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Oxford Law Citator
Contents
Expand All
Collapse All
Preliminary Material
Dedication
Author Biography
Foreword
Preface
Acknowledgements
Contents
Table of Cases
Cases by Country
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
France
Germany
Hong Kong
Netherlands
Singapore
South Africa
Sweden
Switzerland
Tunisia
United Kingdom
United States
International Cases
European Union
International Court of Justice
ICSID
NAFTA Binational Panel
NASD
Permanent Court of International Justice
UNCITRAL
UN Human Rights Committee
World Trade Organisation
Main Text
Introduction
A Thesis and themes
1 Background and challenges
2 The need for self-regulation
3 Existing predicates for self-regulation
a Arbitrators
b Counsel
B Terminology
C Methodology
D Overview of the argument
E Conclusion
Part I Mapping the Terrain
1 From an Invisible College to an Ethical No-Man’s Land
1.01
1.02
1.03
1.04
1.05
1.06
1.07
1.08
1.09
1.10
1.11
A The early modern international arbitration system
1.12
1.13
1.14
1.15
1.16
1.17
1.18
1.19
1.20
1.21
1.22
1.23
B Modern international arbitration
1.24
1.25
1.26
1.27
1 Growth and diversification of international arbitration
1.28
1.29
1.30
1.31
1.32
1.33
1.34
2 Formalization and increased transparency
1.35
1.36
1.37
1.38
3 Economic competition in international arbitration
1.39
1.40
1.41
1.42
C Globalization of the legal profession
1.43
1 The rise of the mega law firm
1.44
1.45
1.46
1.47
1.48
2 The mega-firm goes global
1.49
1.50
1.51
1.52
1.53
D Regulation of transnational law practice
1.54
1.55
1.56
1.57
1.58
1 National regulation of transnational legal practice
1.59
1.60
1.61
1.62
1.63
1.64
1.65
1.66
1.67
1.68
2 Efforts at international regulation of transnational legal practice
1.69
1.70
1.71
1.72
E Regulation of attorneys in international arbitration
1.73
1.74
1.75
1.76
1.77
1 Jurisdictions that seek to attract international arbitration
1.78
1.79
1.80
1.81
1.82
1.83
1.84
1.85
1.86
1.87
2 Jurisdictions historically hostile to foreign lawyers in international arbitration
1.88
1.89
1.90
1.91
1.92
1.93
1.94
1.95
3 Demographics in global and international arbitration practice
1.96
1.97
1.98
1.99
1.100
1.101
1.102
1.103
1.104
F Conclusion
1.105
1.106
1.107
1.108
1.109
1.110
2 Arbitrators, Barbers, and Taxidermists
2.01
2.02
2.03
2.04
2.05
2.06
2.07
2.08
2.09
2.10
A Arbitrator selection and the marketplace for arbitrator services
2.11
1 The pool of international arbitrators
2.12
2.13
2.14
2.15
2.16
2.17
2 The field in which international arbitrators operate
2.18
2.19
2.20
2.21
2.22
2.23
3 The selection process
2.24
2.25
2.26
a The procedures for arbitrator selection
2.27
2.28
2.29
2.30
2.31
2.32
2.33
2.34
b Strategic considerations in selecting an arbitrator
2.35
2.36
2.37
2.38
2.39
4 Imperfections in the market for international arbitrators
2.40
2.41
2.42
2.43
2.44
2.45
2.46
2.47
2.48
B Sources of international arbitrators’ ethical duties
2.49
2.50
2.51
1 Arbitral institutions and rules
2.52
2.53
2.54
2.55
2.56
2.57
2.58
2.59
2.60
2.61
2.62
2.63
2.64
2.65
2.66
2.67
2.68
2.69
2.70
2.71
2.72
2.73
2.74
2.75
2.76
2.77
2.78
2 Codes of ethics
2.79
2.80
2.81
2.82
2.83
2.84
2.85
2.86
2.87
3 National law and national courts
2.88
2.89
4 International conventions
2.90
2.91
5 National bar associations
2.92
2.93
2.94
2.95
6 Liability standards
2.96
2.97
2.98
2.99
2.100
C International arbitrators’ substantive ethical obligations
2.101
1 The obligation of impartiality and independence
2.102
a ‘Independence’ versus ‘impartiality’ versus ‘neutrality’
2.103
2.104
2.105
2.106
2.107
b The duty to disclose
2.108
2.109
2.110
2.111
2.112
2.113
2.114
c The duty to investigate
2.115
d Nationality and other group affiliations
2.116
2.117
2.118
2.119
2 Other ethical obligations
2.120
a Obligation to conduct arbitration in accordance with the arbitration agreement
2.121
2.122
2.123
b Obligations of competence and diligence
2.124
c Obligation of confidentiality
2.125
2.126
2.127
d Obligation to propose (or not to propose) settlement
2.128
e Obligations in light of criminal misconduct
2.129
D Conclusion
2.130
2.131
3 Attorneys, Barbarians, and Guerrillas
3.01
3.02
3.03
3.04
3.05
3.06
3.07
3.08
3.09
A Counsel ethics in international arbitration proceedings
3.10
1 A-national legal ethics?
3.11
3.12
3.13
3.14
3.15
3.16
3.17
2 The effect of a-national ethical rules in arbitral proceedings
3.18
3.19
3.20
3.21
3.22
3.23
3.24
3.25
3.26
3.27
3.28
3.29
B National differences in ethical rules
3.30
3.31
1 Witness communication, improper influence, and perjury
3.32
3.33
a Subterranean conflicts
3.34
3.35
b An elusive international consensus
3.36
3.37
3.38
c Choice-of-law
3.39
3.40
3.41
3.42
3.43
3.44
3.45
3.46
3.47
2 Information disclosure and document exchange
3.48
3.49
3.50
3.51
3.52
3.53
3.54
3 Conflicts of interest
3.55
3.56
3.57
3.58
3.59
3.60
3.61
3.62
3.63
4 Confidentiality and attorney-client privilege
3.64
3.65
3.66
3.67
3.68
3.69
5 Ex parte communications
3.70
3.71
3.72
6 Creativity, aggression, and bad manners
3.73
3.74
3.75
3.76
3.77
3.78
7 Attorney fees
3.79
3.80
3.81
3.82
3.83
C Internationalization and enforcement
3.84
1 Existing international standards
3.85
3.86
3.87
3.88
3.89
3.90
3.91
3.92
2 Enforcement
3.93
3.94
3.95
3.96
3.97
3.98
D Conclusion
3.99
3.100
3.101
3.102
3.103
4 Experts, Partisans, and Hired Guns
4.01
4.02
4.03
4.04
4.05
4.06
4.07
A Comparative differences in expert witnessing
4.08
1 National differences in expert witnessing
4.09
4.10
4.11
4.12
4.13
4.14
4.15
4.16
2 Criticisms and exceptions
4.17
a The United States
4.18
4.19
4.20
4.21
4.22
4.23
4.24
4.25
b England, Australia, and Canada
4.26
4.27
4.28
4.29
4.30
c Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands
4.31
4.32
4.33
4.34
4.35
4.36
4.37
4.38
d Expert mechanisms in public international tribunals
4.39
4.40
4.41
4.42
4.43
4.44
4.45
4.46
B Expert witnesses in international arbitration
4.47
4.48
4.49
4.50
4.51
4.52
4.53
1 Expert witness traditions and innovations
4.54
4.55
4.56
4.57
4.58
2 Efforts to clarify standards for expert ethics
4.59
4.60
a Disclosure obligations under the IBA evidence rules
4.61
4.62
4.63
4.64
b Obligation of independence
4.65
4.66
4.67
4.68
4.69
4.70
3 Proposals for expert witness ‘oaths’
4.71
4.72
4.73
4.74
4.75
4.76
4.77
4.78
4.79
4.80
4.81
C Procedural reforms and the panda’s thumb
4.82
4.83
4.84
4.85
4.86
4.87
4.88
1 Clearer role definition
4.89
4.90
4.91
4.92
4.93
4.94
2 Oaths and certifications for experts
4.95
4.96
4.97
4.98
4.99
4.100
4.101
4.102
4.103
D Conclusion
4.104
4.105
4.106
5 Gamblers, Loan Sharks, and Third-Party Funders
5.01
5.02
5.03
5.04
5.05
5.06
5.07
5.08
5.09
5.10
5.11
5.12
5.13
5.14
5.15
5.16
5.17
A Definitions and mechanics
5.18
5.19
1 Definitions
5.20
5.21
5.22
5.23
5.24
5.25
5.26
2 Mechanics
5.27
5.28
5.29
5.30
5.31
5.32
5.33
5.34
5.35
B Funders and other participants in international arbitration
5.36
1 The funder and the party
5.37
a National law limitations on funding agreements
5.38
5.39
5.40
5.41
5.42
b National limitations in international arbitration
5.43
5.44
5.45
5.46
5.47
5.48
5.49
5.50
5.51
5.52
5.53
5.54
5.55
5.56
2 The funder and counsel
5.57
a Independence
5.58
5.59
5.60
5.61
5.62
b Fee-splitting
5.63
5.64
c Attorney-client confidences
5.65
5.66
5.67
5.68
d Funders and attorneys in international arbitration
5.69
5.70
3 The funder and arbitrators
5.71
a Potential conflicts and the inadequacy of current rules
5.72
5.73
5.74
5.75
5.76
5.77
5.78
5.79
5.80
5.81
5.82
b Analysing potential funder-arbitrator conflicts
5.83
5.84
5.85
c Funders as outside investors?
5.86
5.87
i The concentration effect
5.88
5.89
5.90
5.91
5.92
5.93
5.94
ii Corporate governance constraints
5.95
5.96
5.97
iii The implications of intentionality
5.98
5.99
5.100
5.101
d Purposeful analysis of conflicts
5.102
5.103
5.104
5.105
5.106
C Regulation of third-party funding in international arbitration
5.107
5.108
1 Regulation of funders by funders
5.109
5.110
5.111
5.112
5.113
5.114
5.115
5.116
5.117
5.118
2 Challenges in regulating third-party funders in international arbitration
5.119
5.120
5.121
5.122
5.123
5.124
5.125
5.126
5.127
5.128
5.129
5.130
5.131
D Conclusion
5.132
5.133
5.134
5.135
5.136
5.137
5.138
Part II Staking Out Theoretical Boundaries and Building the Regime
6 Chanticleer, the Fox, and Self-Regulation
6.01
6.02
6.03
6.04
6.05
6.06
6.07
6.08
6.09
A Defining self-regulation
6.10
6.11
1 The meaning of ‘regulation’
6.12
6.13
6.14
6.15
6.16
6.17
6.18
6.19
6.20
6.21
6.22
6.23
6.24
6.25
6.26
6.27
6.28
6.29
6.30
2 Self-regulation and professionalism
6.31
6.32
6.33
6.34
6.35
6.36
6.37
6.38
6.39
6.40
6.41
6.42
6.43
B Self-regulation in international arbitration
6.44
1 International arbitration as a self-regulatory regime
6.45
6.46
6.47
6.48
6.49
6.50
6.51
6.52
6.53
6.54
6.55
6.56
6.57
2 Arbitrator regulation as a model of professional self-regulation
6.58
6.59
a The content of arbitrators’ impartiality obligations
6.60
i The duty to disclose
6.61
6.62
6.63
6.64
6.65
6.66
6.67
6.68
6.69
6.70
6.71
6.72
6.73
6.74
6.75
6.76
6.77
6.78
6.79
6.80
6.81
6.82
6.83
ii The duty to investigate
6.84
6.85
6.86
6.87
6.88
b Enforcement
6.89
i Selection and challenge procedures
6.90
6.91
6.92
6.93
6.94
6.95
6.96
ii Control over compensation and ad hoc regulatory functions
6.97
6.98
6.99
6.100
6.101
6.102
6.103
6.104
6.105
6.106
6.107
iii Arbitrator certification or licensure
6.108
6.109
6.110
6.111
c National alternatives
6.112
6.113
6.114
6.115
6.116
3 Self-regulation of counsel in international arbitration
6.117
6.118
6.119
a National versus international regulation of attorneys
6.120
6.121
6.122
6.123
6.124
6.125
6.126
6.127
b Precursors to ethical regulation
6.128
6.129
6.130
6.131
6.132
6.133
6.134
6.135
6.136
c Developing substantive standards
6.137
6.138
6.139
6.140
6.141
6.142
d Developing enforcement mechanisms
6.143
6.144
6.145
6.146
i Formal tribunal powers
6.147
6.148
6.149
6.150
6.151
6.152
6.153
6.154
6.155
6.156
6.157
6.158
ii Fully operational self-regulation of counsel
6.159
6.160
6.161
6.162
6.163
6.164
6.165
C Conclusion
6.166
6.167
6.168
6.169
6.170
7 Ariadne’s Thread and the Functional Thesis
7.01
7.02
7.03
7.04
7.05
7.06
A A theory of professional ethics
7.07
7.08
7.09
7.10
7.11
7.12
1 Determining professional roles
7.13
7.14
7.15
7.16
7.17
7.18
7.19
7.20
7.21
7.22
2 The role of adjudicators
7.23
7.24
7.25
7.26
7.27
7.28
7.29
7.30
7.31
7.32
3 Defining the advocate’s role
7.33
7.34
7.35
4 The Functional Thesis in comparative perspective
7.36
a Role and ethics in the civil law ideal type
7.37
7.38
7.39
7.40
7.41
7.42
7.43
7.44
7.45
7.46
7.47
b Role and ethics in the US model
7.48
7.49
7.50
7.51
7.52
7.53
7.54
7.55
7.56
7.57
c Ethical obligations in comparative perspective
7.58
7.59
7.60
7.61
7.62
7.63
7.64
7.65
B The Functional Thesis as a prescriptive tool
7.66
1 The Functional Thesis in international arbitration
7.67
7.68
7.69
7.70
a The normative goals of international arbitration
7.71
7.72
7.73
7.74
7.75
7.76
b Applying the Functional Thesis
7.77
7.78
7.79
7.80
7.81
7.82
7.83
7.84
7.85
i The Functional Thesis and party-appointed arbitrators
7.86
7.87
7.88
7.89
7.90
7.91
ii The Functional Thesis and the ethics of dissenting opinons
7.92
7.93
7.94
7.95
7.96
7.97
7.98
7.99
C Conclusion
7.100
7.101
7.102
7.103
7.104
7.105
8 Herodotian Myths and the Impartiality of Arbitrators
8.01
8.02
8.03
8.04
A The myth of the ‘non-humanness of judges’
8.05
8.06
8.07
8.08
8.09
8.10
8.11
8.12
8.13
B The new role and new ethics of investment arbitrators
8.14
8.15
1 Transparency reforms and the precedential effect of awards
8.16
8.17
8.18
2 Role switching and issue conflict
8.19
8.20
8.21
8.22
a Role switching
8.23
8.24
8.25
8.26
8.27
8.28
8.29
b Issue conflict
8.30
8.31
8.32
8.33
8.34
8.35
8.36
C Impartiality obligations of party-appointed arbitrators
8.37
8.38
8.39
8.40
8.41
8.42
8.43
8.44
8.45
8.46
8.47
8.48
8.49
8.50
1 The affirmative case for party-appointed arbitrators
8.51
8.52
a Groupthink
8.53
8.54
8.55
8.56
b Party-appointed devil’s advocates
8.57
8.58
8.59
8.60
8.61
c Party-appointed arbitrators and dissenting opinions
8.62
8.63
8.64
8.65
8.66
8.67
8.68
8.69
2 The impartiality of party-appointed arbitrators
8.70
8.71
8.72
8.73
8.74
8.75
8.76
D Reforming and refining the selection process
8.77
1 Procedural asymmetries
8.78
8.79
8.80
8.81
8.82
8.83
2 Information asymmetries
8.84
8.85
8.86
8.87
8.88
8.89
8.90
8.91
8.92
8.93
3 A market-based solution to a market problem
8.94
8.95
8.96
8.97
8.98
8.99
8.100
8.101
8.102
8.103
8.104
8.105
8.106
8.107
E Conclusion
8.108
8.109
9 Duck-Rabbits, a Panel of Monkeys, and the Status of International Arbitrators
9.01
9.02
A Competing models of international arbitration
9.03
1 The adjudicatory model of arbitration
9.04
9.05
9.06
9.07
9.08
9.09
2 The contract vision of arbitration
9.10
9.11
9.12
9.13
9.14
9.15
9.16
9.17
B Squinting hard to see arbitrators’ duality
9.18
1 The duality of arbitrators’ status
9.19
9.20
9.21
9.22
9.23
9.24
2 Limitations on contracting for adjudication
9.25
9.26
9.27
9.28
9.29
9.30
9.31
9.32
9.33
9.34
9.35
3 Arbitrator immunity
9.36
9.37
9.38
9.39
9.40
9.41
9.42
9.43
4 Decision-making autonomy
9.44
9.45
9.46
9.47
9.48
9.49
9.50
9.51
9.52
9.53
5 Private arbitrators, public goods, and club goods
9.54
9.55
9.56
9.57
9.58
9.59
9.60
9.61
9.62
9.63
9.64
9.65
9.66
9.67
C Conclusion
9.68
9.69
10 Castles in the Air and the Future of Ethics in International Arbitration
10.01
10.02
A The future of international arbitration
10.03
10.04
10.05
10.06
10.07
10.08
10.09
B The future of ethics in international arbitration
10.10
10.11
10.12
The immediate challenge of counsel regulation
10.13
10.14
10.15
10.16
10.17
10.18
10.19
10.20
10.21
10.22
10.23
10.24
10.25
10.26
10.27
10.28
C The future of ethical self-regulation
10.29
10.30
10.31
10.32
10.33
10.34
10.35
Further Material
Index
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Table of Cases
From:
Ethics in International Arbitration
Catherine A. Rogers
Content type:
Book content
Product:
International Commercial Arbitration [ICMA]
Published in print:
01 September 2014
ISBN:
9780198713203
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