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- Preliminary Material
- Main Text
- Part I General Aspects
- 1 Who’s Afraid of MiFID II?: An Introduction
- Preliminary Material
- I Introduction
- II Investment Firms and Investment Services
- III Trading
- 1 Governance and Organization of Trading Venues
- 2 The New Transparency Regime for Trading
- 3 SME Growth Markets
- 4 Dark Pools
- 5 Derivatives Trading and the New Mandatory Trading Obligation
- 6 Commodity Derivatives
- 7 Algorithmic Trading and High-Frequency Trading
- 8 MiFID II and Equity Trading Regulation: a US Perspective
- IV Supervision and Enforcement
- V The Broader View and the Future of MiFID
- VI Final Remarks
- 1 Who’s Afraid of MiFID II?: An Introduction
- Part II Investment Firms and Investment Services
- 2 The Scope of MiFID II
- Preliminary Material
- I Introduction
- II Investment Firms under MiFID II
- III Credit Institutions
- IV Investment Firms under the CRR
- V Structured Deposits
- VI General Exemptions to MiFID II Applicability
- VII Trading on Own Account
- VIII Dealings in Emission Allowances
- IX Financial Instruments
- X Insurance Companies and Insurance Intermediaries
- XI Managers of Collective Investment Undertakings
- XII Data-Reporting Service Providers
- XIII Market Operators
- XIV Conclusion
- 3 Governance of Investment Firms Under MiFID II
- Preliminary Material
- I Introduction
- II Governance-related Regulation of Investment Firms between Prudential and Conduct-of-Business Regulation
- III The Technical Framework under MiFID II
- 1 General Principles and Problems
- 2 The Board
- 3 Organization and Risk Management
- 4 Shareholders and Owners with Qualifying Holdings
- 5 Governance Reporting
- 6 Assessment
- A Systemic Stability Concerns versus Investor Protection: A Reappraisal of Policy Rationales
- B Principles-Based Regulation versus Ever Tighter Rules: Some Observations on Regulatory Strategy
- C Technical Inconsistencies with Company and Partnership Law
- D Impediments to Effective Enforcement: The Public–Private Dichotomy
- IV Conclusions
- 4 The Overarching Duty to Act in the Best Interest of the Client in MiFID II
- Preliminary Material
- I Introduction
- II Antecedents of the Investment Firm’s Duty to Act in the Best Interest of the Client
- III The Duty to Act in the Best Interest of the Client in MiFID II
- IV The Duty’s Functions and Contents
- V The Articulation of the Duty with Respect to Individual Services and Activities
- VI A Look Across the Atlantic
- VII Assessment
- 5 Product Governance and Product Intervention under MiFID II/MiFIR
- Preliminary Material
- I Introduction
- II Product Governance
- 1 Scope
- 2 Manufacturers and Distributors
- 3 Three Perspectives
- 5.11
- A Corporate Governance
- B Investor Protection
- C Organizational Requirements
- III Product Intervention
- IV Conclusion
- 6 Independent Financial Advice
- 7 Conflicts of Interest
- Preliminary Material
- I Foundations of the Regime
- II The Regime by Single Stages and Examples
- 7.31
- 1 Organizational Requirements Minimizing Conflicts of Interest
- 2 Conflicts of Interest in the Formation of Investment Services Contracts
- 3 In Particular: Conflicts of Interest and the Regime on Fees
- 4 Conflicts of Interest in the Execution of Investment Services Contracts (‘Best Execution’)
- 5 Conflicts of Interest in the Case of Linked Contracts
- 6 New Strategies: the Future of the Regulation of Conflicts of Interest
- III Conclusion
- 8 Inducements
- 9 Agency and Principal Dealing under MiFID I and MiFID II
- Preliminary Material
- I Introduction
- II Four Transaction Types
- III Investor Protection
- IV Acting as Agent or as Principal: Not a Justified Distinction to Serve as a Basis for Determining the Degree of Investor Protection
- 1 General
- 2 Investors’ Reasonable Expectations
- 3 Tenuous, Arbitrary, and Easy to Manipulate
- 4 Grant Estates Ltd v Royal Bank of Scotland
- 5 No Practicable Distinction under MiFID II either
- 6 Dutch Supreme Court has Already Extended Civil Duty of Care to Dealing on own Account
- 7 The UK Government Response to the Kay Review
- V Conclusion
- 10 MiFID II/MiFIR’s Regime for Third-Country Firms
- Preliminary Material
- I General
- II Scope of MiFID II/MiFIR’s Regime for Third-Country Firms
- III Eligible Counterparties and Per Se Professional Clients
- IV Retail Clients and Opt Up Professional Clients
- V Retail Clients, Professional Clients and Eligible Counterparties
- VI Initiative Test
- VII Conclusion
- 2 The Scope of MiFID II
- Part III Trading
- 11 Governance and Organization of Trading Venues: The Role of Financial Market Infrastructure Groups
- Preliminary Material
- I Introduction
- II Trading Facilities: Concept and Regulatory Framework
- III The EU Scenario of Trading Venues
- IV FMI Groups in an MiFID II World
- V Conclusion
- 12 EU Financial Governance and Transparency Regulation: A Test for the Effectiveness of Post-Crisis Administrative Governance
- 13 SME Growth Markets
- 14 Dark Trading Under MiFID II
- Preliminary Material
- I Introduction
- II Dark Pools: Motivation, Classification, and Related Literature
- III Dark Pools under MiFID I
- IV Dark Pool Regulation under MiFID II/MiFIR
- V Summary
- 15 Derivatives: Trading, Clearing, Stp, Indirect Clearing, and Portfolio Compression
- Preliminary Material
- I Introduction
- II The Trading Obligation
- III The Clearing Obligation
- IV The Straight-Through-Processing Obligations
- V The Obligations in Respect of Indirect Clearing
- VI The Obligations in Respect of Portfolio Compression
- VII A Few Final Remarks
- 16 Commodity Derivatives
- Preliminary Material
- I Introduction
- II Features of the Commodity Derivatives Markets and Its Relation to the Crisis
- III Overview of the Most Important EU Provisions on Commodity Derivatives
- IV The Regulatory Perimeter of the MiFID II/MiFIR Package
- V The New Position Limits Regime
- VI A New Set of Intervention Powers for Authorities and Trading Venues
- VII Conclusion
- 17 Algorithmic Trading and High-Frequency Trading (HFT)
- 18 MiFID II and Equity Trading: A US View
- Preliminary Material
- 18.01
- 18.02
- 18.03
- I Basic Building Blocks
- 18.04
- 18.05
- 1 The Economics of Liquidity Provision
- 2 The Evaluative Framework
- II High-Frequency Trading
- III Dark Pools and Internalization
- IV Conclusions: Reflections on Issues Raised by MiFID II
- 11 Governance and Organization of Trading Venues: The Role of Financial Market Infrastructure Groups
- Part IV Supervision and Enforcement
- 19 Public Enforcement of MiFID II
- Preliminary Material
- I Introductory Remarks
- II Structure of the Study
- III Competent Authorities: General Aspects, Powers, and Redress Procedures
- 1 General Aspects
- 2 Supervisory Powers
- 3 Power to Impose Administrative Sanctions and Measures as well as Criminal Sanctions
- A General Provisions
- B Exercise of the Power to Impose Administrative Sanctions and Measures
- C Publication of Decisions Imposing Administrative Sanctions and Measures as well as Criminal Sanctions
- i General Provisions
- ii Notification and Reporting Requirements
- 4 Redress Procedures
- IV Cooperation Arrangements
- 1 Cooperation between the Member States’ Competent Authorities
- 2 Powers of Host Member States’ Competent Authorities
- 3 Cooperation with Third Countries
- V Concluding Remarks and Assessment
- 20 The Private Law Effect of MiFID I and MiFID II: The Genil Case and Beyond
- Preliminary Material
- I General
- II May Civil Courts Be Less Strict Than MiFID I and MiFID II?
- III May Civil Courts Be Stricter Than MiFID I and MiFID II?
- IV May Contracting Parties Be Less Strict Than MiFID I and MiFID II?
- V May Contracting Parties Be Stricter Than MiFID I and MiFID II?
- VI Influence of MiFID I and MiFID II on the Principle of Relativity
- VII Influence of MiFID I and MiFID II on Proof of Causation
- VIII Influence of MiFID I and MiFID II on a Contractual Limitation or Exclusion of Liability
- IX MiFID I and MiFID II Assessments by the Courts of Their Own Motion in Relation to Private Investors?
- X Conclusion
- 19 Public Enforcement of MiFID II
- Part V The Broader View and the Future of MiFID
- 21 MiFID II In Relation to Other Investor Protection Regulation: Picking Up The Crumbs of a Piecemeal Approach
- Preliminary Material
- I Introduction
- II MiFID II versus IDD
- III MiFID II and IDD versus UCITS KII and PRIIPs KID
- IV Cross-Selling Practices
- V Conclusion
- 22 Shadow Banking and the Functioning of Financial Markets
- Preliminary Material
- I Introduction
- II Shadow Banking: Concept and Terminology
- III Non-Regulated Activity According to the FSB Approach
- IV What Financial Activity is not Subject to Banking Supervision?
- V The European Response to Shadow Banking
- VI Conclusion
- 23 Investment-Based Crowdfunding: Is MiFID II Enough?
- 21 MiFID II In Relation to Other Investor Protection Regulation: Picking Up The Crumbs of a Piecemeal Approach
- Part I General Aspects
- Further Material
- [3.236.70.233]
- 3.236.70.233
