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- Preliminary Material
- Main Text
- Part I General Part
- Part II EU Law
- 2 Liability of the European Financial Authorities: ECB, SRB, EBA, ESMA, EIOPA, and ESRB
- Preliminary Material
- I Introduction
- II Rationale of Supervision and Supervisory Model
- 1 General
- 2 The European System of Financial Supervisors
- 3 The European Banking Union
- 3.1 Historical background
- 3.2 First pillar: the Single Supervisory Mechanism
- 3.3 Second pillar: the Single Resolution Mechanism
- 3.4 Third pillar: the European Deposit Insurance System
- 4 A European Anti-Money Laundering Authority?
- III Liability Standard
- IV Detailed Liability Criteria
- V Evaluation
- 2 Liability of the European Financial Authorities: ECB, SRB, EBA, ESMA, EIOPA, and ESRB
- Part III Civil Law Legal Systems
- 3 Germany
- 4 Austria
- Preliminary Material
- I Introduction
- II General Principles of State Liability in Austria
- III Rationale of Supervision and Supervisory Model
- IV Liability Standard
- 1 General
- 2 (Additional) Legal Sources
- 3 Liable Financial Supervisors and Their Representatives
- 3.1 General
- 3.2 Austrian Financial Market Authority (Österreichische Finanzmarktaufsicht)
- 3.3 Austrian Financial Market Authority (Österreichische Finanzmarktaufsicht) as resolution authority for banks and other financial institutions
- 3.4 Austrian Financial Reporting Enforcement Panel (AFREP) and the Austrian Auditor Supervision Authority (Abschlussprüferaufsichtsbehörde)
- 3.5 Austrian Takeover Commission (Übernahmekommission)
- 3.6 Austrian National Bank
- 3.7 External auditors
- 3.8 Mandated persons (state commissioner, government commissioner and receivers)
- 4 (No) Direct Liability of the Republic of Austria—Violation of European Law?
- V Detailed Criteria for Liability
- VI No (Personal) Liability of the Employees and Bodies
- VII Liability of Financial Supervisors in Practice
- VIII Summary
- IX Annex—§ 3 Federal Act on the Establishing and Organization of the Financial Market Authority
- 5 France
- Preliminary Material
- I Introduction
- II Rationale of Supervision and Supervisory Model
- III Liability Standard
- IV Detailed Liability Criteria
- V Liability of Financial Supervisors in Practice
- VI Evaluation
- 6 The Netherlands
- Preliminary Material
- I Introduction
- II Rationale of Supervision and Supervisory Model
- III Liability Standard
- IV Detailed Liability Criteria
- 1 General
- 2 Tortious Conduct
- 2.1 Before 1 July 2012: breach of the unwritten duty of proper and careful supervision
- 2.1.1 General
- 2.1.2 Discretionary power
- 2.1.3 No benefit of hindsight
- 2.1.4 Reactive and preventive supervision
- 2.1.5 The purpose of supervision; complex balancing of interests; supervisor’s dilemma
- 2.1.6 No guarantees, but timely and adequate action
- 2.1.7 Legality principle
- 2.1.8 General principles of proper administration
- 2.1.9 Interrelationship
- 2.2 Since 1 July 2012: improper performance of statutory duties or improper exercise of powers
- 2.1 Before 1 July 2012: breach of the unwritten duty of proper and careful supervision
- 3 Imputability
- 4 The Influence of the Principle of Formal Legal Force on the Requirements of Tortious Conduct and Imputability
- 5 Relativity
- 6 Causation
- 7 Loss
- 8 Joint and Several Liability
- V Liability of Financial Supervisors in Practice
- VI Evaluation
- 7 Italy
- 8 Spain
- Preliminary Material
- I Introduction
- II Rationale of Supervision and Supervisory Model
- III Liability Standard
- IV Detailed Liability Criteria
- 1 Introduction: The Four Requirements to Establish Public Administration’s Financial Liability
- 2 Detailed Analysis of the Criteria Determining Financial Supervisors’ Liability
- V Liability of Financial Supervisors in Practice
- 1 Scope of the Analysis and Parameters Examined
- 2 Liability of Financial Supervisors: Comprehensive Analysis of Spanish Case Law
- 3 Liability of Spanish Financial Supervisors in the European Context
- VI Conclusion
- 9 Portugal
- 10 Greece
- Preliminary Material
- I Introduction: Competent Authorities for Financial Supervision and Resolution in Greece
- II Rationale of Supervision and Supervisory Model
- III Liability Standard
- IV Detailed Liability Criteria
- V Liability of Financial Supervisors in Practice
- VI Evaluation
- Part IV Common Law Legal Systems
- 11 United Kingdom
- Preliminary Material
- I Introduction
- II Rationale of Supervision and Supervisory Model
- 1 Changing Supervisory Models
- 2 Why Regulate Financial Services?
- 3 The UK Financial Regulatory System
- 4 The Background to FSMA as Originally Enacted
- 5 Northern Rock and the Global Financial Crisis
- 6 Legislative Measures for Resolution of Financial Institutions
- 7 Financial Regulatory Reform Back on the Agenda
- 8 The Coalition Government and the Introduction of ‘Twin Peaks’
- 9 The Financial Services Act 2012
- 10 The Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013
- 11 The Principal Legislation: The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 as Amended
- 12 The Shift to ‘Twin Peaks’ Regulation
- 13 The Statutory Objectives and the Regulatory Principles
- 14 A Note on Brexit
- III Liability Standard
- 1 Introduction
- 2 The Statutory Immunity from Damages
- 3 The Common Law of Torts
- 4 The Seminal Case of Hedley Byrne
- 5 The Three-Stage Test
- 6 Incrementalism
- 7 Assumption of Responsibility
- 8 Summary of Developments
- 9 Novel Duty of Care Cases
- 10 Yuen Kun Yeu v. Attorney General for Hong Kong
- 11 Davis v. Radcliffe
- 12 Tort of Misfeasance in Public Office
- 13 The Three Rivers Case
- IV Detailed Liability Criteria
- V Liability of Financial Supervisors in Practice
- VI Evaluation
- 12 Ireland
- 13 Hong Kong and Singapore
- 14 United States of America
- Preliminary Material
- I Introduction
- II Rationale of Supervision and Supervisory Model
- III Liability Standard
- IV Detailed Liability Criteria
- V Liability of Financial Supervisors in Practice
- VI Evaluation
- 15 Australia
- Preliminary Material
- I Introduction
- II Rationale of Supervision and Supervisory Model
- 1 The Regulators
- 2 The Underlying Rationale/Goal of Supervision in Australia
- 3 What is the Model for Financial Supervision in your Country?
- 3.1 APRA
- 3.2 The alignment of banks and insurers
- 3.3 Claims schemes
- 3.4 Territoriality and departures from the principle of pari passu distribution in insolvency
- 3.5 APRA’s powers as a supervisor
- 15.27
- 15.28
- 3.5.1 The power to appoint a statutory manager
- 3.5.2 Life insurers—judicial management
- 3.5.3 The power to order recapitalization
- 3.5.4 The power to require a compulsory transfer of business
- 3.5.5 Other directions powers
- 3.5.6 No bail-in power
- 3.5.7 Valuations and ‘no creditor worse off than in insolvency’
- 3.6 RBA
- 3.7 ASIC
- 3.8 Penalties and Australian regulators
- III Liability Standard
- IV Detailed Liability Criteria
- 1 The Tort of Misfeasance in Public Office in Australia
- 1.1 General
- 1.2 An invalid or unauthorized act
- 1.3 Malice
- 1.4 Who is a public officer?
- 1.5 In the purported discharge of a public duty
- 1.6 Loss or harm to the plaintiff
- 1.7 How might claims for misfeasance in public office arise in connection with the supervision or resolution of a financial institution?
- 1.8 Statutory managers
- 1.9 RBA
- 1.10 ASIC
- 2 Other Torts—Intimidation
- 3 Claims for Acquisition of Property not on Just Terms
- 1 The Tort of Misfeasance in Public Office in Australia
- V Liability of Financial Supervisors in Practice
- VI Evaluation
- 11 United Kingdom
- Part V Mixed Legal Systems
- 16 The Republic of South Africa
- Preliminary Material
- I Introduction
- II Rationale of Supervision and Supervisory Model
- III Liability Standard
- IV Accountability in Terms of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act
- VI Evaluation
- 16 The Republic of South Africa
- Part VI Comparative Law Evaluation
- 17 Comparative Law Evaluation
- Preliminary Material
- I Introduction
- II The Growing Tendency to Limit the Liability of Financial Supervisors and Resolution Authorities
- 1 General
- 2 A Fault that Goes beyond Negligence
- 2.1 General
- 2.2 France: gross fault
- 2.3 Italy: intent or gross negligence
- 2.4 The Netherlands: intent or gross fault
- 2.5 Greece: manifest and serious error/gross negligence or bad faith
- 2.6 United Kingdom: bad faith
- 2.7 Ireland: bad faith
- 2.8 Hong Kong & Singapore: bad faith
- 2.9 Australia: bad faith
- 2.10 South Africa: bad faith
- 2.11 United States of America: immunity in the case of discretionary conduct
- 3 The Margin of Discretion: The Portuguese Case
- 4 The Protective Purpose of the Norm Infringed: The German Case
- 5 The Causation Requirement
- 6 The Loss Requirement
- 7 Unlawfulness Combined with the Causation Requirement: The Spanish Case
- 8 Proportionate Liability
- III Limitations of Liability Under Attack
- 1 General
- 2 Arguments Based on Constitutional Law
- 3 Arguments Based on European Union Law
- 3.1 General
- 3.2 No liability criterion that goes beyond a sufficiently serious breach under EU law
- 3.3 Exceptions
- 3.4 Peter Paul revisited?
- 3.5 No causation criterion that goes beyond the requirement under EU law of a direct causal link
- IV Towards Harmonization of Liability Within the European Banking Union
- V Concluding Remarks
- 17 Comparative Law Evaluation
- Further Material
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