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Oxford Law Citator
Contents
Expand All
Collapse All
Preliminary Material
Preface
Table of Contents
Table of Cases
Canada
European Suervisoryauthorities (Board of Appeal)
European Court of Human Rights
European Union
Germany
Netherlands
United Kingdom
United States
Table of Legislation
International Instruments
European Union
Regulations
Directives
National Law
Australia
Bulgaria
Canada
France
Germany
Italy
Netherlands
Slovakia
Spain
United Kingdom
United States
List of Abbreviations
List of Contributors
Main Text
Part I General
1 Governing Financial Institutions: Law and Regulation, Conduct and Culture
Preliminary Material
I Introduction
1.01
1.02
II Basic Concepts
1.03
1.04
1.05
1.06
1.07
1.08
1.09
1.10
1.11
III Lessons from the Financial Crisis
1.12
1.13
1.14
1.15
IV Global Principles
1.16
1.17
1.18
1.19
1.20
1.21
1.22
1.23
1.24
V Corporate Governance and Prudential Regulation: Complements or Substitutes?
1.25
1.26
1.27
1.28
1.29
1.30
VI The Role of Conduct and Culture
1.31
1.32
1.33
1.34
1.35
2 Corporate Governance of Financial Institution: In Need of Cross-Sectoral Regulation
Preliminary Material
I Introduction
2.01
2.02
2.03
2.04
2.05
II Taking Stock: Governance-Related Regulation in EU Legislation after the Global Financial Crisis
A Relevant legal sources
2.06
2.07
2.08
2.09
2.10
B Board-related requirements
1 Board qualification and board composition
2.11
2.12
2.13
2 Remuneration policies
2.14
3 Board responsibilities, organization of the board, and performance standards
2.15
C Control of shareholders and owners of qualifying holdings
2.16
D Risk governance, internal audits and compliance
2.17
2.18
E Preliminary findings
2.19
III The Case for Cross-Sectoral Governance-Regulation Re-examined—A Functional Approach
A Cross-sectoral regulation on a sectoral basis? The traditional focus on banks and its limits
2.20
2.21
2.22
2.23
B Governance-related regulation in the interest of systemic stability and depositor/investor protections
2.24
2.25
2.26
2.27
2.28
2.29
IV Conclusions
2.30
3 Comparative Regulation of Corporate Governance in the Insurance Sector
Preliminary Material
I Introduction
3.01
3.02
3.03
3.04
3.05
3.06
3.07
II Governance-Related Regulation in EU Insurance Legislation
A Relevant legal sources
3.08
3.09
3.10
3.11
3.12
3.13
3.14
B Board-related requirements
3.15
3.16
3.17
3.18
3.19
3.20
3.21
3.22
C Balancing policyholder protection and other goals in insurance supervision
3.23
3.24
3.25
D Fitness and propriety
3.26
3.27
3.28
E Key functions
3.29
3.30
3.31
F Outsourcing
3.32
3.33
3.34
3.35
3.36
3.37
G Remuneration policies
3.38
3.39
3.40
III Risk Management
A Introduction
3.41
3.42
3.43
3.44
3.45
B Risk-management system
3.46
3.47
3.48
3.49
C Strategies, policies, and reporting procedures
3.50
3.51
3.52
D Risk-management function
3.53
IV The Actuarial Function
3.54
V The ORSA Process
3.55
3.56
3.57
VI Internal Control System
3.58
3.59
3.60
VII Governance Regulation Supporting Quantitative Requirements
A Introduction
3.61
B The ‘prudent person principle’
3.62
3.63
3.64
3.65
3.66
C Own fund requirements and the system of governance
3.67
3.68
3.69
VIII Conclusions
3.70
3.71
4 The Governance of Banks and the Requirement of Resolvability: Fundamental Change in Perspective?
Preliminary Material
I Introduction
4.01
II Complex Banks and a Global Financial Crisis
4.02
4.03
4.04
III The EU Banking Union
A Purpose and pillars
4.05
4.06
B CRD IV, BRRD, and SRMR
4.07
IV Resolvability
A The requirement
4.08
4.09
B An iterative process
4.10
C What is and what should be: mind the gap
4.11
V The Resolvable Bank: A Blue Print
4.12
A Structure and operations
4.13
4.14
4.15
B Financial resources
4.16
4.17
4.18
4.19
C Information
4.20
4.21
D Cross-border issues
4.22
4.23
4.24
E Other potential impediments
4.25
4.26
F The common thread: reducing complexity
4.27
VI Decision to Remove Impediments
A Process and decision
4.28
4.29
4.30
4.31
B Alignment of the SREP and resolvability assessment
4.32
4.33
VII The Transition to Being Resolvable
4.34
4.35
4.36
VIII Rethinking the Governance of Banks
4.37
4.38
4.39
4.40
4.41
IX Conclusion
4.42
5 Corporate Law Versus Financial Regulatory Rules: The Impact on Managing Directors and Shareholders of Banks
Preliminary Material
I Introduction
5.01
5.02
5.03
5.04
II Taking Stock: The Potential Tension between Corporate Law and Financial Regulatory Rules
A Introduction
5.05
B Types of tension
5.06
5.07
C The different nature of company law and financial regulatory rules
5.08
5.09
5.10
III Impact on the Board
A Variety in board models; appointment of board members
5.11
5.12
5.13
5.14
B Appointing directors
5.15
5.16
5.17
5.18
5.19
C Composition of the boards: diversity criteria
5.20
5.21
5.22
5.23
5.24
5.25
D Tasks and duties of directors
5.26
5.27
5.28
5.29
E Arrangements on remuneration
5.30
5.31
5.32
5.33
5.34
F Zooming in: the prevalence of the financial regulatory rules over company law
5.35
5.36
5.37
IV Impact on Shareholders
A Conditions for shareholdings in company law
5.38
B Approval of (candidate) shareholders in the banking sector
5.39
C Further conditions for shareholdings in a bank
5.40
5.41
D Redemption of capital, distributions
5.42
5.43
5.44
5.45
V Impact of the Single Rulebook on the Interpretation of Corporate Interest
A Shareholder-driven v stakeholder-driven
5.46
5.47
5.48
5.49
5.50
5.51
B The application of the rules on corporate interest to banks
5.52
5.53
5.54
5.55
VI Conclusions
5.56
5.57
5.58
5.59
Part II Governance Structures and Regulation
6 Non-Shareholder Voice in Bank Governance: Board Composition, Performance, and Liability
Preliminary Material
I Bank Governance and Corporate Governance
6.01
6.02
6.03
6.04
6.05
6.06
II Supervisory Approval of Bank Directors and Senior Managers
6.07
6.08
6.09
A The United Kingdom
6.10
6.11
6.12
6.13
6.14
B The Euro area
6.15
6.16
III Debt-Holders and Bank Governance
6.17
6.18
6.19
6.20
6.21
6.22
6.23
6.24
6.25
6.26
6.27
6.28
6.29
6.30
6.31
IV Composition of the Boards of Banks
6.32
A Indirect representation of the creditors’ interests in the board
6.33
6.34
6.35
6.36
B Direct representation of the creditors’ interests in the board
6.37
6.38
6.39
6.40
6.41
6.42
C Representation of the creditors’ interests in the board by bank regulators
6.43
6.44
6.45
D Board in bank groups
6.46
6.47
6.48
6.49
6.50
6.51
V Liability of Bank Directors and Other Key Function Holders
6.52
6.53
A Regulatory duties of care and loyalty
6.54
6.55
B Criminal responsibility of bank directors
6.56
6.57
6.58
6.59
C More severe civil liability of bank directors and key function holders
6.60
6.61
6.62
6.63
6.64
6.65
6.66
6.67
6.68
6.69
6.70
6.71
D Stricter enforcement by the board, by the creditors, and/or by regulators
6.72
6.73
6.74
6.75
6.76
6.77
6.78
6.79
7 Responsibility of Directors of Financial Institutions
Preliminary Material
I Introduction
7.01
7.02
II Analysis
A Duties generally applicable to directors of firms, including financial institutions
7.03
1 The scope of directors’ fiduciary duties
7.04
7.05
7.06
7.07
7.08
2 The substance of directors’ fiduciary duties.
7.09
7.10
7.11
Duty of care
7.12
7.13
7.14
7.15
7.16
7.17
7.18
7.19
Duty of loyalty
7.20
7.21
7.22
3 Enforcement mechanisms
7.23
7.24
7.25
7.26
B Duties specifically applicable to directors of financial institutions
7.27
1 Comparing the scope of fiduciary duties of directors of financial institutions
7.28
7.29
2 Comparing the substance of fiduciary duties of directors of financial institutions
7.30
Duty of care
7.31
7.32
7.33
7.34
7.35
7.36
7.37
Duty of loyalty
7.38
3 Comparing enforcement mechanisms
Regulatory enforcement
7.39
7.40
7.41
Criminal penalties
7.42
7.43
7.44
7.45
7.46
7.47
C Normative perspectives
7.48
7.49
7.50
7.51
7.52
7.53
7.54
7.55
III Conclusion
7.56
8 Fit and Proper Requirements in EU Financial Regulation: Towards More Cross-Sectoral Harmonization
Preliminary Material
I Introduction
8.01
II Scope and Definitions
A Scope
8.02
8.03
B Definitions
8.04
8.05
8.06
8.07
III The Impact of the Financial Crisis
8.08
8.09
8.10
IV Credit Institutions and Investment Firms
A MiFID I and CRD III
8.11
B EBA Guidelines 2012
8.12
8.13
C CRD IV
8.14
8.15
D MiFID II
8.16
E The Joint EBA and ESMA Guidelines 2017
8.17
8.18
8.19
8.20
8.21
V Cross-Sectoral Analysis
A General
8.22
B Differences in substantive requirements
1 Good repute and sufficient experience
8.23
2 Requirements for the collective
8.24
3 Sufficient time and independence of mind
8.25
4 Interpretation and guidance
8.26
8.27
8.28
8.29
8.30
C Differences in scope and definitions
1 Non-executive directors
8.31
8.32
2 Senior management and key function holders
Scope
8.33
Senior management
8.34
8.35
8.36
8.37
Key function holders
8.38
8.39
8.40
3 Members or shareholders with qualifying holdings
8.41
D Limited cross-sectoral convergence
8.42
8.43
8.44
8.45
VI The Dutch Cross-Sectoral Approach
A General
8.46
B Division of labour between AFM and DNB
8.47
C Fit and proper testing
8.48
D The Dutch Financial Supervision Act
8.49
E Fit and proper requirements
8.50
8.51
F A harmonized approach to fit and proper requirements and fit and proper testing
8.52
8.53
VII Recommendations
A General
8.54
B The lessons of the financial crisis
8.55
8.56
8.57
8.58
8.59
8.60
8.61
8.62
8.63
8.64
8.65
C A nuanced cross-sectoral approach
1 General
8.66
8.67
2 Good repute
8.68
8.69
3 Independence of mind
8.70
8.71
8.72
4 Sufficient knowledge, skills, and experience, both individually and collectively
8.73
8.74
8.75
8.76
5 Time commitment
8.77
6 Scope
8.78
8.79
8.80
7 Definitions
8.81
8.82
8.83
VIII Final Remark
8.84
9 Risk, Risk Management, and Internal Controls
Preliminary Material
I The Concept of ‘Risk’
9.01
9.02
9.03
9.04
9.05
II Risk Management is an Intrinsic Component of the Governance Design of a Firm
9.06
9.07
9.08
9.09
9.10
9.11
9.12
9.13
9.14
9.15
9.16
9.17
9.18
9.19
III Culture and Conduct Inform Risk Management
9.20
9.21
9.22
9.23
9.24
9.25
9.26
9.27
9.28
IV Risk Management is Part of the Internal Controls of a Firm
9.29
9.30
9.31
9.32
9.33
9.34
9.35
V The Risk Management and Internal Control Provisions of CRD IV
9.36
9.37
9.38
9.39
9.40
9.41
9.42
9.43
9.44
VI The Risk Management and Internal Control Provisions of MiFID II
9.45
9.46
9.47
9.48
9.49
9.50
VII Risk Management and Internal Controls in the UCITS Directive and AIFMD
9.51
9.52
9.53
9.54
9.55
VIII Specific Risk-Management Controls: Remuneration Policies
9.56
9.57
9.58
9.59
9.60
9.61
IX Concluding Remarks
9.62
10 Financial Market Infrastructures: The Essential Role of Risk Management
Preliminary Material
I Introduction
10.01
10.02
10.03
10.04
10.05
10.06
10.07
10.08
10.09
10.10
10.11
II FMIs and the Business of Managing Risk
10.12
10.13
10.14
10.15
10.16
10.17
10.18
10.19
III The Public Regulation of Risk Management: EMIR and CSDR and their Implementing Regulations
A The international context
10.20
10.21
10.22
10.23
B EMIR and the regulation of risk managements: CCPs and TRs
10.24
1 Systemic and macro-prudential risk management: the clearing and reporting mandate
10.25
10.26
10.27
2 Organizational and micro-prudential risk management: the internal governance of CCPs and TRs
10.28
10.29
10.30
10.31
10.32
10.33
3 Transactional and hybrid risk management: the business of managing risk
10.34
10.35
10.36
10.37
10.38
10.39
10.40
10.41
10.42
C An overview of the regulation of risk management in CSDs
10.43
10.44
IV The Challenges of Regulating Risk Management
10.45
10.46
10.47
A Regulatory capture of policymakers
10.48
10.49
B The costs of regulating risk management: distortion of economic incentives and moral hazard
10.50
10.51
10.52
10.53
10.54
10.55
10.56
V Conclusion
10.57
10.58
10.59
11 Compensation in Financial Institutions: Systemic Risk, Regulation, and Proportionality
Preliminary Material
I Introduction
11.01
II Grounds for Regulation
A Role of incentives in the crisis
11.02
11.03
11.04
11.05
11.06
B Policy issues
11.07
11.08
11.09
11.10
11.11
III International Principles and Standards
A The FSB principles and standards
11.12
11.13
11.14
11.15
11.16
B The choice between standards and rules
11.17
11.18
11.19
11.20
IV European Banking Regulation
11.21
A CRD IV
11.22
11.23
11.24
11.25
11.26
11.27
11.28
11.29
11.30
B The cap on variable remuneration
11.31
11.32
11.33
11.34
11.35
C Criticism of the cap
11.36
11.37
11.38
11.39
11.40
11.41
11.42
D Impact of the cap in practice
11.43
11.44
11.45
11.46
11.47
V EU Regulation of Insurers, Asset Managers, and Investment Undertakings
11.48
A Insurers
11.49
11.50
11.51
11.52
B Asset managers
11.53
11.54
11.55
11.56
C Investment firms
11.57
VI Ways to Improve EU Regulation
11.58
A Focusing on systemic risk
11.59
11.60
11.61
11.62
B Enhancing proportionality
11.63
11.64
11.65
11.66
11.67
11.68
11.69
12 Corporate Governance, Financial Information, and Mar
Preliminary Material
I Inside Information and Listed Banks: An Introduction
12.01
12.02
12.03
12.04
12.05
II A Snapshot of the MAR Regime for Inside Information
12.06
12.07
12.08
12.09
12.10
12.11
12.12
12.13
12.14
12.15
III Is Inside Information Relevant to Bank Governance?
12.16
12.17
12.18
12.19
12.20
12.21
12.22
12.23
12.24
12.25
12.26
12.27
IV Internal Information Flows
12.28
12.29
12.30
12.31
12.32
12.33
12.34
12.35
12.36
12.37
V Listed Banks and Their Subsidiaries and Associates
12.38
A Subsidiaries
12.39
12.40
12.41
12.42
12.43
12.44
B Associates
12.45
12.46
C Common directors
12.47
12.48
VI Listed Banks and Their Shareholders
12.49
12.50
12.51
12.52
12.53
12.54
12.55
12.56
12.57
12.58
12.59
12.60
VII Financial Reporting
12.61
12.62
12.63
12.64
12.65
12.66
VIII Conclusion
12.67
12.68
Part III Ownership Structures
13 Engagement of Institutional Investors
Preliminary Material
I Financial Institutions and Investor Activism
13.01
13.02
13.03
13.04
13.05
13.06
13.07
13.08
13.09
13.10
13.11
13.12
II Active Ownership
A The role of shareholders
13.13
13.14
13.15
13.16
13.17
B Active investors
13.18
13.19
13.20
13.21
13.22
III Stewardship Principles
A Premises for stewardship
13.23
13.24
13.25
13.26
13.27
B Stewardship codes and principles
13.28
13.29
13.30
13.31
13.32
13.33
13.34
C Sustainable and responsible investment (SRI)
13.35
13.36
13.37
13.38
13.39
13.40
13.41
13.42
13.43
13.44
IV Engagement and Voting
A Engagement—a rising trend
13.45
13.46
13.47
13.48
13.49
13.50
13.51
13.52
B Individual and collective engagement
13.53
13.54
13.55
C Board—investor engagement
13.56
13.57
13.58
D Board elections—a form of engagement
13.59
13.60
13.61
13.62
13.63
13.64
V Exercise of Voting Rights
13.65
13.66
13.67
13.68
13.69
VI Conclusions
13.70
13.71
13.72
14 State-Owned Financial Institutions
Preliminary Material
I Introduction
14.01
14.02
14.03
14.04
14.05
II A Theoretical Case for State-Owned Institutions
14.06
A Possible rationales
1 The shareholder perspective
14.07
14.08
14.09
14.10
14.11
14.12
2 The debtholder perspective
14.13
14.14
14.15
14.16
14.17
3 The state’s perspective
14.18
14.19
14.20
14.21
14.22
14.23
4 Triangular relationships around management
14.24
14.25
14.26
5 State-ownership as an appropriate mitigant?
14.27
14.28
14.29
6 Challenges of state-ownership of banks
14.30
14.31
14.32
14.33
14.34
14.35
14.36
III State-Owned Institutions: The Practical Challenges
14.37
A The United States
14.38
14.39
14.40
1 Government-sponsored enterprises
14.41
14.42
14.43
14.44
14.45
14.46
14.47
14.48
14.49
14.50
14.51
2 Export-import bank
14.52
14.53
14.54
14.55
14.56
14.57
14.58
14.59
14.60
B Germany
1 The three pillars of the German banking system
14.61
2 First pillar: commercial credit and private banks
14.62
3 Second pillar: savings banks and Landesbanken
14.63
4 Third pillar: cooperative bank
14.64
5 Market Shares
14.65
14.66
6 Development banks, especially KfW
14.67
7 Overall assessment
14.68
Allocative efficiency
14.69
14.70
Systemic stability
14.71
KfW
14.72
IV Alternative Legal Paths to the Same Policy Goals?
14.73
A The German perspective
14.74
14.75
14.76
14.77
14.78
14.79
B The US perspective
1 Performance-based standards
14.80
14.81
14.82
2 Flexible mandates to ‘have regard’
14.83
14.84
14.85
15 Cooperative Banking—A Dutch Experience
Preliminary Material
I Introduction
15.01
15.02
15.03
15.04
II A Short History of Cooperative Banking
A The emergence of cooperatives in Europe
15.05
15.06
15.07
15.08
B The Rochdale Principles of Co-operation
15.09
15.10
C The Raiffeissen Principles
15.11
15.12
III A Short History of Cooperative Banking in the Netherlands: Rabobank
15.13
15.14
15.15
15.16
15.17
15.18
15.19
15.20
IV Main Characteristics of Dutch Cooperative Law
A General
15.21
15.22
B Members
15.23
15.24
15.25
15.26
15.27
C Governance models
15.28
15.29
15.30
V Specific Features of Cooperatives: Assets or Risks?
A Members, no shareholders
15.31
15.32
15.33
15.34
15.35
B No shares, no listing
15.36
15.37
C Corporate governance
15.38
15.39
VI Rabobank Corporate Governance and Finance Structure—The Recent Past
A General
15.40
B Governance in and supervision over local Rabobanks
15.41
15.42
15.43
C Governance in Rabobank
15.44
D Events driven change
15.45
15.46
E Preliminary discussion for a new governance
15.47
15.48
15.49
15.50
15.51
VII Rabobank Corporate Governance Structure—The Present
A Group structure
15.52
B Rabobank—general
15.53
C Rabobank—Executive board and mandates for local banks
15.54
D Member influence within Rabobank
15.55
15.56
15.57
15.58
15.59
15.60
15.61
15.62
15.63
E Business of local banks
15.64
15.65
15.66
F Employee Influence within the Group
15.67
VIII Regulatory Framework
15.68
15.69
IX Summary
15.70
15.71
15.72
15.73
15.74
15.75
Part IV Conduct and Culture
16 Corporate Culture in the Governance of Financial Institutions: An Interdisciplinary Approach
Preliminary Material
I Financial Institutions and Culture
A Introduction
16.01
16.02
16.03
16.04
16.05
16.06
B A new approach to financial reform
16.07
16.08
16.09
16.10
16.11
C Culture and morals
16.12
16.13
16.14
16.15
16.16
II The Notion of Culture
A Defining culture
16.17
16.18
16.19
16.20
16.21
B Diagnosing culture
16.22
16.23
16.24
16.25
16.26
III Governing Corporate Culture: (A) Leadership
16.27
16.28
A Tone at the top
16.29
16.30
16.31
16.32
16.33
16.34
16.35
B The ethical leader
16.36
16.37
16.38
16.39
16.40
16.41
IV Governing Corporate Culture: (B) Managerial Incentives
A Traditional theories
16.42
16.43
16.44
16.45
16.46
B A broader perspective
16.47
16.48
16.49
16.50
16.51
16.52
V Governing Corporate Culture: (C) Codes of Conduct
A A global practice
16.53
16.54
16.55
16.56
B The limited effectiveness of codes of conduct
16.57
16.58
16.59
16.60
VI Cognitive Framing and Group Dynamics
A Not just ‘bad apples’
16.61
16.62
16.63
16.64
B Decision-making in the boardroom
16.65
16.66
VII Concluding Remarks
16.67
16.68
16.69
17 Public Supervision of Behaviour and Culture at Financial Institutions
Preliminary Material
I Introduction
17.01
17.02
17.03
17.04
II Development of the Supervision of Behaviour and Culture
17.05
17.06
17.07
17.08
17.09
17.10
III What is the Supervision of Behaviour and Culture?
A General overview
17.11
17.12
17.13
1 Leadership
17.14
17.15
17.16
2 Decision making
17.17
17.18
17.19
17.20
3 Reflective learning
17.21
4 The impact of contextual factors on (individual or group) behaviour
17.22
17.23
17.24
17.25
17.26
B Findings and effects of the supervision of behaviour and culture
1 Examples of assessment findings
17.27
2 Effects of supervision of behaviour and culture
17.28
17.29
C How is the supervision of behaviour and culture performed?
17.30
D Legal concepts that are relevant for the supervision of behaviour and culture
17.31
17.32
17.33
17.34
E Recent and future developments
1 Recent developments
17.35
17.36
17.37
17.38
3 Future developments
17.39
17.40
17.41
17.42
17.43
F Summary and conclusion
17.44
18 The Dutch Banker’s Oath and the Dutch Banking Disciplinary Committee
Preliminary Material
I Introduction
18.01
18.02
18.03
18.04
II The Dutch Banker’s Oath
18.05
18.06
18.07
18.08
18.09
III The Dutch Banking Disciplinary Committee: Actors, Procedures, and Sanctions
18.10
18.11
18.12
18.13
18.14
18.15
18.16
18.17
18.18
18.19
18.20
18.21
IV Right to a Fair Trial
18.22
18.23
18.24
18.25
18.26
18.27
18.28
18.29
18.30
18.31
18.32
18.33
18.34
18.35
18.36
V Independence and Impartiality of the Tribunal
18.37
18.38
18.39
18.40
18.41
18.42
18.43
18.44
18.45
VI Anonymizing Files by Notifying Banks
18.46
18.47
18.48
18.49
18.50
18.51
VII Demarcation of the Bank’s Acts, Professional Acts, and Private Acts
18.52
18.53
18.54
18.55
18.56
18.57
18.58
18.59
VIII Conflicting Interests of the Notifying Bank
18.60
18.61
18.62
18.63
18.64
IX Deviation from Internal Policies
18.65
18.66
18.67
18.68
18.69
X Transparency
18.70
18.71
18.72
18.73
18.74
18.75
18.76
XI Evaluation
18.77
18.78
18.79
18.80
18.81
18.82
18.83
18.84
18.85
18.86
19 Managing Conduct Risk: From Rules to Culture
Preliminary Material
I Introduction
19.01
19.02
19.03
19.04
19.05
19.06
19.07
19.08
II Examples of Misconduct and Analysis of the Related Costs
19.09
19.10
19.11
19.12
19.13
19.14
19.15
19.16
19.17
III Definitional Issues Related to ‘Conduct Risk’
19.18
19.19
19.20
A The definition of ‘conduct risk’ according to the FSB
19.21
B The definition of ‘conduct risk’ according to supervisory authorities
19.22
19.23
19.24
19.25
19.26
19.27
19.28
C The definition of ‘conduct risk’ within the Banking Union context—EBA
19.29
D The definition of ‘conduct risk’ within the Banking Union context—ESRB
19.30
IV Conduct Risk: Between the ‘Conduct Perspective’ and the ‘Prudential Perspective’
19.31
A The conduct perspective
19.32
19.33
B The prudential perspective
19.34
19.35
19.36
19.37
V A New Approach: From Rules to Culture
19.38
19.39
19.40
19.41
19.42
19.43
19.44
19.45
19.46
19.47
20 Conflicts of Interest: Comparing Compliance and Culture in the United States and the United Kingdom
Preliminary Material
I Introduction
20.01
20.02
20.03
20.04
20.05
II Protecting the Retail Investor: The Legal Framework
20.06
20.07
20.08
A Fiduciary duties as financial regulation
20.09
20.10
20.11
20.12
20.13
20.14
B Developments in fiduciary duty law
20.15
20.16
20.17
20.18
20.19
20.20
20.21
20.22
20.23
20.24
20.25
20.26
20.27
20.28
20.29
20.30
20.31
III Navigating the Conflicts of Interest Ahead
20.32
20.33
20.34
A Retail conflicts on the horizon
20.35
1 Mega firms: allocating investment opportunity
20.36
20.37
20.38
2 Robo-advisers: evaluating best interests
20.39
20.40
20.41
20.42
20.43
20.44
20.45
3 Fragmentation and competition among advisers
20.46
20.47
4 The rise of passive funds
20.48
20.49
20.50
20.51
5 Perceived professional norms and disclosure of conflicts of interest
20.52
20.53
20.54
B Bringing culture into compliance
1 Existing law on compliance
20.55
20.56
20.57
20.58
2 Regulation and supervision of compliance
20.59
20.60
20.61
20.62
20.63
20.64
20.65
20.66
20.67
IV Building Cultural Infrastructure Around Legal Frameworks
20.68
20.69
A Conflicts modelling
20.70
20.71
B Pioneering industry standards
20.72
20.73
20.74
20.75
C Proxies for personal liability
20.76
20.77
20.78
20.79
V Conclusion
20.80
21 The Venetian Banks’ Collapse
Preliminary Material
I Introduction
21.01
21.02
21.03
21.04
21.05
21.06
21.07
II The Collapse of Banca Popolare di Vicenza
A A short introduction on the legal framework
21.08
21.09
B BPVI’s short history: from birth to Zonin
21.10
21.11
21.12
C From apparent success to the crisis
1 BPVI is among the top 120 European banks
21.13
21.14
21.15
2 The capital increases of 2013 and 2014
21.16
21.17
21.18
3 The issue price and how it was assessed
21.19
21.20
21.21
4 The ECB spots some issues that deserve more investigation
21.22
21.23
21.24
5 The 2014 financial statements—an exercise in disguise
21.25
21.26
6 A bold board defends the bank’s honour
21.27
21.28
7 April 2015: the share price is lowered and BPVI starts sliding towards collapse
21.29
21.30
21.31
8 The mandatory transformation into a public company and the need to raise 1.4 billion euros
21.32
21.33
21.34
21.35
9 The IPO failure and the fall into insolvency
21.36
21.37
21.38
D Veneto Banca (VB)
21.39
21.40
III Public Enforcement
A Sanctioning decisions
1 Competition law authority fine for aggressive selling practices
21.41
21.42
2 Bank of Italy and the ECB sanctioning decisions
21.43
21.44
3 The securities watchdog’s decisions
21.45
21.46
21.47
21.48
21.49
B General assessment on the quality of public enforcement
21.50
21.51
IV Red Flags
A Domination by a single individual
21.52
21.53
B The problems of the cooperative structure
21.54
21.55
21.56
21.57
C Massive growth
21.58
D Excessively easy access to capital
21.59
1 Bundling lending services and shares sale
21.60
2 Prospectus ambiguity
21.61
3 Control of the secondary market in the banks’ financial instruments
21.62
4 Investors’ nature and financial illiteracy
21.63
21.64
E Massive elusion of MiFID rules
21.65
21.66
21.67
21.68
21.69
21.70
V Would MiFID II Have Prevented the Disaster?
21.71
21.72
21.73
21.74
22 The Spanish Banking Crisis as a Corporate Governance Problem
Preliminary Material
I Introduction
22.01
22.02
22.03
22.04
22.05
22.06
22.07
22.08
II The Cajas de Ahorros
22.09
22.10
22.11
22.12
22.13
22.14
22.15
22.16
III Recapitalization Efforts
22.17
22.18
22.19
22.20
22.21
22.22
22.23
22.24
22.25
22.26
IV The Bankia Case: The Bank that Broke Spain
22.27
22.28
22.29
22.30
22.31
22.32
22.33
V The Unhappy Ending
22.34
22.35
22.36
22.37
22.38
22.39
22.40
VI Conclusions
22.41
22.42
22.43
23 Banco Espírito Santo: Anatomy of a Banking Scandal in Portugal
Preliminary Material
I From Cradle to Grave: 150 Years of Banking History
23.01
A The origins
23.02
23.03
B The growth
23.04
23.05
23.06
23.07
C The downfall
23.08
23.09
23.10
D The funeral
23.11
23.12
II The BES’s Autopsy: On the Causes of Death
23.13
A The usual suspect: the global financial crisis
23.14
23.15
B The supervisory prop: ‘laissez-faire’ and other stories
23.16
23.17
C The explosive blend: banking and commerce
23.18
23.19
D The War of the Roses: the race for succession
23.20
23.21
E At the Penthouse: unethical leadership
23.22
23.23
23.24
III Epitaph
23.25
23.26
24 Governance Problems in Dutch Financial Institutions from 2007 to 2017
Preliminary Material
I Introduction
24.01
24.02
24.03
24.04
II The Case of DSB Bank
A Origins and structure of DSB Bank
24.05
24.06
24.07
B Governance at DSB Bank
24.08
24.09
24.10
24.11
C Culture at DSB Bank
24.12
D DSB’s downfall
24.13
E Subsequent developments
24.14
III Reflections on Governance and Supervision in the DSB Case
A Special features of bank governance
24.15
B DSB’s flawed governance: an inadequate board and the presence of a controlling shareholder
24.16
24.17
24.18
24.19
24.20
C Supervision on culture and governance
24.21
24.22
24.23
24.24
24.25
24.26
IV Legislative and Policy Changes after DSB
24.27
24.28
24.29
24.30
V EU Rules and the DSB Case
24.31
24.32
24.33
24.34
VI Main Lessons from the Netherlands
24.35
Further Material
Index
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Table of Cases
Edited By: Danny Busch, Guido Ferrarini, Gerard Van Solinge
From:
Governance of Financial Institutions
Edited By: Danny Busch, Guido Ferrarini, Gerard van Solinge
Content type:
Book content
Product:
Financial Law [FBL]
Series:
Published in print:
31 January 2019
ISBN:
9780198799979
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