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Part IV Legal Aspects of Central Banking and Banking Regulation and Supervision, 17 Independence and Accountability of Central Banking

Jean-Victor Louis

From: International Monetary and Banking Law post COVID-19

Edited By: William Blair, Christos Gortsos, Chiara Zilioli

From: Oxford Legal Research Library (http://olrl.ouplaw.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2023. All Rights Reserved.date: 19 April 2024

Subject(s):
Financial regulation — International monetary conduct — Monetary system — European Central Bank — Federal Reserve System (‘Fed’)

This chapter covers the independence and accountability of central banking. It recognizes the European Central Bank (ECB) as the most independent central bank in the world because the provision of independence is protected by the organic law, that is included in the EU Treaty, and is only revisable by the unanimity of the concluding parties. According to Mario Draghi in 2018, Central Bank independence primarily correlates to the relationship between monetary and fiscal policy. The chapter then elaborates on populism influencing the political regimes and central banks in democratic and authoritarian states. It mentions how populism as development plays a significant role in the contestation of independence.

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