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Contents
- Preliminary Material
- Main Text
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Withdrawal Agreement and Political Declaration on the Future EU–UK Relationship
- 2.1 Introduction
- 2.2 Ratification
- 2.3 Renegotiation
- 2.4 Structure
- 2.5 Protocols
- 2.6 Implications for Financial Services
- 2.7 Dispute Resolution
- 2.8 The Political Declaration on the Future EU–UK relationship
- 2.9 Five Parts
- 2.10 Implications for Financial Services
- 2.11 Going Forward
- 2.12 FCA EU Withdrawal Impact Assessment
- 3 International Standards
- 3.1 Introduction
- 3.2 Governments, Central Banks, and Regulators Participating as Members of International Bodies
- 3.02
- 3.2.1 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
- 3.2.2 IMF
- 3.2.3 Bank for International Settlements (BIS)
- 3.2.4 FSB
- 3.2.5 FATF
- 3.2.6 CPMI
- 3.2.7 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS)
- 3.2.8 IOSCO
- 3.2.9 Global Foreign Exchange Committee (GFXC)
- 3.2.10 International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS)
- 3.2.11 International Organisation of Pension Supervisors (IOPS)
- 3.2.12 International Association of Deposit Insurers (IADI)
- 3.2.13 Markets Committee
- 3.2.14 Irving Fisher Committee on Central Bank Statistics (IFC)
- 3.2.15 International Financial Consumer Protection Organisation (FinCoNet)
- 3.3 Accounting and Audit
- 3.4 UK Firms Participating in Industry Bodies
- 3.5 Conclusion
- 4 EU Equivalence Regime
- 4.1 Introduction
- 4.2 The Concept of Equivalence
- 4.3 Current Status and Timing
- 4.4 Remaining Equivalent Following Brexit: Onshoring of EU Law
- 4.5 Third Countries and Member States
- 4.6 Equivalence at the EU Level
- 4.7 Equivalence Decisions
- 4.8 Banking Framework
- 4.9 Investment Services
- 4.10 Market Infrastructure
- 4.11 Recognition of UK CCPs and CSDs
- 4.12 EMIR and Derivatives
- 4.13 Investment Funds
- 4.14 Insurance and Reinsurance Framework
- 4.15 Benchmark Administrators
- 4.16 Issuers
- 5 The EU Approach to Authorisation
- 5.1 Introduction
- 5.2 Background
- 5.3 The ESMA Opinions
- 5.3.1 Legal Basis
- 5.3.2 The ESMA Cross-Sectoral Opinion
- 5.3.2.1 Purpose and scope
- 5.3.2.2 The general principles
- (a) Principle one: no automatic recognition of existing authorisations
- (b) Principle two: authorisation granted by EU27 NCAs should be rigorous and efficient
- (c) Principle three: NCAs should be able to verify the objective reasons for relocations
- (d) Principle four: special attention should be granted to avoid letter-box entities in the EU27
- (e) Principle five: outsourcing and delegation to third countries is only possible under strict conditions
- (f) Principle six: NCAs should ensure that substance requirements are met
- (g) Principle seven: NCAs should ensure sound governance of EU entities
- (h) Principle eight: NCAs must be in a position to effectively supervise and enforce Union law
- (i) Principle nine: coordination to ensure effective monitoring by ESMA
- 5.3.3 The ESMA Sector-Specific Opinions
- 5.3.4 The ESMA Investment Firms Opinion
- 5.3.5 The ESMA Secondary Markets Opinion
- 5.3.6 The ESMA Investment Management Opinion
- 5.4 The EBA Opinions
- 5.5 The Withdrawal Agreement, the Political Declaration, and the Interim Legislation
- 6 The EU Approach to Authorisation: Germany, France, the Netherlands, and Ireland
- 6.1 Introduction
- 6.2 Germany
- 6.2.1 Introduction
- 6.2.2 German Brexit Legislation
- 6.2.3 National Approach to Authorisation
- 6.3 France
- 6.3.1 Introduction
- 6.3.2 French Competent Authorities
- 6.3.3 French Approach to a No-Deal Brexit
- 6.3.4 Continuity of Contracts
- 6.3.5 French Monopoly
- 6.3.6 Territorial Application of the French Monopoly
- 6.3.7 Reverse Solicitation Exemption
- 6.3.8 Standard Procedure for Non-EEA Entities Following Exit Day
- 6.3.9 French Guidelines in Relation to the Use of Third Party Employees or Technical Means
- 6.3.10 Required Substance in France
- 6.3.11 Outsourcing Arrangements
- 6.3.12 ‘Dual-hatting’ within Group Entities
- 6.4 Netherlands
- 6.5 Ireland
- 6.5.1 Background
- 6.5.2 Brexit Contingency Planning
- 6.5.3 Authorisation of AIFMs, UCITS Management Companies, and MiFID Investment Firms in Ireland
- 6.5.4 Treatment of Third Country Firms under Irish Law
- 6.5.5 Key Requirements for Authorisation in Ireland
- 6.5.5.1 The influence of ESMA on the authorisation requirements
- 6.5.5.2 Head office and registered office in Ireland
- 6.5.5.3 Substance in Ireland
- 6.5.5.4 AIFMs and UCITS management companies: managerial functions
- 6.5.5.5 AIFMs and UCITS management companies: senior management location rule
- 6.5.5.6 Fitness and probity regime
- 6.5.5.7 Financial control, compliance, and risk management
- 6.5.5.8 Staffing
- 6.5.6 The Authorisation Process
- 7 The UK Supervisory Regime in the Post-Brexit Environment
- 7.1 Introduction
- 7.2 The Entangled Nature of the UK and EU Frameworks
- 7.3 UK Framework for Financial Services Legislation and Regulation
- 7.4 A ‘Bonfire of Regulation’?
- 7.5 The EU (Withdrawal) Act 2018
- 7.6 Statutory Instruments under the EU Withdrawal Act
- 7.7 Minimising Disruption
- 7.8 Allocation of Powers to UK Regulators
- 7.9 The Bank of England’s Approach to Onshoring
- 7.10 The FCA’s Approach to Onshoring
- 7.11 The PSR’s Approach to Onshoring
- 7.12 The UK Regulators’ Approach to Non-Legislative EU Materials
- 7.13 The Impact of Brexit on the FCA Handbook
- 7.14 The Impact of Brexit on the PRA Rulebook
- 7.15 The Overseas Persons’ Exclusion after Brexit
- 7.16 Reallocation of Supervisory Powers
- 7.17 Regulatory Cooperation
- 7.18 Treatment of ‘In Flight’ Legislation
- 7.19 Impact of a ‘No-Deal’ Scenario
- 7.20 Conclusion
- 8 PRA Approach to the Authorisation of International Branches and Subsidiaries
- 8.1 Introduction
- 8.2 General Differences between Branches and Subsidiaries
- 8.3 Banks: PRA’s Approach to Significant Retail Activities
- 8.4 ‘Wholesale’ Banks: PRA’s General Approach to Branch Authorisation and Supervision (Where No Significant Retail Activities)
- 8.43
- 8.44
- 8.4.1 The Wholesale or ‘General Approach’ to Branch Authorisation and Supervision
- 8.4.2 The PRA’s and FCA’s Threshold Conditions for Authorisation
- 8.4.3 PRA
- 8.4.4 FCA
- 8.4.5 Equivalence Standards
- 8.4.6 Supervisory Cooperation Arrangements
- 8.4.7 Assurance over Resolution Arrangements
- 8.4.8 Considerations for Banks
- 8.5 Banks: PRA’s Approach to ‘Systemic’ Wholesale Branches
- 8.6 Banks: Application Process
- 8.7 Banks: Implications of the Transition to Overseas Branch or Subsidiary Status
- 8.8 Overseas (Re)insurers: General PRA Approach to Authorisation
- 8.9 Overseas (Re)insurers: PRA Approach to UK Branches—Factors to Be Considered
- 9 The UK’s Senior Managers, Certification and Conduct Regime
- 9.1 Introduction
- 9.2 Summary of the Relevant Background
- 9.3 Applicability of Different SMCR Regimes with Brexit
- 9.4 Responsibility for Changing Regulatory Requirements during Brexit
- 9.5 Practical Implications of Moving between Regimes
- 9.6 Responsibility for Cross-border Business into the UK
- 9.7 Impact on Certification and Conduct Regimes
- 9.8 Insourcing and Outsourcing
- 9.9 Enforcement against non-UK Resident Senior Managers
- 10 Markets in Financial Instrument Directive II (MiFID II)/Markets in Financial Instruments Regulation (MiFIR)
- 10.1 Introduction
- 10.2 Regulation under MIFID II
- 10.3 Rights of Operation and Access
- 10.3.1 Authorisation of Exchanges in the UK
- 10.3.2 Authorisation of Trading Infrastructure in the EU
- 10.3.3 Access for EU Investment Firms to Trading Infrastructure in other Member States
- 10.3.4 Access for Non-EU Investment Firms to Trading Infrastructure in the EU
- 10.4 The Potential Impact of Brexit
- 11 Capital Requirements Directive (CRD IV)/Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR)
- 11.1 Introduction
- 11.2 How Does the CRD IV/CRR Regime Differ from Other Sectors in Respect of Passporting and Equivalence Tests?
- 11.3 The Handling of Prudential Requirements under the UK’s Authorisation of EU Bank Branches
- 11.4 Collaboration and Information Sharing
- 11.5 Setting Capital Buffer Requirements
- 11.6 EU Intermediate Holding Company Regime
- 11.7 Impact of Brexit on Risk Weights of EU and UK Exposures and Liquidity
- 11.8 CRD Remuneration Provisions: Variable Remuneration
- 11.9 Supervision of Banking Groups and Consolidation
- 11.10 Securitisation
- 12 Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD)
- 12.1 Introduction
- 12.2 Background to the UK Regime
- 12.3 Overview of UK Legislation That Will Amend the UK Regime
- 12.4 What the UK Regime Will Look Like after Brexit
- 12.4.1 Overview of the Regime
- 12.4.2 Preparatory Measures: Recovery Plans
- 12.4.3 Preparatory Measures: Resolution Planning
- 12.4.4 Preparatory Measures: Intragroup Financial Support Arrangements
- 12.4.5 Early Intervention
- 12.4.6 Resolution: Conditions
- 12.4.7 Stabilisation Options: Overview
- 12.4.8 Stabilisation Options: Bail-in
- 12.4.9 MREL Reforms: External TLAC
- 12.4.10 MREL Reforms: Eligible Liabilities
- 12.4.11 MREL Reforms: Internal TLAC
- 12.4.12 Stabilisation Options: Moratorium Tool
- 12.4.13 Government Stabilisation Tools
- 12.4.14 Cross-border Group Resolution
- 12.4.15 Depositor Preference
- 12.5 Conclusion
- 13 European Markets Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) and Euro Clearing
- 13.1 Introduction
- 13.2 The EU Withdrawal Act and ‘Onshoring’
- 13.3 Onshoring EMIR and the Delegated Legislation Made under It
- 13.4 Implications of Exit and Onshoring
- 13.5 CCP SI
- 13.6 Trade Repository SI
- 13.7 EMIR SI
- 13.66
- 13.7.1 Scope and Exemptions
- 13.7.2 Definition of OTC Derivative: Exclusion of EU27 Exchange-Traded Derivatives
- 13.7.3 Definition of OTC Derivative: C6 Energy Derivatives
- 13.7.4 Exemptions for Intragroup Transactions
- 13.7.5 Clearing Obligation
- 13.7.6 Reporting Obligation
- 13.7.7 Risk Mitigation Obligations
- 13.7.8 Trade Repository Regulation
- 13.8 Standstill
- 13.9 Implications for Market Participants
- 14 Benchmarks Regulation
- 14.1 Introduction
- 14.2 The History of the Regulation of Benchmarks in the UK
- 14.3 The Regulation of Benchmarks in the UK
- 14.3.1 The UK’s Post-Brexit Approach to the Benchmarks Regulation
- 14.3.2 The Purpose of the Benchmarks Regulation
- 14.3.3 The Meaning of a ‘Benchmark’
- 14.3.4 Scope of the Benchmarks Regulation
- 14.3.5 Restriction on the Use of Benchmarks
- 14.3.6 Authorisation and Registration of Benchmark Administrators
- 14.3.7 Requirements Applicable to Benchmark Administrators
- 14.3.8 Benchmark Categories
- 14.3.9 Requirements Applicable to Benchmark Contributors
- 14.3.10 Transitional Provisions
- 14.3.10.1 Transitional provisions: benchmark administrators
- 14.77
- 14.78
- 14.79
- 14.80
- (a) Index provider providing a benchmark on 30 June 2016
- (b) FCA option to register rather than authorise
- (c) Index provider providing an existing benchmark on 1 January 2018
- (d) Competent authority/FCA option to allow use of a benchmark which does not meet requirements under certain conditions
- 14.3.10.2 Transitional provisions: supervised contributors
- 14.3.10.1 Transitional provisions: benchmark administrators
- 14.4 Brexit and the Benchmarks Regulation: Cross-border Issues
- 14.4.1 Introduction
- 14.4.2 The Impact of Brexit on benchmark administrators Based in the UK
- 14.4.3 The Impact of Brexit on Benchmark Administrators Based in the EU
- 14.4.4 The Impact of Brexit on Benchmark Administrators Based Outside the EU and the UK
- 14.4.5 The Impact of Brexit on Users of Benchmarks in the EU
- 14.4.6 The Impact of Brexit on Benchmark Users Based in the UK
- 14.5 Updates after July 2019
- 14.6 Conclusion
- 15 Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (AIFMD)
- 16 Solvency II Directive (Solvency II)
- 16.1 Introduction
- 16.2 The Position of European Insurers Operating in the United Kingdom
- 16.2.1 Licensing Issues
- 16.16
- 16.17
- 16.18
- 16.2.1.1 Inbound EEA authorised insurers passporting into the UK
- 16.2.1.2 EEA authorised insurers conducting business in the UK on an offshore basis
- 16.2.1 Licensing Issues
- 16.3 The Position of UK Insurers Operating in Europe
- 16.4 Contract Continuity for Existing Business
- Further Material