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II Trust Arbitration at the Institutional Level, 3 A Critique of the American Arbitration Association’s Efforts to Facilitate Arbitration of Internal Trust Disputes

E Gary Spitko

From: Arbitration of Trust Disputes: Issues in National and International Law

Edited By: SI Strong, Tony Molloy (Consultant Editor)

From: Oxford Legal Research Library (http://olrl.ouplaw.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2023. All Rights Reserved. Subscriber: null; date: 06 June 2023

Subject(s):
Arbitrability — Arbitral agreements — Arbitral tribunals — Arbitrators — Statehood, jurisdiction of states, organs of states

(p. 49) A Critique of the American Arbitration Association’s Efforts to Facilitate Arbitration of Internal Trust Disputes

I.  Introduction

3.01  The American Arbitration Association (AAA) first promulgated rules specific to wills and trusts arbitration in July 2003.1 The AAA subsequently has amended those rules several times,2 most recently in June 2012.3 This chapter focuses on the (p. 50) AAA’s June 2012 Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules (hereinafter AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules or the Rules).

3.02  The Introduction to the AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules points out that every year the executors of estates and the trustees of family trusts, charitable trusts, and commercial trusts administer billions of dollars’ worth of property with respect to the estates and trusts for which they serve as fiduciaries.4 Inevitably, disputes arise with respect to the administration of these estates and trusts and the interpretation of these wills and trust instruments. The Introduction posits that arbitration may be a suitable means for resolution of these disputes: ‘Arbitration is an effective way to resolve these disputes privately, promptly, and economically, utilizing as the arbitrator a lawyer or lawyers with substantial experience in the area of wills, trusts and estates.’5

3.03  Implicit in the touting of these virtues of arbitration by the drafters of the AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules is the understanding that the drafters sought to promulgate rules for administering wills and trusts arbitrations that would maximize these benefits of arbitration.6 Moreover, implicit in the very concept of arbitration rules specific to wills and trusts arbitrations is the expectation that the drafters would consider the nature of will and trust disputes in promulgating such specialized arbitration rules and would seek to promulgate rules complementary to this nature. This chapter evaluates the AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules in light of the goals that presumably were at the centre of this pioneering effort to craft rules specific to the arbitration of will and trust disputes and therefore considers the extent to which the Rules promote the private, expeditious, cost-effective, and expert resolution of will and trust disputes.7

(p. 51) II.  Private and Confidential Dispute Resolution

3.04  Privacy and confidentiality historically have been typical features of arbitration. Arbitration hearings ordinarily are closed to the public. Pleadings and awards in arbitration rarely become part of the public record. The arbitrator generally is understood to have an obligation to maintain the confidentiality of information she learns in the course of the arbitration.8

3.05  The parties to a will or trust dispute especially might be expected to prize the virtues of privacy and confidentiality in arbitration.9 Such disputes often centre on financial information, personal relationships, and health records that the parties would strongly prefer to keep private.10 The testator or settlor who anticipates a dispute over her estate or trust which might focus on the details of her private life and state of mind especially might desire to keep such details private.11

3.06  The AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules include basic provisions to promote privacy in arbitration. Rule 22 provides, ‘[t]he arbitrator and the AAA shall maintain the privacy of the hearings unless the law provides to the contrary.’12 To this end, Rule 22 invests discretion in the arbitrator ‘to determine the propriety of the attendance [at a hearing] of any person other than a party and its representatives’.13 (p. 52) This rule further expressly gives to the arbitrator ‘the power to require the exclusion of any witness, other than a party or other essential person, during the testimony of any other witness’.14

3.07  At the same time, Rule 22 provides, ‘Any person having a direct interest in the arbitration is entitled to attend hearings.’15 The rule does not expressly define what might constitute a ‘direct interest’. Given the balance of Rule 22, however, the most plausible interpretation of ‘direct interest’ would limit the scope of the term to parties to the arbitration only.16

3.08  Rule 22 of the AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules is nearly identical to Rule 25 of the AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules.17 No other part of the Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules specifically provides for privacy or confidentiality in arbitration. Thus, the drafters of the Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules do not appear to have paid any particular attention to the need for privacy and confidentiality specifically in wills and trusts arbitration.

3.09  The AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules might be revised to enhance privacy and confidentiality principally in two ways. First, the Rules might expressly authorize the arbitrator to issue orders to protect confidential information. For example, the AAA Employment Arbitration Rules expressly provide that an arbitrator ‘shall have the authority to make appropriate rulings to safeguard that confidentiality [of the arbitration], unless the parties agree otherwise or the law provides to the contrary’.18 Similarly, the Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services, Inc. (JAMS) Comprehensive Arbitration Rules and Procedures expressly provide that ‘[t]he Arbitrator may issue orders to protect the confidentiality of proprietary information, trade secrets or other sensitive information.’19

(p. 53) 3.10  Second, the Rules might extend the obligation to maintain the confidentiality of the arbitration beyond the arbitrator and the arbitral organization to the parties to the arbitration. For example, the International Institute for Conflict Prevention & Resolution (CPR) Administered Arbitration Rules provide that, subject to certain specified exceptions, ‘[u]nless the parties agree otherwise, the parties, the arbitrators and CPR shall treat the proceedings, any related discovery and the decisions of the Tribunal, as confidential.’20 Thus, the Rules might expressly direct the parties to maintain the confidentiality of the will or trust at issue as well as any sensitive financial or personal information to which a party is exposed via the arbitration process. Given that the present AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules lack a provision expressly authorizing the arbitrator to issue protective orders and fail to extend to the parties the obligation to maintain the confidentiality of the arbitration, a party or parties considering adopting the Rules may wish to provide in the will, trust, or arbitration contract for such confidentiality protections.

III.  Prompt and Economical Dispute Resolution

3.11  A testator or settlor may reasonably be concerned that prolonged and complex litigation relating to her will or trust may deplete assets of her estate or trust.21 Arbitration offers the potential of a faster, more efficient, and thereby more economical means of will or trust dispute resolution.22 Generally, savings in arbitration of time and resources is promoted by arbitration rules that provide for effective arbitrator management of an arbitral process that calls for simplified pleading and motion practice, strictly limited discovery, informal hearings (when necessary), a concise award, and narrow grounds for appeal. The AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules contain a number of these types of standard provisions.

Effective Arbitrator Management of the Arbitral Process

3.12  The AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules authorize the AAA, at its own discretion or at the request of a party, to convene an administrative conference ‘to expedite (p. 54) the arbitration proceedings’.23 The conference may be conducted in person or by telephone and may cover preliminary issues such as arbitrator selection and exchange of information.24 Once the arbitrator is appointed, the Rules provide that the arbitrator, on her own initiative or at the request of a party, may hold a ‘preliminary hearing’, also known as a management conference, to plan for the efficient management of the case.25 The conference may be held in person or by telephone and may focus on ‘preliminary matters’ such as clarification of claims and issues and the schedule for the hearings.26

3.13  The Rules do not mandate that the arbitrator hold a management conference. In contrast, the AAA Employment Arbitration Rules provide, ‘[a]s promptly as practicable after the selection of the arbitrator(s), but not later than 60 days thereafter, an arbitration management conference shall be held among the parties and/or their attorneys or other representatives and the arbitrator(s).’27 The management conference affords the arbitrator a valuable opportunity to learn from the parties the basic outlines of their dispute and to plan for and schedule an efficient arbitration process. The testator, settlor, or parties selecting will or trust arbitration, therefore, may want to provide in the will, trust, or arbitration agreement that the management conference shall be mandatory.28

3.14  Rule 28 of the AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules provides, ‘[t]he arbitrator may postpone any hearing upon agreement of the parties, upon request of a party for good cause shown, or upon the arbitrator’s own initiative.’29 This provision differs from the parallel rule in the AAA Employment Arbitration Rules, which makes postponement of a hearing mandatory upon agreement of the parties.30 Where the parties have made a joint request for postponement of a hearing, an arbitrator will be reluctant to refuse to postpone the hearing, regardless of the applicable arbitral rule, for fear of having her arbitration award vacated on the ground that she has been ‘guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown’.31 Nonetheless, the AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules promote efficiency by authorizing the arbitrator to refuse to postpone a hearing, since that discretion gives the arbitrator additional leverage with the parties to require continued movement toward an expeditious resolution of their dispute.

(p. 55) Simplified Pleading and Motion Practice

3.15  The AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules allow for informal and minimal pleading. Rule 4 encourages the parties who are filing a demand for arbitration, a counterclaim, or an answer to a demand ‘to provide descriptions of their claims in sufficient detail to make the circumstances of the dispute clear to the arbitrator’.32 Rule 4 also provides, however, that the respondent need not file an answer at all and, if the respondent does not file a timely answer, ‘the respondent will be deemed to deny the claim’.33 Such lax pleading requirements may, in the end, impair arbitral efficiency. The respondent’s filing of an answer to the demand forces the respondent to educate herself about the claimant’s demand and typically is the first opportunity for the respondent to educate the arbitrator and the opposing party about the respondent’s perspective on the case. Foregoing this early education may be expected to slow the arbitration process. On the other hand, such lax pleading requirements, which are common in arbitral rules,34 may be especially well suited to will and trust arbitration, since some respondents may not necessarily be adverse to the claimant.35

3.16  Significantly, the AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules make no express provision for any dispositive motions. Given the folklore that succession law is prone to generate vexatious strike suits,36 the testator or settlor may wish to provide in her will or trust for the possibility of a dispositive motion in an appropriate case. The AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules provide a model clause that the testator or settlor may wish to incorporate: ‘The arbitrator may allow the filing of and make rulings upon a dispositive motion only if the arbitrator determines that the moving party has shown that the motion is likely to succeed and dispose of or narrow the issues in the case.’37 By requiring the parties to get the arbitrator’s informed permission before filing a dispositive motion, the commercial standard is designed to encourage motions that are likely to promote efficiency and economy and to discourage motions that are likely to impede such efficiency and economy. At a minimum, the provision is intended to ensure that a party will not be put to the effort and expense of responding to a dispositive motion unless the motion has substantial merit on its face.

(p. 56) Limited Discovery

3.17  The AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules significantly limit discovery as compared to probate litigation in court. Rule 20 invests the arbitrator with the authority to order written discovery (‘the production of documents and other information’) ‘consistent with the expedited nature of arbitration’.38 The absence of any reference to oral discovery in the Rules suggests that depositions shall not be allowed under the Rules.39 At a minimum, this omission suggests that depositions shall be strongly disfavoured.

Informal Hearings

3.18  The AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules provide for an informal evidentiary hearing. Indeed, the Rules allow the parties to waive an oral hearing if the parties believe that the arbitrator can decide the case based on written submissions.40 The Rules grant the arbitrator broad authority to structure the evidentiary hearing as she thinks most efficient, stating:

The arbitrator, exercising his or her discretion, shall conduct the proceedings with a view to expediting the resolution of the dispute and may direct the order of proof, bifurcate proceedings and direct the parties to focus their presentations on the issues the decision of which could dispose of all or part of the case.41

3.19  This authority includes the discretion to ‘exclude evidence deemed by the arbitrator to be cumulative or irrelevant’.42 Legal rules of evidence do not apply at the evidentiary hearing.43

A Concise Award

3.20  The AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules provide for a timely and concise award. Rule 41 requires the arbitrator to issue her award in the case ‘no later than 30 days from the closing of the hearing’ unless the parties agree otherwise or the law imposes a different requirement.44 Rule 42(b) provides that the arbitrator need not issue a reasoned award ‘unless the parties request such an award in writing prior to appointment of the arbitrator’.45

(p. 57) 3.21  The latter provision is in accord with traditional practice. Most arbitration agreements do not require the arbitrator to issue a reasoned opinion, at least in the domestic realm.46 Traditional thinking is that a reasoned opinion is not desirable principally for two reasons. First, given that the arbitrator bills by the hour for her time, a reasoned opinion will add to the expense of the arbitral process. Second, a reasoned opinion makes it easier for the losing party to challenge the arbitration award in court.

3.22  There are costs to foregoing a reasoned opinion that the testator, settlor, or parties contracting for arbitration of a will or trust dispute should consider.47 The task of drafting a reasoned opinion may force the arbitrator to approach the arbitration hearing and process of arriving at a decision in a more disciplined, deliberate, and thoughtful manner. On the flip side of this coin, one might reasonably fear that the lack of a reasoned opinion will make it easier for an arbitrator to hide decision-maker bias. Relatedly, a reasoned opinion may increase the confidence of the losing party in the fairness of the arbitration process.

Narrow Grounds for Appeal

3.23  The relative finality of the arbitrator’s award is a prized feature of arbitration. Rule 46 of the AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules furthers the goal of finality by making clear that an arbitrator may not entertain a motion for reconsideration. Rule 46 allows a party to request, within twenty days of the arbitration award, that the arbitrator ‘correct any clerical, typographical, or computational errors in the award’.48 The rule clarifies, however, that ‘[t]he arbitrator is not empowered to redetermine the merits of any claim already decided.’49 This provision is consistent with the common law doctrine of functus officio, which provides that once an arbitrator has issued her final award she may not revisit the merits of the award.50

3.24  The Rules also provide a ‘Standard Arbitration Clause’ which speaks to the finality of the arbitrator’s award.51 The Standard Arbitration Clause is provided as a model (p. 58) clause that a testator or settlor might include in her will or trust in an effort to require that future disputes relating to the will or trust be arbitrated.52 With respect to finality, the Standard Arbitration Clause provides, ‘[t]he arbitrator’s decision shall not be appealable to any court, but shall be final and binding on any and all persons who have or may have an interest in my estate or any trust under my will (or my trust), including unborn or incapacitated persons, such as minors or incompetents.’53

3.25  It is difficult to know what to make of this provision of the clause. Perhaps the provision is meant only to convey that the arbitration award shall be considered final for the purposes of judicial confirmation or vacation of the award. If that is the intended meaning, the provision should be redrafted to state more clearly that narrow purpose.

3.26  If the provision is meant to provide for an ‘opt-out’ model of arbitration in which courts provide no review whatsoever following an arbitration award, then the provision would be both foolish and (fortunately) ineffective. Provision for such an opt-out model would be foolish because the model would have no mechanism to police even the worst abuses of the arbitral process. For example, assume an arbitration award that is beyond the scope of the arbitrator’s authority and that was procured through a bribe to the arbitrator: under a literal reading of the Standard Arbitration Clause, the award would be binding on the parties.

3.27  The opt-out model provision would be ineffective because it would be in conflict with the mechanics of arbitral award enforcement. An arbitrator has no power to enforce her own award. A party wishing to enforce the arbitration award must file a motion to confirm the award in state or federal court. The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) provides that a party may apply for a court order affirming the award ‘at any time within one year after the award is made’ and that the court ‘must grant such an order unless the award is vacated, modified, or corrected as prescribed in sections 10 and 11’ of the FAA.54 Thus, the award confirmation process affords the losing party the opportunity to oppose confirmation of the award on the narrow grounds specified in Sections 10 and 11 of the FAA.55 (p. 59) Section 10 of the FAA authorizes a court to vacate an arbitration award on four narrow grounds: fraud, arbitrator partiality, arbitrator misconduct in refusing to postpone a hearing or consider evidence, and excess of powers.56 Section 11 of the FAA provides for judicial correction of the arbitration award in the case of a miscalculation in the award, an award ‘upon a matter not submitted to’ the arbitrator, and an award that is ‘imperfect in matter of form’.57 These narrow grounds make it very difficult in practice for a losing party to move successfully to vacate an arbitration award.58

3.28  In sum, a testator, settlor, or party contracting for will or trust arbitration would be wise to avoid incorporating the Standard Arbitration Clause’s language on the appeal of an arbitrator’s award. More sensible provisions relating to enforcement of the arbitration award that might be incorporated into a will, trust, or contract for arbitration of a will or trust dispute are found in the JAMS Comprehensive Arbitration Rules and Procedures. Rule 24(k) of the JAMS Rules provides, ‘[t]he Award is considered final, for purposes of … a judicial proceeding to enforce, modify or vacate the Award.’59 Rule 25 of the JAMS Rules provides, ‘[p]roceedings to enforce, confirm, modify or vacate an Award will be controlled by and conducted in conformity with the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. Sec. 1, et seq., or applicable state law.’60

IV.  Provisions of Great Relevance When a Party Seeks to Avoid Arbitration

3.29  The AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules contain two provisions likely to have a significant impact on the speed and efficiency of arbitration in a case in which a party seeks to avoid arbitration altogether. The first of these provisions is a ‘delegation clause’. The second of these provisions is an anti-waiver clause.

(p. 60) The Delegation Clause

3.30  Rule 7(a) contains a broad delegation clause. This rule addresses the arbitrator’s jurisdiction and is critically important to furthering the goal of designing a prompt and economical dispute resolution process. Rule 7(a) provides, ‘[t]he arbitrator shall have the power to rule on his or her own jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the existence, scope, or validity of the arbitration agreement.’61 To gain a fuller appreciation of the importance of this provision, one must consider the related doctrines of arbitrability (in the domestic US sense) and separability.62

3.31  Two primary issues of arbitrability arise when a party seeks to compel another to arbitrate their dispute. The first issue is whether the parties have entered into a valid arbitration agreement. If the parties have entered into a valid arbitration agreement, the question arises as to whether their instant dispute is within the scope of that arbitration agreement.63

3.32  When a party raises either of these ‘gateway’ arbitrability issues, the default rule is that a court rather than an arbitrator gets to decide the issue.64 The parties, however, may choose to opt out of the default. Thus, the parties may contract to assign these arbitrability questions to the arbitrator.65 When deciding whether the parties have agreed to arbitrate arbitrability, a court will require ‘clear and unmistakable evidence that they did so’.66 In announcing this rule, the US Supreme Court explained that the question of who should decide the arbitrability issue is an ‘arcane’ one that the parties most likely may not have thought about.67 Thus, ‘given the principle that a party can be forced to arbitrate only those issues it specifically has agreed to submit to arbitration’, a court will insist on clear and unmistakable evidence of an agreement to arbitrate the arbitrability issue so as not to mistakenly ‘force unwilling parties to arbitrate a matter they reasonably would have thought a judge, not an arbitrator, would decide’.68

3.33  Rule 7(a) purports to assign to the arbitrator the arbitrability issues relating to ‘the existence, scope or validity of the arbitration agreement’.69 Thus, this rule (p. 61) is intended to opt the parties out of the default rule that a court rather than an arbitrator gets to decide the existence and scope of an arbitration clause. As discussed immediately above, this delegation clause will be effective to switch this default only if a court finds that the parties’ adoption of the AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules constitutes clear and unmistakable evidence of an agreement to assign arbitrability to the arbitrator.

3.34  No court has considered the ‘clear and unmistakable evidence’ issue in a case involving the Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules. Numerous courts, however, have considered whether the delegation clause in the AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules or the AAA Employment Arbitration Rules is effective to assign the arbitrability issue to the arbitrator. The delegation clause in the AAA Employment Arbitration Rules is identical to the delegation clause in the AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules.70 The delegation clause in the AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules is nearly identical.71

3.35  The overwhelming consensus among courts that have considered the issue is that the parties’ agreement to incorporate the AAA arbitration rules into their arbitration agreement constitutes clear and unmistakable evidence that the parties have agreed to arbitrate arbitrability issues.72 Thus, where a testator, settlor, or contracting parties have adopted the AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules or have incorporated the Rules into their arbitration agreement, the arbitrator should have the authority to decide any challenge to the existence, scope, or validity of the arbitration agreement. In such a case, when a court is presented with a motion to compel arbitration, the court should do no more than ensure that the assertion of arbitrability is not ‘wholly groundless’ before sending the case to the arbitrator.73 Moreover, in such a case, a court will review the arbitrator’s decisions on these arbitrability issues after the fact only under the extremely deferential standard of review applicable to arbitration awards.

(p. 62) 3.36  Rule 7(a)’s delegation clause also is relevant to the arbitration doctrine of separability.74 The separability doctrine provides that an arbitration clause is separable from the contract in which the clause is found.75 In essence, the arbitration clause is a contract within a contract. Thus, under the separability doctrine, where a party to a contract containing an arbitration clause challenges the validity of the container contract, the party is not challenging the arbitration clause found within the container contract.76 In such a case, the arbitrator rather than the court has the authority to decide the challenge to the container contract.77 Only if a party challenges the precise agreement to arbitrate will a court decide the challenge.78

3.37  A delegation clause, such as that in Rule 7(a), alters this separability scheme to deprive a court of the ability to hear even a challenge that is specific to the arbitration agreement. In essence, like a Russian nesting doll,79 the delegation clause is an arbitration contract within an arbitration contract within a container contract.80 Thus, where a party challenges the validity or scope of an arbitration provision but does not specifically challenge the delegation provision, the arbitrator rather than a court has the authority to decide the challenge to the arbitration agreement. As the US Supreme Court explained in Rent-A-Center, West, Inc v Jackson,81 a delegation provision ‘is simply an additional, antecedent agreement the party seeking arbitration asks the federal court to enforce’ and ‘unless [the party opposing arbitration] challenged the delegation provision specifically, we must treat it as valid under § 2 [of the Federal Arbitration Act], and must enforce it under §§ 3 and 4, leaving any challenge to the validity of the [arbitration] Agreement as a whole for the arbitrator’.82

The Anti-Waiver Provision

3.38  The AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules contain a broad anti-waiver provision. Rule 48(a) provides, ‘[n]o judicial proceeding by a party relating to the subject matter of the arbitration shall be deemed a waiver of the party’s right to arbitrate.’83 An anti-waiver provision may be beneficial in expressing the parties’ intention that (p. 63) a court should not find waiver lightly.84 Rule 48(a), however, is so overly broad that its demerits outweigh its merits.

3.39  This broad anti-waiver provision may encourage a party to an arbitration contract to litigate in court strategically as a prelude to arbitration. If it were enforceable, Rule 48(a)’s language would allow a party to take advantage of the typically broader discovery available in court before filing a demand for arbitration. Such a course of action would be antithetical to a prompt and economical dispute resolution process.

3.40  Unfortunately for the party who has litigated strategically in reliance upon Rule 48(a)’s broad anti-waiver provision, but fortunately for the party to an arbitration agreement who has been prejudiced by the other party’s litigation activity, courts generally have found the AAA’s broad anti-waiver provision not to be controlling. Several courts have interpreted the broad language in Rule 48(a), which is common to several sets of AAA arbitration rules,85 as covering only a party’s resort to a court ‘to seek provisional remedies or other judicial proceedings that would not function to displace arbitration on the underlying dispute’.86 More generally, courts have held that, notwithstanding the AAA’s broad anti-waiver provision, a court should engage in standard waiver analysis.87 Thus, where a court finds that a party’s litigation activity meets the jurisdiction’s standard for waiver, the court will deem the party to have waived her right to arbitrate despite the AAA’s broad anti-waiver provision.88 This approach (p. 64) is supported by the rationale that a court should not sanction the waste of scarce judicial resources.89

3.41  Professor SI Strong has pointed out that ‘a non-waiver provision is particularly helpful in the trust context because parties in some jurisdictions may need to apply to the court for assistance with certain trust-related matters’ such as those associated with representation for absent parties.90 Nonetheless, for the reasons set out earlier, a testator, settlor, or parties contracting for arbitration of will or trust disputes would be wise to opt out of Rule 48(a) and instead to incorporate a narrower anti-waiver provision into the will, trust, or arbitration contract. The CPR Administered Arbitration Rules provide a more sensible provision for adoption: ‘A request for interim measures by a party to a court shall not be deemed incompatible with the agreement to arbitrate or as a waiver of that agreement.’91

V.  Expert Decision-Making

3.42  A principal virtue of arbitration is that it enables the parties to a dispute to select a decision-maker with expert knowledge relating to the matter in dispute. The expectation is that such expertise will lead to a more informed decision-making process. This expectation itself may result in even the losing party in arbitration having greater acceptance of and respect for the arbitrator’s award.

(p. 65) 3.43  In the context of a will or trust dispute, the testator, settlor, and parties to the dispute might desire a decision-maker with specialized knowledge of the procedural and substantive law of trusts and estates as well as the tax aspects of estate planning.92 The interested parties also might desire a decision-maker who is familiar with the testator’s or settlor’s values and, thus, possesses a fuller appreciation of how those values influenced the will or trust.93 The hope is that the decision of an arbitrator with such an understanding of the testator’s or settlor’s values will be more likely to reflect the donative intent grounding the estate plan.94

3.44  The AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules have several provisions designed to provide for the selection of an arbitrator with expertise in wills and trusts. First, the Standard Arbitration Clause provides, ‘[t]he arbitrator(s) shall be a practicing lawyer licensed to practice law in the state whose law governs my will (or my trust) and whose practice has been devoted primarily to wills and trusts or (sic) at least 10 years.’95 Also, Rule 3 of the AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules provides, ‘[t]he AAA shall establish and maintain a Roster of Arbitrators … with knowledge of the Wills and Trusts area of law and practice.’96 Moreover, Rule 11 provides for appointment of arbitrators from the Wills and Trusts Panel.97

(p. 66) 3.45  Despite these provisions, it is not entirely clear that one who arbitrates under the AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules will have the benefits of an arbitrator with expertise in wills and trusts. A testator or settlor who provides in her will or trust for arbitration ‘in accordance with the AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules’ as a practical matter may have inadvertently selected the AAA’s Expedited Procedures or the AAA’s Procedures for Large, Complex Commercial Disputes to govern a particular dispute relating to her will or trust due to the provisions of Rule 1 of the AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules. That Rule provides that for any case involving only two parties and ‘in which no disclosed claim or counterclaim exceeds $75,000’, the AAA’s Expedited Procedures shall apply unless the parties agree otherwise.98 In such a case, the AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules will apply only to the extent that they do not conflict with the Expedited Procedures.99 Rule 1 further provides that for any case ‘in which the disclosed claim or counterclaim of any party is at least $500,000’, the AAA’s Procedures for Large, Complex Commercial Disputes shall apply unless the parties agree otherwise.100 In such a case, the AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules will apply only to the extent that they do not conflict with the Procedures for Large, Complex Commercial Disputes.101 Thus, depending on the value of the claims asserted in the arbitration and the number of claimants and respondents in the arbitration, the AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules (exclusive of Rule 1) may or may not control.

3.46  Application of the Expedited Procedures or Procedures for Large, Complex Commercial Disputes in a will or trust arbitration may be problematic with respect to arbitrator selection. While Rules 3 and 11 of the AAA Wills and Trusts Rules speak of the appointment of an arbitrator or arbitrators ‘with knowledge of the Wills and Trusts area of law and practice’,102 neither the Expedited Procedures nor the Procedures for Large, Complex Commercial Disputes expressly provides for arbitrators with such expertise. Rule E-4 of the Expedited Procedures provides, ‘[t]he AAA shall simultaneously submit to each party an identical list of five proposed arbitrators drawn from its National Roster from which one arbitrator shall be appointed.’103 Knowledge in the area of wills or trusts is not a prerequisite for appointment to the AAA’s National Roster of Arbitrators.104 Rule L-2 of the Procedures for Large, Complex Commercial Disputes provides that if the parties are not able to agree on a method for appointment of the arbitrators, ‘the AAA shall appoint arbitrators from the Large, (p. 67) Complex Commercial Case Panel, in the manner provided in the Regular Commercial Arbitration Rules’.105

3.47  One might reasonably expect that the AAA would submit to the parties in a will or trust arbitration only arbitrators with experience in the areas of wills and trusts. The Rules, however, do not guarantee this. As a precaution, any testator, settlor, or parties contracting for arbitration who provide for arbitration under the AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules should expressly limit application of Rule 1 so that the arbitration selection procedures in Rules 3 and 11 always trump the arbitrator selection procedures in the Expedited Procedures and the Procedures for Large, Complex Commercial Disputes.

VI.  Procedures Tailored to the Specific Characteristics of Will and Trust Disputes

3.48  By far the most serious shortcoming of the AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules is that the Rules are not sufficiently reflective of the nature of will and trust disputes. With respect to the 2009 version of the AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules, Professor Strong has remarked that ‘the overall impression is that the AAA has largely tracked other AAA rule sets without any regard to the unique nature of trust disputes’.106 Professor Strong continues: ‘the AAA appears to be operating largely under the belief that trusts are just another type of business association and that standard arbitral procedures are sufficient to address any disputes arising under a trust.’107 She has labelled these rules ‘entirely inadequate’ as ‘a highly specialized set of rules tailored specifically to the unique demands of trust arbitration’.108 These same criticisms must be made of the current version of the Rules. Other than its provisions for selection of an arbitrator with expertise in wills and trusts, certain language in the Standard Arbitration Clauses providing that ‘questions regarding my competency, attempts to remove a fiduciary, or questions concerning the amount of bond of a fiduciary’ shall not be arbitrable,109 and a rule providing for representation for incompetent and unborn parties,110 the Rules do not contain any provisions drafted especially for will or trust disputes.

(p. 68) 3.49  A second substantial shortcoming of the AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules is that the Rules make almost no distinction between a multi-billion dollar commercial trust and a family trust with a relatively small corpus.111 The Rules do provide one Standard Arbitration Clause for Wills and Non-Commercial Trusts and a separate Standard Arbitration Clause for Commercial Trusts.112 Also, the Rules do channel many disputes with only small value claims (not exceeding US$75,000) into a process governed by the AAA Expedited Procedures while channelling disputes with at least one large value claim (of at least US$500,000) into a process governed by the AAA Procedures for Large, Complex Commercial Disputes.113 For the most part, however, the AAA has designed model procedures that will apply the same rules to a family squabble over grandmother’s intent with respect to her modest estate as to a dispute between different classes of investors over the administration of a multi-billion dollar commercial trust. In trying to be all things to all trusts, the AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules prove suboptimal for lack of sufficient differentiation.

The Puzzling Absence of a Provision for Consolidation and Joinder

3.50  The nature of trusts and estates litigation is such that it will often be beneficial, if not essential, to consolidate actions or join entities not presently a party to an action.114 For example, a trust beneficiary may be a required party to an action interpreting the trust if her absence might impair her ability to protect her interests in the trust or might lead to an inconsistent ruling in later litigation.115 Thus, it is notable that that AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules do not contain any provision that addresses the authority of the AAA or an arbitrator to consolidate cases or to join parties or that provides for the mechanics of doing so.116

(p. 69) 3.51  The testator, settlor, or parties selecting arbitration, therefore, may want to provide in the will, trust, or arbitration agreement for the consolidation of actions and the joinder of absent parties.117 The JAMS Comprehensive Arbitration Rules contain provisions expressly governing consolidation and joinder that would be suitable for incorporation into the will, trust, or arbitration agreement. JAMS Rule 6(e) provides, ‘[u]nless the Parties’ Agreement or applicable law provides otherwise, JAMS, if it determines that the Arbitrations so filed have common issues of fact or law, may consolidate Arbitrations in [certain specified] instances.’118 Moreover, JAMS Rule 6(f) authorizes an arbitrator to grant a third party’s request to participate in an already pending arbitration and also empowers the arbitrator to grant the request of a party to a pending arbitration to compel a third party to participate in the arbitration.119

Rules Relating to Unrepresented, Incompetent, and Unborn Parties

3.52  As noted earlier, the AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules expressly recognize that incompetent and unborn persons may need representation in an arbitration of a will or trust dispute. Rule 23 provides, ‘[t]he Arbitrator shall have the discretion to determine whether representation, such as a guardian ad litem, is required to preserve the interests of unrepresented, incompetent, and unborn parties.’120 The arbitrator’s authority to appoint a representative for such an incompetent or unborn party is not expressed in the Rules, but arguably should be implied.

3.53  One entity whose interests the Rules largely overlook is the testator/settlor. This oversight is ironic given that it is likely to have been the testator/settlor who selected the Rules for application in the first place. The Rules arguably allow the parties to the dispute to override the testator/settlor’s choices with respect to application of the Rules and selection of an arbitrator.121

3.54  Rule 1 of the AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules provides, ‘[t]he parties, by written agreement, may vary the procedures set forth in these Rules.’122 Given that a will is not effective until after the death of the testator, it is certain that the testator will not be a party to an arbitration under her will. Depending on the (p. 70) circumstances, a settlor may or may not be a party to an arbitration under her trust. Thus, by written agreement, the parties to an arbitration under the will or trust may be able to override the procedures selected by the testator or settlor to govern arbitration of disputes relating to her will or trust.

3.55  Of particular concern, the method provided in the Rules for the appointment of the arbitrator seems to discount the possibility that the testator or settlor may have wished to influence the appointment of the arbitrator. Rule 11 provides for the appointment of the arbitrator from the Wills and Trusts Panel in a specified manner ‘[i]f the parties have not appointed an arbitrator and have not provided any other method of appointment.’123 Moreover, Rule 11 further provides, ‘[u]nless the parties agree otherwise,’ whenever there are two or more claimants or two or more respondents in the arbitration, ‘the AAA may appoint all the arbitrators.’124 Rule 12 provides, with respect to direct appointment of the arbitrators by the parties, ‘[i]f the agreement of the parties names an arbitrator or specifies a method of appointing an arbitrator, the designation or method shall be followed.’125 Given that the testator will not and the settlor may not be a party to the arbitration, it is not clear from the Rules whether a provision in the will or trust intended to govern the appointment of arbitrators would trump Rules 11 and 12. Indeed, the drafters of the AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules appear to have lifted the language quoted earlier from Rules 1, 11, and 12 almost verbatim from Rules 1, 12, and 13 respectively of the AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules, seemingly without any consideration of the relevance of a testator/settlor’s intent in an arbitration of a dispute concerning her will or trust.126

Rules Specifying Which Types of Claims May be Arbitrated

3.56  The Standard Arbitration Clause for Wills and Non-Commercial Trusts seems to conflict with AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rule 7(b) with respect to the types of claims that the arbitrator shall have the power to determine. In short, the former is most plausibly read as excluding from the scope of the arbitration clause any claim challenging the validity of the will or trust. To the contrary, Rule 7(b) expressly grants to the arbitrator the authority to determine any claim challenging the validity of the will or trust. From this apparent conflict, one might conclude that the drafters borrowed Rule 7(b) from the AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules without regard for the wills- and trusts-related concerns that motivated the limiting language that the drafters included in the Standard Arbitration Clause.

3.57  The Standard Arbitration Clause speaks of requiring arbitration of any ‘dispute regarding the interpretation of my will (or my trust) or the administration of my (p. 71) estate or any trust under my will (or my trust)’.127 Thus, the Standard Arbitration Clause does not seem to contemplate arbitration of a challenge to the validity of the will or trust. Moreover, the Standard Arbitration Clause expressly excludes one type of validity challenge—‘questions regarding [the testator or settlor’s] competency’—from the scope of the arbitration clause.128 The exclusion of validity challenges is most likely purposeful and is likely grounded in a concern that those who seek to challenge the validity of a will or trust may not be bound to the arbitration clause in the will or trust.

3.58  The extent to which an arbitration clause in a will or trust may force a beneficiary to arbitrate her claim concerning the will or trust remains unresolved in most jurisdictions.129 A consensus has begun to develop in the case law and the statutory reform movement, however, indicating that a beneficiary should not be bound by the arbitration clause in a will or trust where the beneficiary does not seek to take under the will or trust.130 The Standard Arbitration Clause’s exclusion of validity challenges from the scope of the arbitration clause is broader than this consensus would require in that the clause would exclude a claim by a beneficiary who challenges a part of the will or trust while seeking to take under another part of the will or trust.

3.59  The narrow scope of the Standard Arbitration Clause arguably is in conflict with the broad scope of arbitrability provided for in Rule 7(b). That rule states in part, (p. 72) ‘[t]he arbitrator shall have the power to determine the existence or validity of a trust or will in which an arbitration clause forms a part.’131 It may be that this provision was intended merely to provide for a separability scheme so that a challenge to the will or trust as a whole will not be deemed a challenge to the arbitration provision that might divest the arbitrator of her authority to address a claim relating to the interpretation of the will or trust or administration of the estate or trust. Indeed, Rule 7(b) continues, ‘Such an arbitration clause shall be treated as an agreement independent of the other terms of the contract. A decision by the arbitrator that the contract is null and void shall not for that reason alone render invalid the arbitration clause.’132 Regardless, on its face, the first sentence of Rule 7(b) gives the arbitrator the authority to decide claims that the Standard Arbitration Clause states that the arbitrator does not have the authority to decide. That conflict seems likely to breed litigation over the intended scope of the arbitration provision.

3.60  The drafters of the AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules appear to have borrowed Rule 7(b) from Rule 7(b) of the AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules. The two provisions are identical except that the former, in the first sentence of the rule, replaces the phrase ‘contract of which an arbitration clause forms a part’ with the phrase ‘trust or will in which an arbitration clause forms a part’.133 Indeed, the remaining two sentences in Rule 7(b) of the Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules, in language that is copied verbatim from Rule 7(b) of the AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules, speak of the arbitration clause as being located in a larger ‘contract’ rather than as being located in a trust or will.134

3.61  The Standard Arbitration Clause in the AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules provides, ‘[a]ny controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this contract, or the breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration.’135 Thus, unlike the Standard Arbitration Clause in the AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules, the Standard Arbitration Clause in the AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules is not limited to disputes regarding interpretation or administration and does not exclude claims regarding competency. Rule 7(b), therefore, does not conflict with the Standard Arbitration Clause in the AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules. The drafters of the AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules seem not to have realized, however, that when borrowing Rule 7(b) for the AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules they needed to take account of the wills- and trusts-related concerns that motivated the limiting language in the Standard Arbitration Clause in the AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules and needed to harmonize the rule with the Standard Arbitration Clause in the AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules.

(p. 73) 3.62  Indeed, more generally, the AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules, considered as a whole, support a suspicion that the drafters did not think carefully enough about the ways in which will and trust disputes and litigation differ from commercial disputes and litigation. The oversight that is reflected in the apparent conflict between Rule 7(b) and the Standard Arbitration Clause in the AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules is symptomatic of the greater shortcoming—that the Rules do not sufficiently take account of the nature of will and trust disputes. Thus, a testator, settlor, or parties to a contract for will or trust arbitration who consider adopting the AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules must give careful thought to modifying the Rules to better meet the needs of the potential will or trust dispute.

VII.  Conclusion

3.63  This chapter has suggested ways in which adopters might vary the procedures set forth in the Rules better to serve the interests of a testator, settlor, or parties arbitrating a will or trust dispute. The ability to contract around the oversights and shortcomings of the AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules, however, is not a panacea. Ad hoc drafting, especially when it is extensive, incurs the risk of litigation over the meaning of the customized provisions.136 Indeed, a presumed virtue of adopting an arbitral organization’s rules of arbitration procedure is that the rules will have been utilized by others extensively over time and their meaning will have become settled. Thus, the AAA itself should form a study group to analyse the nature of will and trust disputes and to recommend arbitration procedures best suited to that particular nature. The AAA should then revise the AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules accordingly.

Footnotes:

1  See American Arbitration Association, Archived Rules, <www.adr.org>.

2  See ibid (archiving Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules effective respectively in September 2005 and June 2009).

3  American Arbitration Association, Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules, effective 1 June 2012 (hereinafter AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules), <www.adr.org>.

4  ibid at Introduction.

5  ibid. Although not referenced in the Introduction to the AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules, informality is an additional feature typical of arbitration and, in fact, is a feature of arbitration under the AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules. See eg ibid Rule 31(a) (providing that ‘[c]onformity to legal rules of evidence shall not be necessary’ in the evidentiary hearing).

6  See ibid at Standard Arbitration Clause for Wills and Non-Commercial Trusts (citing as the motive for the testator/settlor’s arbitration clause a desire ‘to save the cost of court proceedings and promote the prompt and final resolution of any dispute’ within the scope of the arbitration clause); ibid at Standard Arbitration Clause for Commercial Trusts (citing as the motive for the settlor’s arbitration clause a desire ‘to preserve the assets of the trust’).

7  See also SI Strong, ‘Institutional Approaches to Trust Arbitration: Comparing the AAA, ACTEC, ICC, and DIS Trust Arbitration Regimes’ in SI Strong (ed), Arbitration of Trust Disputes: Issues in National and International Law (Oxford University Press 2016) paras 5.01–5.135. Professor SI Strong has noted that the AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules have not been widely effective in promoting wills and trusts arbitration at all. She observed in 2012, nine years after the AAA published the first version of its Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules, that the Rules ‘are not very well known in either the trust industry or the arbitral community’ and ‘[i]ndeed, only a few references have ever been made to the AAA Trust Arbitration Rules in the legal literature, and then only in passing.’ SI Strong, ‘Mandatory Arbitration of Internal Trust Disputes—Improving Arbitrability and Enforceability through Proper Procedural Choices’ (2012) 28 Arbitration International 591, 595 n 18 (hereinafter Strong, Proper Procedural Choices). This remains true in 2015. A 4 June 2015 search for ‘Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules’ in the Westlaw Law Review and Journals database produced eight law review articles that cite to the Rules. A similar search on the same date in the Westlaw Cases database (both state and federal) produced no cases that have cited the Rules.

8  See eg Bridget A Logstrom, ‘Arbitration in Estate and Trust Disputes: Friend or Foe?’ (2005) 30 ACTEC Law Journal 266, 267 (‘Arbitration hearings are not public record and, therefore, may help to keep private details of family disputes private.’).

9  See eg Frances H Foster, ‘Privacy and the Elusive Quest for Uniformity in the Law of Trusts’ (2006) 38 Arizona State Law Journal 713, 725–26 (discussing how the details of a trust that otherwise would have remained private might become public during trust litigation in the civil court system).

10  See eg David Horton, ‘The Federal Arbitration Act and Testamentary Instruments’ (2012) 90 North Carolina Law Review 1027, 1035–36 (explaining how litigation that might ‘expose[] a testator’s foibles and intimate life in open court’ would tend to generate an appreciation for the virtue of privacy in arbitration); Stephen Wills Murphy, ‘Enforceable Arbitration Clauses in Wills and Trusts: A Critique’ (2011) 26 Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution 627, 635–36 (‘Arbitration can shield both the trust and the personal affairs of the interested parties from the public eye.’).

11  See eg Lela P Love and Stewart E Sterk, ‘Leaving More Than Money: Mediation Clauses in Estate Planning Documents’ (2008) 65 Washington and Lee Law Review 539, 553 (‘A decedent who fears contest of her dispositions would undoubtedly prefer to avoid the spectacle of a trial in which her mental capacity, or her susceptibility to undue influence, is the central issue.’); John R Phillips, Scott K Martinsen, and Matthew L Dameron, ‘Analyzing the Potential for ADR in Estate Planning Instruments’ (2006) 24 Alternatives to the High Cost of Litigation 1, 10 (‘For some clients, the primary impetus for implementing the dispute resolution processes into trusts is confidentiality, often overriding concern about litigation costs.’).

12  AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules (n 3) Rule 22. See also ibid Rule 27 (providing in the context of a rule governing the attendance of expert witnesses at hearings that ‘[t]he arbitrator shall maintain the privacy of the hearings unless the law provides to the contrary.’).

13  ibid Rule 22. See also ibid Rule 27 (providing in the context of a rule governing the attendance of expert witnesses at hearings that ‘[i]t shall be discretionary with the arbitrator to determine the propriety of the attendance of any other person’ aside from a party or other essential person).

14  ibid Rule 22. See also ibid Rule 27 (providing the arbitrator similar authority in the context of a rule governing the attendance of expert witnesses at hearings).

15  ibid Rule 22. See also ibid Rule 27 (using identical language in the context of a rule governing the attendance of expert witnesses at hearings).

16  Cf Strong, Proper Procedural Choices (n 7) 633 (discussing this ‘direct interest’ language in the 2009 AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules and opining that ‘[w]hile this phrase may refer only to persons who have been formally joined in the proceedings, the language could be interpreted to include potential parties who have not yet officially joined the arbitration even though they have an interest in the outcome of the dispute.’).

17  Compare AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules (n 3) Rule 22, with American Arbitration Association, Commercial Arbitration Rules, effective 1 October 2013 (hereinafter AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules), Rule 25, <www.adr.org>.

18  American Arbitration Association, Employment Arbitration Rules, effective 1 November 2009 (hereinafter AAA Employment Arbitration Rules), Rule 23, <www.adr.org>.

19  JAMS, Comprehensive Arbitration Rules, effective 1 July 2014 (hereinafter JAMS Comprehensive Arbitration Rules), Rule 26(b), <www.jamsadr.com/rules-comprehensive-arbitration/>. See also International Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution, Administered Arbitration Rules, effective 1 July 2013 (hereinafter CPR Administered Arbitration Rules), Rule 11, <www.cpradr.org/RulesCaseServices/CPRRules/AdministeredArbitrationRules.aspx>.

20  CPR Administered Arbitration Rules (n 19) Rule 20.

21  See John H Langbein, ‘Living Probate: The Conservatorship Model’ (1978) 77 Michigan Law Review 63, 64–66.

22  Horton (n 10) 1030 (noting that ‘in an effort to prevent time-consuming and estate-depleting litigation, a rising number of testators and settlors are placing arbitration clauses in their dispositive instruments’); Murphy (n 10) 630, 635–36; Bridget A Logstrom, Bruce M Stone, and Robert W Goldman, ‘Resolving Disputes with Ease and Grace’ (2005) 31 ACTEC Law Journal 235, 235 (‘Our collective gut tells us that the administration of a will or trust would run more efficiently and at less cost if we could resolve disputes arising in those proceedings through the use of an arbitral, rather than judicial forum.’); Stanard T Klinefelter and Sandra P Gohn, ‘Alternative Dispute Resolution: Its Value to Estate Planners’ (1995) 22 Estate Planning 147, 151; Dominic J Campisi, ‘Alternatives to Litigation in Trust and Probate Proceedings’ (1987) 42 Arbitration Journal 30, 31–32.

23  AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules (n 3) Rule 9.

24  ibid.

25  ibid Rule 19.

26  ibid.

27  AAA Employment Arbitration Rules (n 18) Rule 8.

28  See eg CPR Administered Arbitration Rules (n 19) Rule 9.3 (‘The Tribunal shall hold an initial pre-hearing conference for the planning and scheduling of the proceeding.’).

29  AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules (n 3) Rule 28.

30  AAA Employment Arbitration Rules (n 18) Rule 24.

31  See 9 USC s 10.

32  AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules (n 3) Rule 4.

33  ibid.

34  See eg AAA Employment Arbitration Rules (n 18) Rule 4(b)(ii) (providing that the Respondent ‘may file an Answer with the AAA’ and that ‘[i]f no answering statement is filed within the stated time, Respondent will be deemed to deny the claim’); AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules (n 17) Rule 5(a) (same).

35  Cf Strong, Proper Procedural Choices (n 7) 632 (commenting that the AAA’s practice of labelling any party who did not initiate the arbitration a ‘respondent’ ‘fails to take into account the possibility that not all members of the so-called respondent group may be similarly situated’).

36  See Langbein (n 21) 64–66.

37  AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules (n 17) Rule 33. See also AAA Employment Arbitration Rules (n 18) Rule 27 (same).

38  AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules (n 3) Rule 20(a).

39  Cf AAA Employment Arbitration Rules (n 18) Rule 9 (‘The arbitrator shall have the authority to order such discovery, by way of deposition, interrogatory, document production, or otherwise, as the arbitrator considers necessary to a full and fair exploration of the issues in dispute, consistent with the expedited nature of arbitration.’).

40  AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules (n 3) Rule 30(c).

41  ibid Rule 30(b).

42  ibid Rule 31(b).

43  ibid Rule 31(a).

44  ibid Rule 41.

45  ibid Rule 42(b).

46  But see AAA Employment Arbitration Rules (n 18) Rule 39(c) (‘The award … shall provide the written reasons for the award unless the parties agree otherwise.’). Reasoned awards are the norm in international arbitration. See generally, SI Strong, ‘Reasoned Awards in International Commercial Arbitration: Embracing and Exceeding the Common Law-Civil Law Dichotomy’ (2016) 37 Michigan Journal of International Law 1.

47  See Strong, Proper Procedural Choices (n 7) 635 (positing that a reasoned award ‘is essential in an in rem type of proceeding’).

48  AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules (n 3) Rule 46.

49  ibid.

50  See eg Office & Profl Employees Int’l Union v Brownsville Gen Hosp, 186 F3d 326, 331 (3rd Cir 1999).

51  Indeed, the Rules provide two such standard arbitration clauses, one of which is tailored to non-commercial trusts and one of which is tailored to commercial trusts. See AAA, Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules (n 3) Standard Arbitration Clause for Wills and Non-Commercial Trusts; ibid at Standard Arbitration Clause for Commercial Trusts.

52  ibid at Introduction.

53  ibid at Standard Arbitration Clause for Wills and Non-Commercial Trusts. See also ibid at Standard Arbitration Clause for Commercial Trusts (providing a clause that is similar to the clause quoted in the text but differs in that it relates solely to trusts as opposed to wills and trusts).

54  9 USC s 9. See also David Horton, ‘Donative Trusts and the Federal Arbitration Act’ in SI Strong (ed), Arbitration of Trust Disputes: Issues in National and International Law (Oxford University Press 2016) paras 9.01–9.62 (considering whether and to what extent the FAA applies to internal trust arbitration).

55  Section 12 of the FAA provides that a party seeking to vacate or modify an arbitration award may do so within three months of the time the award ‘is filed or delivered’. ibid s 12. If the losing party does not file a motion to vacate the arbitration award within three months of the award, she cannot oppose a subsequently filed motion to confirm brought within one year. The Uniform Arbitration Act (UAA) and the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act (RUAA) similarly have ninety-day time limits in which to seek vacatur, modification, or correction of an arbitral award, although neither the UAA nor the RUAA has an express deadline for seeking to confirm the arbitration award. See Revised Uniform Arbitration Act ss 23–24 (2000); Uniform Arbitration Act (1955) ss 12–13. The UAA previously had been adopted in forty-nine states. The RUAA has now been adopted in eighteen states and the District of Columbia. See Uniform Law Commission, Legislative Fact Sheet—Arbitration Act (2000), <www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Arbitration%20Act%20(2000)>.

56  9 USC s 10.

57  ibid s 11.

58  The UAA and the RUAA set forth provisions for challenging an arbitration award that are nearly identical to the grounds provided for in the FAA. See Revised Uniform Arbitration Act ss 23–24 (2000); Uniform Arbitration Act (1955) ss 12–13. Thus, the standards for judicial review are generally the same under federal and state law.

59  JAMS Comprehensive Arbitration Rules (n 19) Rule 24(k).

60  ibid Rule 25.

61  AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules (n 3) Rule 7(a).

62  The term ‘arbitrability’ can be understood in two senses. Internationally, the term refers to the question of whether the state will permit the dispute in question to be heard in arbitration. In the United States, the term also refers to the notion of who is to decide the question of arbitrability: the court or the arbitral tribunal. These latter concerns have also been referred to as ‘gateway issues’. Gary B Born, International Commercial Arbitration (2nd edn, Kluwer Law International 2014) 944, 1135.

63  Howsam v Dean Witter Reynolds, 537 US 79, 84 (2002).

64  ibid; First Options of Chicago, Inc v Kaplan, 514 US 938, 943 (1995).

65  First Options, 514 US at 943.

66  ibid 944 (internal quotation omitted).

67  ibid 945.

68  ibid.

69  AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules (n 3) Rule 7(a).

70  Compare ibid with AAA Employment Arbitration Rules (n 18) Rule 6.

71  Compare AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules (n 3) Rule (7)(a) with AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules (n 17) Rule 7(a) (using language identical to AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rule 7(a) except with the additional phrase ‘or to the arbitrability of any claim or counterclaim’).

72  See eg Oracle Am., Inc v Myriad Grp AG, 724 F3d 1069, 1074 (9th Cir 2013) (‘Virtually every circuit to have considered the issue has determined that incorporation of the American Arbitration Association’s (AAA) arbitration rules constitutes clear and unmistakable evidence that the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability.’); Zenelaj v Handybrook, Inc, 82 F Supp 3d 968, 971-76 (ND Cal 2015) (discussing numerous cases).

73  Douglas v Regions Bank, 757 F3d 460, 464 (5th Cir 2014) (‘The two-part … test demands that even if there is a delegation provision (step one), the court must ask whether the averment that the claim falls within the scope of the arbitration agreement is wholly groundless (step two).’); Zenelaj, 82 F Supp 3d at 975 (‘If a court finds [in a case where the parties clearly and unmistakably have assigned the arbitrability issue to the arbitrator] that the assertion of arbitrability is not “wholly groundless,” it should stay the action pending a ruling on arbitrability by the arbitrator.’).

74  For a fuller discussion of the separability doctrine in the context of an arbitration clause found in a will, see E Gary Spitko, ‘The Will as an Implied Unilateral Arbitration Contract’ (2016) 68 Florida Law Review 49 (hereinafter Spitko, Implied Unilateral Arbitration Contract).

75  Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc v Cardegna, 546 US 440, 445 (2006).

76  ibid 445–46.

77  Prima Paint Corp v Flood & Conklin Mfg Co, 388 US 395, 404 (1967).

78  ibid 403–04.

79  See Rent-A-Center, West, Inc v Jackson, 130 S Ct 2772, 2786 (2010) (Stevens, J, dissenting) (‘Today the Court adds a new layer of severability—something akin to Russian nesting dolls—into the mix.’).

80  ibid 2777 (‘[T]he delegation provision is an agreement to arbitrate threshold issues concerning the arbitration agreement.’).

81  ibid.

82  ibid 2777–78, 2779.

83  AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules (n 3) Rule 48(a).

84  See Kostakos v KSN Joint Venture No 1, 491 NE2d 1332, 1326 (Ill App Ct 1986) (‘The inclusion of [the AAA’s anti-waiver provision] indicates the parties’ intention to favor arbitration and we will not lightly waive this right.’).

85  See eg AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules (n 17) Rule 52(a); AAA Employment Arbitration Rules (n 18) Rule 42(a).

86  S&R Co of Kingston v Latona Trucking, Inc, 159 F3d 80, 85 (2nd Cir 1998) (adopting this interpretation of the language in Rule 48(a) and citing additional cases that have done the same).

87  See ibid (‘Thus, the fact that an arbitration agreement incorporates such a clause [containing the language in Rule 48(a)] would not prevent a court from finding that a party has waived arbitration by actively participating in protracted litigation of an arbitrable dispute.’); ibid 86 (‘Accordingly, we hold that the presence of the [AAA’s] “no waiver” clause does not alter the ordinary analysis undertaken to determine if a party has waived its right to arbitration.’). See also Home Gas Corp of Massachusetts, Inc v Walter’s of Hadley, Inc, 532 NE2d 681, 683–85 (Mass 1989) (engaging in standard waiver analysis and finding waiver despite inclusion of the AAA’s waiver provision in the arbitration contract); Haddock v Quinn, 287 SW3d 158, 176 (Tex Ct App 2009) (‘The presence of such a [AAA] “no waiver” clause in an arbitration agreement does not alter the ordinary analysis undertaken to determine if a party has waived its right to arbitration by litigation conduct.’); Gray Holdco, Inc v Cassady and RWLS, LLC, 654 F3d 444, 454 (3rd Cir 2011) (holding that despite an anti-waiver provision allowing either party to seek injunctive relief, ‘the question for purposes of finding an arbitration waiver remains whether [the party seeking arbitration], through its litigation conduct, waived its right to compel arbitration because of the prejudice [the party opposing arbitration] suffered attributable to [the first party]’s delay in invoking its right to arbitrate’).

88  See S&R Co of Kingston, 159 F3d at 86 (upholding the district court’s finding that a party had waived its right to arbitrate and holding that ‘the “no-waiver” clause in the AAA rule does not prevent a court from finding that a party has waived its right to arbitration’); Home Gas Corp, 532 NE2d at 685; Illinois Concrete-ICI, Inc v Storefitters, Inc, 922 NE2d 542, 547–48 (Ill App Ct 2010) (holding that parties seeking to arbitrate had ‘acted in a manner inconsistent with their right to seek arbitration’ and that the trial court had properly found that they had waived their right to arbitrate despite the AAA anti-waiver provision in the arbitration agreement); Haddock, 287 SW3d at 182 (holding despite AAA anti-waiver provision that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding waiver of the right to arbitrate where the party seeking arbitration ‘substantially invoked the judicial process … to the prejudice of’ opposing parties). See also Gray Holdco, 654 F3d at 461 (finding, despite an anti-waiver provision allowing either party to seek injunctive relief, that ‘the overall circumstances of this case indicate that [a party], through its litigation conduct, has waived its right to arbitrate’); Republic Ins Co v Paico Receivables, LLC, 383 F3d 341, 342, 348–49 (5th Cir 2004) (despite an anti-waiver clause providing that ‘[t]he institution and maintenance of an action for judicial relief … shall not be deemed a waiver’, finding waiver where the party seeking arbitration had ‘substantially invoked the judicial process to the prejudice of’ the opposing party).

89  Gray Holdco, 654 F3d at 453–54 (stating in a case involving an anti-waiver provision that ‘a court, by finding that there has been a waiver of the right to arbitrate predicated on a party’s litigation conduct, effectuates the principle that a party may not use arbitration to manipulate the legal process and in that process waste scarce judicial resources’). See also S&R Co of Kingston, 159 F3d at 86; Home Gas Corp, 532 NE2d at 685.

90  Strong, Proper Procedural Choices (n 7) 635, 635 n 273. Professor Strong also has argued that ‘[t]his type of non-waiver provision … protects the settlor’s desire to have all proper disputes heard in arbitration, since it stops parties from intentionally initiating litigation simply to eliminate the obligation to arbitrate’; ibid 635 n 274. A party who litigates an otherwise arbitrable matter does not, however, eliminate her obligation to arbitrate. Rather, she may eliminate her right to arbitrate. The other party may still successfully move to compel arbitration of the matter unless that party also has litigated to the extent that she too has waived her right to enforce the arbitration contract.

91  CPR Administered Arbitration Rules (n 19) Rule 13.2.

92  See eg SI Strong, ‘Arbitration of Trust Disputes: Two Bodies of Law Collide’ (2012) 45 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 1157, 1184 (suggesting that because ‘trust law can be quite specialized as a matter of both procedural and substantive law’ the settlor of a trust might especially value a decision-maker with expertise in the subject matter). See also Robert L Freedman and others, ‘ADR in the Trusts and Estates Context’ (1995) 21 ACTEC Notes 170, 171 (‘In many areas of the country the probate judges are becoming less and less specialized, while the trusts and estates practice, especially the tax aspects, has become increasingly specialized. Would it not be better in the future to try a trusts and estates case before an ACTEC Fellow than before a probate judge or jury?’).

93  E Gary Spitko, ‘Gone But Not Conforming: Protecting the Abhorrent Testator from Majoritarian Cultural Norms Through Minority-Culture Arbitration’ (1999) 49 Case Western Reserve Law Review 275, 297 (hereinafter Spitko, Abhorrent Testator). Cf Richard Z Kabaker, Joseph F Maier, and Frank Gofton Ware, ‘The Use of Arbitration in Wills and Trusts’ (1991) 17 ACTEC Notes 177, 183 (‘A testator’s choice of executor, friend, or relative as umpire is logical given their personal knowledge of the testator’s desires.’); Blaine Covington Janin, Comment, ‘The Validity of Arbitration Provisions in Trust Instruments’ (1967) 55 California Law Review 521, 532 (‘Because the settlor or the parties are free to select those whom they wish to decide future controversies, arbitrators may be chosen either on the basis of their knowledge in areas most likely to become the subject of dispute or because of their familiarity with the settlor and beneficiaries.’).

94  Spitko, Abhorrent Testator (n 93) 297 (arguing that arbitration allows a minority-culture testator to appoint a decision-maker who is familiar with and respectful of the values that informed the drafting of the estate plan and, thus, to overcome biases inherent in traditional probate litigation).

95  AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules (n 3) Standard Arbitration Clause for Wills and Non-Commercial Trusts. See also ibid at Standard Arbitration Clause for Commercial Trusts (providing a clause that is identical to the clause quoted in the text except that it lacks one typographical error contained in the clause quoted in the text).

96  ibid Rule 3(a).

97  ibid Rule 11(a). More specifically, Rule 11 provides for appointment of arbitrators from a list of ‘names of persons chosen by the AAA from its Wills and Trust [sic] and Commercial Panels’. ibid. It is unclear why the Wills and Trusts Rules provide for arbitrators from the commercial panel.

98  ibid Rule 1(b).

99  ibid.

100  ibid Rule 1(c).

101  ibid.

102  ibid Rule 3(a). See also ibid Rule 11(a).

103  American Arbitration Association, Expedited Procedures, Rule E-4, <www.adr.org>.

104  See Qualification Criteria for Admittance to the AAA National Roster of Arbitrators, <www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?doc=ADRSTG_003878>.

105  American Arbitration Association, Procedures for Large, Complex Commercial Cases, Rule L-2, <www.adr.org>.

106  Strong, Proper Procedural Choices (n 7) 636.

107  ibid 650.

108  ibid. See also ibid 636 (labelling the drafters’ lack of specific attention to the nature of trust disputes ‘highly problematic given the many unique challenges associated with mandatory arbitration of internal trust disputes’).

109  AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules (n 3) Standard Arbitration Clause for Wills and Non-Commercial Trusts. See also ibid at Standard Arbitration Clause for Commercial Trusts (containing identical language minus the language respecting competency).

110  ibid Rule 23.

111  Strong, Proper Procedural Choices (n 7) 650 n351 (stating with respect to the 2009 AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules that ‘[t]here is little evidence that the AAA considered concerns relating to commercial trusts separately from those arising under non-commercial trusts.’).

112  See AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules (n 3) Standard Arbitration Clause for Wills and Non-Commercial Trusts; ibid at Standard Arbitration Clause for Commercial Trusts.

113  See ibid Rule 1(b)–(c).

114  See Strong, Proper Procedural Choices (n 7) 646 (noting that trust disputes may ‘involve[] the coordination of related claims brought by different individuals and the possibility of parallel proceedings’ in light of ‘the number of parties and the potential disparity of their relationship to each other and the trust itself’).

115  See eg Graves v Vitu, 2013 WL 499339, at *6-7 (WD Va 2013) (in a case interpreting a no-contest clause found within two trusts, a certain trust beneficiary was ‘required as a party to this litigation because permitting the action to proceed without her may impair her ability to protect her interests’ and ‘as a nonparty, [the beneficiary] would not be bound by any judgment rendered in this case and could, should she so desire, bring a state court action on the same grounds yielding the possibility of inconsistent results’).

116  Professor Strong has suggested that arbitral procedures specific to trust arbitration should take into account ‘matters regarding late-joining and non-participating parties, [and] special or virtual representation, including appointment and payment of the representative’. Strong, Proper Procedural Choices (n 7) 650; ibid 638. See also ibid 633 (noting that ‘some parties to a trust dispute may only wish to join or need to be joined at some point late in the proceedings [yet] the [2009 AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules do] not address the issue of late joinder’).

117  The RUAA contains provisions authorizing a court to consolidate separate arbitration proceedings upon a motion of a party to an arbitration agreement or proceeding. See Revised Uniform Arbitration Act s 10 (2000).

118  JAMS Comprehensive Arbitration Rules (n 19) Rule 6(e).

119  ibid Rule 6(f).

120  AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules (n 3) Rule 23.

121  Cf Strong, Proper Procedural Choices (n 7) 631–32 (noting that there are important differences between the 2009 AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules and the Procedures for Large, Complex Commercial Disputes and opining that ‘the AAA’s approach to the application of these alternative procedures is problematic because it puts procedural decisions in the hands of the AAA and, to a lesser extent, the parties, even though trust law has traditionally given precedence to the intent of the settlor in all matters concerning the trust’).

122  AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules (n 3) Rule 1(a).

123  ibid Rule 11(a).

124  ibid Rule 11(c).

125  ibid Rule 12.

126  See AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules (n 17) Rules 1(a), 12, 12(c), 13(a).

127  AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules (n 3) Standard Arbitration Clause for Wills and Non-Commercial Trusts.

128  ibid at Standard Arbitration Clause for Wills and Non-Commercial Trusts. A mental capacity challenge to a will or trust containing an arbitration clause raises complex separability issues. Compare Primerica Life Ins Co v Brown, 304 F3d 469, 472 (5th Cir 2002) (holding that a ‘capacity defense is part of the underlying dispute between the parties which, in light of [the separability doctrine], must be submitted to the arbitrator’), with Spahr v Secco, 330 F3d 1266, 1273 (10th Cir 2003) (concluding that ‘the analytical formula developed in [the Supreme Court’s separability jurisprudence] cannot be applied with precision when a party contends that an entire contract containing an arbitration provision is unenforceable because he or she lacked the mental capacity to enter into the contract’).

129  Horton (n 10) 1030; Erin Katzen, ‘Arbitration Clauses in Wills and Trusts: Defining the Parameters for Mandatory Arbitration of Wills and Trusts’ (2011) 24 Quinnipiac Probate Law Journal 118, 119; SI Strong, ‘Empowering Settlors: How Proper Language Can Increase the Enforceability of a Mandatory Arbitration Provision in a Trust’ (2012) 47 Real Property, Trust and Estate Law Journal 275, 287 (noting that ‘many US states have not yet addressed issues’ concerning the enforceability of mandatory trust arbitration). See also Rachal v Reitz, 403 SW3d 840, 848 (Tex 2013) (‘There is a dearth of authority as to the validity of an arbitration provision in a trust.’); McArthur v McArthur, 224 Cal App 4th 651, 656 (Cal Ct App 2014) (noting the lack of case law on the issue of whether a trust’s arbitration clause can bind a trust beneficiary).

130  Spitko, Implied Unilateral Arbitration Contract (n 74) (discussing this consensus and arguing that the FAA and state arbitration statutes require enforcement of an arbitration clause in a will even against a beneficiary who seeks to render the will a complete nullity). This consensus is consistent with a conditional gift or direct benefits estoppel theory to bind parties to the arbitration clause. See eg Rachal, 403 SW3d at 845–47 (relying upon direct benefits estoppel theory to bind a trust beneficiary to a trust’s arbitration clause where the beneficiary sought to enforce his rights under the trust); Horton (n 10) 1062 (arguing that ‘parties to an estate plan can agree to arbitrate by accepting benefits under the terms of an instrument that contains an arbitration clause’).

131  AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules (n 3) Rule 7(b).

132  ibid.

133  Compare ibid with AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules (n 17) Rule 7(b).

134  Compare AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules (n 3) Rule 7(b) with AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules (n 17) Rule 7(b).

135  AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules (n 17) Standard Arbitration Clause.

136  Strong, Proper Procedural Choices (n 7) 628 (noting that ‘experts in arbitration do not encourage drafters to adopt these sorts of lengthy, ad hoc provisions, since the use of non-standard language can lead to disputes over the scope and interpretation of the operative terms’).