Since the global financial crisis of 2008, claims by clients, shareholders, depositors, and bondholders of financial firms have increased against financial supervisors and resolution authorities for inadequate supervision or resolution action. This book offers a thorough and systematic analysis of the liability regimes which apply to financial supervisors and resolution authorities at the EU level (particularly relevant since the European Banking Union came into operation in 2014), at the level of individual EU Member States, as well as in other major jurisdictions worldwide. The jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction approach provides a detailed analysis of the liability regimes as they apply to local financial supervisors and resolution authorities in major civil law, common law, and mixed legal system jurisdictions. This global view of the primary financial jurisdictions as examples provides a unique and comprehensive overview which is of great practical and theoretical importance. The work concludes with a comparative law evaluation that discusses to what extent limitations of the liability of national financial supervisors and resolution authorities are valid under the EU rules on Member State liability. It also explores whether it would be preferable to adopt a uniform liability standard for the European Central Bank, the Single Resolution Board, and national financial supervisors and resolution authorities. Furthermore, the book addresses whether it would be preferable to adopt a provision to the effect that the Court of Justice of the European Union has exclusive jurisdiction in relation to the European Central Bank, Single Resolution Board, and the national financial supervisors and resolution authorities.