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- Preliminary Material
- Dedication
- Foreword
- Preface
- Lee Buchheit: A Biographical Note
- Approaches to Sovereign Debt Resolution: Recent Developments
- Contents
- Table of Cases
- Table of Legislation
- List of Contributors
- List of Abbreviations
- Main Text
- Part I Sovereign Debt Restructuring
- Preliminary Material
- 1 Minimizing Holdout Creditors: Carrots
- 2 Minimizing Holdout Creditors: Sticks
- 3 Managing Holdouts: The Case of the 2012 Greek Exchange
- 4 Revisiting the Pari Passu Clause
- 5 The Role of the International Monetary Fund
- 6 Debt Relief for Low-Income Countries
- 7 The Longer-Term Consequences of Sovereign Debt Restructuring
- Part II Enforcement of Sovereign Debt
- Preliminary Material
- 8 Defences
- 9 Special Immunities
- 10 Special Immunities
- 11 Creditors’ Remedies
- 12 Sovereign Arbitration
- Part III Complicating Factors
- Preliminary Material
- 13 Restructuring in a Monetary Union
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Sovereign Debt Restructuring in the Case of a State Participating in the European Monetary Union: Elements of Differentiation Vis-à-Vis other Sovereign Debt Restructurings
- 13.06
- A Impossibility of devaluing the currency
- B Impossibility of imposing restrictions on movements of capital
- C Impossibility of monetizing the sovereign’s debt
- D Impossibility of being bailed out by other Union members
- E Impossibility of redenominating the sovereign debt into a new or revived national currency
- F Increased risk of contagion within members of the currency area
- 3 Analysis of Some Legal Issues Arising in the Restructuring of the Sovereign Debt of the Hellenic Republic in 2012
- 13.20
- A ‘Negative pledge clauses’ and maintaining the eligibility of Greek government bonds as central bank collateral throughout the debt exchange process
- B Question of a voluntary participation of the Eurosystem in a collective action clause process
- 4 Legal Framework for Debt Issuance by States Participating in the European Monetary Union
- 5 Idea of Establishing a Statutory Framework for Debt Restructuring within a Regional Monetary Union
- 6 Conclusions
- 14 Restructuring in a Monetary Union
- 15 Sovereign Debt and Banking Crises
- 16 International Lender of Last Resort
- 1 Introduction
- 2 A Third Party in a Two-Party Game
- 3 For an International Lender of Last Resort: Incentives, Discipline, and Control of Risk
- 4 A Floor of Support to Preserve the Flow of Private Sector Funds
- 5 A Floor of Support to Restore Private Sector Investment Flows
- 6 A Floor of Support to Underpin an Orderly Restructuring
- 7 Toward a Credible International Lender of Last Resort
- 17 Odious Debt
- 18 Sovereign Contingent Liabilities
- Part IV Economics of Sovereign Borrowing
- Preliminary Material
- 19 Why Governments Default
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Enforcement of Private Debt Contracts
- 3 Sovereign Default
- 4 So Why Do Governments Default?
- 5 The Political Economy of When and How to Default as a Sovereign
- 6 Conclusions
- 20 Sovereign Debt Markets
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Sovereign Borrowing: The Last Thirty Years
- 3 Macro Drivers of Demand for Sovereign Debt
- 4 Emerging Market Self-Insurance and the Rise of China
- 5 Surfing the China Wave
- 6 The Apparent End of ‘Original Sin’
- 7 Sovereign Debt Demand Dynamics
- 8 Financial Weapons of Mass Destruction
- 9 Europe: A Microcosm of Past, Present, and Future Crises
- 10 Lessons Learned, Ignored, and Forgotten
- 11 The Fallen Saints of Original Sin
- 12 The Limits of Conflict Resolution
- 13 Hostages to Benchmarks and Ratings
- 14 Conclusion
- 21 Borrowing and Debt
- Part V Proposals to Reform Sovereign Debt Systems
- Preliminary Material
- 22 Statutory Sovereign Debt Resolution Mechanisms
- 1 Introduction
- 2 The Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM)
- 3 The European Stability Mechanism: An Institution Designed to Avert Financial Crises
- 4 Perfecting the Status Quo
- 5 Concluding Remarks
- 6 Corollary
- 23 Debt Restructuring and Economic Recovery
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Corporate Debt Restructuring in the Context of a Systemic Crisis
- 3 The Resolution of Financial Institutions in a Cross-Border Context
- 4 Household Debt and its Systemic Implications
- 5 Restructuring Sovereign Debt: An Unresolved Problem
- 6 Conclusion
- 24 Corporate Bankruptcy Law and State Insolvencies
- 1 Introduction
- 2 How Do Sovereign Bankruptcies Work?
- 3 What Rights Do Creditors Have?
- 4 Moratorium on Payments and Attachments
- 5 Bankruptcy Ladder of Priorities
- 6 Control of the Debtor’s Financing
- 7 Reorganization Plans
- 8 Discharge of a Debtor
- 9 Other Differences between Corporate and Sovereign Insolvencies
- 10 International Bankruptcy Court
- 11 General Differences in Status
- 12 Conclusion
- 25 European Collective Action Clauses
- 1 What is a Collective Action Clause?
- 2 The Holdout Creditor Problem
- 3 Are CACs the Only Way?
- 4 Collective Action Clauses in Sovereign Debt
- 5 The Move towards Standardization: Model CACs pre-2013
- 6 The European Sovereign Crisis and Response
- 7 The Model Clause in Detail
- A Approval thresholds: reserved matters
- B Approval thresholds: non-reserved matters
- C Aggregation
- D Disenfranchisement: does everyone get to vote?
- E Is every bondholder’s vote given the same weight? Zero-coupon and index-linked obligations
- F Reserved matters
- G Calculation agent/bondholder representative
- H Acceleration and rescission of acceleration
- I Consistency
- 8 Conclusion
- 26 Eurozone Financial Rescue and Stabilization Measures, and their Legal Foundations
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Background to the Crisis
- 3 EU Financial Rescue and Stabilization Measures, and Legal Foundations
- 26.20
- 26.21
- 26.22
- A Financial assistance under EU law
- B Financial rescue and stabilization measures, and legal foundations
- 4 Future Financing Measures: Longer-Term Solutions
- 5 Concluding Observations
- 27 Unctad Principles on Responsible Sovereign Financing
- 1 Introduction
- 2 The Need for Global Principles to Promote Responsible Sovereign Financing
- 3 The PRSLB Tackle Global Debt Problems with Well-Rooted and Tested Principles
- 4 Injecting Legitimacy into the PRSLB through its Decision-Making Process: Representation, Consultation, and Deliberation
- 5 Soft Law Facilitates Endorsement and Implementation
- 6 The Role of the United Nations in the Global Economic Agenda and the PRSLB
- 7 Concluding Remarks. The PRSLB in the Progression of International Law
- 28 Sovereign Debt in the Light of Eternity
- Part I Sovereign Debt Restructuring
- Further Material
- [44.192.92.49]
- 44.192.92.49
