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Oxford Law Citator
Contents
Expand All
Collapse All
Preliminary Material
Preface
Contents
Table of Cases
European Commission of Human Rights
European Court of Human Rights
European Union
Germany
Italy
Netherlands
United Kingdom
United States
Table of Legislation
International Instruments
European Union
Regulations
Directives
Decisions
Recommendations
National Law
Austria
Belgium
France
Germany
Italy
Malaysia
Netherlands
Portugal
Spain
United Kingdom
United States
List of Contributors
Editors
Contributors
List of Abbreviations
Main Text
Part I General Aspects
1 Capital Markets Union after Brexit
I Introduction
1.01
1.02
1.03
1.04
1.05
II CMU Objectives
1.06
1.07
III EBU–CMU Relationship
1.08
1.09
IV Regulatory Burden
1.10
1.11
1.12
1.13
V Better Regulation and Call for Evidence
1.14
1.15
1.16
1.17
1.18
1.19
1.20
1.21
VI Final Remarks
1.22
1.23
2 CMU and the Deepening of Financial Integration
I Introduction
2.01
2.02
II Brief History of EU Financial Integration Policies
2.03
1 Integration post-Second World War and Bretton Woods
2.04
2.05
2 Mutual recognition and the Single European Act
2.06
2.07
2.08
3 Post-crisis capital markets integration
2.09
2.10
2.11
2.12
III CMU as a Risk Absorber
2.13
1 What is risk sharing?
2.14
2.15
2.16
2.17
2.18
2.19
2 Building a financial ecosystem in Europe
2.20
2.21
2.22
2.23
2.24
2.25
IV The Greatest Capital Market Integration: A Glimpse into the Economic History of the United States
2.26
1 A long and complex integration process
2.27
2.28
2.29
2.30
2.31
2.32
2.33
2 Key lessons for Europe
2.34
2.35
2.36
2.37
2.38
2.39
2.40
2.41
2.42
V Conclusions
2.43
2.44
2.45
3 A Stronger Role for the European Supervisory Authorities in the EU27
I Introduction
3.01
3.02
3.03
3.04
3.05
3.06
II Pan-European Governance of the ESAs
3.07
3.08
3.09
3.10
3.11
3.12
3.13
3.14
3.15
III Direct ESA Supervision
1 General
3.16
3.17
3.18
3.19
2 Data reporting services providers
3.20
3.21
3.22
3.23
3.24
3.25
3 Asset management industry
3.26
3.27
4 CCPs
3.28
5 PEPP providers
3.29
6 FinTech
3.30
IV Direct ESMA Supervision of CCPs
1 Background
A General
3.31
B The rapidly expanding role of CCPs
3.32
3.33
3.34
3.35
3.36
C Highly concentrated and highly interconnected clearing markets
3.37
3.38
3.39
3.40
3.41
2 Supervision of EU CCPs—current shortcomings
A CCP colleges
3.42
B Home-country control in a cross-border world
3.43
C Regulatory and supervisory arbitrage
3.44
3 Supervision of third-country CCPs—current shortcomings
A Significant number of financial instruments denominated in the currencies of the Member States cleared by recognized third-country CCPs
3.45
B Shortcomings in ongoing supervision of third-country CCPs
3.46
C Un-level playing field
3.47
D Brexit
3.48
3.49
3.50
4 The creation of ESMA’s CCP Executive Session
A General
3.51
3.52
B Composition
3.53
3.54
3.55
3.56
3.57
3.58
C Tasks and powers
3.59
3.60
3.61
3.62
D Decision-making
3.63
3.64
5 A stronger role for ESMA with regard to EU CCPs
3.65
3.66
3.67
3.68
3.69
6 A stronger role for ESMA with regard to third-country CCPs
A General
3.70
B A two-tier system for third-country CCPs
i General
3.71
3.72
3.73
ii Tier 1 CCPs
3.74
iii Tier 2 CCPs
3.75
3.76
3.77
3.78
3.79
3.80
3.81
3.82
3.83
3.84
3.85
3.86
iv Outright refusal to recognize Tier 2 CCPs
3.87
3.88
3.89
3.90
C Ongoing ESMA supervision over third-country CCPs
i General
3.91
ii Responsibility for ongoing supervision
3.92
3.93
3.94
iii Investigation powers
3.95
3.96
3.97
3.98
iv Procedural rules, infringements, and enforcement
3.99
3.100
3.101
3.102
3.103
3.104
3.105
3.106
D An enhanced role for ESMA in the recognition regime
3.107
V Concluding Remarks
3.108
4 A Single Listing Authority and Securities Regulator for the CMU and the Future of ESMA: Costs, Benefits, and Legal Impediments
I Introduction
4.01
4.02
4.03
4.04
4.05
4.06
4.07
4.08
4.09
4.10
4.11
II Nature and Reach of ESMA Powers
1 Overview
4.12
4.13
2 ESMA as supervisor
4.14
4.15
4.16
4.17
3 ESMA enforcement action
4.18
4.19
4 Emergency powers
4.20
5 Evaluation
4.21
4.22
III The Proposed EULA System
4.23
1 The Listing Directive, MiFID, and the Markets for Securities Listings and Trading
4.24
4.25
4.26
4.27
4.28
4.29
4.30
4.31
4.32
4.33
4.34
4.35
2 Prospectus Regulation
4.36
4.37
4.38
4.39
3 Transparency Directive
4.40
4.41
4 Centralization of the listing process and the CMU
4.42
4.43
4.44
4.45
IV A Possible CMU-SEC and Configuration of Powers
4.46
4.47
4.48
4.49
4.50
4.51
4.52
4.53
4.54
4.55
4.56
V The Constitutionality of a Euro-SEC and EULA
4.57
4.58
4.59
4.60
4.61
4.62
4.63
4.64
4.65
4.66
4.67
4.68
4.69
VI Conclusion
4.70
4.71
4.72
4.73
4.74
4.75
4.76
4.77
Part II Brexit
5 Some Aspects of the Impact of Brexit in the Field of Financial Services
I Introduction
5.01
II Access
5.02
5.03
5.04
5.05
5.06
5.07
5.08
5.09
5.10
5.11
5.12
5.13
III The Equivalence of Third Country Regulations or Standards
5.14
5.15
5.16
5.17
5.18
5.19
5.20
5.21
5.22
5.23
5.24
5.25
5.26
5.27
5.28
5.29
5.30
5.31
5.32
IV Euro Derivatives Clearing
5.33
5.34
5.35
5.36
5.37
5.38
5.39
5.40
5.41
5.42
5.43
V Brexit and the EBA
5.44
1 Relocation
5.45
5.46
5.47
2 EBA and ECB
5.48
5.49
5.50
5.51
5.52
5.53
3 Reform of the three ESAs
5.54
5.55
5.56
5.57
5.58
5.59
5.60
5.61
5.62
5.63
5.64
6 Capital Markets Union, Third Countries, and Equivalence: Law, Markets, and Brexit
I Capital Markets Union, Regulation, and Equivalence
6.01
6.02
6.03
6.04
6.05
6.06
II CMU and its Investment Banker
1 Market conditions
6.07
6.08
6.09
2 Legal remedies
6.10
6.11
6.12
6.13
6.14
6.15
6.16
III Third Country Rules, the UK, and CMU: Access and Export Implications
1 The equivalence regime
6.17
6.18
6.19
6.20
2 Investment services: MiFID II/MiFIR
6.21
6.22
6.23
6.24
6.25
6.26
6.27
6.28
6.29
3 The MiFID II/MiFIR equivalence challenge
6.30
6.31
6.32
6.33
6.34
6.35
6.36
6.37
4 Infrastructure: EMIR
6.38
6.39
6.40
6.41
5 The EMIR equivalence challenge
6.42
6.43
6.44
IV Managing Access and Export: The International Context
1 Managing access and export and international financial governance
6.45
6.46
6.47
6.48
6.49
6.50
6.51
2 Investment services
6.52
6.53
6.54
6.55
6.56
3 Infrastructure
6.57
6.58
6.59
6.60
4 Learning from international financial governance
6.61
6.62
V Building a New Model: The EU Perspective and a Proposal
1 Competing visions of equivalence
6.63
6.64
6.65
6.66
2 A bespoke EU/UK arrangement
6.67
6.68
6.69
6.70
6.71
6.72
6.73
6.74
3 A New Horizontal EU Equivalence Regime
6.75
6.76
6.77
6.78
6.79
6.80
6.81
6.82
6.83
6.84
4 The interests at stake
6.85
6.86
6.87
6.88
6.89
VI Conclusion
6.90
6.91
7 OTC Derivatives Clearing, Brexit, and the CMU
I Introduction
7.01
7.02
7.03
7.04
7.05
7.06
II Central Clearing of OTC Derivatives
7.07
1 Clearing economics and regulation
7.08
7.09
A Concentration
7.10
7.11
B Globalization
7.12
7.13
7.14
2 Eurozone vs. City clearing
7.15
7.16
7.17
7.18
III Brexit, EMIR, and Equivalence
7.19
7.20
7.21
7.22
1 Non-consensual Brexit and equivalence
7.23
7.24
7.25
7.26
7.27
7.28
7.29
2 Consensual Brexit and agreement on clearing
7.30
7.31
7.32
7.33
7.34
3 Proposed EMIR reform
7.35
7.36
7.37
7.38
IV Speculating on the Worst-case Scenario
7.39
7.40
7.41
7.42
7.43
7.44
7.45
7.46
V Network Strategies as an Alternative Solution
7.47
1 Cross-margining agreements
7.48
7.49
7.50
2 Participant link
7.51
7.52
3 Interoperability
7.53
7.54
7.55
7.56
7.57
4 Assessment
7.58
7.59
7.60
VI Concluding Remarks
7.61
7.62
7.63
7.64
7.65
Part III Financing Innovation, Start-Ups, Non-Listed Companies, and Infrastructure Projects
8 The Role of Financial Innovation in EU Market Integration and the Capital Markets Union: A Reconceptualization of Policy Objectives
I Introduction
8.01
8.02
8.03
8.04
8.05
8.06
8.07
8.08
8.09
8.10
II Financial Innovation: A Principled Cost-Benefit Analysis
1 What is financial innovation?
8.11
8.12
8.13
8.14
8.15
8.16
8.17
8.18
8.19
8.20
2 FinTech’s potential and risks
8.21
8.22
8.23
8.24
8.25
8.26
III Market Integration and Financial Law Harmonization
1 Whither integration
8.27
8.28
2 Building blocks of the EU single financial market
8.29
A Early stages of European financial integration
8.30
8.31
B The political economy market integration in the EU
8.32
8.33
8.34
C EU harmonization legislation since 1985
8.35
i Harmonization principles
8.36
8.37
8.38
8.39
ii The gradual shift to ‘maximum’ harmonization
8.40
8.41
8.42
iii MiFID II and MIFIR
8.43
8.44
8.45
8.46
8.47
8.48
8.49
8.50
8.51
IV FinTech and the CMU
8.52
8.53
8.54
8.55
1 FinTech and financial regulation
A Sandboxes: Regulatory monitoring and industry experimentation
8.56
8.57
8.58
8.59
B Shortcomings of regulatory sandboxes as a tool to foster EU market integration
8.60
8.61
8.62
C FinTech and the MiFID II investment product regime
8.63
8.64
8.65
8.66
V Conclusion
8.67
8.68
8.69
9 Capital Markets Union: Why ‘Venture Capital’ is not the Answer to Europe’s Innovation Challenge
I Introduction
9.01
9.02
9.03
9.04
II Innovation Ecosystems
9.05
9.06
9.07
9.08
9.09
9.10
9.11
9.12
III Stimulating Venture Capital
9.13
9.14
9.15
1 Government investment
9.16
9.17
9.18
9.19
9.20
9.21
9.22
9.23
9.24
2 Making VC more accessible
9.25
9.26
9.27
9.28
9.29
9.30
9.31
9.32
9.33
9.34
9.35
9.36
9.37
9.38
IV But … Entrepreneurs Don’t Always Benefit
9.39
9.40
9.41
9.42
9.43
9.44
V A Different Approach for Europe?
9.45
9.46
9.47
9.48
9.49
9.50
9.51
1 Driving genuine opportunities for serendipity
9.52
9.53
9.54
9.55
9.56
2 Aligning incentives and ‘signalling’
9.57
9.58
9.59
9.60
9.61
VI Both Cultures Need to Adapt
9.62
9.63
9.64
9.65
9.66
10 FinTech and Alternative Finance in the CMU: The Regulation of Marketplace Investing
I Introduction
10.01
10.02
II Economics and Technology of Alternative Finance
1 FinTech as applied to alternative finance
10.03
10.04
10.05
10.06
10.07
2 Main types
10.08
10.09
10.10
10.11
III Loan-based and Investment-based Crowdfunding: Characteristics and Comparison
1 Business models in FR-crowdfunding
10.12
10.13
10.14
2 Benefits and risks of FR-crowdfunding
10.15
10.16
10.17
10.18
10.19
10.20
10.21
IV Regulation of Crowdfunding Platforms: EU and Member States
1 National approaches to loan-based crowdfunding
10.22
10.23
10.24
A Banking regulation approach
10.25
10.26
10.27
B Payment regulation approach
10.28
C Securities regulation approach
10.29
10.30
D Bespoke regimes
10.31
10.32
10.33
10.34
10.35
10.36
10.37
2 National approaches to investment-based crowdfunding
10.38
A Securities regulation approach
10.39
10.40
B Ad hoc regimes
10.41
10.42
10.43
10.44
10.45
10.46
10.47
V Policy Proposals and Conclusions
1 General criteria
10.48
10.49
10.50
2 The proposed regime of IB-crowdfunding
10.51
A Scope of MiFID
10.52
10.53
10.54
10.55
B Is MiFID enough?
10.56
3 The proposed regime of LB-crowdfunding
10.57
A Nature of the service
10.58
10.59
B Core rules
10.60
10.61
4 Proportionality
10.62
10.63
10.64
VI Conclusions
10.65
Part IV Raising Capital on the Capital Markets
11 Modernizing the Prospectus Directive
I Introduction
11.01
11.02
11.03
11.04
II Background and Purposes of the Reformed Prospectus Rules
1 Difficulties in the Prospectus Directive
11.05
11.06
11.07
11.08
11.09
11.10
2 Aims
11.11
11.12
3 Revision to a regulation
11.13
III Most Important Modifications
1 Modifications of the exemptions to the duty to publish a prospectus
11.14
11.15
11.16
11.17
11.18
11.19
2 Special regime for small and medium-sized companies
11.20
11.21
11.22
11.23
3 Simplified disclosure regime for secondary issuances
11.24
11.25
11.26
11.27
4 Special regime for frequent issuers
11.28
11.29
11.30
11.31
5 Increasing the relevance of the prospectus for investors
11.32
11.33
11.34
11.35
11.36
6 Publication process and access point for EU prospectuses
11.37
11.38
IV General Comments on the Prospectus Regulation: The Problem of the Information Paradigm
11.39
11.40
11.41
11.42
11.43
11.44
V Final Remarks
11.45
11.46
11.47
12 Small and Medium Enterprises Growth Markets
I Introduction
12.01
12.02
12.03
12.04
II The SME GM Regime
12.05
1 SME GMs as an optional subset of MTFs
12.06
A The quantitative requirements for eligible MTFs
12.07
12.08
12.09
12.10
B Competent authority for registration and deregistration
12.11
12.12
2 The balance between investor protection and reducing compliance costs
12.13
A Initial and ongoing admission to trading
12.14
12.15
B Disclosure to investors upon initial admission to trading
12.16
12.17
12.18
12.19
12.20
C Periodic financial reporting
12.21
12.22
12.23
D Prevention of market abuse
12.24
12.25
12.26
III A Critical Evaluation
12.27
1 An answer at odds with the problems to be solved
12.28
12.29
2 The limits of disclosure
12.30
12.31
3 The forgotten liquidity problem
12.32
12.33
4 An incomplete approach
12.34
12.35
IV An Alternative Proposal
12.36
12.37
1 A pan-European trading venue
12.38
12.39
12.40
12.41
2 A single regime
12.42
A Increasing liquidity
12.43
12.44
12.45
12.46
B Protecting investors
12.47
12.48
12.49
12.50
12.51
12.52
V Conclusions
12.53
13 Initial Public Offerings in the CMU: A US Perspective
I Introduction
13.01
13.02
13.03
13.04
13.05
13.06
13.07
13.08
13.09
13.10
13.11
13.12
II The Information-Asymmetry Problem
13.13
1 Adverse selection in markets generally
13.14
13.15
2 Application in securities markets
13.16
13.17
13.18
3 The additional problem of no guidance from secondary-market prices
13.19
4 The social-welfare challenge posed by information asymmetries
13.20
13.21
13.22
13.23
13.24
13.25
13.26
III Market-Based Solutions to Adverse-Selection Problems
13.27
1 Signalling
13.28
13.29
13.30
13.31
13.32
13.33
2 Intermediation
13.34
13.35
13.36
13.37
13.38
3 Third-party certification
13.39
13.40
13.41
13.42
13.43
4 Buyer search
13.44
13.45
13.46
13.47
13.48
13.49
13.50
IV Affirmative-Disclosure Regimes
13.51
13.52
1 The rationale for an affirmative-disclosure regime at the time of the offering
13.53
13.54
13.55
13.56
2 The rationale for a periodic-disclosure regime after the time of the offering
13.57
13.58
3 Mandatory versus optional initial offering and ongoing-disclosure regimes
13.59
13.60
A Private costs of issuer disclosure exceed social costs
13.61
13.62
B Social benefits of issuer disclosure exceed private benefits
13.63
C Impact on issuer disclosure behaviour
13.64
13.65
V Mandated Liability Terms
13.66
1 The rationale for imposing liability on operating corporate issuers
13.67
13.68
13.69
13.70
2 The choice of liability regime for the issuer
13.71
A What constitutes an omission or a false or misleading statement of fact?
13.72
B Comparing strict absolute liability to scienter-based liability
13.73
13.74
13.75
C Comparing strict absolute liability to absolute liability with a due-diligence defence
13.76
3 The rationale for underwriter liability
13.77
13.78
A Issuer bankruptcy
13.79
13.80
13.81
B Issuer irrationality
13.82
13.83
4 The choice of liability regime for underwriters
13.84
A Scienter-based liability versus strict liability with or without a due-diligence defence
13.85
13.86
B Strict liability with or without a due-diligence defence
13.87
i Assuming a costless, error-free determination of the due-diligence defence
13.88
13.89
13.90
13.91
13.92
ii Taking account of the cost of determining the due-diligence defence and the chance of judicial error
13.93
13.94
iii Absolute strict liability ties a due-diligence and an insurance function
13.95
iv Conclusion
13.96
VI Application to the CMU
13.97
1 Liability
13.98
13.99
2 Reducing or eliminating disclosure burdens for SMEs
13.100
13.101
A Exemptions based on the nature of the investors
13.102
13.103
13.104
13.105
B Exemptions based on measures of size of enterprise
13.106
13.107
VII Conclusion
13.108
13.109
13.110
14 Private Placements in the Capital Markets Union: A Priority Moving in Reverse?
I Introduction
14.01
14.02
II What is a Private Placement?
1 Proposed definition
14.03
14.04
14.05
14.06
2 Market size
14.07
14.08
14.09
3 Private placements: benefits and disadvantages for issuers
14.10
14.11
III A Closer Look at US Private Placements and European Market Initiatives
1 US private placements
14.12
14.13
2 Private placements: European market initiatives
14.14
A A Euro PP Working Group
14.15
14.16
B LMA
14.17
C ICMA PEPP Joint Committee
14.18
D Use of LMA/ICMA documentation
14.19
3 Credit rating agency developments
14.20
4 Other barriers
14.21
IV Private Placements in the CMU Agenda: Gradual De-prioritization
1 February 2015 Green Paper and consultation
14.22
14.23
2 Consultation responses to the Green Paper
14.24
3 The September 2015 CMU Action Plan
14.25
14.26
14.27
14.28
14.29
14.30
4 Private placements in the April 2016 CMU Status Report and the September 2016 CMU Acceleration Communication
14.31
14.32
V Private Placements and the PD3 Regime
1 Reforming the PD regime
14.33
14.34
2 No realistic private placement exemption under the PD?
14.35
14.36
14.37
14.38
3 The PD3 safe harbours
14.39
14.40
14.41
14.42
14.43
VI An Interim Scorecard on PEPPs in the CMU
14.44
14.45
14.46
14.47
14.48
VII Conclusions
14.49
15 Damages Actions by Investors on the Back of Market Disclosure Requirements
I Introduction
15.01
15.02
15.03
15.04
II Investor Actions and the Promotion of Disclosure
1 The goals of disclosure rules
15.05
15.06
15.07
15.08
15.09
15.10
2 Private incentives for investors to litigate
15.11
15.12
15.13
15.14
15.15
15.16
III Investor Litigation in the Context of Public Offerings
15.17
15.18
15.19
15.20
15.21
15.22
15.23
15.24
15.25
15.26
15.27
IV Investor Litigation in the Context of Continuing Disclosures
15.28
15.29
15.30
15.31
15.32
15.33
15.34
15.35
15.36
15.37
15.38
15.39
15.40
15.41
15.42
V Conclusion
15.43
15.44
Part V Fostering Retail and Institutional Investment
16 Investor Protection in the Capital Markets Union
I Introduction
1 CMU and investor protection
16.01
16.02
16.03
2 Building blocks of investor protection
16.04
16.05
II Product Information
1 Background
A The information paradigm
16.06
16.07
B Problems associated with the information paradigm
16.08
i Information overload
16.09
ii Limits to investor rationality
16.10
iii Costs
16.11
iv Information and responsibility
16.12
2 Recent trends
A Focus on presentation of information
16.13
i UCITS—from simplified prospectus to KIID
16.14
ii Summary prospectus
16.15
iii National initiatives for complex products
16.16
16.17
iv PRIIPs—KID
16.18
v PEPPs—KID
16.19
vi Conclusion
16.20
16.21
16.22
16.23
B A more cross-sectoral approach
16.24
16.25
16.26
III Service Quality Requirements (Conduct of Business Rules)
1 Background
16.27
16.28
16.29
16.30
16.31
16.32
2 Recent trends
A Increasing detail
i From ISD to MiFID II
16.33
16.34
ii Investment advice
16.35
iii Inducements
16.36
iv Information obligations
16.37
B Increased cooperation between services provider and product manufacturer
16.38
C Towards a more cross-sectoral approach?
i Limited scope of application of ISD and MiFID I
16.39
16.40
ii Member States’ reaction
16.41
iii EU reaction—MiFID II and IDD
16.42
16.43
iv Proposal for a PEPP Regulation
16.44
v Further widening the scope?
16.45
16.46
16.47
IV Product Regulation
1 Background
16.48
16.49
2 Recent trends
16.50
A Product quality requirements
16.51
16.52
16.53
B Product design
16.54
i Member States’ initiatives
16.55
16.56
16.57
ii EU reaction
16.58
16.59
16.60
iii Effect: restricted access to certain products
16.61
16.62
C Product intervention
16.63
16.64
i Member State measures
16.65
16.66
16.67
16.68
16.69
16.70
16.71
16.72
ii EU initiatives
16.73
16.74
16.75
V Conclusion
16.76
1 Trends per building block
i Information obligations
16.77
ii Service quality (conduct of business) rules
16.78
16.79
iii Product Regulation
16.80
16.81
16.82
2 Overarching trends
16.83
16.84
16.85
17 A Policy Framework for European Personal Pensions?
I Introduction
1 Towards a European market for personal pensions
17.01
17.02
17.03
2 A shift to personal pensions in the Netherlands?
17.04
3 Reasons for a European market for personal pensions
17.05
17.06
17.07
17.08
4 Outline of this chapter
17.09
II Background: The Dutch Pensions System
1 Introduction
17.10
2 The three pillars of the Dutch pension system
17.11
A AOW: State pension
17.12
B Supplementary pension (employer related)
17.13
C Voluntary personal pension (individual pension)
17.14
3 The legal framework for second pillar pension
A Pension agreement between employer and employee
17.15
B Execution by pension provider is required by law
17.16
17.17
C Three parties: employer, employee, and pension provider
17.18
4 Pensions Act allows three types of pension agreement
17.19
A Defined benefit (DB) schemes
17.20
17.21
17.22
17.23
B Defined capital schemes
17.24
C Defined contribution (DC) schemes
17.25
17.26
17.27
D Development of the DC schemes
17.28
17.29
17.30
5 Pension providers
17.31
A Sector pension fund—company pension fund—occupational pension fund
17.32
17.33
17.34
17.35
III Towards Personal Pension in the Netherlands: The PPR
1 Context: Dutch pension contract and system reform
17.36
2 Main features of the PPR: A DC scheme
17.37
17.38
3 The balance of the PPR
17.39
4 Numerical example of the build-up/accumulation phase
17.40
5 Explanation numerical example PPR build-up/accumulation phase
17.41
6 Numerical example of the distribution/decumulation phase
17.42
7 Explanation numerical example PPR distribution/decumulation phase
17.43
8 The PPR as a panacea?
17.44
17.45
17.46
IV Obstacles to Realizing the PPR
1 Introduction
17.47
2 Variable pension benefits
17.48
3 Ring-fencing
17.49
4 The PPR and existing pension agreement types
17.50
A Defined benefit does not fit PPR
17.51
B Defined capital
17.52
C Defined contribution
17.53
5 Age differentiation in personal pension
17.54
A Life-cycle investment
17.55
17.56
17.57
6 The compulsory nature of the PPR in sector pension funds
17.58
17.59
17.60
7 PPR and accrued pension
17.61
A Value transfer of accrued pension
17.62
B Conversion of accrued rights under DC schemes
17.63
C The risk of conversion
17.64
D Protection of pension property rights?
17.65
E Property rights protected by Article 1 Protocol ECHR
17.66
17.67
F EU Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFR)
17.68
17.69
V A Model for a (European) PPP
1 The European PPP
17.70
17.71
17.72
17.73
17.74
2 Characteristics of a PPP
17.75
17.76
17.77
3 Economic benefits of the PPR
17.78
17.79
A Financial and longevity risk
17.80
B Transparency and portability
17.81
4 Macroeconomic aspects of the PPR as a model for a PPP
17.82
A Growth and financial stability
17.83
17.84
B Fiscal aspects
17.85
5 Can a compulsory PPR be a model for a voluntary PPP?
17.86
6 Measures for a trustworthy, cost effective, transparent, and flexible PPP
17.87
VI Conclusion
17.88
18 Institutional Investors and Development of Europe’s Capital Markets
I Introduction
18.01
18.02
18.03
18.04
18.05
18.06
18.07
II Home Bias in the Literature
18.08
18.09
18.10
18.11
18.12
18.13
18.14
18.15
18.16
18.17
18.18
18.19
18.20
III Evolution of Institutional Investment and the Supply of Securities
18.21
18.22
18.23
18.24
18.25
18.26
18.27
18.28
18.29
IV Empirical Results on Home Bias and Euro-Area Bias
18.30
1 Data issues
18.31
18.32
18.33
2 Our home bias and euro-area bias indicators
18.34
18.35
18.36
18.37
18.38
18.39
18.40
18.41
18.42
3 Home bias and euro-area bias developments
18.43
18.44
18.45
18.46
18.47
18.48
18.49
18.50
18.51
18.52
18.53
4 Home bias and institutional investment
18.54
18.55
18.56
18.57
V Policy Recommendations
18.58
18.59
18.60
18.61
18.62
18.63
19 Cross-border Distribution of Collective Investment Products in the EU
I Introduction
19.01
19.02
19.03
II The Regulatory Menu for Collective Investment Products: Taxonomy and Structural Implications
1 The EU product menu for collective investment schemes
19.04
19.05
19.06
19.07
19.08
19.09
2 The structure of asset managers
19.10
19.11
III The Disclosure Regime
19.12
1 The regulatory framework at a glance
19.13
19.14
19.15
2 Marketing AIFs: general rules
19.16
19.17
19.18
19.19
19.20
19.21
3 Marketing AIFs on a cross-border basis
19.22
19.23
19.24
19.25
4 Marketing UCITS funds: general rules
19.26
19.27
19.28
5 Marketing UCITS funds on a cross-border basis
19.29
19.30
19.31
IV Conduct of Business Rules
19.32
19.33
19.34
V Supervision on Product Regulation
19.35
19.36
19.37
19.38
19.39
VI Is the EU Passport Working?
19.40
19.41
19.42
19.43
19.44
VII Rules and Practices on Marketing and Distribution of Funds: Host Member States
1 Local rules and practices on the notification and approval process
19.45
19.46
19.47
19.48
2 Local facilities for the exercise of unit-holder rights
19.49
19.50
19.51
19.52
19.53
19.54
3 Divergent interpretations of the definition of ‘marketing’
19.55
19.56
19.57
19.58
19.59
4 Divergent interpretations on the scope of ‘investment advice’
19.60
19.61
19.62
5 Divergent treatments of retrocessions
19.63
19.64
19.65
19.66
19.67
19.68
19.69
19.70
VIII Rules and Practices on Marketing and Distribution of Funds: Home Member States
19.71
1 Length of administrative proceedings
19.72
19.73
19.74
19.75
2 Gold-plating in areas left to home country control/regulation
19.76
19.77
19.78
IX How to Address the Barriers
19.79
1 Inbound restrictions
19.80
19.81
19.82
19.83
19.84
19.85
19.86
2 Outbound restrictions
19.87
19.88
19.89
19.90
X Conclusion
19.91
19.92
19.93
19.94
Part VI Leveraging Banking Capacity to Support the Wider Economy
20 Relief from Prudential Requirements to Support the Capital Markets Union
I Introduction
20.01
20.02
20.03
20.04
II The Impact of Capital Requirements of Banks on their Lending Portfolio: Comments from a Level Playing Field Perspective
20.05
20.06
20.07
20.08
20.09
III Capital Relief when Financing Small and Medium-sized Businesses
20.10
20.11
20.12
20.13
20.14
20.15
20.16
IV Equity Investments by Banks and Insurers: An Alternative for Traditional Lending?
20.17
20.18
20.19
20.20
20.21
20.22
20.23
20.24
20.25
20.26
20.27
20.28
V Relief for Banks Purchasing STS Securitization Positions
20.29
20.30
20.31
20.32
20.33
20.34
20.35
20.36
20.37
20.38
20.39
20.40
20.41
20.42
20.43
20.44
20.45
20.46
20.47
20.48
20.49
VI Capital Relief Insurers when Investing in Infrastructure
20.50
20.51
20.52
20.53
20.54
20.55
20.56
20.57
VII Conclusions
20.58
20.59
20.60
20.61
20.62
20.63
21 Securitization in the Capital Markets Union: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back
I Introduction
21.01
II How the Securitization Reform Fits in the Capital Markets Union
21.02
21.03
21.04
III The Context: The European Securitization Market Pre and Post Crisis
1 Background
21.05
21.06
21.07
21.08
21.09
21.10
21.11
21.12
21.13
IV The Legislative Proposal and Process
21.14
21.15
21.16
V The Securitization Regulation
21.17
1 The STS requirements
21.18
21.19
21.20
21.21
21.22
21.23
21.24
21.25
21.26
21.27
21.28
21.29
21.30
21.31
2 STS notification requirements
21.32
21.33
21.34
21.35
3 Liability risk for having it wrong
21.36
21.37
21.38
21.39
21.40
4 Provisions applicable to all securitizations
A Restrictions on investors
21.41
B Due diligence requirements for institutional investors
21.42
21.43
21.44
C Risk retention
21.45
21.46
21.47
21.48
21.49
21.50
D Transparency requirements for originators, sponsors, and SSPEs and securitization repositories
i Disclosure obligations for originators, sponsors, and SSPE’s
21.51
21.52
ii Securitization repositories
21.53
E Ban on re-securitization
21.54
F Criteria for credit granting
21.55
5 Administrative sanctions and remedial measures
21.56
21.57
21.58
21.59
21.60
21.61
21.62
VI The Regulation Amending the CRR
1 Additional requirements to be eligible for favourable risk weighting
21.63
21.64
21.65
2 Determination of regulatory capital charges
21.66
21.67
21.68
21.69
21.70
21.71
3 Regulatory capital floors
21.72
21.73
21.74
21.75
VII Conclusion
21.76
22 A Global Perspective on Securitized Debt
I Introduction
22.01
22.02
1 Explaining securitization
22.03
22.04
2 Securitization and the financial crisis
22.05
22.06
22.07
3 Securitization and the CMU
22.08
22.09
22.10
22.11
II US Regulatory Responses
22.12
1 Disclosure
22.13
2 Risk retention
22.14
3 Rating agency reform
22.15
4 Capital requirements
22.16
22.17
III European Regulatory Responses
22.18
22.19
22.20
1 Disclosure
22.21
22.22
22.23
22.24
22.25
2 Risk retention
22.26
3 Rating agency reform
22.27
4 Capital requirements
22.28
5 Due diligence requirements
22.29
IV Critiquing the US and European Regulatory Responses
22.30
1 Critique of disclosure
22.31
22.32
2 Critique of risk retention
22.33
22.34
22.35
22.36
3 Critique of rating agency reform
22.37
22.38
4 Critique of capital requirements
22.39
22.40
22.41
5 Critique of due diligence requirements
22.42
V Rethinking the Regulatory Framework
22.43
22.44
1 Identifying market failure causes
22.45
A Complexity
22.46
B Conflicts
22.47
22.48
C Complacency
22.49
22.50
22.51
D Change
22.52
E Tragedy of the commons
22.53
22.54
22.55
2 Addressing the market failure causes that apply distinctively to securitization
22.56
A Addressing ‘complexity’
22.57
22.58
22.59
B Addressing ‘change’
22.60
22.61
22.62
22.63
22.64
VI Conclusions
22.65
22.66
22.67
Part VII Facilitating Cross-Border Investing
23 Shareholder Activism in the CMU
I Introduction
23.01
23.02
23.03
23.04
23.05
23.06
23.07
II Entrepreneurial Shareholder Activism
23.08
23.09
23.10
23.11
23.12
23.13
23.14
23.15
23.16
23.17
23.18
23.19
23.20
23.21
23.22
III Hedge Fund Activism as a Conflict of Entrepreneurship
1 The real issue about short-termism
23.23
23.24
23.25
23.26
23.27
23.28
2 Who decides?
23.29
23.30
23.31
23.32
23.33
23.34
IV The Shareholder Rights Directive: A Missed Opportunity
23.35
23.36
23.37
1 Curbs on hedge fund activism
23.38
23.39
23.40
23.41
23.42
2 The myth of institutional investor engagement
23.43
23.44
23.45
23.46
23.47
23.48
V Shareholder Rights Directive as Capital Market Regulation
23.49
23.50
23.51
23.52
23.53
VI Conclusion
23.54
24 Efforts to Strengthen the Clearing and Settlement Framework of the Capital Markets Union
I Introduction
24.01
24.02
II General Overview
24.03
24.04
24.05
24.06
24.07
24.08
III The Transaction Chain
24.09
1 Trading
24.10
2 Clearing
24.11
24.12
24.13
3 Settlement
24.14
IV EMIR
1 Introductory comments
24.15
2 Enhancing EMIR provisions
A Licence and European passport
24.16
B Membership criteria
24.17
C Default waterfall
24.18
24.19
24.20
D Corporate governance
24.21
E Interoperability
24.22
F Additional protection against clearing member default
24.23
G Investment policy
24.24
H Segregation and portability of assets
24.25
V CCP Recovery and Resolution
1 Introductory remarks. The ‘nightmare’ of a CCP insolvency
24.26
24.27
24.28
2 The draft Regulation—introductory comments
24.29
24.30
24.31
3 The resolution authority
24.32
24.33
4 Recovery plans
24.34
24.35
5 Resolution
A Resolution plans
24.36
24.37
24.38
B Early intervention measures
24.39
C Resolution
24.40
24.41
24.42
24.43
24.44
24.45
24.46
D Remedies
24.47
24.48
24.49
24.50
6 The impact of the CCP Regulation
24.51
24.52
24.53
VI CSD Regulation
1 Introductory comments
24.54
24.55
24.56
2 Harmonized CSD definition
24.57
24.58
3 Ancillary services
24.59
4 Harmonized regulatory framework—European passport
24.60
24.61
24.62
5 Settlement period to T+2
24.63
6 Settlement discipline
24.64
7 Dematerialization and immobilization
24.65
VII Target2Securities
1 Introductory comments
24.66
2 Outsourcing of the settlement function
24.67
3 Cash leg and securities leg
24.68
24.69
24.70
24.71
4 Voluntary participation
24.72
5 Potential benefits of T2S
24.73
VIII Segregation under EMIR and the CSDR
1 Introductory remarks
24.74
2 Administrative segregation
24.75
24.76
3 Portability
A Portability under EMIR
24.77
24.78
24.79
B Forthcoming changes in EMIR
24.80
C No portability under the CSDR
24.81
24.82
4 Level of segregation
24.83
24.84
IX Open Access and Competition between Market Infrastructures
1 Introductory remarks
24.85
2 Capital Markets Union objectives
24.86
24.87
X Conclusion
24.88
24.89
24.90
24.91
25 Preventive Restructuring Frameworks
I Introduction
25.01
25.02
25.03
25.04
II Background and Objectives of the Draft Directive
25.05
25.06
25.07
25.08
25.09
25.10
25.11
25.12
25.13
III Justification for Restructuring Plans
25.14
25.15
25.16
25.17
25.18
IV Preventive Restructuring Frameworks
25.19
25.20
25.21
25.22
1 Commencement
25.23
A The plan process need not to be opened by a court
25.24
25.25
B Likelihood of insolvency
25.26
25.27
C Right to initiate the process
25.28
25.29
D Debtor in possession
25.30
25.31
25.32
25.33
2 Stay
25.34
A Application for a stay
25.35
B Scope of the stay
25.36
C Effects of the stay
25.37
25.38
25.39
25.40
D Extension(s) and lifting of the stay
25.41
25.42
25.43
25.44
3 The restructuring plan
25.45
A Affected parties
25.46
25.47
25.48
25.49
25.50
B Scope of the plan
25.51
C Contents of the plan
25.52
25.53
25.54
25.55
25.56
4 Class composition
25.57
A Criterion for class composition
25.58
25.59
B Judicial involvement with class composition
25.60
5 Voting
25.61
A Notification and right to vote
25.62
25.63
25.64
B Voting procedure
25.65
C Requisite majority
25.66
25.67
6 Confirmation hearing
25.68
A Process
25.69
25.70
B Confirmation
25.71
25.72
25.73
25.74
C Cross-class cram down
25.75
25.76
25.77
25.78
25.79
25.80
25.81
25.82
25.83
7 Appeal
25.84
25.85
V Conclusion
25.86
25.87
25.88
25.89
25.90
26 Removing Cross-border Tax Barriers
I The Long Shadow of National Tax Sovereignty over the Free Circulation of Capital
26.01
26.02
26.03
26.04
26.05
26.06
26.07
26.08
26.09
26.10
II Freedom of Capital Movements from Article 67 EEC to Article 63 TFEU
26.11
26.12
26.13
26.14
26.15
26.16
26.17
26.18
26.19
III Tax Derogations
26.20
26.21
26.22
26.23
26.24
26.25
26.26
26.27
26.28
26.29
26.30
26.31
26.32
26.33
26.34
26.35
IV Tax Barriers in Cross-border Investments
26.36
26.37
26.38
26.39
26.40
26.41
1 Withholding taxes on dividends
26.42
26.43
26.44
26.45
26.46
26.47
26.48
26.49
26.50
26.51
26.52
26.53
26.54
2 Pension funds
26.55
26.56
26.57
26.58
3 Contributions to charities
26.59
26.60
26.61
26.62
26.63
26.64
26.65
26.66
26.67
26.68
26.69
4 Inheritances
26.70
26.71
26.72
V Conclusions
26.73
26.74
26.75
Further Material
Index
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Table of Cases
Danny Busch, Emilios Avgouleas, Guido Ferrarini
From:
Capital Markets Union in Europe
Edited By: Danny Busch, Emilios Avgouleas, Guido Ferrarini
Content type:
Book content
Product:
Financial Law [FBL]
Published in print:
01 March 2018
ISBN:
9780198813392
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