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Oxford Law Citator
Contents
Expand All
Collapse All
Preliminary Material
Preface
Summary Contents
Detailed Contents
Tables of Cases
European
United Kingdom
United States
Table of Legislation
Treaties and Conventions
European Secondary Legislation
Directives
Directives 2006/48 and 2006/49 are referred to as the Capital Requirements Directive or CRD
Regulations
Commission Decisions
National Legislation
Belgium
European Union
France
Germany
Ireland
Spain
Switzerland
United Kingdom
United States
European Committee Charters
Proposals
List of Abbreviations
List of Contributors
Main Text
Part I European Reform as a Response to the 2008 Crisis
1 Restructuring Global and EU Financial Regulation
Introduction
1.01
1.02
1.03
1.04
1.05
1.06
1.07
Financial regulation—a polycentric regime
1.08
1.09
1.10
1.11
1.12
Policy battlefronts and opposing forces
Opposing forces
1.13
1.14
1.15
1.16
1.17
1.18
Policy battlefronts
Surveillance
1.19
1.20
1.21
1.22
Resilience
1.23
1.24
1.25
1.26
1.27
1.28
1.29
1.30
Stability
1.31
1.32
Organizational restructuring and regime management
1.33
1.34
1.35
1.36
1.37
1.38
1.39
Emerging structures of coordination: the global level
1.40
Financial Stability Board—‘Head of Global’?
1.41
1.42
1.43
1.44
1.45
FSB as a regulator: setting standards
1.46
1.47
1.48
1.49
FSB as a regulator: monitoring, assessment, and putative enforcement
1.50
1.51
1.52
1.53
1.54
1.55
1.56
1.57
1.58
1.59
1.60
1.61
1.62
The changing role of the IMF
1.63
1.64
1.65
1.66
1.67
Restructuring at the regional level: reconfiguring EU financial regulation
1.68
1.69
1.70
1.71
Managing the financial regulatory regime: orchestrating interactions
Types and methods of interaction
1.72
1.73
1.74
1.75
1.76
1.77
1.78
1.79
1.80
1.81
1.82
1.83
1.84
1.85
1.86
1.87
Levels of interaction: multi-lateral supervisory arrangements and supervisory colleges
1.88
1.89
1.90
1.91
1.92
1.93
1.94
1.95
1.96
1.97
Potential strategies for developing capacities, responsiveness, and learning
1.98
1.99
1.100
Information
1.101
1.102
1.103
1.104
1.105
1.106
Cognitive challenge
1.107
Summary and conclusions
1.108
1.109
1.110
1.111
1.112
1.113
1.114
1.115
2 Unfinished Business
Moving at different speeds
2.01
2.02
2.03
2.04
2.05
What went wrong?
2.06
2.07
2.08
2.09
2.10
Will we now get it right?
2.11
2.12
2.13
2.14
2.15
2.16
2.17
2.18
2.19
2.20
2.21
2.22
Slowing down reforms
2.23
2.24
2.25
2.26
2.27
Institutional reforms
2.28
2.29
2.30
2.31
3 The Relationship between Micro-Macro-Prudential Supervision and Central Banking
The issue
3.01
3.02
The irreducible functions of a central bank
3.03
3.04
3.05
3.06
3.07
Supervision at the central bank
3.08
1
2
3
4
3.09
3.10
3.11
3.12
3.13
3.14
Supervision separate from the central bank
3.15
1
2
3
3.16
3.17
3.18
3.19
3.20
3.21
3.22
Blurring the lines
3.23
3.24
3.25
3.26
Differences in process
3.27
3.28
3.29
3.30
3.31
Interconnection is crucial
3.32
3.33
3.34
3.35
3.36
3.37
3.38
3.39
‘Macro-prudential policy’
3.40
3.41
3.42
Making macro-prudential policy operational
3.43
3.44
3.45
3.46
3.47
3.48
3.49
3.50
3.51
Conclusion
3.52
3.53
Part II The New European Supervisory Architecture
4 Supervision in the Wake of the Financial Crisis
Introduction
4.01
4.02
4.03
Effective supervision and the financial crisis: new light on an old problem?
4.04
4.05
4.06
4.07
4.08
4.09
4.10
4.11
4.12
4.13
4.14
4.15
4.16
The complexities of supervision: designing a best practice template
What is ‘good’ supervision?
4.17
4.18
4.19
4.20
4.21
Designing a system
Environmental and institutional factors
4.22
4.23
4.24
4.25
4.26
4.27
4.28
4.29
4.30
4.31
Resourcing
4.32
4.33
4.34
4.35
4.36
The underpinning regulatory system
4.37
4.38
Supervisory styles and approaches
4.39
4.40
The supervisory tool box—outsourcing supervision through internal governance and self-regulation?
4.41
4.42
4.43
4.44
4.45
4.46
4.47
4.48
The international dimension
4.49
4.50
4.51
4.52
4.53
4.54
4.55
4.56
The EU model
Law in action and the European Securities and Markets Authority
4.57
4.58
4.59
4.60
4.61
A best practice template?
4.62
4.63
4.64
4.65
4.66
4.67
4.68
4.69
4.70
Lessons from CESR?
4.71
4.72
4.73
4.74
4.75
4.76
4.77
4.78
4.79
Conclusion
4.80
4.81
5 Understanding the New Institutional Architecture of EU Financial Market Supervision
Introduction
5.01
5.02
5.03
5.04
5.05
5.06
Member State-based supervision of financial markets
Organization of supervision at national level
5.07
5.08
5.09
5.10
The structure of pre-crisis financial market supervision at the EU level
The Lamfalussy Level 3 committees: overview
5.11
5.12
5.13
The Committee of European Securities Regulators
5.14
5.15
5.16
5.17
5.18
5.19
5.20
5.21
5.22
5.23
5.24
5.25
5.26
5.27
5.28
Committee of European Banking Supervisors
5.29
5.30
5.31
5.32
5.33
5.34
5.35
Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors
5.36
5.37
From the Lamfalussy Level 3 Committees to the European Supervisory Authorities
Post-crisis reform of the structure of EU financial market supervision: overview
5.38
5.39
5.40
5.41
5.42
5.43
5.44
5.45
5.46
5.47
5.48
5.49
5.50
5.51
Binding technical standards
5.52
5.53
5.54
5.55
5.56
5.57
5.58
5.59
5.60
5.61
5.62
5.63
ESA enforcement of EU law
5.64
5.65
1
2
3
4
5.66
5.67
5.68
ESA action in emergency situations
5.69
5.70
5.71
Resolution of disputes between supervisors in cross-border situations
5.72
5.73
5.74
5.75
Direct supervision of financial market participants and direct control over market activity
5.76
5.77
5.78
5.79
5.80
5.81
5.82
5.83
5.84
Taking stock
5.85
5.86
5.87
5.88
5.89
5.90
5.91
5.92
6 A European Framework for Macro-Prudential Oversight
Introduction
6.01
Issues of competence
6.02
6.03
6.04
Tasks and objectives
Macro-prudential oversight versus micro-prudential supervision
6.05
6.06
6.07
The mandate
Tasks and objectives of the ESRB—
6.08
6.09
Instruments of the ESRB—
6.10
6.11
The impact—
6.12
The tasks of the ESRB secretariat—
6.13
6.14
The organizational framework
6.15
6.16
The General Board
6.17
6.18
Steering Committee and Secretariat
6.19
Conclusions
6.20
7 The New Structure of Financial Supervision in Europe
Introduction
7.01
The new EU supervisory structure
The evolution of the financial system
7.02
7.03
7.04
7.05
7.06
7.07
7.08
7.09
7.10
7.11
From the de Larosière Report to the supervisory package
7.12
7.13
7.14
7.15
The main features of the EU financial regulatory package
7.16
7.17
The European Systemic Risk Board in short
7.18
7.19
7.20
7.21
7.22
The European Supervisory Authorities
7.23
7.24
7.25
7.26
7.27
7.28
7.29
7.30
7.31
7.32
7.33
7.34
7.35
7.36
7.37
7.38
7.39
7.40
7.41
7.42
7.43
7.44
7.45
7.46
7.47
7.48
7.49
7.50
7.51
7.52
7.53
The new EU supervisory structure: how to fill the half empty glass
ESRB competences
7.54
7.55
7.56
7.57
7.58
7.59
7.60
ESAs: regulatory and supervisory powers
7.61
7.62
7.63
7.64
7.65
7.66
7.67
ESAs governance
7.68
7.69
7.70
What’s next in the long term? A proposal
The objectives of regulation
7.71
7.72
7.73
7.74
7.75
7.76
7.77
7.78
7.79
7.80
7.81
7.82
7.83
7.84
7.85
7.86
7.87
7.88
7.89
7.90
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
7.91
7.92
7.93
7.94
8 Nationally Fragmented Supervision over Multinational Banks as a Source of Global Systemic Risk
Introduction
8.01
8.02
8.03
8.04
8.05
Supervising multinational banks in the light of the recent crisis
The rise of multinational banks
8.06
8.07
8.08
Cross-border supervision and crisis management
Basel and EU
8.09
8.10
Crisis management of European cross-border groups: recent cases
8.11
8.12
8.13
8.14
Lessons from the crisis: national fragmentation is a source of systemic risk
8.15
8.16
8.17
8.18
8.19
Policy analysis
Centralizing supervision
8.20
8.21
Enhanced cooperation
8.22
8.23
Lead supervisor
8.24
8.25
Central authority
8.26
8.27
Assessment of the three models
8.28
8.29
8.30
Centralizing crisis management
8.31
8.32
8.33
8.34
Recent reforms in Europe
8.35
Cooperation mechanisms
8.36
Information exchange and consultation
8.37
8.38
Joint decision procedure
8.39
8.40
8.41
Written cooperation agreements and colleges of supervisors
8.42
Action in crisis situations
8.43
8.44
Lead supervisor and consolidating supervisor
8.45
8.46
The new European supervisory architecture
8.47
8.48
Single rulebook and consistent application of standards
8.49
8.50
8.51
Emergency situations
8.52
8.53
8.54
8.55
Supervisory cooperation
8.56
8.57
8.58
8.59
Why should the EU enhance centralization?
A critical assessment of the new European framework
8.60
8.61
Delegation costs
8.62
8.63
Coordination costs
8.64
Need for centralization
8.65
The legal basis for centralizing supervision
8.66
8.67
8.68
Conclusions
8.69
8.70
9 The European Financial Supervisory Authorities or ESAs
Introduction
Overall presentation
9.01
9.02
9.03
9.04
9.05
Antecedents
9.06
The basic model
9.07
9.08
9.09
9.10
9.11
9.12
9.13
Transfer of power and the Meroni doctrine.
9.14
9.15
9.16
9.17
Centralization
9.18
9.19
9.20
9.21
9.22
9.23
Authorities, agencies, and accountability
9.24
9.25
9.26
The ESAs’ remit
9.27
Objectives
9.28
9.29
Internal market objectives (litt a)
9.30
9.31
Functioning of financial markets
9.32
9.33
Competition
9.34
9.35
Consumer protection
9.36
Systemic risk concerns
9.37
9.38
The ESAs’ scope of action
9.39
9.40
9.41
Primary responsibility of ESMA
9.42
ESMA’s partial responsibility
9.43
9.44
9.45
9.46
9.47
9.48
9.49
The ESAs ‘legally binding’ powers
9.50
9.51
Regulatory Technical Standards (RTS)
Overview
9.52
9.53
9.54
9.55
9.56
9.57
9.58
9.59
9.60
Using the delegation for binding RTS: preliminary stage
9.61
Endorsement of RTS by the Commission
9.62
Legal form of the RTS
9.63
9.64
Non-endorsement by the Commission
9.65
9.66
Involvement of the Council and Parliament
9.67
9.68
9.69
9.70
9.71
Implementing acts
9.72
9.73
The authorisation—
9.74
Process—
9.75
9.76
Evaluation
9.77
‘Breach of Union law’ (Art 17)
9.78
9.79
9.80
The scope
9.81
9.82
9.83
9.84
9.85
9.86
Right of action
9.87
9.88
9.89
The process
9.90
9.91
9.92
9.93
9.94
9.95
9.96
9.97
9.98
9.99
9.100
9.101
9.102
9.103
9.104
9.105
9.106
9.107
Evaluation
9.108
‘Action in emergency situations’
9.109
9.110
9.111
Identifying an emergency
9.112
9.113
9.114
Decisions by the ESAs in case of emergency
9.115
9.116
Evaluation
9.117
9.118
Mediation or ‘settling disagreements between competent authorities’
Scope
9.119
9.120
9.121
9.122
9.123
9.124
9.125
Right of initiative
9.126
9.127
9.128
9.129
Mediation or arbitration?
9.130
9.131
9.132
9.133
9.134
Binding decisions addressed to individual financial market participants
9.135
The mediation panel
9.136
9.137
9.138
9.139
Cross-sectoral dispute settlement
9.140
Consumer protection and financial activities (Art 9)
9.141
9.142
9.143
Consumer protection matters
9.144
9.145
9.146
9.147
9.148
9.149
9.150
Tasks related to financial activities
9.151
9.152
9.153
9.154
9.155
9.156
Evaluation
9.157
The safeguard clause (Art 38)
9.158
9.159
9.160
9.161
The non-legally binding tools
9.162
9.163
Supervisory cooperation, convergence, and efficiency
Guidelines and recommendations (Art 16)
9.164
9.165
9.166
9.167
Coordination function (Art 31)
9.168
Collection of information (Art 35)
9.169
9.170
9.171
9.172
9.173
Common supervisory culture (Art 29)
9.174
9.175
Peer reviews of competent authorities (Art 30)
9.176
9.177
9.178
9.179
9.180
Delegation of tasks and responsibilities (Art 28)
9.181
9.182
9.183
9.184
9.185
9.186
Supporting the colleges of supervisors (Art 21)
9.187
9.188
9.189
Contribute to systemic surveillance and financial stability (Arts 22–27)
9.190
9.191
Identify systemic developments
9.192
9.193
9.194
9.195
9.196
Recovery and resolution procedures (Art 25)
9.197
9.198
European system of investor compensation schemes (Art 26)
9.199
Policy support function
Assessment of market developments (Art 32)
9.200
9.201
International relations
9.202
9.203
The European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS)
9.204
9.205
The Joint Bodies of the European Supervisory Authorities
The Joint Committee
9.206
9.207
9.208
9.209
9.210
9.211
9.212
9.213
9.214
9.215
9.216
9.217
9.218
The Board of Appeal
Nature of the appeal
9.219
9.220
9.221
Right to appeal
9.222
Acts to be appealed
9.223
9.224
9.225
9.226
Scope of the review
9.227
9.228
Decisions by the Board of Appeal
9.229
9.230
The procedure before the Board of Appeal
9.231
9.232
The organization of the Board of Appeal
9.233
9.234
9.235
9.236
9.237
The ESA’s governance
9.238
9.239
The Board of Supervisors (BoS)
Composition
9.240
9.241
9.242
9.243
9.244
9.245
9.246
9.247
Decision-making and voting procedures
9.248
9.249
9.250
9.251
9.252
9.253
9.254
Tasks and missions
9.255
9.256
9.257
9.258
The Management Board
9.259
Composition
9.260
9.261
9.262
9.263
9.264
Decision-making rules
9.265
Tasks
9.266
9.267
9.268
The Chairperson
9.269
9.270
9.271
9.272
9.273
9.274
9.275
9.276
The executive director
9.277
9.278
The Securities and Markets Stakeholders Group
9.279
9.280
9.281
9.282
9.283
9.284
9.285
9.286
9.287
Accountability
9.288
9.289
9.290
Administrative provisions
9.291
Financial matters
Financing
9.292
9.293
Budget
9.294
9.295
9.296
9.297
9.298
Anti-fraud measures
9.299
Internal organization of the ESAs
Staff regulations
9.300
Liability of the ESA
9.301
Professional secrecy
9.302
Data protection
9.303
9.304
Access to documents
9.305
Language arrangements
9.306
Review clause and further developments
9.307
9.308
9.309
(1)
9.310
(2)
Conclusion
9.311
9.312
9.313
9.314
9.315
Part III Regulation in Search for a Purpose
10 Post-Financial Crisis Trading and Clearing Reforms in the EU
Introduction
10.01
10.02
10.03
10.04
10.05
OTC derivatives: few players, more voice
10.06
10.07
10.08
10.09
10.10
10.11
10.12
10.13
Transparency reforms
10.14
10.15
10.16
10.17
Channelling trades through ‘official’ platforms
10.18
10.19
10.20
10.21
Mandating the use of clearing houses
10.22
10.23
10.24
10.25
Conclusion: managing voice imbalances
10.26
10.27
10.28
11 Corporate Governance of Banks after the Financial Crisis
Corporate governance of firms and its relevance for banks
Corporate governance and bank governance: An emerging discussion
What is special about banks and bank governance?
11.01
11.02
11.03
The discussion on bank governance before and after the financial crisis
11.04
11.05
11.06
11.07
Internal and external corporate governance: different relevance for banks
Control within the corporation
11.08
11.09
Control from the outside
11.10
11.11
11.12
11.13
Regulation and supervision of banks
11.14
One size does not fit all: sector-specific corporate governance and governance codes
11.15
Corporate governance of banks
Corporate governance of banks and the financial crisis
Corporate governance failures in banks as evidenced by the financial crisis
11.16
Risk management and internal control failures—
11.17
Deficiencies in the profile and practice of directors and senior management—
11.18
Complex and opaque corporate and bank structures—
11.19
Perverse incentives—
11.20
Failures in disclosure and transparency—
11.21
The irrelevance theory and the major cause theory in view of these failures
11.22
11.23
Equity governance and debt governance: parallel and divergent interests of management/board, shareholders, debtholders, and regulators/supervisors
11.24
The directors
11.25
The shareholders
11.26
11.27
11.28
The debtholders
11.29
11.30
The regulators and supervisors
11.31
11.32
The ambiguous role of deposit insurance and bail-out
11.33
Internal corporate governance of banks: corporate and supervisory law reform measures under discussion
11.34
Less suited corporate law reforms (stakeholder governance, stakeholder goal, duties and liabilities, hybrid capital)
Stakeholder governance for banks?
11.35
11.36
Stakeholder goal for banks?
11.37
Strengthening legal duties?
11.38
(Financial) liability?
11.39
Hybrid capital
11.40
Supervisory law requirements for board and bank structure and internal procedures
11.41
Two-tier board for banks
11.42
Group-wide corporate governance for banks
11.43
Less opaque and, if possible, less complex bank structure
11.44
Risk management and internal control
11.45
11.46
11.47
11.48
11.49
Supervisory law requirements for people
11.50
Profile and practices of the bank board
11.51
11.52
11.53
11.54
11.55
Profile of the bank management
11.56
Fit and proper test for major shareholders
11.57
Appropriate incentives or at least eliminating bad incentives: the case of remuneration
11.58
Conclusion: co-regulation for corporate governance of banks and no general spill over of bank governance requirements to firm governance
11.59
11.60
Summary and theses
Corporate governance of firms and its relevance for banks
11.61
11.62
11.63
Corporate governance of banks
11.64
11.65
11.66
Internal corporate governance of banks: corporate and supervisory reform proposals under discussion
11.67
11.68
11.69
11.70
11.71
Spilling over of bank governance to firm governance?
11.72
12 The Financial Crisis
Introduction
12.01
12.02
12.03
The governance crisis of 2001–03
12.04
12.05
12.06
Persistent governance problems
12.07
Executives
12.08
Risk
12.09
12.10
Remuneration
12.11
12.12
Non-executives
12.13
12.14
12.15
12.16
Shareholders
12.17
12.18
CRD IV: better governance of banks?
12.19
12.20
Risk governance
12.21
12.22
12.23
12.24
Remuneration
12.25
12.26
Non-executives
12.27
12.28
12.29
12.30
Shareholders
12.31
12.32
12.33
Conclusion
12.34
12.35
Part IV The International Dimension: New Challenges
13 Developments Regarding Global Cooperation in Supervision of Financial Markets
Introduction
13.01
13.02
13.03
13.04
13.05
13.06
The IOSCO multilateral approach to international enforcement cooperation
The 2002 MMOU
Background and scope
13.07
13.08
13.09
13.10
13.11
13.12
13.13
13.14
13.15
13.16
13.17
13.18
13.19
13.20
13.21
13.22
13.23
13.24
13.25
13.26
13.27
13.28
13.29
13.30
13.31
13.32
Compliance with the MMoU
13.33
13.34
13.35
13.36
13.37
13.38
13.39
13.40
13.41
13.42
13.43
13.44
13.45
13.46
Application of the MMoU by its signatories
13.47
13.48
13.49
Further perspectives of enforcement cooperation
13.50
13.51
Full implementation of the MoU and contacts with uncooperative jurisdictions —
13.52
13.53
13.54
13.55
Monitoring the effective implementation of the IOSCO MMoU—
13.56
13.57
13.58
13.59
An enhanced bilateral and multilateral approach to enforcement cooperation—
13.60
13.61
13.62
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
13.63
13.64
13.65
13.66
13.67
Build on regional experiences—
13.68
13.69
13.70
13.71
FSB initiatives to strengthen adherence to international standards—
13.72
13.73
13.74
Future developments in global securities cooperation: supervisory cooperation
Overview of initiatives regarding international supervisory cooperation in the securities field
13.75
13.76
13.77
13.78
13.79
13.80
13.81
13.82
13.83
13.84
13.85
13.86
(i)
(ii)
13.87
13.88
13.89
13.90
13.91
13.92
13.93
13.94
13.95
13.96
The IOSCO framework for supervisory cooperation
13.97
13.98
13.99
13.100
13.101
13.102
13.103
Conclusion
13.104
13.105
13.106
14 The Last Frontier
Introduction
14.01
14.02
14.03
14.04
14.05
14.06
Save functions, not institutions
14.07
14.08
14.09
The challenge
14.10
How to achieve an efficient and equitable cross-border solution
14.11
14.12
14.13
14.14
14.15
Towards a framework for cross-border resolution
14.16
Functional approach to resolution
14.17
14.18
14.19
14.20
14.21
14.22
14.23
14.24
Functional universality
14.25
14.26
14.27
14.28
14.29
14.30
14.31
14.32
14.33
The quest for continuity—market-based mechanisms
14.34
14.35
14.36
14.37
14.38
14.39
14.40
14.41
14.42
14.43
14.44
Conclusion
14.45
14.46
15 Extraterritorial Reach of the US Financial Laws
Extraterritorial reach of anti-fraud provision in private litigation
15.01
15.02
15.03
15.04
15.05
15.06
Foreign inspection of auditors of foreign issuers listed in United States
15.07
15.08
15.09
The ‘cooperative approach’
15.10
15.11
15.12
Inspection work programme
15.13
Full reliance
15.14
15.15
Criticisms of PCAOB extraterritorial regulation
15.16
15.17
Pushback
15.18
15.19
15.20
15.21
Reasons that some firms have not yet been inspected
15.22
15.23
Extraterritorial scope of the whistleblower provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
15.24
15.25
(4)
(A)
(B)
15.26
15.27
Applicability of §301 extraterritorially
15.28
Compliance with §301—US ‘best practices’
15.29
15.30
15.31
15.32
Challenging the extraterritorial applicability of §301
15.33
15.34
Conflicts with European data privacy laws
15.35
15.36
15.37
15.38
15.39
15.40
15.41
15.42
15.43
Due process protections for the accused—
15.44
15.45
Transfer of data to third countries—
15.46
15.47
Case Study: French culture clashes with SOX whistleblower mandate—
15.48
15.49
15.50
15.51
Conflicts with European labour laws—
15.52
15.53
15.54
US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
15.55
Jurisdiction
15.56
Basic prohibitions
15.57
15.58
15.59
Extraterritorial application
15.60
15.61
15.62
15.63
15.64
15.65
15.66
15.67
Department of Justice opinion procedure
15.68
Sanctions
15.69
Conclusion
15.70
Further Material
Index
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Table of Legislation
Edited By: Eddy Wymeersch, Klaus J Hopt, Guido Ferrarini
From:
Financial Regulation and Supervision: A post-crisis analysis
Edited By: Eddy Wymeersch, Klaus J Hopt, Guido Ferrarini
Content type:
Book content
Product:
Financial Law [FBL]
Published in print:
16 August 2012
ISBN:
9780199660902
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