2003) .
58 Skočajić and Bjelić v Serbia, App no 9460/05 (18 September 2007).
59 Nikolić-Krstić v Serbia, App no 54195/07 (14 October 2014) . See also Timotiyevich v Ukraine, App no 63158/00 (18 May 2004), where the Court ignored a period of nine years before the Convention entered into force when finding that a period of almost four years after this date was reasonable.
60 Pauwelyn, ‘The Concept of a “Continuing” Violation’ (n 38) 445.
61 ILC, ‘Fifth Report on State Responsibility, by Mr. Roberto Ago, Special Rapporteur—the internationally wrongful act of the State, source of international responsibility’ (1976) UN Doc A/CN.4/291 : ‘If … the obligation had entered into force at a time when detention had already commenced, the extension of such detention for more than a generally reasonable time, would, in our view, be internationally wrongful, even if much of the period of detention had occurred prior to the entry into force of the obligation’.
62 M Sorensen, ‘Le problème inter-temporel dans l’application de la Convention Européenne des droits de l’homme’ in Mélanges offerts à Polys Modinos (Editions A Pedone 1968) 304, 309–10: ‘Avant l’entrée en vigueur les autorités nationals n’étaient pas soumises à l’obligation internationale de mettre fin à la detention preventive dans un délai quelconque; tenir compte de leur conduit pendant cette période pour determiner si la detention a dépassé les limites raisonnables au sens de la Convention serait donc appliquer les disposition de celle-ci à des faits antérieurs. Cela ne signifie pas cependant que dans une telle situation, la detention d’une personne avant l’entrée en vigueur de la Convention ne pourrait pas imposer une certain rigueur dans l’appréciation de la période subséquente considérée séparément’.
63 Wyler, ‘Quelques réflexions sur la realisation dans le temps’ (n 38): ‘Ne pouvant faire deux poids deux measures, nous optons pour la seconde solution. Par consequent, la période de detention antérieure à l’entrée en vigueur de l’obligation ne saurait être comptée dans l’évaluation du caractère “déraisonnable” de la detention au meme titre que, dans le premier exemple, l’attitude antérieure des autorités de l’Etat auteur de discriminations ne pouvait influer sur l’illicéité du comportement considéré dans son ensemble’.
64 Institut de Droit International, ‘The Intertemporal Problem in Public International Law’ (Wiesbaden 11 August 1975) art 2(d).
65 Zachary Douglas, The International Law of Investment Claims (Cambridge University Press 2009) .