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Oxford Law Citator
Contents
Expand All
Collapse All
Preliminary Material
Foreword
Preface
Introduction
Corporate Restructuring
Bank Recovery and Resolution
Sovereign Debt Restructuring
About the Book
Contents
Author Biographies
Table of Cases
Table of Legislation
European Union
Regulations
Directives
Decisions
Recommendations
National Legislation
Argentina
Australia
Belgium
Canada
Germany
Greece
Japan
Mexico
Pakistan
Peru
Philippines
Singapore
South Africa
Spain
Switzerland
United Kingdom
Primary Legislation
Statutory Instruments
Financial Conduct Authority (FCA)
United States of America
Primary Legislation
Secondary legislation
Treaties, Conventions and Other International Instruments
List of Abbreviations
Main Text
Part I Corporate Debt Restructuring
1 Insolvency in the UK and the US
Preliminary Material
I The Case for a Comparative Approach
1.01
1.02
1.03
II Directors’ Duties to Promote a Restructuring in the US
1.04
1.05
1.06
1.07
1.08
III Directors’ Duties to Promote a Restructuring in England
A The Common Law
1.09
1.10
1.11
1.12
1.13
1.14
1.15
1.16
B Wrongful Trading
1.17
C Alleging Breach of Duty
1.18
1.19
1.20
1.21
D Other Miscellaneous Provisions
1.22
1.23
E Groups
1.24
1.25
1.26
1.27
1.28
F Particular Issues for Directors of Listed Companies
1.29
1.30
1.31
G Implications of Changing Capital Structures and Relevance of the Tests for Inability to Pay Debts
1 Incurrence covenants and covenant lite loans
1.32
2 The tests of inability to pay debts
1.33
1.34
1.35
1.36
1.37
1.38
1.39
3 The cash flow test
1.40
1.41
1.42
1.43
1.44
1.45
1.46
1.47
1.48
1.49
1.50
1.51
1.52
1.53
1.54
4 The balance sheet test
1.55
1.56
1.57
1.58
1.59
1.60
1.61
1.62
1.63
H The Relevance of the Accounts
1.64
1.65
IV Avoidance Actions in the US
A Fraudulent Conveyances
1 Overview
1.66
1.67
1.68
2 Elements of an intentional fraudulent conveyance
1.69
1.70
3 Elements of a constructive fraudulent conveyance
1.71
1.72
1.73
4 Solvency and related tests
1.74
(i) Balance sheet solvency test
1.75
(ii) Unreasonably small capital test
1.76
1.77
1.78
(iii) Inability to pay debts as they come due test
1.79
B Preferences
1 Generally
1.80
1.81
2 Trustees’ rights to bring preference actions under section 544 of the Bankruptcy Code
1.82
3 A transfer is broadly defined
1.83
1.84
4 Antecedent debt
1.85
5 Insolvency presumed for 90-day preference period
1.86
6 Creditor must benefit from transfer
1.87
7 Defences to a preference action
1.88
C ‘Safe Harbors’ for Certain Financial Transactions
1 Generally
1.89
2 The ‘safe harbors’ are broad in scope
1.90
1.91
V Vulnerable Transactions in England
1.92
1.93
A Transactions at an Undervalue (Section 238 of the Insolvency Act 1986)
1.94
1.95
1.96
1.97
1.98
1.99
1.100
B Transactions Defrauding Creditors (Section 423 of the Insolvency Act 1986)
1.101
1.102
C Preferences (Section 239 of the Insolvency Act 1986)
1.103
1.104
1.105
1.106
1.107
1.108
1.109
1.110
1.111
1.112
D Jurisdiction of the Court
1.113
E Avoidance of Floating Charges (Section 245 of the Insolvency Act 1986)
1.114
1.115
2 The EC Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings
Preliminary Material
I Preliminary
2.01
2.02
II Legal Framework
A Purpose
2.03
B Interpretation
2.04
2.05
C Relationship with the Brussels Regulation
2.06
2.07
2.08
2.09
2.10
D Scope and Application
2.11
2.12
2.13
2.14
2.15
2.16
2.17
2.18
2.19
2.20
E International Jurisdiction
2.21
2.22
2.23
2.24
2.25
2.26
2.27
2.28
1 Asserting jurisdiction: the meaning of COMI
2.29
2.30
2.31
2.32
2.33
2.34
2.35
2.36
2.37
2.38
2.39
2 When is COMI assessed?
2.40
2.41
3 Main and territorial proceedings
2.42
2.43
2.44
2.45
2.46
2.47
2.48
2.49
2.50
2.51
4 The meaning of ‘establishment’
2.52
2.53
2.54
2.55
F Choice of Law Rules
1 The general rule
2.56
2.57
2 Lex concursus and the ranking of claims
2.58
3 Exceptions to the general rule—general observations
2.59
2.60
2.61
2.62
2.63
2.64
2.65
2.66
2.67
2.68
2.69
4 Effects of a statutory moratorium on rights in rem
2.70
5 Paying off the secured creditor
2.71
G Recognition of Proceedings
2.72
2.73
2.74
2.75
2.76
2.77
H Cooperation
2.78
2.79
2.80
2.81
2.82
I Rights of Creditors
2.83
2.84
III Managing the Insolvency of Group Companies
A Group Companies and Sharing of COMIs
2.85
2.86
2.87
2.88
2.89
2.90
1 ‘Rustling’
2.91
2 Consolidation of proceedings—the approach of the English courts
2.92
2.93
2.94
2.95
2.96
2.97
3 Consolidation of proceedings—the approach of the German and French courts
2.98
2.99
2.100
2.101
2.102
4 The recast EC Regulation
2.103
2.104
2.105
2.106
2.107
2.108
2.109
2.110
2.111
5 Management of local creditors’ interests in group restructurings
2.112
2.113
2.114
2.115
2.116
IV Application of the EC Regulation to Rescue Plans
A Impact on Discharge and Variation of Debt
2.117
2.118
2.119
2.120
B Use of Company Voluntary Arrangements in Main Proceedings
2.121
2.122
2.123
2.124
C Use of Company Voluntary Arrangements and Administrations in Secondary Proceedings
2.125
2.126
D Schemes of Arrangement
2.127
2.128
2.129
2.130
2.131
2.132
2.133
2.134
2.135
2.136
2.137
2.138
2.139
V Forum Shopping as a Restructuring Tool
A Introduction
2.140
1 Background
2.141
2.142
2.143
2 The underlying rationale: the need for certainty
2.144
2.145
2.146
2.147
3 Why forum shop?
2.148
2.149
2.150
2.151
2.152
2.153
4 Forum shopping: judicial support
2.154
2.155
2.156
2.157
B Timing Post-Migration: When to Open Insolvency Proceedings
2.158
2.159
2.160
2.161
2.162
2.163
2.164
2.165
1 Migrations involving transfer of registered office
2.166
2.167
2.168
2.169
2.170
2.171
2.172
2 Failed migration: practical lessons from Hans Brochier
2.173
2.174
2.175
2.176
2.177
2.178
2.179
2.180
2.181
2.182
3 Migration without a change in registered office
2.183
2.184
2.185
C Freedom of Establishment
2.186
2.187
2.188
2.189
2.190
2.191
2.192
2.193
2.194
D The Recast Regulation and COMI Shifting
2.195
E The Impact of the European Merger Directive
2.196
3 Out-of-Court vs Court-Supervised Restructurings
Preliminary Material
I Workouts and Other Restructurings in the US
A Advantages and Disadvantages of Workouts
3.01
3.02
3.03
3.04
1 Advantages of a workout
3.05
2 Disadvantages of a workout
3.06
B Considerations in Out-of-Court Workouts
3.07
1 Moratorium
3.08
3.09
2 Negotiations
3.10
3 Ad hoc creditor’s committee
3.11
3.12
4 Debt repayment
3.13
5 Collateralization
3.14
6 Management changes
3.15
C Typical Out-of-Court Approaches
3.16
3.17
1 ‘Down-round’ financing
3.18
2 ‘Washout’ or ‘cramdown’ venture financing
3.19
3 Debt conversion deals
3.20
4 Assignment for the benefit of creditors (informal wind downs)
3.21
D Potential for Failure and a Subsequent Chapter 11 Filing
3.22
II Out-of-Court Restructurings in England
A Advantages and Disadvantages of an Out-of-Court Restructuring in the UK
3.23
3.24
B Considerations in Out-of-Court Restructurings in the UK
3.25
1 Standstill
3.26
3.27
3.28
3.29
2 Negotiation
3.30
3 Coordinator and coordination committees
3.31
3.32
4 Debt repayment
3.33
3.34
5 Collateralization
3.35
C Typical Approaches in the UK
1 Rescue rights issue
3.36
3.37
2 Debt conversion
3.38
D Subsequent Failure and Insolvency Filing
3.39
III US Exchange Offers
A Introduction
3.40
1 Typical structure
3.41
2 Recent trends
3.42
3.43
B Reasons for Doing a Debt Exchange Offer
3.44
3.45
C US Securities Law Considerations
3.46
1 Considerations under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934—tender offer rules and anti-fraud provisions
(a) Regulation 14E
3.47
3.48
3.49
3.50
3.51
3.52
(b) The offer document and anti-fraud rules
3.53
3.54
(c) Early consent/early tender deadlines
3.55
3.56
3.57
3.58
3.59
(d) Equity tender offer rules
3.60
(e) Is there such a thing as a ‘creeping tender offer’?
3.61
3.62
2 Considerations under the US Securities Act of 1933—Issuance of New Securities
3.63
(a) Registration under the Securities Act
3.64
3.65
3.66
(b) Exempt offerings—private placements under Section 4(a)(2) of the Securities Act
3.67
3.68
3.69
3.70
3.71
(c) Exchange offers under Section 3(a)(9) of the Securities Act
3.72
3.73
3.74
3 State securities law concerns
3.75
D Common Tactics in Debt Exchange Offers
3.76
1 Exit consents
3.77
3.78
2 Increased coupon or covenant enhancements
3.79
3 Threat of bankruptcy
3.80
4 ‘Leapfrog’
3.81
(a) Increased contractual priority
3.82
(b) Increased structural priority
3.83
3.84
(c) Increased priority as to security
3.85
3.86
5 Partial repayment and extension of maturity
3.87
E Certain US Federal Income Tax Considerations and Accounting Considerations
3.88
3.89
3.90
IV Exchange Offers in the UK
3.91
3.92
3.93
3.94
3.95
V Chapter 11 Plan Reorganizations
A Introduction
3.96
B Limitations on Bankruptcy Court Jurisdiction— Stern v Marshall
1 General
3.97
3.98
3.99
2 Stern v Marshall
3.100
3.101
3.102
3 Post- Stern developments
3.103
3.104
3.105
3.106
C Chapter 11 Plan Standards
1 General
3.107
3.108
3.109
2 Best interests test
3.110
3.111
3 Absolute priority rule
3.112
(a) The plan must not unfairly discriminate
3.113
3.114
3.115
3.116
(b) The plan must be fair and equitable
3.117
3.118
3.119
3.120
3.121
3.122
3.123
3.124
3.125
3.126
4 Feasibility
3.127
5 Other plan confirmation standards
3.128
(a) The plan must comply with the applicable provisions of title 11 (section 1129(a)(1))
3.129
(b) The plan proponent must comply with the applicable provisions of title 11 (section 1129(a)(2))
3.130
(c) The plan must be proposed in good faith (section 1129(a)(3))
3.131
(d) Additional requirements under section 1129(a)
3.132
3.133
3.134
3.135
3.136
D Plan Mediation
3.137
3.138
3.139
3.140
3.141
3.142
VI Pre-Packaged and Pre-Arranged Chapter 11 Plans
A Pre-Petition Activities
1 General
(a) Pre-packaged chapter 11 plan
3.143
(b) Pre-arranged chapter 11 plan
3.144
2 Pre-petition disclosure and solicitation of a pre-packaged plan of reorganization
(a) Is court approval of the disclosure statement required?
3.145
3.146
(b) Sufficient disclosure
3.147
3.148
(c) The ‘adequate information’ standard
3.149
(d) Disclosure statement contents
3.150
(e) Dissemination of the plan, disclosure statement, plan ballots, and voting notice to creditors and shareholders
3.151
(f) Deadline to vote on the plan
3.152
3 The reorganization plan
3.153
3.154
B First-Day Filings
3.155
1 Debtor’s standard filings
(a) Administrative filings
3.156
(b) Operational filings
3.157
2 Additional filings for pre-packaged or pre-arranged plans
3.158
(a) Plan and disclosure statement
3.159
(b) Pleadings to establish date for plan confirmation hearing and date by which plan confirmation objections must be filed
3.160
(c) Pleadings to set bar date for filing proofs of claim or interest
3.161
(d) Pleadings to obtain court approval of pre-petition and post-petition documents and actions
3.162
C Confirmation Hearing (Day 30–60)
3.163
1 Determining plan acceptances and rejections
3.164
2 Confirmation when no impaired class rejects the plan
3.165
3 Confirmation when an impaired class rejects the plan
3.166
D Post-Confirmation Activities
1 Effectiveness of confirmation order
3.167
2 Effect of confirmation
3.168
3 Post-confirmation jurisdiction
3.169
E Advantages and Disadvantages of a Pre-Packaged or Pre-Arranged Chapter 11 Plan
3.170
1 Certainty
3.171
2 Speed and control
3.172
3.173
3 Business deterioration
3.174
4 Pre-petition negotiation, solicitation, and voting
3.175
3.176
VII The Section 363 Sale Alternative
A Relevant Standard: Sound Business Reason
3.177
1 Sound business purpose
3.178
3.179
2 The sale must contemplate a fair and reasonable price
3.180
3 Notice must be given to creditors and interested parties
3.181
4 The purchaser is proceeding in good faith
3.182
3.183
B Section 363 Sales Versus Plan Sales
3.184
3.185
3.186
C Improper Section 363 Sub Rosa Plans
3.187
3.188
3.189
3.190
3.191
D Secured Creditors’ Right to Credit Bid
3.192
3.193
3.194
3.195
3.196
3.197
3.198
VIII US Chapter 11 and Administration in the UK Compared
A Administration
3.199
3.200
3.201
3.202
3.203
B Differences in Theory
3.204
C Differences in Practice
3.205
1 Management of the debtor
3.206
3.207
3.208
3.209
3.210
3.211
2 Ability of third parties to terminate contracts with the debtor
3.212
(a) Chapter 11 automatic stay
3.213
(i) Judicial and administrative proceedings
3.214
(ii) Enforcement of judgments
3.215
(iii) Acts to obtain possession or control of estate property
3.216
(iv) Acts to create, perfect, or enforce liens
3.217
(v) Acts to collect
3.218
(vi) Exercise of right to set-off
3.219
(vii) Tax court proceedings
3.220
3.221
(b) Moratoria in administration
3.222
(i) Moratorium on other insolvency processes
3.223
(ii) Moratorium on the enforcement of security
3.224
(iii) Moratorium on the repossession of goods
3.225
(iv) Moratorium on the exercise of a right of forfeiture by peaceable re-entry (or right of irritancy in Scotland)
3.226
(v) Moratorium on the institution of a legal process against the company or its property
3.227
3.228
3.229
3 The ability of the debtor to raise new financing
3.230
3.231
3.232
4 The ability to bind non-consenting creditors
3.233
3.234
D Perceptions of Administration and Chapter 11
3.235
3.236
3.237
3.238
3.239
IX The Role of Receivership in English Debt Restructurings
3.240
3.241
3.242
3.243
3.244
3.245
X The Role of the Company Voluntary Arrangement in English Debt Restructurings
A Introduction
3.246
3.247
3.248
B Process
3.249
3.250
3.251
3.252
3.253
3.254
3.255
3.256
C Challenge
3.257
3.258
3.259
3.260
3.261
3.262
3.263
1 Vertical comparison
3.264
3.265
3.266
2 Horizontal comparison
3.267
3.268
3.269
3.270
3.271
3.272
3.273
3.274
3.275
3.276
D Decision to Implement a CVA
3.277
E Moratorium
3.278
3.279
3.280
3.281
3.282
3.283
F The CVA and the Great Recession
3.284
3.285
3.286
3.287
3.288
3.289
3.290
XI English Pre-Packaged Administrations and Corporate Debt Restructurings
A Introduction
3.291
3.292
B Criticisms of Pre-Packs
3.293
3.294
C Pre-Pack Guidelines
3.295
3.296
3.297
3.298
3.299
3.300
3.301
3.302
3.303
3.304
3.305
3.306
3.307
3.308
3.309
3.310
3.311
3.312
3.313
3.314
3.315
3.316
3.317
D Courts’ Approach to Pre-Packs
3.318
3.319
3.320
3.321
3.322
3.323
3.324
3.325
3.326
3.327
3.328
3.329
3.330
3.331
3.332
3.333
XII English Schemes of Arrangement and Corporate Debt Restructurings
A Introduction
3.334
3.335
B Meaning of ‘Creditor’
3.336
3.337
3.338
3.339
3.340
3.341
3.342
3.343
C Stages of a Scheme and Related Issues
3.344
3.345
1 Leave to convene hearing
3.346
(a) Class issues
3.347
3.348
3.349
3.350
3.351
3.352
3.353
3.354
3.355
3.356
3.357
3.358
3.359
3.360
3.361
2 Convening and holding of scheme meetings
3.362
3.363
3 Sanction hearing
3.364
3.365
3.366
3.367
3.368
3.369
3.370
3.371
XIII Comparison Between ‘Cramdown’ in England Achieved Through a Scheme and a Pre-Packaged Administration and (A) a Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization and (B) a Section 363 Credit Bid with Stalking Horse
A Introduction
3.372
3.373
3.374
3.375
3.376
3.377
B The Courts’ Approach
3.378
3.379
3.380
3.381
3.382
C Valuation
3.383
3.384
3.385
3.386
3.387
3.388
3.389
3.390
3.391
3.392
3.393
3.394
3.395
3.396
3.397
3.398
D Pre-Packaged Administration and Section 363 Sales
3.399
3.400
3.401
3.402
4 The UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency
Preliminary Material
I The Impact of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency
A Introduction
4.01
4.02
B Objectives
4.03
4.04
C Scope of Application
4.05
4.06
D Interpretation
4.07
4.08
4.09
II The US Version—Chapter 15
A Overview
4.10
B History of Chapter 15
1 Section 304
4.11
(a) Framework of section 304
4.12
4.13
4.14
2 Legislative history
4.15
4.16
3 Chapter 15 vs section 304
4.17
4.18
4.19
4.20
C Mechanics of Chapter 15
1 When does chapter 15 apply?
4.21
4.22
4.23
4.24
2 Commencement of a chapter 15 case
4.25
4.26
4.27
4.28
3 Recognition
4.29
4.30
4.31
4.32
4 Recognition timeline
4.33
5 Relief under chapter 15
4.34
(a) Automatic relief
4.35
(b) Discretionary relief
4.36
4.37
4.38
(c) Provisional relief
4.39
4.40
4.41
(d) Additional assistance
4.42
4.43
4.44
(e) Conditions to relief
4.45
(f) Foreign representative
4.46
4.47
6 Venue
4.48
4.49
7 Cooperation and communication
4.50
8 Multiple proceedings
4.51
4.52
4.53
4.54
9 Interpretation
4.55
III Chapter 15 Recognition of English Schemes of Arrangement
4.56
4.57
4.58
4.59
4.60
IV Does Availability of Chapter 15 Relief Affect Willingness to Accept Jurisdiction in Chapter 11 Case Where Debtor’s COMI is Outside the US?
A Eligibility Requirements for Relief
4.61
4.62
4.63
4.64
4.65
B Eligibility for Chapter 11 Relief when the Debtor’s COMI is Outside the US
4.66
4.67
4.68
4.69
4.70
4.71
4.72
V Choosing Between Chapter 15 and Chapter 11 for Foreign Debtors
A The Automatic Stay
4.73
4.74
4.75
B Debtor in Possession Financing
4.76
4.77
C Automatic Relief
4.78
D Additional Protections Under Chapter 11
4.79
4.80
4.81
4.82
4.83
4.84
VI Notable Litigation Arising Under Chapter 15
A Litigation Regarding COMI
4.85
1 In re SPhinX, Ltd
4.86
(a) Facts
4.87
4.88
4.89
(b) The Bankruptcy Court’s decision
4.90
4.91
4.92
4.93
4.94
4.95
4.96
(c) The District Court’s opinion
4.97
2 In re Bear Stearns High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies Master Fund, Ltd
4.98
(a) The Bankruptcy Court’s decision
4.99
4.100
4.101
4.102
4.103
4.104
(b) The District Court’s opinion
4.105
4.106
4.107
4.108
3 In re Basis Yield Alpha Fund (Master)
4.109
4.110
4.111
4.112
4.113
4 In re Saad Investments Finance Company (No 5) Limited
4.114
4.115
4.116
4.117
4.118
4.119
5 Lavie v Ran
4.120
4.121
4.122
4.123
4.124
4.125
B Litigation Regarding Available Relief
1 In re Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments
4.126
4.127
4.128
4.129
4.130
4.131
4.132
2 In re Vitro SAB de CV
4.133
4.134
4.135
4.136
3 In re Sino-Forest Corp
4.137
4.138
4.139
4.140
4 In re AJW Offshore, Ltd
4.141
4.142
4.143
C Litigation Regarding Section 363
1 In re Fairfield Sentry, Ltd
4.144
4.145
4.146
4.147
4.148
2 In re Elpida Memory, Inc
4.149
4.150
4.151
4.152
4.153
VII Areas for Potential Improvement
4.154
4.155
4.156
4.157
4.158
4.159
4.160
VIII The English Experience of the Model Law— The Cross-Border Insolvency Regulations 2006
A Implementation
4.161
4.162
4.163
B Framework of the Regulations and Limitations on Application
4.164
4.165
4.166
4.167
C Relationship Between the Regulations and Other Bases of Recognition and Assistance Under English Law
4.168
4.169
4.170
4.171
4.172
D Key Definitions
4.173
4.174
4.175
4.176
4.177
4.178
E Recognition of a Foreign Proceeding and Relief
1 Application for recognition
4.179
4.180
4.181
4.182
4.183
2 Presumptions concerning recognition and insolvency
4.184
4.185
4.186
4.187
4.188
4.189
4.190
3 Decision to recognize a foreign proceeding
4.191
4.192
4.193
4 Interim relief pending recognition
4.194
F Effects of Recognition
1 Automatic stay
4.195
4.196
4.197
4.198
4.199
2 Discretionary relief
(a) Stay and suspension
4.200
4.201
4.202
4.203
4.204
4.205
4.206
4.207
(b) Distribution of assets
4.208
4.209
4.210
4.211
4.212
(c) Disclosure
4.213
3 Protection of creditors and interested third parties
4.214
4.215
4 Actions to avoid acts detrimental to creditors
4.216
4.217
4.218
G Foreign Creditors’ Rights of Access to Proceedings Under British Insolvency Law
4.219
4.220
4.221
H Cross-Border Cooperation
1 Cooperation with foreign courts and foreign representatives
4.222
4.223
4.224
4.225
2 Extent of cooperation
4.226
4.227
4.228
4.229
4.230
I Commencement of Concurrent Proceedings and Coordination of Relief
4.231
4.232
4.233
4.234
4.235
4.236
J UNCITRAL Guidance
4.237
4.238
4.239
4.240
4.241
4.242
Part II Bank Resolution
5 Legal Aspects of Banking Regulation in the UK and US
Preliminary Material
I Introduction
5.01
5.02
5.03
5.04
II The UK Model of Regulation and Supervision
5.05
5.06
5.07
5.08
5.09
5.10
5.11
5.12
5.13
A The Scope of the Responsibilities of the FCA and PRA
1 Authorization and permission
5.14
5.15
5.16
5.17
2 The threshold conditions
5.18
5.19
5.20
B Bank Supervision
5.21
1 Capital and liquidity requirements
5.22
5.23
5.24
5.25
5.26
5.27
5.28
C Ring-fencing
5.29
5.30
5.31
III The US Approach to Bank Supervision
5.32
5.33
A The Dual Banking System
5.34
5.35
B The Individual Regulators
5.36
5.37
5.38
5.39
5.40
5.41
5.42
5.43
5.44
1 The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999
5.45
5.46
5.47
C Financial Stability Oversight Council
5.48
5.49
IV The US Regulation of the Business of Banks and Safe and Sound Requirements
5.50
5.51
A Volcker Rule
5.52
5.53
B Safety and Soundness
5.54
5.55
5.56
5.57
5.58
5.59
C Capital and Liquidity Requirements
5.60
5.61
5.62
D Stress Testing
5.63
5.64
E The Directors’ Duties
5.65
F The Common Law Standard
5.66
G The Statutory Position
5.67
5.68
5.69
5.70
H Other Enforcement Actions
5.71
5.72
5.73
5.74
5.75
6 Banks in Distress
Preliminary Material
A Sermons and Burials
6.01
6.02
B Northern Rock: the Catalyst for the Banking Legislation
6.03
6.04
6.05
6.06
6.07
6.08
6.09
6.10
6.11
C The Institutions to Which the Banking Act Applies
6.12
6.13
D The Role of the Appropriate Regulator, the Bank of England, and the Treasury
6.14
6.15
6.16
6.17
6.18
6.19
6.20
6.21
6.22
6.23
6.24
6.25
6.26
6.27
6.28
6.29
E Recovery and Resolution Plans
6.30
1 Recovery plans
6.31
6.32
2 Resolution plans
6.33
6.34
F Early Intervention and the PRA Proactive Intervention Framework
6.35
6.36
6.37
6.38
6.39
6.40
6.41
6.42
6.43
6.44
6.45
6.46
6.47
6.48
6.49
6.50
G The Special Resolution Regime: Part 1 of the Banking Act
6.51
6.52
6.53
6.54
6.55
1 The stabilization options
6.56
6.57
6.58
6.59
6.60
6.61
6.62
6.63
6.64
6.65
6.66
6.67
6.68
6.69
6.70
6.71/6.80
H The Impact of Share Write-down and Conversion, and Share Transfers and Property Transfers
6.81
6.82
6.83
6.84
6.85
6.86
6.87
6.88
6.89
6.90
6.91
6.92
I Compensation and Valuation
6.93
6.94
6.95
6.96
6.97
6.98
6.99
1 Creditors’ interests
6.100
6.101
6.102
6.103
(a) Partial property transfers
6.104
6.105
6.106
6.107
6.108
6.109
6.110
6.111
6.112
6.113
6.114
6.115
6.116
6.117
(b) Property held on trust
6.118
6.119
(c) Compensation
6.120
6.121
J The Resolution of Dunfermline Building Society
6.122
6.123
6.124
6.125
6.126
6.127
6.128
6.129
K Third Country Resolution Actions
6.130
6.131
6.132
6.133
6.134
L Recognized Central Counterparties
6.135/6.136
6.137
6.138
7 Banking Act Restructuring and Insolvency Procedures
Preliminary Material
A Introduction
7.01
7.02
7.03
7.04
7.05
7.06
7.07
7.08
7.09
B The Administration and Liquidation Regime for Banking Institutions
7.10
C The Bank Administration Procedure
7.11
7.12
7.13
7.14
1 The application for an administration order
7.15
7.16
7.17
7.18
7.19
2 The purpose of the administration
7.20
7.21
7.22
7.23
7.24
7.25
7.26
7.27
7.28
3 The process of administration
7.29
7.30
7.31
7.32
(a) The Objective 1 Stage—the Bank of England’s control of the administration process
7.33
7.34
7.35
7.36
7.37
7.38
7.39
7.40
7.41
7.42
7.43
7.44
7.45
7.46
7.47
(b) The Objective 2 Stage
7.48
7.49
7.50
(c) Statutory claims available to bank administrators
7.51
(d) Termination of the administration
7.52
7.53
7.54
7.55
7.56
D Bank Insolvency Procedures
7.57
1 The application for a bank winding-up order
7.58
7.59
7.60
7.61
2 The process of the winding up
7.62
7.63
7.64
7.65
7.66
7.67
7.68
7.69
7.70
7.71
7.72
7.73
(a) Claims for misfeasance, misconduct, and adjustment of prior transactions
7.74
(b) Termination of the liquidation
7.75
7.76
7.77
E Building Societies
7.78
7.79
7.80
7.81
F The Treatment of Creditors in Bank Insolvencies
7.82
7.83
7.84
7.85
G Deposit Protection
7.86
7.87
7.88
7.89
7.90
7.91
7.92
7.93
7.94
7.95
7.96
7.97
7.98
7.99
7.100
7.101
H Cross-Border Bank Insolvency
7.102
7.103
7.104
I The Investment Bank Special Administration Regime
7.105
7.106
7.107
1 Lehman Brothers
7.108
7.109
7.110
7.111
7.112
7.113
7.114
7.115
7.116
7.117
2 Investment Bank Special Administration Regulations 2011
7.118
7.119
7.120
7.121
7.122
7.123
7.124
3 Special Administration (Bank Insolvency) Procedure
7.125
7.126
4 Special Administration (Bank Administration) Procedure
7.127
5 Review of the Investment Bank Special Administration Regime
7.128
7.129
7.130
7.131
7.132
8 Resolution of US Banks and Other Financial Institutions
Preliminary Material
I Introduction
8.01
8.02
8.03
8.04
8.05
8.06
8.07
II Fundamentals of Resolution Authority
8.08
8.09
8.10
8.11
8.12
8.13
8.14
8.15
8.16
8.17
8.18
8.19
8.20
III Resolution of US IDIs
8.21
8.22
A Background
1 Chartering authorities and primary regulators
8.23
8.24
8.25
8.26
8.27
2 Deposit insurance
8.28
8.29
8.30
3 Structure of the FDIC, and the FDIC’s resolution unit
8.31
8.32
8.33
4 Nature of the resolution process
8.34
8.35
8.36
8.37
8.38
5 Limited legal guidance
8.39
8.40
8.41
B Supervisory and Other Tools to Prevent Failure
8.42
1 Capital and liquidity regulation
8.43
8.44
8.45
8.46
2 Prompt corrective action
8.47
8.48
8.49
8.50
3 Discount window and other lender-of-last-resort facilities
8.51
8.52
8.53
4 Deposit insurance
8.54
5 Supervision, examination, and enforcement
8.55
8.56
6 Enhanced prudential standards
8.57
8.58
8.59
7 Early remediation
8.60
8 Recovery plans
8.61
8.62
8.63
9 Source of strength obligations
8.64
8.65
8.66
8.67
8.68
8.69
10 Government assistance to open financial institutions
8.70
8.71
8.72
8.73
8.74
C Resolution Process
8.75
1 Grounds for closing an institution
8.76
8.77
8.78
8.79
8.80
8.81
8.82
2 Effect of appointment
8.83
3 Timing of appointment
8.84
8.85
4 FDIC’s duties
8.86
8.87
5 Purchase-and-assumption sale transactions
8.88
8.89
8.90
8.91
6 Bridge banks
8.92
8.93
7 Recapitalization (bail-in) within resolution
8.94
8.95
8.96
8.97
8.98
8 Break-up and sell strategy
8.99
9 Orderly wind-down strategy
8.100
10 Liquidation strategy
8.101
D FDIC-Assisted Purchase-and-Assumption Sale Transactions
8.102
1 Initiation of the process
8.103
8.104
8.105
2 The bidding process
8.106
8.107
8.108
8.109
8.110
8.111
8.112
8.113
8.114
8.115
8.116
8.117
8.118
8.119
8.120
3 The transaction structure
8.121
8.122
8.123
8.124
8.125
8.126
8.127
8.128
8.129
8.130
8.131
8.132
8.133
8.134
8.135
8.136
8.137
4 Marketing the failed or failing bank
8.138
8.139
8.140
8.141
8.142
8.143
8.144
8.145
8.146
E Claims Process
8.147
8.148
F FDIC Super Powers
8.149
1 Domestic depositor preference rule
8.150
8.151
8.152
2 Contingent claims not provable
8.153
8.154
3 High bar to enforceability of contracts
8.155
8.156
8.157
8.158
8.159
4 Power to enforce contracts despite ipso facto clauses
8.160
8.161
8.162
5 Repudiation of contracts
8.163
8.164
8.165
8.166
8.167
8.168
8.169
6 Special treatment for qualified financial contracts
8.170
8.171
8.172
8.173
8.174
8.175
7 Security interests
8.176
8.177
8.178
8.179
8 Discretion to discriminate among similarly situated creditors
8.180
8.181
8.182
8.183
8.184
9 Super-priority over fraudulent transfers by insider or debtor
8.185
10 Cross-guarantees
8.186
11 Statute of limitations, tolling, and removal powers
8.187
8.188
8.189
8.190
8.191
8.192
IV Resolution Authority over Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loan Banks
A Background
1 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
8.193
8.194
8.195
8.196
2 Federal Home Loan Bank System
8.197
8.198
8.199
8.200
B Resolution Authority
1 Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008
8.201
2 New resolution authority
8.202
8.203
8.204
8.205
8.206
C Exercise of New Resolution Authority
8.207
8.208
D Recent Developments
8.209
8.210
8.211
8.212
8.213
8.214
8.215
V Resolution Authority over Systemically Important Financial Institutions
8.216
8.217
A Orderly Liquidation Authority Framework
8.218
8.219
8.220
8.221
8.222
8.223
8.224
8.225
8.226
B Key Policy Issues
8.227
1 Why not apply the US Bankruptcy Code?
8.228
8.229
8.230
2 The ‘too big to fail’/moral hazard debate
8.231
8.232
8.233
8.234
8.235
3 The proper procedure for handling creditor claims
8.236
8.237
8.238
8.239
8.240
8.241
8.242
8.243
8.244
4 Funding
8.245
8.246
8.247
8.248
8.249
8.250
5 Who should be the resolving agency?
8.251
8.252
8.253
8.254
6 Mandatory rule-making
8.255
8.256
8.257
7 Valuation issues
8.258
8 Practical remedy for minimum recovery rights?
8.259
9 Haircuts on secured claims?
8.260
8.261
10 Extend automatic stay to QFCs
8.262
8.263
8.264
C Single-Point-of-Entry Strategy
8.265
8.266
8.267
8.268
8.269
8.270
8.271
D Resolution Under the US Bankruptcy Code
8.272
1 Existing US Bankruptcy Code
8.273
8.274
2 Proposed new chapter 14
8.275
8.276
8.277
8.278
8.279
3 Proposed new chapter 14 2.0
8.280
8.281
8.282
8.283
8.284
8.285
4 Financial Institutions Bankruptcy Act
8.286
8.287
8.288
8.289
4 Taxpayer Protection and Responsible Resolution Act
8.290
5 National Bankruptcy Conference
8.291
E Resolution Planning
8.292
8.293
8.294
8.295
8.296
8.297
8.298
8.299
8.300
8.301
8.302
VI International Coordination of Cross-Border Resolutions
8.303
8.304
8.305
8.306
8.307
8.308
8.309
8.310
8.311
8.312
8.313
8.314
8.315
8.316
8.317
8.318
8.319
8.320
VII Conclusion
8.321
8.322
9 European Bank Resolution Regime
Preliminary Material
I Introduction
9.01
9.02
9.03
II The Pillars of the Banking Union
9.04
9.05
9.06
9.07
A The Rationale for the BRRD
9.08
9.09
9.10
9.11
9.12
B Recovery and Resolution Plans
9.13
9.14
9.15
9.16
9.17
9.18
9.19
9.20
9.21
9.22
C Resolvability
9.23
9.24
III Early Intervention
9.25
9.26
9.27
9.28
IV Resolution Objectives, Conditions, and Principles
9.29
9.30
9.31
9.32
9.33
9.34
9.35
9.36
9.37
V Resolution Tools
9.38
A The Sale of Business Tool
9.39
B The Bridge Institution Tool
9.40
9.41
C Asset Separation Tool
9.42
D The Bail-in Tool
9.43
9.44
9.45
9.46
9.47
9.48
9.49
9.50
E Government Financial Stabilization Fund
9.51
F Resolution Powers of the Resolution Authority: Administrative and Procedural
9.52
9.53
9.54
9.55
9.56
9.57
1 Goldman Sachs International v Novo Banco SA
9.58
9.59
9.60
9.61
2 Bayerische Landesbank v Hypo Alpe Adria Bank International AG (now HETA Asset Resolution AG)
9.62
9.63
VI Cross-Border Group Resolution
9.64
9.65
9.66
A The Resolution Colleges
9.67
9.68
9.69
9.70
9.71
VII Relations with Third Countries
9.72
9.73
9.74
9.75
9.76
9.77
9.78
VIII The Financing Arrangements
9.79
9.80
9.81
9.82
9.83
9.84
9.85
9.86
9.87
9.88
Part III Sovereign Debt Restructuring
10 An Introduction to Sovereign Debt Restructuring
Preliminary Material
I Introduction
10.01
10.02
10.03
10.04
10.05
10.06
10.07
10.08
10.09
10.10
10.11
10.12
10.13
10.14
10.15
10.16
10.17
10.18
10.19
10.20
10.21
11 Litigation Aspects of Sovereign Debt
Preliminary Material
I Sovereign Debt Litigation
11.01
11.02
11.03
11.04
11.05
11.06
11.07
11.08
11.09
11.10
11.11
11.12
11.13
11.14
11.15
11.16
11.17
11.18
11.19
11.20
11.21
II Legal Precedents
A Cases Being Analysed
11.22
11.23
B Some Preliminary Distinctions: Using a Fiscal Agent and a Trust Structure
11.24
11.25
11.26
11.27
11.28
C The Pari Passu Cases
1 Pravin Banker Associates v Banco Popular del Peru
11.29
11.30
11.31
2 Elliott Associates, LP v Banco de la Nación
11.32
11.33
11.34
11.35
11.36
11.37
11.38
11.39
11.40
11.41
11.42
3 The pari passu clause in sovereign debt instruments
11.43
11.44
11.45
11.46
11.47
11.48
11.49
11.50
11.51
11.52
4 The Red Mountain case (California)
11.53
5 The Kensington International case (England)
11.54
6 The Kensington International II case (against BNP) (New York)
11.55
7 The LNC case (Belgium)
11.56
11.57
11.58
8 A new legislative development to curtail the applicability of the pari passu clause
11.59
11.60
11.61
9 Applestein, Macrotecnic International Corporation and EM Ltd v Argentina
11.62
10 NML Capital Limited (and Others) v Argentina : the latest, and most important, chapter in the pari passu saga
11.63
11.64
11.65
11.66
11.67
11.68
11.69
11.70
11.71
11.72
D The Pari Passu Clause and Multilateral Debt Payments
11.73
11.74
11.75
11.76
E The Attachment of the Tendered Bonds (Future Rights)
1 General aspects
11.77
11.78
11.79
2 Request of attachment
11.80
11.81
11.82
11.83
11.84
11.85
3 Vacatur of the attachment and the restraining notices
11.86
11.87
11.88
11.89
11.90
11.91
11.92
11.93
11.94
11.95
11.96
11.97
11.98
11.99
11.100
11.101
11.102
11.103
(a) Stay order in the vacatur
11.104
11.105
(b) Resolution of the Court of Appeals
11.106
11.107
11.108
11.109
11.110
III Conclusion
11.111
11.112
11.113
12 Transactional Aspects of Sovereign Debt Restructuring
Preliminary Material
I Transactional Aspects of Sovereign Debt Restructuring
A An Introduction to the Transactional Aspects of Sovereign Debt Restructuring
12.01
12.02
12.03
12.04
12.05
12.06
12.07
12.08
B Current Debate on Sovereign Debt Restructuring: Procedures and Methods
12.09
12.10
12.11
12.12
12.13
12.14
12.15
12.16
C The SDRM Proposed by the IMF
12.17
12.18
12.19
12.20
12.21
12.22
12.23
12.24
1 The interaction of the SDRM with other creditors, preferred status of the IMF, and special treatment of HIPCs
12.25
12.26
12.27
12.28
12.29
12.30
12.31
12.32
12.33
12.34
12.35
12.36
12.37
12.38
12.39
12.40
2 Disadvantages of the SDRM
12.41
12.42
12.43
12.44
12.45
12.46
12.47
12.48
12.49
12.50
12.51
12.52
12.53
12.54
3 An alternative SDRM
12.55
(a) UN resolutions
12.56
12.57
12.58
12.59
12.60
12.61
(b) The Iraqi case and the use of UN resolutions
12.62
12.63
12.64
12.65
12.66
12.67
D The ESM: An Institution Designed to Avert Financial Crises
12.68
12.69
12.70
12.71
12.72
1 Initial responses
12.73
12.74
12.75
2 The ESM
12.76
12.77
12.78
12.79
12.80
12.81
12.82
12.83
12.84
12.85
12.86
12.87
12.88
12.89
12.90
12.91
12.92
12.93
12.94
12.95
3 A critical analysis of the ESM
12.96
12.97
12.98
12.99
12.100
4 An ESM add-on
12.101
12.102
12.103
E The Use of CACs, Exit Consent, and Term Enhancements
12.104
1 Collective action clauses
12.105
12.106
12.107
12.108
12.109
12.110
12.111
12.112
12.113
12.114
(a) The expansion in the use of CACs
12.115
12.116
12.117
12.118
12.119
12.120
12.121
12.122
12.123
12.124
12.125
2 The use of exit consents and amendments to the terms of the bonds under New York and English law
12.126
12.127
12.128
12.129
12.130
12.131
12.132
12.133
12.134
3 CACs, exit consents, and term enhancements in practice
12.135
12.136
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F Case Study: Uruguay’s Debt Reprofiling—How to Perform a Successful Exchange Offer
1 Introduction
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2 A success story in debt reprofiling
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(a) ‘Check-the-box’ exit consents
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(b) The use of exit consents to amend the waiver of immunity
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(c) Incorporation of CACs in all the new bonds
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(d) Aggregation
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(e) Vote packing
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(f) Disenfranchisement
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(g) Prohibition of the use of exit consents coercively
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3 Some concluding remarks on Uruguay’s exchange offer
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II Conclusion
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Further Material
Annex
Index
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Table of Legislation
From:
Debt Restructuring (2nd Edition)
Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal, Alan Kornberg, Sarah Paterson, John Douglas, Randall Guynn, Dalvinder Singh
Content type:
Book content
Product:
Financial Law [FBL]
Published in print:
11 August 2016
ISBN:
9780198725244
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34.229.63.28