Footnotes:
5 Richard M. Kohn, ‘The Case for Including Directly Held Securities within the Scope of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions’ (2010) XV(2) Uniform Law Review 413–18.
6 Richard M. Kohn, ‘The Case for Including Directly Held Securities within the Scope of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions’ (2010) XV(2) Uniform Law Review 413–18, at 417.
8 Based on the definition of ‘intermediated securities’ contained in Art 1(b) of the Geneva Securities Convention.
9 Based on the definition of ‘securities account’ contained in Art 1(c) of the Geneva Securities Convention. Thus, there is a clear distinction from a ‘bank account’ in which funds (not securities) may be held (Art 2(c)).
10 See A/CN.9/802, para 704.
11 The main criticism against the DML as compared to the EU Financial Collateral Directive (FCD) is that the DML does not distinguish between transactions involving securities that enhance liquidity in the financial markets and other types of securities, with the result that, unlike the FCD, the DML does not provide for distinct legal regimes in this regard (see Thomas Keijser, ‘Non-intermediated Securities: A European View on the Draft UNCITRAL Model Law on Secured Transactions’ (2015) 12(1) European Company Law 7–12, at 8). However, the DML is a model law. States may enact it or not, and, if a State enacts it, it may enact it as is or revised to adjust it to its own domestic regime. In any case, the fact that the FCD provides for two distinct regimes does not necessarily prevent an EU Member State from enacting the same regime for both types of transaction.
12 For a discussion of the reasons why financial collateral should be used differently from other types of collateral and the limits of this different treatment, see Louise Gullifer, ‘What Should We Do about Financial Collateral’ (2012) 65 Current Legal Problems 377–410; Thomas Keijser, ‘A Need for a Change: The Undesirable Consequences of the Settlement Finality Directive and the Collateral Directive in the Field of Property and Insolvency Law, in Particular for Small- and Medium-Sized Enterprises’ (2006) 2 Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht 308–25.
13 On the creation of non-intermediated securities, see Michel Deschamps, ‘The Best Rules for Non-intermediated Securities’, Chapter 1 of the main work, paras 1.20–22.
14 Arguably, the signature requirement may be inconsistent with Art 3 FCD (see Louise Gullifer, ‘What Should We Do about Financial Collateral’ (2012) 65 Current Legal Problems 377–410, at 386). But an EU Member State may still enact the DML, leaving out this signature requirement.
15 In order to facilitate consideration of the matter by the national legislator, the commentary of the LGST discusses the various approaches taken in different legal systems in this regard to ensure that grantors are not over-committed (LGST, Ch II, paras 51–5).
16 The LGST discusses over-collateralization, suggesting ways in which it could be addressed, but makes no recommendation, as the appropriate response may vary widely from State to State (LGST, Ch II, para 69).
17 There is no inconsistency between the creation requirements of the DML and Art 3 FCD as a flexible writing requirement (i.e. a signature, including the e-signature of the grantor, is only required if there is no transfer of possession, while the legal consequences of a lack of signature are left to enacting States) is not really a prohibited ‘form requirement’. There is no inconsistency even with regard to evidentiary requirements as there has to be a written document or delivery of possession and an oral agreement (see a different view with respect to evidentiary requirements by Thomas Keijser, ‘Non-intermediated Securities: A European View on the Draft UNCITRAL Model Law on Secured Transactions’ (2015) 12(1) European Company Law 7–12, at 9).
18 Michel Deschamps, ‘The Best Rules for Non-Intermediated Securities’, Chapter 1 of the main work, para 1.46, argues that the same methods should be available to perfect both an outright transfer and a security interest in non-intermediated securities, as (i) it is not always easy to determine whether a prior competing transaction is an outright transfer or a security transfer and (ii) complications would arise if an outright transferee could perfect its interest under a method not available to a secured creditor.
19 The methods for achieving third-party effectiveness and priority are not ‘formal requirements’ prohibited by Art 3 FCD in the sense that, for example, registration is not required for the creation of a security interest. This certainly applies to registration in the books of the issuer, but it also applies to delivery of a certificate to the secured creditor or the registration of a notice in the security interest registry (see also Thomas Keijser, ‘Non-intermediated Securities: A European View on the Draft UNCITRAL Model Law on Secured Transactions’ (2015) 12(1) European Company Law 7–12, at 9). In any case, their disapplication would not be justified as they promote transparency and certainty, and the English enactment of the FCD disapplies registration only if the collateral is in the possession or control of the collateral taker and only with respect to arrangements between public bodies, central banks, financial institutions, and large companies relating to liquid assets (see Louise Gullifer, ‘What Should We Do about Financial Collateral’ (2012) 65 Current Legal Problems 377–410, at 392 and 409).
20 Article 27 of the DML provides for the establishment of a general security interest registry. The articles that deal with the details of registration are included in a set of draft Model Registry Provisions, as enacting States may include them in their enactment of the DML, in subsidiary legislation, or some in the former and the rest in the latter.
21 LGST, Ch V, paras 90–93.
22 It is questionable whether the provision dealing with the priority of a security interest as against the rights of the administrator in the grantor’s insolvency will be retained in the DML, as the DML does not deal with matters typically addressed in insolvency law. Chapter XII of the LGST does deal with insolvency-related matters on the basis of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law, but does not apply to security interests in any types of securities (recommendation 4(c)). Thus, there cannot be any inconsistency in this regard between the DML (or the LGST) and the FCD.
23 These priority rules are generally identical to those proposed by Michel Deschamps, ‘The Best Rules for Non-Intermediated Securities’, Chapter 1 of the main work, paras 1.56–95. Moreover, they are compatible with the FCD as the FCD does not contain substantive law rules with respect to priority conflicts (see Thomas Keijser, ‘Non-intermediated Securities: A European View on the Draft UNCITRAL Model Law on Secured Transactions’ (2015) 12(1) European Company Law 7–12, at 9).
24 The secured creditor’s right to use the encumbered non-intermediated securities is in line with Art 5 FCD regarding the use of encumbered securities even before default. See also the discussion in Chapter 2 of the main work.
25 The secured creditor’s rights to obtain possession of, sell, or otherwise dispose of, or propose that it acquires a tangible encumbered asset in full or partial satisfaction of the secured obligation, and exercise any other right provided in the security agreement or other law, including close-out netting (Art 70(1) DML) are in line with Arts 4–7 FCD. So is the provision that permits the secured creditor to exercise its rights in court or out of court (Art 71 DML). Arguably, the requirement that the secured creditor must notify interested parties and avoid a breach of peace in attempting to repossess a tangible encumbered asset out of court is inconsistent with the FCD, but probably it is not as the requirement does not apply to tangible assets that are perishable, may decline in value speedily, or are of a kind sold on a recognized market (Art 75 DML). In any case, Art 4(6) FCD allows national standards of commercially reasonable enforcement, and notifying the grantor and parties with a right in the encumbered asset to allow them to exercise their rights is a key part of what is generally considered to be commercially reasonable enforcement (see Thomas Keijser, ‘Non-intermediated Securities: A European View on the Draft UNCITRAL Model Law on Secured Transactions’ (2015) 12(1) European Company Law 7–12, at 10). Louise Gullifer, ‘What Should We Do about Financial Collateral’ (2012) 65 Current Legal Problems 377–410, at 403, argues that formal requirements are disapplied in this regard only with respect to liquid assets and thus shares in private companies and securities not traded in wholesale capital markets should not be affected by Art 3 FCD.
26 These rules are the same as those provided in the DML for tangible assets; see Arts 96(1) and 99(1)).
27 Article 9 FCD deals with the law applicable to a number of substantive law issues with respect to book entry securities and refers to the relevant account as the connecting factor, which cannot be a connecting factor for non-intermediated securities (for a discussion of this provision of the FCD and other European developments, see Thomas Keijser, ‘Non-intermediated Securities: A European View on the Draft UNCITRAL Model Law on Secured Transactions’ (2015) 12(1) European Company Law 7–12, at 11).