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Oxford Law Citator
Contents
Expand All
Collapse All
Preliminary Material
Foreword
Preface
Contents
Table of Cases
United Kingdom
Australia
Canada
Germany
Hong Kong
Japan
Netherlands
United States
Regional Jurisdictions
Table of Legislation
United Kingdom
Statutory Instruments
European Union
Directives
Regulations
France
Germany
Japan
Netherlands
United States
International Instruments
Industry Materials
Other Sources
List of Contributors
Main Text
Part I United States
1 The Rise and Fall of Lehman Brothers
I Introduction
1.01
1.02
1.03
1.04
II The Examiner’s Appointment
1.05
1.06
1.07
1.08
A Document collection and review
1.09
1.10
B Witness interview process
1.11
1.12
1.13
1.14
III A Brief History
1.15
1.16
1.17
1.18
1.19
1.20
1.21
1.22
1.23
1.24
1.25
1.26
1.27
IV Why Did Lehman Fail?
1.28
1.29
A Lehman adopts a more aggressive business model
1.30
1.31
1.32
1.33
B With more aggressive growth came more risk
1.34
1.35
1.36
1.37
1.38
1.39
1.40
1.41
1.42
1.43
1.44
1.45
C Repo 105
1.46
1.47
1.48
1.49
1.50
1.51
1.52
D Where were the regulators?
1.53
1.54
1.55
1.56
1.57
1.58
1.59
1.60
1.61
1.62
1.63
1.64
1.65
1.66
1.67
E Lehman weekend
1.68
1.69
1.70
1.71
1.72
1.73
1.74
1.75
1.76
1.77
1.78
1.79
1.80
1.81
1.82
1.83
2 The Liquidation of Lehman Brothers Inc, the New York Brokerage of the Lehman Global Enterprise
2.01
2.02
2.03
I Overview of a SIPA Liquidation and its Purposes
2.04
2.05
2.06
2.07
2.08
A SIPA’s enactment in 1970
2.09
B Significant SIPA amendments
2.10
2.11
2.12
2.13
2.14
C Pre-liquidation regulatory regime
2.15
2.16
II LBI’s Historical Background and the Story of its Collapse
2.17
2.18
2.19
2.20
2.21
2.22
2.23
2.24
2.25
2.26
2.27
2.28
III Key Aspects of the LBI Liquidation
2.29
A The emergency sale to Barclays
2.30
2.31
2.32
2.33
2.34
B The control of information and records
2.35
2.36
2.37
2.38
2.39
C Account transfers
2.40
2.41
2.42
2.43
2.44
2.45
D The PIK note transfer
2.46
E Atomization of foreign affiliates with different regulatory regimes
2.47
1 Intercompany claims among LBI and LBIE
2.48
2.49
2.50
2.51
2 Intercompany claims among LBI and LBHI
2.52
2.53
F The general estate—LBI’s role as a major counterparty in markets for derivatives and other complex financial products
2.54
2.55
2.56
2.57
2.58
IV Litigation over the Status of Claims by LBI’s Counterparties to Complex Financial Instruments
2.59
A The TBA litigation
2.60
2.61
B The repo litigation
2.62
2.63
2.64
V Reflections on the LBI Liquidation and Post-LBI Reforms
2.65
2.66
2.67
2.68
3 Lehman’s Derivative Portfolio: A Chapter 11 Perspective
3.01
3.02
3.03
3.04
3.05
3.06
3.07
3.08
3.09
3.10
I ISDA Master Agreements and Netting
3.11
3.12
3.13
3.14
3.15
II The Safe Harbours
3.16
3.17
3.18
3.19
3.20
3.21
3.22
3.23
3.24
3.25
3.26
III Lehman’s Derivatives
3.27
3.28
3.29
3.30
3.31
3.32
3.33
3.34
3.35
3.36
IV Close-Out Netting and Value Destruction in Chapter 11
3.37
3.38
3.39
3.40
3.41
3.42
3.43
3.44
3.45
3.46
3.47
3.48
3.49
3.50
3.51
3.52
3.53
3.54
3.55
3.56
3.57
3.58
3.59
3.60
3.61
3.62
3.63
3.64
V Close-Out Netting, Clearinghouses, and OLA
3.65
3.66
3.67
3.68
3.69
3.70
3.71
3.72
3.73
3.74
3.75
3.76
3.77
3.78
3.79
3.80
3.81
3.82
VI Systemic and Societal Considerations
3.83
3.84
3.85
3.86
3.87
3.88
4 Lessons from Lehman: Forcing A Settlement of Substantive Consolidation
I Introduction
4.01
4.02
4.03
4.04
II Substantive Consolidation, Generally
4.05
4.06
4.07
4.08
4.09
4.10
4.11
4.12
4.13
4.14
4.15
4.16
4.17
4.18
4.19
4.20
4.21
III Substantive Consolidation in Lehman
4.22
4.23
4.24
4.25
4.26
4.27
4.28
4.29
4.30
IV Settlements and Unfair Discrimination
4.31
4.32
4.33
4.34
4.35
4.36
4.37
4.38
4.39
4.40
4.41
4.42
4.43
4.44
4.45
4.46
4.47
4.48
4.49
4.50
4.51
V Lessons from Lehman
4.52
4.53
4.54
4.55
4.56
4.57
4.58
5 Lehman Brothers and Equitable Subordination in Cross-Border Proceedings
5.01
5.02
5.03
5.04
5.05
5.06
5.07
5.08
5.09
I The Enron Standard
5.10
5.11
5.12
5.13
5.14
5.15
5.16
5.17
5.18
5.19
5.20
5.21
II Lehman Brothers and the Enron Standard in the US Context
5.22
5.23
5.24
5.25
5.26
5.27
III Lehman Brothers and the Enron Standard in the Cross-Border Context
5.28
5.29
5.30
5.31
5.32
5.33
5.34
5.35
IV The Consequences of Lehman for Equitable Subordination in Cross-Border Proceedings
5.36
5.37
5.38
5.39
5.40
5.41
5.42
5.43
Part II United Kingdom
6 How Has English Law Coped with the Lehman Collapse?
6.01
6.02
6.03
6.04
6.05
6.06
I The Common Law
6.07
6.08
6.09
6.10
6.11
6.12
6.13
6.14
6.15
6.16
6.17
6.18
6.19
6.20
II Statute and Regulation
6.21
6.22
6.23
6.24
6.25
6.26
6.27
6.28
6.29
6.30
6.31
III The ISDA Contract
6.32
6.33
6.34
A Section 2(a)(iii)
6.35
6.36
6.37
6.38
6.39
B Valuation on close-out
6.40
6.41
6.42
IV Anti-Deprivation
6.43
6.44
6.45
6.46
V Cross-Border Issues
6.47
6.48
6.49
6.50
VI Practice and Procedure
6.51
6.52
6.53
6.54
6.55
6.56
6.57
6.58
6.59
6.60
6.61
6.62
6.63
6.64
6.65
6.66
6.67
7 Extended Liens
7.01
7.02
7.03
7.04
7.05
I Nature and Purpose of Extended Liens
7.06
7.07
7.08
7.09
II Conceptual Impossibility
7.10
7.11
7.12
7.13
III Defining a Charge
7.14
7.15
7.16
7.17
7.18
7.19
7.20
7.21
IV Questions Arising
7.22
7.23
V Indivisibility
7.24
7.25
7.26
7.27
7.28
7.29
7.30
7.31
7.32
VI The Consequences of Repayment of C by B
7.33
7.34
7.35
VII The Consequences of Enforcement by A
7.36
7.37
7.38
7.39
7.40
7.41
7.42
7.43
7.44
VIII Can A Extract a Price from C?
7.45
7.46
7.47
7.48
7.49
IX The Treatment of an Extended Lien in B’s Insolvency
7.50
7.51
7.52
7.53
X FSC v Lemma Europe Insurance Company Limited
7.54
7.55
XI Conclusions
7.56
8 The Management and Distribution of LBIE’s Client Assets
I Factual Background and the Legal Issues They Raised
8.01
A Why did LBIE hold client assets?
8.02
8.03
8.04
8.05
B Two estates in one administration: The trust estate
8.06
8.07
8.08
8.09
C Trust law is the basic law for dealing with client assets
8.10
8.11
8.12
8.13
8.14
D Trust property could be used to satisfy liabilities to the house
8.15
8.16
8.17
E Trust property could be rehypothecated
8.18
8.19
8.20
8.21
F Trust property needed to be recovered and was often held in mixed omnibus accounts
8.22
G The insolvency was sudden and there were many unsettled or failed trades
8.23
H Other people including affiliates had proprietary claims and wanted to be treated as customers too
8.24
I Many assets were held at LBI
8.25
8.26
J How could claims be finalized?
8.27
K Information was incomplete and unreliable
8.28
8.29
II Managing Both the Trust and the House Estate Side-By-Side
8.30
8.31
8.32
8.33
8.34
8.35
8.36
8.37
III Solving the Legal Questions
8.38
8.39
8.40
8.41
8.42
8.43
IV The Scheme of Arrangement
8.44
8.45
8.46
V The CRA
8.47
8.48
8.49
8.50
8.51
8.52
8.53
8.54
8.55
8.56
8.57
8.58
8.59
8.60
8.61
8.62
8.63
VI What Was the Problem with Client Money?
8.64
8.65
8.66
8.67
8.68
VII What Were the Issues with the US Assets?
8.69
8.70
8.71
8.72
8.73
8.74
8.75
VIII The Resolution of the LBI Client Asset Claim
8.76
8.77
8.78
8.79
8.80
8.81
8.82
8.83
8.84
8.85
IX Affiliate Claims: Was LBIE a Trustee for its Affiliates?
8.86
8.87
8.88
8.89
8.90
8.91
X The Aftermath: Reform and the SAR
8.92
8.93
8.94
8.95
8.96
8.97
8.98
8.99
8.100
9 Lessons of LBIE: Reuse and Rehypothecation
I Introduction
9.01
9.02
II Nature of Reuse of Securities Collateral
9.03
A Economic nature
9.04
9.05
9.06
9.07
B Legal nature and terminology
9.08
1 Security interest plus rehypothecation
9.09
9.10
9.11
2 Title transfer collateral arrangement
9.12
(a) Outright transfer
9.13
(b) Equivalent redelivery
9.14
9.15
(c) Close-out on default
9.16
(d) Facilitates reuse
9.17
(e) Recognition
9.18
3 Terminology
9.19
III Prime Broker Rehypothecation
9.20
A Overview
9.21
9.22
B The deal and hypo limits
9.23
9.24
9.25
9.26
9.27
C Legal position
9.28
1 Prior to rehypothecation
9.29
9.30
2 Upon rehypothecation
9.31
3 Closing the rehypothecation
9.32
9.33
9.34
4 Impact on prime broker’s charge
9.35
(a) Charged asset during rehypothecation
9.36
9.37
(b) The charged asset after rehypothecation closed
9.38
9.39
9.40
D Operational aspects of rehypothecation
9.41
9.42
1 Credit house
9.43
2 Omni account
9.44
9.45
3 Allocation to client
9.46
9.47
4 Client account and client securities balances
9.48
9.49
5 Notice to client
9.50
6 Client balance not amended
9.51
9.52
E Inadvertent rehypothecation
9.53
1 Intraday settlement related shortfalls
9.54
9.55
9.56
9.57
9.58
9.59
2 Settlement into house
9.60
3 Contractual settlement and failed settlement
9.61
(a) Practice of contractual settlement
9.62
(b) Status of contractual settlement credit
9.63
4 Inadvertent breach of hypo limit: sudden deleveraging
9.64
9.65
IV Rehypothecation and the Failure of LBIE
A The failure
1 LBIE
9.66
9.67
2 Delays in the return of client assets
9.68
9.69
B Doctrine: the role of property rights
9.70
1 Property rights in insolvency
9.71
2 Reliance on trust
9.72
9.73
9.74
9.75
9.76
3 Official recognition of custody trust
9.77
(a) Joint administrators’ reports
9.78
(i) Trust property order
9.79
(b) Most unusual type of trust
9.80
9.81
9.82
9.83
4 Custody cash protected
9.84
9.85
9.86
5 Theory and practice (first catch your rabbit)
9.87
C Process
9.88
1 Inability to recover assets through courts
9.89
(a) RAB Capital v LBIE (2009)
9.90
9.91
2 Role of administrators
(a) LBIE
9.92
9.93
(b) Potential conflicts
9.94
(c) SAR objectives
9.95
3 Consensual collective solutions
(a) Complexity and uncertainty
9.96
(b) Lack of statutory scheme
9.97
(c) Contractual schemes
9.98
9.99
9.100
9.101
(d) SAR pro-ration
9.102
(e) Collective loss bearing
9.103
D Property remedies rejected as impracticable
9.104
1 Client money
(a) LBIE CM litigation and treatment of under-segregation
(i) Overview of litigation
9.105
Facts
9.106
Key issues and decisions
9.107
9.108
When client money trust arises
9.109
9.110
The rights of unsegregated clients to distributions
9.111
9.112
9.113
9.114
9.115
Components of CM pool
9.116
9.117
9.118
9.119
9.120
Key implications
9.121
Client due diligence inconclusive
9.122
Alternative approach and fiduciary duty
9.123
Recourse for unsegregated clients
9.124
(b) Administrators reject tracing
9.125
9.126
(c) Clients release CME
9.127
9.128
(d) Use of credit derivatives
9.129
2 Client securities
9.130
E Practical problems
9.131
1 Complexity and scale of exercise
9.132
2 Affiliate disputes and assets out of the jurisdiction
9.133
(a) Recovery from sub-custodians (title disputes)
9.134
9.135
(b) Recovery from CM banks (recognition failure)
9.136
3 Tax
9.137
4 Disputed title to client money entitlements (BarCap)
9.138
F Central issue: complexity of encumbrance key factor in delays
9.139
1 Security and close-out
9.140
2 Set-off
9.141
9.142
3 Client liabilities
9.143
9.144
9.145
4 Extended lien
9.146
9.147
9.148
9.149
9.150
9.151
G Impact of rehypothecation
9.152
1 Not major delaying factor
9.153
9.154
9.155
2 Rehypo credit exposure not material disadvantage
9.156
(a) Shortfalls resolved
9.157
(b) Timing not extent of recovery
9.158
H Compare US experience
9.159
9.160
I Key role of securities finance in failure
9.161
9.162
9.163
9.164
1 Legitimacy
9.165
2 Market responses
9.166
V Post-Crisis Client Asset Measures
9.167
A FSA/FCA
9.168
1 Daily reports
9.169
2 Disclosure annex
9.170
3 Systems and controls
9.171
B FSB
9.172
9.173
C MiFID II
9.174
1 Restrictions on use of client financial instruments
9.175
9.176
9.177
9.178
2 Inappropriate use of title transfer collateral arrangements
9.179
9.180
9.181
D AIFMD
9.182
9.183
9.184
E UCITS V
9.185
F EMIR
9.186
9.187
1 CCP
9.188
G CSDR
9.189
H SFTR
1 Definition of reuse
9.190
9.191
2 Right of reuse
9.192
9.193
3 Exercise of the right of use
9.194
9.195
9.196
9.197
I Conclusions
9.198
9.199
VI Securities Finance and the Reuse of Securities Collateral
9.200
9.201
9.202
9.203
9.204
9.205
A Origination transactions: reuse into the shadow
9.206
1 Agency securities lending
(a) Overview
(i) Institutional investors as securities lenders
9.207
(ii) Broker dealers and hedge funds as securities borrowers
9.208
9.209
(b) Cash collateral reinvestment
9.210
(i) Collateral
9.211
(c) Cash collateral
9.212
(d) Asset risk
9.213
9.214
2 Collateral swaps
9.215
9.216
9.217
9.218
9.219
3 Systemic concern: safe, liquid assets drawn into shadow
9.220
9.221
B Market transactions: Reuse within the shadow
9.222
1 Reuse in practice
9.223
9.224
9.225
2 Repo and reuse
(a) Repo finance
9.226
9.227
9.228
9.229
(i) Collateralizing repo finance
9.230
9.231
9.232
(ii) Use of repo finance to fund long securities positions
9.233
9.234
9.235
9.236
3 Securities lending and reuse
9.237
4 Swaps collateral/margin and reuse
9.238
5 Flows of cash and securities
9.239
9.240
9.241
VII Repo Run
9.242
9.243
9.244
9.245
9.246
9.247
VIII Post-Crisis Systemic Measures
9.248
A FSB
9.249
9.250
B SFTR
9.251
C Generally
9.252
IX Transactional Integrity
9.253
A Once a mortgage
9.254
B FCAD protection of right of use
9.255
C Recognition of TTCA
9.256
D Recharacterization risk
9.257
E Position v title
9.258
9.259
F Credit protection
9.260
9.261
9.262
9.263
X Conclusions
9.264
A Costs of rehypothecation and reuse
9.265
1 Client asset protection
9.266
9.267
2 Erosion of institutional asset base
9.268
9.269
9.270
3 Systemic costs
9.271
9.272
B Value of rehypothecation and reuse
9.273
9.274
9.275
10 The English Law Treatment of Lehman’s Derivatives Positions
I Introduction
10.01
10.02
10.03
II Exchange-Traded Positions
10.04
10.05
10.06
III The ISDA Master Agreement
10.07
10.08
10.09
10.10
10.11
10.12
10.13
10.14
10.15
10.16
10.17
IV Section 2(a)(iii)
10.18
10.19
10.20
10.21
10.22
10.23
10.24
10.25
10.26
10.27
10.28
10.29
10.30
10.31
10.32
10.33
10.34
10.35
V The Value Clean Principle
10.36
10.37
10.38
10.39
10.40
10.41
10.42
10.43
10.44
10.45
10.46
10.47
10.48
10.49
10.50
10.51
10.52
10.53
10.54
10.55
10.56
10.57
10.58
10.59
10.60
10.61
10.62
10.63
10.64
10.65
10.66
10.67
VI Credit Risk
10.68
10.69
10.70
10.71
10.72
10.73
10.74
10.75
10.76
10.77
10.78
10.79
10.80
10.81
10.82
10.83
VII Obtaining Quotations
10.84
10.85
10.86
10.87
10.88
VIII Default Interest
10.89
10.90
10.91
IX Conclusion
10.92
10.93
11 The Scope and Application of the Anti-Deprivation Rule
I Introduction: What Is the Anti-Deprivation Rule About?
11.01
11.02
11.03
11.04
II How Did the Anti-Deprivation Issue Arise in the Lehman Litigation?
11.05
11.06
III The Contrasting UK and US Approaches
11.07
11.08
11.09
11.10
11.11
11.12
11.13
11.14
11.15
11.16
11.17
11.18
IV The Crucial Elements of the UK Pari Passu and Anti-Deprivation Rules
11.19
11.20
11.21
11.22
11.23
11.24
11.25
11.26
11.27
V Do These Rules Apply in an Administration?
11.28
11.29
VI Controversies and Uncertainties
11.30
11.31
11.32
11.33
VII Pari Passu: Defining the Insolvent’s Assets or Distributing Them?
11.34
11.35
11.36
11.37
11.38
11.39
VIII Which Rule? Can the Same Transaction Offend Both Rules?
11.40
11.41
11.42
11.43
11.44
11.45
11.46
11.47
11.48
11.49
11.50
11.51
11.52
11.53
11.54
IX The Good Faith Requirement in the Anti-Deprivation Rule
11.55
11.56
11.57
11.58
11.59
11.60
11.61
11.62
11.63
X Anti-Deprivation: A Relevant Deprivation or Not?
11.64
11.65
11.66
A What question must be answered?
11.67
11.68
B The forfeited assets were paid for by the preferred creditor
11.69
11.70
11.71
11.72
C ‘Flawed assets’
11.73
D Late insertion of the insolvency trigger
11.74
E Flawed assets: forfeiture of an asset or defining a limited asset?
11.75
11.76
11.77
11.78
11.79
11.80
11.81
F Forfeiting an asset or suspending its enjoyment?
11.82
11.83
11.84
G Enjoying a new asset rather than forfeiting an old one
11.85
H Leases and licences terminated on insolvency
11.86
11.87
11.88
I Forfeiture of an asset and termination of a contract
11.89
11.90
11.91
11.92
11.93
11.94
11.95
XI Conclusion
11.96
11.97
11.98
11.99
Part III Europe
12 The Use of a Composition Plan as a Valuation and Distribution Framework
I Introduction
12.01
12.02
12.03
II Parties in the Custody Chain and Creditor Rights in Dutch Insolvency Proceedings
A General remarks
12.04
12.05
12.06
B The creditor in the custody chain for the purposes of Dutch insolvency proceedings
1 General remarks
12.07
12.08
2 GTS
12.09
12.10
12.11
12.12
12.13
12.14
12.15
12.16
3 UPC
12.17
12.18
12.19
12.20
12.21
4 Plaza Centers
12.22
12.23
12.24
12.25
12.26
12.27
5 LBT
12.28
12.29
12.30
12.31
12.32
III Submission and Admission of Insolvency Claims
A The submission procedure
1 General remarks
12.33
2 Communication with creditors
12.34
12.35
12.36
12.37
3 Formal requirements for the submission of claims
12.38
4 Solicitation of filing instructions
12.39
12.40
12.41
B The admission of insolvency claims
1 General remarks
12.42
12.43
12.44
12.45
12.46
12.47
2 Proactive admission of claims
12.48
12.49
12.50
12.51
12.52
12.53
12.54
C Evaluation of the CSM in relation to the submission and admission of claims
12.55
12.56
12.57
12.58
12.59
12.60
D Special proceedings concerning a large number of creditors
12.61
12.62
IV The Use of a Composition Plan as a Valuation and Distribution Framework
A Pursuing a consensual deal
12.63
12.64
12.65
12.66
B General description of the procedure for the adoption of a composition plan
1 Role of main parties in the preparation of a composition plan
12.67
12.68
12.69
12.70
12.71
12.72
2 The content of a composition plan
(a) The nature of a composition plan
12.73
(b) The permissible content of a composition plan
12.74
12.75
12.76
12.77
12.78
(c) Valuation and distribution arrangements
12.79
12.80
12.81
12.82
12.83
12.84
12.85
12.86
12.87
12.88
12.89
12.90
(d) Indemnification and (third party) release clauses
12.91
12.92
12.93
C Solicitation of voting instructions
12.94
12.95
12.96
12.97
D The voting procedure
12.98
12.99
12.100
12.101
12.102
12.103
12.104
12.105
12.106
12.107
12.108
12.109
12.110
12.111
E Confirmation of the composition plan by the court
12.112
12.113
12.114
12.115
12.116
12.117
12.118
F Cram down mechanism
12.119
G Governance of LBT in voluntary liquidation
12.120
12.121
V Conclusions
12.122
12.123
13 The Valuation of LBT Notes: An Application of Dutch Insolvency Law
I Introduction
13.01
13.02
13.03
13.04
II Procedure Applied by the LBT Bankruptcy Trustees
13.05
13.06
13.07
13.08
III General Legal Valuation Principles Applicable in the LBT Proceedings
A General
13.09
B Contractual amount versus the admissible amount of insolvency claims
13.10
13.11
13.12
C Fixation of admissible claims and the admissible amount
13.13
13.14
13.15
D Special treatment of specific types of insolvency claims
1 General remarks
13.16
2 Unmatured claims
13.17
13.18
13.19
3 Unliquidated claims
13.20
13.21
13.22
4 Post-commencement interest claims
13.23
13.24
5 Foreign currency claims
13.25
13.26
13.27
IV General Economic Aspects of the Valuation of LBT Notes
A Fair value as a valuation framework
13.28
13.29
13.30
13.31
13.32
13.33
13.34
B Application of fair value to the LBT Notes
13.35
13.36
13.37
13.38
13.39
C Discount rates and the issuer credit spread
13.40
13.41
D Liquidated LBT Notes that mature after the 12 Month Anniversary Date
13.42
13.43
13.44
13.45
E Unliquidated LBT Notes that mature after the 12 Month Anniversary Date
13.46
F Treatment of post-commencement interest
13.47
V Recommendations for Future Law Reform
A General remarks
13.48
13.49
13.50
B Fixation principle
13.51
13.52
C Unmatured claims
13.53
13.54
13.55
D Unliquidated claims
13.56
13.57
E Post-commencement interest claims
13.58
13.59
F Foreign currency claims
13.60
13.61
13.62
VI Conclusions
13.63
13.64
13.65
14 Derivatives in Cross-Border Insolvency Proceedings
I Introduction
14.01
14.02
Example.
14.03
14.04
14.05
Example.
14.06
14.07
14.08
II Pre-Crisis Scenario: Privileged Status of Derivatives and Financial Collateral
14.09
A Substantive-law level (‘safe harbours’)
1 General considerations
14.10
14.11
14.12
14.13
2 European law
14.14
14.15
14.16
B Conflict-of-laws level
14.17
Example.
14.18
14.19
1 Close-out netting
14.20
Example.
14.21
14.22
Example.
14.23
14.24
14.25
14.26
Example.
14.27
14.28
2 Financial collateral
14.29
14.30
Example.
14.31
14.32
Example.
14.33
III Post-Crisis: The Review of ‘Safe Harbours’
14.34
A Substantive-law level
1 Resolution Framework
14.35
14.36
14.37
2 Close-out netting provisions and collateral arrangements
14.38
14.39
14.40
14.41
3 Bail-in and derivatives
14.42
14.43
14.44
14.45
14.46
14.47
14.48
14.49
14.50
B Conflict-of-laws level
1 Introduction
14.51
2 Resolution stay
14.52
14.53
Example.
14.54
14.55
14.56
Example.
14.57
3 Transfer of assets and liabilities and bail-in
14.58
14.59
Example.
14.60
14.61
14.62
14.63
14.64
14.65
IV Concluding Remarks
14.66
Further Material
Index
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Table of Legislation
Dennis Faber, Niels Vermunt
From:
Bank Failure: Lessons from Lehman Brothers
Edited By: Dennis Faber, Niels Vermunt
Content type:
Book content
Product:
Financial Law [FBL]
Published in print:
16 March 2017
ISBN:
9780198755371
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