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Oxford Law Citator
Contents
Expand All
Collapse All
Preliminary Material
Dedication
Series Editor’s Preface
Preface
Summary Table of Contents
Detailed Table of Contents
Table of Cases
European Court Of Justice: Alphabetical List Of Cases
European Court of Justice: Numerical List of Cases
National Cases
Australia
United Kingdom
United States of America
Table of Legislation
EU Legislation
Treaties
Decisions
Directives
For specific Articles see these individual Directives below
Commission Recommendations
Regulations
Charters, Conventions, Agreements
International Conventions
National Legislation
Australia
Canada
Germany
Spain
United Kingdom
United States of America
List of Abbreviations
Main Text
I Introduction
I.1 EU Securities and Markets Regulation
I.2 Securities and Markets Regulation and the Financial Crisis
I.3 Securities and Markets Regulation and the EU: Building an Integrated EU Financial Market
I.3.1 The Treaty and the Single Market: the Role of Law
I.3.2 Market Finance and Financial Market Integration
I.3.3 Harmonization: From Liberalization to Regulation
I.4 The Evolution of EU Securities and Markets Regulation
I.4.1 Prior to the FSAP
I.4.2 The FSAP and Post-FSAP Eras
I.4.2.1 The FSAP, Market Finance, and Integration
I.4.2.2 Harmonization and the FSAP: Liberalization and Re-regulation
I.4.2.3 The post-FSAP Era and the Legislative Pause
I.4.3 The Crisis Era
I.4.3.1 The Financial Crisis and the EU
(a) The Financial Crisis
(b) The Securities and Markets Reform Agenda
I.4.3.2 The Major Securities and Markets Regulation Reforms
I.5 EU Securities and Markets Regulation After the Financial Crisis
I.5.1 The Single Market
I.5.2 Harmonization and an Ever Expanding Regulatory Perimeter
I.5.2.1 The Location of Control
I.5.2.2 The Breadth of the Rulebook
I.5.2.3 Correction and Review
I.5.3 Market Finance and Market Integration
I.5.3.1 Market Finance
I.5.3.2 Financial Market Integration
II Capital-Raising
II.1 Introduction
II.1.1 Introduction
II.1.2 The EU Regime
II.2 The Capital-raising Process, Regulation, and the EU
II.2.1 Regulating Capital-raising and Issuer Disclosure
II.2.1.1 Regulating Capital-raising: the Regulatory Context
II.2.1.2 The Issuer-disclosure Debate
II.2.2 The EU, Market Finance, and the Integration of Capital Markets
II.2.2.1 A Transformative Regime
II.2.2.2 Market Finance
II.2.2.3 Market Integration
II.3 The Evolution of the Harmonization Programme
II.3.1 The Initial Approach to Harmonization
II.3.2 The FSAP and Reform
II.3.3 The Crisis Era and the Growth Agenda
II.3.3.1 The Crisis Era and Capital-Raising Reforms
II.3.3.2 The SME Agenda
II.4 The Prospectus Directive
II.4.1 The Evolution of the Prospectus Directive Regime
II.4.1.1 Initial Efforts
II.4.1.2 The FSAP and the Lamfalussy Report
II.4.1.3 The 2003 Prospectus Directive Negotiations
II.4.1.4 The 2010 Reforms and the Crisis
II.4.2 The Prospectus Regime, Harmonization, and ESMA
II.4.3 Setting the Perimeter: Public and Private Markets
II.4.3.1 The Core Prospectus Publication Obligation
II.4.3.2 Public Offers
II.4.3.3 Regulated Markets
II.4.3.4 Securities
II.4.3.5 Private Markets and Placements
II.4.3.6 Exempted Transactions, including Employee Share Offerings
II.4.4 Calibration and Differentiation
II.4.4.1 Calibration and Differentiation
II.4.4.2 The Wholesale Debt Markets
II.4.4.3 SME Finance and the Prospectus Regime
II.4.4.4 The Retail Markets
(a) Retail Investor Protection
(b) Market Integration and Promoting Household Savings
II.4.5 The Prospectus: Structure and Validity
II.4.5.1 Structure: Short-form Disclosure and the Retail Markets—the Summary
II.4.5.2 Structure: Shelf Registration and Base Prospectuses
II.4.5.3 Structure: Prospectus Supplements
II.4.5.4 Validity
II.4.6 The Prospectus: Disclosure
II.4.6.1 The Core Obligation
II.4.6.2 The Annexes: An Upgraded Disclosure Regime
II.4.6.3 A Calibrated Regime: Administrative Rules and the Building Blocks
II.4.6.4 Omission of Information
II.4.6.5 Incorporation by Reference
II.4.7 Market Integration: Prospectus Approval and the Passport Mechanism
II.4.7.1 Approving the Prospectus: Home Member State Control
II.4.7.2 Prospectus Approval
II.4.7.3 The Passport and Mutual Recognition
II.4.7.4 Notification
II.4.7.5 The Language Regime
II.4.7.6 Home Member State Control and the Transfer of Approval
II.4.7.7 Precautionary Powers
II.4.8 Publication and Dissemination
II.4.9 Advertising
II.4.10 Supervision and Enforcement
II.4.10.1 NCAs
II.4.10.2 Supervisory Co-operation
II.4.10.3 Supervisory Convergence and ESMA
II.4.10.4 Enforcement, Sanctions, and Civil Liability
II.4.11 Third Country Issuers
II.4.12 Impact
II.5 Ongoing and Periodic Disclosure: The Transparency Directive and the Market Abuse Regime
II.5.1 Transparency Directive: Evolution
II.5.1.1 Initial Efforts: Limited and Fragmented Transparency
II.5.1.2 The FSAP
II.5.1.3 The 2004 Directive Negotiations
II.5.1.4 Crisis-era Reform and the 2011 Proposal
II.5.2 Transparency Directive: Harmonization and ESMA
II.5.3 Transparency Directive: An Integrated Regime?
II.5.4 Transparency Directive: Scope
II.5.5 Transparency Directive: Differentiation, Exemptions, and SMEs
II.5.6 Transparency Directive: the Issuer-disclosure Regime
II.5.6.1 Periodic Annual Financial Reports
II.5.6.2 Periodic Half-yearly Financial Reports
II.5.6.3 Quarterly Reporting and the Interim Management Statement
II.5.6.4 Ongoing Disclosure on Rights Attached to Securities
II.5.6.5 Access to Information for Holders of Securities Admitted to Trading on a Regulated Market
II.5.6.6 Payments to Governments
II.5.7 Transparency Directive: Ongoing Disclosure on Major Holdings
II.5.7.1 The Notification Regime
II.5.7.2 Attribution of Voting Rights to other Natural Persons and Legal Entities
II.5.7.3 The Notification Procedure
II.5.8 Transparency Directive: Market Integration and Home Member State Control
II.5.8.1 Home Member State Control
II.5.8.2 Language Regime
II.5.9 Transparency Directive: Supervision and Enforcement
II.5.9.1 Supervision: NCAs, Co-operation, and Convergence
II.5.9.2 Liability and Sanctions
(a) Civil Liability
(b) Sanctions
II.5.10 Transparency Directive: Third Country Regime and Equivalence
II.5.11 Transparency Directive: Impact
II.5.12 Ad Hoc Disclosure and the Market Abuse Regime
II.6 Financial Reporting and International Financial Reporting Standards
II.6.1 The EU Financial Reporting Framework: Main Features
II.6.2 IFRS and the IAS Regulation
II.6.2.1 The Road to the 2002 IAS Regulation
II.6.2.2 The IAS Regulation
II.6.3 Incorporating IFRS in the EU: Risks and Challenges
II.6.3.1 The Endorsement Mechanism
II.6.3.2 EU/IASB Relations and IFRS
II.6.3.3 IFRS in Practice in the EU: the Mark-to-Market Problem
(a) The Transition
(b) The Financial Crisis
II.6.3.4 IFRS in Practice in the EU: SMEs
II.6.4 CESR/ESMA and the Financial Reporting Regime
II.6.5 Third Country Issuers and Equivalence
II.6.5.1 Equivalence
II.6.5.2 US GAAP and IFRS
II.7 Admission to Trading and to Official Listing
II.7.1 Regulated Markets and Capital-raising
II.7.1.1 The Regulated Market and Perimeter Control
(a) Trading Venues and Perimeter Control
(b) Regulated Markets and Official Listing
II.7.1.2 Regulated Markets, Exchange-regulated Markets, and SME Funding
II.7.2 The Admission of Securities to Trading
II.7.2.1 Regulated Markets
(a) Admission to Trading
(b) Suspension and Removal
II.7.2.2 Official Listing
II.8 Filing and Dissemination of Issuer Disclosures
II.8.1 Substantive and Operational Harmonization
II.8.2 Filing Issuer Disclosures
II.8.3 Dissemination of Disclosure
II.9 Market Impact of the Issuer-disclosure Regime
II.9.1 Issuers and Market Finance
II.9.2 Integration Trends
III Asset Management
III.1 Introduction
III.1.1 Collective and Discretionary Asset Management in the EU
III.1.1.1 A Fragmented Regime
III.1.1.2 An Intensifying Regime
III.1.2 The Regulation of Collective Asset Management
III.1.3 The Regulation of Discretionary Asset Management
III.2 Discretionary Asset Management: The 2014 MiFID II Regime
III.3 Collective Asset Management: the UCITS Regime
III.3.1 Introduction
III.3.2 Rationale for and Forms of Retail Market CIS Regulation
III.3.2.1 The Rationale for Regulating Retail Market CISs and CIS Management
III.3.2.2 The EU and Retail Market CIS Regulation
III.3.3 The Evolution of the UCITS Regime
III.3.3.1 Early Developments
III.3.3.2 The FSAP and the UCITS III Reforms
III.3.3.3 Post-FSAP and the UCITS Review
III.3.3.4 Post UCITS IV and the Crisis Era: the Financial Stability Agenda and the Growth Agenda
III.3.4 Harmonization and ESMA
III.3.5 Setting the Perimeter: Scope of the UCITS Regime
III.3.5.1 Defining Features
III.3.5.2 Open and Closed-end CIS
III.3.6 Differentiation and Calibration
III.3.7 Market Integration: the Passport and UCITS Mergers
III.3.7.1 Authorization: the UCITS
III.3.7.2 Authorization: the Management Company
III.3.7.3 The Passport and Notification
(a) The UCITS
(b) The Management Company
III.3.7.4 Mergers of UCITSs
III.3.8 Asset Allocation and Investment Limits
III.3.8.1 An Evolving Regime
III.3.8.2 Strand (1): Eligible Assets
(a) Transferable Securities and Money-market Instruments
(b) CISs
(c) Deposits
(d) Financial Derivatives
(e) Investment in securitization positions
III.3.8.3 Strand (2): Investment Limits—Risk-spreading Rules
III.3.8.4 Strand (2): Investment Limits–Particular Investment Policies and UCITS Structures
(a) Tracker Funds
(b) Funds of Funds
(c) Master-feeder Funds
III.3.8.5 Strand (2): Investment Limits–Disclosure of Investment Policies
III.3.8.6 Strand (3): Efficient Portfolio Management Techniques, Managing Derivatives Exposure, and Risk Management
III.3.8.7 Asset Allocation and UCITS VI
III.3.8.8 The Risks Associated with Asset-allocation Regulation
III.3.9 The Management Company: Ongoing Regulation
III.3.10 The Depositary
III.3.10.1 The Depositary and the 2009 Regime
III.3.10.2 Madoff and Depositary Liability
III.3.10.3 The UCITS V Reforms and the Depositary
III.3.11 UCITS Disclosure
III.3.11.1 Prospectus and Ongoing Disclosure
III.3.11.2 Disclosure Distribution and Passporting
III.3.11.3 Short-Form Disclosure, the Retail Markets, and the KIID
III.3.11.4 Beyond Disclosure and the Retail Market
III.3.12 General Obligations
III.3.12.1 Redemption
III.3.12.2 Borrowing and Loans
III.3.12.3 Conflicts of Interest and Remuneration
III.3.13 Supervision and Enforcement
III.3.13.1 NCAs
III.3.13.2 Supervisory Co-operation
III.3.13.3 Supervisory Convergence and ESMA
III.3.13.4 Sanctions and Enforcement
III.3.14 The Crisis-era Financial Stability Agenda, Shadow Banking, and UCITS Regulation
III.3.14.1 The Shadow Banking Agenda and Money-market Funds
III.3.14.2 Exchange Traded Funds
III.3.14.3 Structured UCITSs
III.3.14.4 Securities Lending, Repos, and Collateral Management: UCITS Risk Management
III.3.15 Impact
III.4 Collective Asset Management: the 2011 AIFMD
III.4.1 Introduction
III.4.2 The Rationale for Regulating CIS Management in the Alternative Investment Segment
III.4.3 The EU and the AIF Sector: the Evolution of the AIFMD
III.4.3.1 The Pre-crisis Position
III.4.3.2 The Crisis and the AIFMD Negotiations
III.4.3.3 The Directive
III.4.4 The UCITS Directive and the AIFMD
III.4.5 Harmonization and ESMA
III.4.6 Calibration and Differentiation
III.4.7 Setting the Perimeter: Scope
III.4.8 Authorization and the AIFM Passport
III.4.8.1 AIFM Authorization and the Home Member State
III.4.8.2 De Minimis AIFMs
III.4.8.3 The Passport and EU AIFMs
III.4.9 Operational and Organizational Requirements
III.4.10 The Depositary
III.4.11 Leverage
III.4.12 Disclosure and Transparency
III.4.13 Private Equity Funds
III.4.14 The Retail Markets
III.4.15 Supervision and Enforcement
III.4.16 The Third Country Regime
III.5 Venture Capital Funds, Social Entrepreneurship Funds, and Long-term Investments
III.5.1 Venture Capital Funds and Social Entrepreneurship Funds
III.5.2 Long-term Investment Vehicles
IV Investment Firms and Investment Services
IV.1 Intermediaries, Regulation, and the EU
IV.1.1 The Regulation of Intermediaries
IV.1.2 Intermediary Regulation and the EU
IV.2 The Evolution of the EU Regime
IV.2.1 Initial Developments and the 1993 Investment Services Directive
IV.2.1.1 Early Developments
IV.2.1.2 The 1985 White Paper and the Single European Act
IV.2.2 The Financial Services Action Plan and MiFID I
IV.2.2.1 The Financial Services Action Plan and the Lamfalussy Reforms
IV.2.2.2 MiFID I: Negotiation Process
IV.2.2.3 2004 MiFID I: Key Features
IV.2.3 The Crisis Era and the MiFID I Review
IV.2.3.1 The 2004 MiFID I Experience
IV.2.3.2 The MiFID I Review and the Financial Crisis
IV.2.3.3 The MiFID II Negotiations
IV.3 Harmonization and ESMA
IV.4 Setting the Perimeter: Scope
IV.4.1 A Functional Approach
IV.4.2 Investment Services and Activities
IV.4.3 Financial Instruments
IV.5 Calibration and Differentiation
IV.5.1 Exemptions
IV.5.2 Client Classification
IV.6 The Authorization Process
IV.6.1 Jurisdiction to Authorize and the Home Member State
IV.6.2 Scope of Authorization and the Regulatory Passport
IV.6.3 Authorization Conditions: Minimum Initial Capital
IV.6.4 Authorization Conditions: Governance Requirements
IV.6.5 Authorization Conditions: Organizational Structure and Shareholders
IV.6.6 Authorization: Notification of Proposed Acquisitions
IV.6.7 Authorization: Investor Compensation Schemes
IV.6.8 Authorization: Organizational Requirements
IV.6.9 Authorization: Process and Protections
IV.6.10 ESMA and the Authorization Process
IV.7 Operating Conditions: 2014 MiFID II Prudential and Conduct Requirements
IV.7.1 Operating Conditions: A Multilayered Regime
IV.7.2 Organizational Requirements
IV.7.2.1 The Legislative Regime
IV.7.2.2 The Administrative Regime
IV.7.3 Conflict-of-interest Management
IV.7.3.1 The Legislative Regime
IV.7.3.2 The Administrative Regime
IV.7.4 Transaction Reporting
IV.7.5 Trading Rules and Trading Venues
IV.7.6 Conduct Regulation
IV.7.7 Tied Agents
IV.8 Operating Conditions: the 2013 CRD IV/CRR Prudential Regime
IV.8.1 Capital, Investment Firms, and Basel III
IV.8.2 2013 CRD IV/CRR
IV.8.3 2013 CRD IV/CRR: Scope
IV.8.4 2013 CRD IV/CRR: Initial Capital
IV.8.5 2013 CRD IV/CRR: Risk Management and Systems
IV.8.6 2013 CRD IV/CRR: Firm Governance and Remuneration
IV.8.6.1 The Management Body
IV.8.6.2 Remuneration
IV.8.6.3 Governance Reporting
IV.8.7 2013 CRD IV/CRR: Own Funds, Liquidity, and Leverage
IV.8.7.1 The Basel III Reforms and CRD IV/CRR
IV.8.7.2 Own Funds
IV.8.7.3 Liquidity and Leverage
IV.8.8 2013 CRD IV/CRR: Public Disclosure and Supervisory Reporting
IV.9 The Passport
IV.9.1 Passport Rights
IV.9.1.1 The Investment Firm
IV.9.1.2 Restrictions on the Passport: General Restrictions
IV.9.1.3 Restrictions on the Passport: Branch Member State Control
IV.9.2 The Notification Process
IV.10 Third Countries
IV.11 Supervision and Enforcement in the Investment Services Market: 2014 MiFID II
IV.11.1 2014 MiFID II and 2013 CRD IV/CRR
IV.11.2 The 2014 MiFID II Supervisory Framework
IV.11.3 NCAs
IV.11.3.1 Designation and Delegation
IV.11.3.2 NCA Supervisory and Investigatory Powers
IV.11.4 Supervisory Co-operation
IV.11.5 Supervisory Convergence and ESMA
IV.11.6 Enforcement and Sanctions
IV.11.6.1 Sanctions
IV.11.6.2 Civil Liability
IV.12 Supervision and Enforcement in the Investment Services Market: 2013 CRD IV/CRR
IV.12.1 NCAs and the ESFS
IV.12.2 Supervisory Co-operation
IV.13 Resolution and Recovery
V Trading Venues
V.1 Trading Venues and Regulation
V.1.1 Introduction
V.1.2 Regulating Trading Venues
V.1.2.1 Trading Venues and the Financial System
V.1.2.2 Regulation of Trading Venues
V.1.2.3 Venue Regulation and Transparency
V.1.2.4 Trading Venue Regulation and the Financial Crisis
V.1.3 Regulating Trading Venues and the EU
V.2 The Evolution of the EU’s Trading Venue Regime
V.2.1 From Concentration to Competition: 2004 MiFID I
V.2.2 2004 MiFID I’s Regulatory Model
V.2.3 The Impact of 2004 MiFID I
V.3 The MiFID I Review and the 2014 MiFID II/MiFIR Negotiations
V.3.1 The MiFID I Review and the Commission Proposals
V.3.1.1 The MiFID I Review
V.3.1.2 Organizational Models for Venue Regulation
V.3.1.3 Transparency Regulation
V.3.1.4 Data Consolidation
V.3.1.5 The SME Growth Market
V.3.1.6 Venue Resilience and Regulation
V.3.2 The 2014 MiFID II/MiFIR Negotiations
V.4 2014 MiFID II/MiFIR: Harmonization and ESMA
V.5 2014 MiFID II/MiFIR: Scope
V.6 2014 MiFID II/MiFIR: Venue Classification
V.6.1 Regulatory Design
V.6.2 Regulated Markets
V.6.3 Multilateral Trading Facilities
V.6.4 Organized Trading Facilities
V.6.4.1 The OTF
V.6.4.2 The OTF and the Exercise of Discretion
V.6.4.3 A Successful Reform?
V.6.5 Own-account Dealing: SIs and Investment Firms
V.6.6 Shrinking the OTC Space
V.7 Operational Regulation of Multilateral Trading: Regulated Markets
V.7.1 A Flexible Regime
V.7.2 Authorization
V.7.3 Operating Requirements
V.7.3.1 General Operating Requirements
V.7.3.2 Market Resilience and Liquidity
V.7.3.3 Market Access
V.7.3.4 Market Monitoring and Abusive Conduct
V.7.3.5 Transparency Rules
V.7.4 Admission of Financial Instruments to Trading and Suspension and Removal of Instruments
V.8 Operational Regulation of Multilateral Trading: Multilateral Trading Facilities
V.9 Operational Regulation of Multilateral Trading: Organized Trading Facilities
V.10 Operational Regulation of the OTC Sector: Dealing on Own Account
V.10.1 Systematic Internalizers
V.10.2 Dealing on Own Account
V.11 Transparency Regulation and the 2014 MiFIR
V.11.1 Regulated Markets, MTFs, and OTFs: Equity Market Transparency
V.11.1.1 Pre-trade Transparency
V.11.1.2 Pre-trade Transparency Waivers
V.11.1.3 Post-trade Transparency
V.11.1.4 Deferred Publication of Post-trade Transparency
V.11.2 Regulated Markets, MTFs, and OTFs: Non-equity Market Transparency
V.11.2.1 Pre-trade Transparency
V.11.2.2 Pre-trade Transparency Waivers
V.11.2.3 Post-trade Transparency
V.11.2.4 Post-trade Transparency Deferred Publication
V.11.3 The Bilateral/OTC Segment: Equity Market Transparency
V.11.3.1 Pre-trade Transparency: Equity Markets
(a) The Pre-trade Quote Publication Obligation
(b) Execution of Quotes
(c) Access to Quotes
(d) Limit Orders in Shares and Transparency
V.11.3.2 Post-trade Transparency and Deferrals
V.11.4 The Bilateral/OTC Segment: Non-equity Market Transparency
V.11.4.1 Pre-trade Transparency
V.11.4.2 Post-trade Transparency and Deferrals
V.11.5 Liquid Markets
V.11.6 Publication Requirements and Data Distribution and Consolidation
V.11.6.1 Enhancing Data Quality
V.11.6.2 Data Publication
V.11.6.3 Data-reporting Services
V.11.7 An Ambitious Reform
V.12 Supervision and Enforcement
V.12.1 NCAs
V.12.2 Supervisory Co-ordination and Co-operation
V.13 2014 MiFID II/MiFIR and Post-trading in the EU
V.13.1 Post-trading
V.13.2 2014 MiFID II/MiFIR and Post-trading
VI Trading
VI.1 Introduction
VI.1.1 Regulating Trading: Financial Stability and Anti-speculation
VI.1.2 The EU Trading Regime
VI.2 2014 MiFID II/MiFIR: The Regulation of Trading
VI.2.1 2014 MiFID II/MiFIR: Setting the Regulatory Perimeter—Scope and Dealing
VI.2.2 Regulating the Order-execution Process: the General Framework
VI.2.2.1 The 2014 MiFID II/MiFIR and the 2013 CRD IV/CRR Framework
VI.2.2.2 Best Execution
VI.2.2.3 Order Handling
VI.2.2.4 Trade and Transaction Reporting
VI.2.3 Algorithmic Trading and High Frequency Trading
VI.2.4 Market-making
VI.2.5 Position Management and Trading in Commodity Derivatives
VI.2.5.1 The Commodity Derivatives Agenda
VI.2.5.2 NCA Powers
VI.2.5.3 ESMA Powers
VI.2.5.4 Trading Venue Requirements
VI.2.5.5 Position Reporting
VI.2.6 General Position Management
VI.3 The Regulation of Short Selling
VI.3.1 The EU Regime
VI.3.2 Regulating Short Sales and the Financial Crisis
VI.3.3 The Evolution of the EU’s Response
VI.3.3.1 Initial Developments
VI.3.3.2 The Negotiations
VI.3.3.3 The Short Selling Regulation
VI.3.3.4 A Workable Regime?
VI.3.4 Harmonization and ESMA
VI.3.5 Setting the Perimeter: Scope and Exemptions
VI.3.5.1 Scope
VI.3.5.2 Exemptions
VI.3.6 Calibration and Differentiation
VI.3.7 Restricting Short Sales: the Uncovered Short Sales Prohibition
VI.3.7.1 The Prohibition
VI.3.7.2 Uncovered Short Sales in Shares
VI.3.7.3 Uncovered Short Sales in Sovereign Debt
VI.3.7.4 Uncovered Sovereign CDSs
VI.3.7.5 Buy-in Procedures
VI.3.8 Transparency of Net Short Positions
VI.3.9 Intervention in Exceptional Circumstances
VI.3.9.1 NCA Powers
VI.3.9.2 ESMA Powers
VI.3.10 Supervision and Enforcement
VI.3.11 Third Countries
VI.3.12 ESMA and the Short Selling Regime
VI.3.13 Impact
VI.4 Trading in the OTC Derivatives Markets
VI.4.1 The Reform Agenda
VI.4.2 2012 EMIR
VI.4.2.1 Introduction: the 2012 EMIR Regime
(a) 2012 EMIR: Main Features
(b) EMIR and CCP Clearing
(c) The Risks for the EU
(d) Timing Issues
VI.4.2.2 The Evolution of the 2012 EMIR and the Crisis Context
VI.4.2.3 Harmonization and ESMA
VI.4.2.4 Setting the Perimeter: Scope
VI.4.2.5 Calibration and non-Financial Counterparties
VI.4.2.6 The Clearing Obligation
VI.4.2.7 The Risk Mitigation Obligation for non-CCP-cleared Derivatives
VI.4.2.8 The Reporting Obligation
VI.4.2.9 The CCP Regime: Authorization and the CCP College
VI.4.2.10 CCP Regulation
VI.4.2.11 CCP Supervision and Cross-border Co-ordination
VI.4.2.12 The Trade Repository Regime
VI.4.2.13 Third Countries
VI.4.2.14 ESMA and the 2012 EMIR
VI.4.3 Derivatives Trading on Organized Venues: 2014 MiFIR
VI.5 The Financial Transaction Tax
VI.5.1 Evolution of the EU FTT
VI.5.2 The Closer Co-operation Mechanism and the FTT
VII Gatekeepers
VII.1 Gatekeeper Regulation and the EU
VII.1.1 Gatekeepers and Regulation
VII.1.2 Gatekeeper Regulation and the EU
VII.2 Rating Agencies
VII.2.1 Regulating Rating Agencies and the Financial Crisis
VII.2.1.1 CRA Regulation and the EU
VII.2.1.2 Credit Rating Agency Risk
VII.2.1.3 The International Crisis-era Response to CRA Risk
VII.2.2 The Evolution of the EU Regime
VII.2.2.1 Initial Efforts
VII.2.2.2 The Financial Crisis
VII.2.2.3 The CRA Regime Negotiations
(a) CRA I: A New Regulatory Regime
(b) CRA II: ESMA Supervision
(c) CRA III: Market Structure Risks
(d) An Effective Rulebook?
VII.2.3 Harmonization and ESMA
VII.2.4 Setting the Regulatory Perimeter
VII.2.4.1 Scope
VII.2.4.2 Application and Reach
VII.2.5 Differentiation and Calibration
VII.2.6 The Registration Process
VII.2.7 Regulating Rating Agencies
VII.2.7.1 Conflict-of-Interest Management and Organizational Requirements
VII.2.7.2 Methodologies
VII.2.7.3 Disclosure: Ratings and Ratings Presentation
VII.2.7.4 Disclosure: Conflict-of-interest Risk
VII.2.7.5 Disclosure: ESMA Reports and the Ratings Platform
VII.2.7.6 Structured-finance Instruments
VII.2.8 Addressing Market Structure and Reliance on Ratings
VII.2.8.1 Reliance on Ratings
VII.2.8.2 Competition and Market Structure
VII.2.9 Ratings and the Sovereign Debt Market
VII.2.10 Supervision and Enforcement: ESMA
VII.2.10.1 Supervision
VII.2.10.2 Enforcement and ESMA
VII.2.10.3 Civil Liability
VII.2.11 Third Countries
VII.2.12 ESMA and the CRA Regime
VII.3 Investment Analyst Regulation
VII.3.1 The Rationale for Intervention
VII.3.2 The Evolution of the EU Regime
VII.3.2.1 The Enron Effect
VII.3.2.2 Developing a Response
(a) The Enron Response
(b) The 2003 Commission Investment Recommendations Directive
(c) The 2006 Commission MiFID I Directive and Investment Research
VII.3.3 Investment Analysts and Conflicts of Interest: The MiFID I/II and 2006 Commission MiFID I Directive Regime
VII.3.3.1 Scope
(a) The 2014 MiFID II Regime
(b) Investment Research
VII.3.3.2 Conflict-of-Interest Management: Organizational Arrangements
(a) Investment Research-specific Requirements
(b) The Application to Analysts of Generic Organizational Arrangements under Article 22
(c) Exemptions
VII.3.3.3 Dealing Rules
VII.3.3.4 Inducements and ‘Bundled’ Research
VII.3.3.5 The Integrity of Investment Research
VII.3.3.6 Disclosure of Conflicts of Interest
VII.3.4 The 2003 MAD/2014 MAR and Investment Recommendations
VII.3.4.1 The 2014 MAR and Investment Recommendations
VII.3.4.2 The 2003 Commission Investment Recommendations Directive
(a) Relevant Persons
(b) Website Disclosure
(c) The Presentation of Investment Research and Conflicts of Interest Disclosure
(d) Dissemination of Recommendations Produced by Third Parties
VIII Market Abuse
VIII.1 Introduction
VIII.2 The Rationale for Prohibiting Insider Dealing and Market Manipulation and the EU
VIII.2.1 The Rationale for Prohibiting Insider Dealing and Market Manipulation
VIII.2.1.1 Insider Dealing
VIII.2.1.2 Market Manipulation
VIII.2.2 The EU and the Prohibition of Market Abuse
VIII.3 The Evolution of the Regime
VIII.3.1 Early Developments
VIII.3.2 The 1989 Insider Dealing Directive
VIII.3.3 The FSAP
VIII.3.4 The 2003 MAD Negotiations
VIII.3.5 The Crisis Era and Reform
VIII.4 Harmonization and ESMA
VIII.5 Setting the Perimeter: Scope
VIII.5.1 Financial Instruments and Commodities
VIII.5.2 Venues
VIII.5.3 Transactions, Orders, and Behaviours
VIII.5.4 Jurisdictional Scope
VIII.6 The Prohibition on Insider Dealing
VIII.6.1 Inside Information
VIII.6.1.1 The Core Definition: Inside Information and Financial Instruments
VIII.6.1.2 Inside Information and Commodities
VIII.6.1.3 Inside Information and Execution Information
VIII.6.1.4 Inside Information: Of a Precise Nature, Relating to One or Several Issuers of Financial Instruments
VIII.6.1.5 Inside Information: Information which Has Not Been Made Public
VIII.6.1.6 Inside Information: Likely to have a Significant Effect on Prices
VIII.6.2 Persons Subject to the Prohibition
VIII.6.3 The Prohibition: Dealing, Recommending, and Disclosing
VIII.6.3.1 Dealing
VIII.6.3.2 Recommending and Inducing
VIII.6.3.3 Improper Disclosure and ‘Market Soundings’
VIII.6.3.4 Legitimate Behaviour
VIII.7 Disclosure Obligations
VIII.7.1 Issuer Disclosure
VIII.7.1.1 Article 17(1) and Ongoing Issuer Disclosure
VIII.7.1.2 Delaying Article 17(1) Disclosure
VIII.7.1.3 Selective Disclosure: Article 17(8)
VIII.7.1.4 The SME Segment
VIII.7.2 Insider Lists
VIII.7.3 Disclosure of Insider Transactions: Managers’ Transactions
VIII.7.4 Investment Research
VIII.7.5 Public Statistics
VIII.7.6 Disclosure or Dissemination of Information in the Media
VIII.8 Prohibition on Market Manipulation
VIII.8.1 The Prohibition on Market Manipulation and Identification of Market Manipulation
VIII.8.2 Extending the Perimeter: Derivatives, Algorithmic Trading, and Benchmarks
VIII.8.2.1 Financial Derivatives and Commodity Derivatives
VIII.8.2.2 Algorithmic Trading
VIII.8.2.3 Benchmark and Index Manipulation
VIII.8.3 Calibration and Differentiation
VIII.8.3.1 Accepted Market Practices
VIII.8.3.2 Stabilization and Buy-Backs
VIII.9 Supervision and Enforcement
VIII.9.1 Context
VIII.9.2 Supervision
VIII.9.2.1 NCAs
VIII.9.2.2 Supervisory Co-operation
VIII.9.2.3 Supervisory Convergence and ESMA
VIII.9.2.4 Harnessing Market Actors to Supervision
(a) Firm Systems and Suspicious Transaction Reports
(b) Whistle-blowing
VIII.9.3 Enforcement
VIII.9.3.1 Enforcement and the Market Abuse Regime
VIII.9.3.2 The New Sanctions Regime
VIII.9.3.3 Criminal Sanctions
IX The Retail Markets
IX.1 Investor Protection, Regulation, and the EU
IX.1.1 Regulation and the Retail Markets
IX.1.2 Investor Protection, Regulation, and the EU
IX.1.2.1 The EU Retail Market
IX.1.2.2 Scope
IX.1.2.3 A Silo-based Regime
IX.2 The Evolution of EU Retail Market Law and Policy
IX.2.1 Initial Developments
IX.2.2 The FSAP, the Pre-crisis Period, and the Retail Markets
IX.2.3 The Financial Crisis
IX.3 Harmonization
IX.4 Calibration and Segmentation: Classifying the Retail Investor
IX.5 Distribution and Investment Advice
IX.5.1 The EU Distribution Market and Distribution Risks
IX.5.1.1 Distribution in the EU
IX.5.1.2 Distribution Risks: Incentives and Commission
IX.5.2 Distribution and the 2014 MiFID II
IX.5.2.1 From the 1993 ISD to the 2014 MiFID II
IX.5.2.2 2014 MiFID II: Scope
IX.5.2.3 2014 MiFID II: Fair Treatment—Article 24(1)
IX.5.2.4 2014 MiFID II: Marketing—Article 24(3)
IX.5.2.5 2014 MiFID II: Quality of Advice—Articles 24 and 25
(a) Investment Advice and Independent Investment Advice (MiFID II Article 24)
(b) Suitability and Appropriateness (2014 MiFID II Article 25)
(c) Conflicts of Interest and Inducements (2014 MiFID II Articles 23 and 24)
IX.5.2.6 2014 MiFID II: Execution-Only Distribution and Trading—Article 25
(a) Product Distribution
(b) The Trading Process
IX.5.2.7 2014 MiFID II: Disclosure and Record-keeping—Article 24(3) and (4) and 25(5) and (6)
IX.5.3 Distribution and the 2002 IMD
IX.5.4 Distribution and Horizontal Consumer Protection
IX.6 Disclosure and the Retail Markets
IX.6.1 The EU Disclosure Regime
IX.6.2 Scope of the Disclosure Regime
IX.6.3 Disclosure for Packaged Retail Investment Products
IX.7 Product Oversight and Product Intervention
IX.7.1 A New Product Intervention Regime: 2014 MiFID II/MiFIR
IX.7.2 Product-specific Initiatives
IX.7.3 An Ambitious Reform
IX.8 The Investor Compensation Schemes Directive
IX.8.1 Compensation Schemes, Retail Investor Protection, and the EU
IX.8.2 The 1997 ICSD
IX.8.2.1 Scope and Claims
IX.8.2.2 Scheme Governance and Funding
IX.8.2.3 Cross-border Claims
IX.8.3 Reviewing the 1997 ICSD
IX.8.3.1 The FSAP/Pre-crisis Era
IX.8.3.2 The Financial Crisis and the 2010 Proposal
IX.9 Supporting the Rulebook: Education and Engagement
IX.10 The Retail Markets and ESMA
X Law-making
X.1 Introduction
X.1.1 A Complex and Evolving Process
X.1.2 Levels and Forms of Intervention
X.1.3 Chronology of Developments
X.2 The Evolution of the Law-making Process and Institutional Change
X.2.1 Early Developments and Comitology
X.2.2 The Lamfalussy Model
X.2.3 Learning from Lamfalussy
X.2.3.1 Did it Work?
X.2.3.2 Managing Institutional Tensions
X.2.3.3 Establishing the Space for Administrative Rule-making
X.2.3.4 Consultation and Engagement
X.2.3.5 Institutional Design Risks and the CESR Experience: the Soft Law Issue
X.2.4 The Financial Crisis: Recalibrating the Law-making Process
X.2.4.1 The Financial Crisis and the Single Rulebook
X.2.4.2 Negotiating the ESAs and Rule-making
X.2.4.3 A Brave New World?
X.3 The Legislative Process
X.3.1 Legislation and the Treaty: Competence to Act
X.3.2 The Legislative Process: the Ordinary Legislative Process
X.3.3 The Legislative Process and the Crisis-era Reform Agenda
X.3.3.1 Heightened Political (Intergovernmental) and Institutional (Supranational) Tensions
X.3.3.2 Procedural Innovation: Fast-tracking Legislation
X.3.3.3 Impact Assessment and Consultation
X.4 Administrative Rule-making
X.4.1 Administrative Rule-making, Securities and Markets Regulation, and the EU
X.4.2 The Commission and Administrative Rule-making
X.4.2.1 The Current Framework: Article 290 and 291 TFEU
X.4.2.2 Applying the Model
X.4.2.3 Early Lessons?
X.5 ESMA and Administrative Rule-making
X.5.1 Introduction
X.5.2 ESMA Structure and Governance
X.5.2.1 Agency Design and Meroni
X.5.2.2 ESMA’s Status, Structure, and Governance, and the Independence Problem
X.5.2.3 Hubs and Spokes
X.5.2.4 Technical Capacity and Strains
X.5.2.5 Inter-institutional Strain
X.5.2.6 Cross-sectoral Liaison
X.5.3 Objectives and Scope
X.5.4 ESMA and Technical Advice
X.5.4.1 The Procedure
X.5.4.2 Early Lessons
X.5.5 Binding Technical Standards
X.5.5.1 The Procedure and the Meroni Constraint
X.5.5.2 Early Lessons: Classifying BTSs
X.5.5.3 Early Lessons: Effectiveness, Institutional Balance, and the Meroni Effect
X.5.6 Guidelines and Recommendations
X.5.6.1 Article 16 and the ‘Hardening’ of Soft Law
X.5.6.2 Early Lessons
X.5.7 Supervisory Convergence Measures: Article 29 and Beyond
X.5.8 Shaping the Rulebook: Reviews
X.5.9 The International Context and ESMA
X.5.10 The ESFS Review, ESMA, and Rule-making
XI Supervision and Enforcement
XI.1 The European System of Financial Supervision
XI.2 Achieving Outcomes: From Rules on the Books to Rules in Action
XI.2.1 Supervision and Enforcement
XI.2.2 Achieving Outcomes in the EU
XI.2.2.1 Cross-border Supervision: Managing Decentralization Risks
XI.2.2.2 Private Enforcement
XI.3 The Evolution of the EU’s Supervisory Model for Financial Markets
XI.3.1 The pre-CESR Era
XI.3.2 The FSAP, the CESR Era, and Supervisory Convergence
XI.3.2.1 The FSAP era
XI.3.2.2 CESR and Supervisory Convergence
XI.3.2.3 Prior to the Financial Crisis and the 2007 Lamfalussy Review
XI.3.3 The Financial Crisis
XI.3.3.1 The Financial Crisis and Supervisory Weaknesses
XI.3.3.2 Legislative Reform: Enhancing Supervision and Enforcement and Strengthening Co-ordination
XI.3.3.3 Institutional Reform: the ESA Negotiations
XI.3.3.4 A Brave New World?
XI.4 The ESFS: NCAs
XI.4.1 NCAs: Supervision and Enforcement
XI.4.1.1 Supervision
XI.4.1.2 Enforcement and Sanctions
XI.4.1.3 Civil Liability
XI.4.2 NCAs and the Home/Host Model
XI.4.2.1 Home/Host Co-ordination
XI.4.2.2 Colleges of Supervisors
XI.4.2.3 Delegation
XI.5 The ESFS: ESMA
XI.5.1 ESMA and Supervision: A New Model
XI.5.2 ESMA Structure and Operation
XI.5.3 Directing NCAs
XI.5.3.1 Directing NCAs: Horizontal Articles 17–19 Powers
XI.5.3.2 Directing NCAs: ESMA Opinions and Advice
XI.5.4 Directing and Supervising Market Participants
XI.5.4.1 Horizontal Article 17–19 Powers
XI.5.4.2 Direct Supervision: Credit Rating Agencies and Trade Repositories
XI.5.4.3 Direct Supervision: Discrete Powers of Intervention
XI.5.4.4 Quasi-Supervision and Norm-Setting Effects
XI.5.5 Supervisory Co-ordination: Colleges of Supervisors, Cross-border Co-operation, and Cross-sector Co-operation
XI.5.5.1 Colleges of Supervisors and Cross-border Co-ordination
XI.5.5.2 Co-ordination in Crisis Conditions
XI.5.5.3 System Oversight and Systemic Risk
XI.5.6 Supervisory Convergence and Co-ordination and an EU Supervisory ‘Approach’: the ‘Supervisory Handbook’
XI.5.6.1 Supervisory Convergence
XI.5.6.2 Shaping Supervisory Decision-Making: Quasi-Rule-Making
XI.5.6.3 Common Decision-Making
XI.5.6.4 Peer Review
XI.5.7 Supervision and the International Market
XI.5.8 ESMA’s Operating Environment and Effectiveness
XI.5.8.1 The Treaty Context
XI.5.8.2 The Treaty Context: Meroni
XI.5.8.3 The 2014 Short Selling Ruling
XI.5.8.4 ESMA’s Governance
XI.5.9 ESMA and the Removal of NCA Discretion
XI.5.9.1 Squeezing NCA Discretion?
XI.5.9.2 Mitigating Factors: the Fiscal Check and the Institutional Environment
XI.5.10 The ESFS Review and ESMA
XI.6 The ESFS: the ESRB
XI.6.1 The ESRB
XI.6.2 ESRB Functions, Warnings, and Recommendations
XI.6.3 Financial Markets, ESMA, and the ESRB
XI.7 Banking Union and Financial Market Supervision
Further Material
Index
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Table of Cases
From:
EU Securities and Financial Markets Regulation (3rd Edition)
Niamh Moloney
Content type:
Book content
Product:
Financial Law [FBL]
Series:
Oxford European Union Law Library
Published in print:
23 October 2014
ISBN:
9780199664344
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